Standing out in the crowd: The effect of information clutter on consumer attention for front-of-pack nutrition labels

Whether and how information density on front-of-pack design affects consumers’ attention for nutrition labels is explored. The main manipulation concerned the number and type of nutrition labels (directive-, semi-, and non-directive), chromaticity (monochrome vs. traffic light color-coded scheme); number and type of additional design elements; and the distance between the label and additional design elements. Attention was measured by performance in visual search task. Performance was slower with increasing number of additional design elements, and when the label appeared in a dense rather than non-dense area. These effects were modulated by label type and chromaticity. The results show that information density is a key factor for consumer attention to (nutrition) information. Implications for policy makers and food producers who want to optimize package design layout and thus help consumers easily to find nutrition information displayed front of the pack are discussed.     

Food product composition,consumer health,and public policy: Introduction and overview of special section

As efforts to improve diets in high income countries intensify, attention has turned to how policies may influence diet composition. The case studies in this special issue contribute to our understanding of how two main types of policies have influenced food product composition and dietary outcomes: (1) policies affecting food manufacturers’ input costs and (2) information policy affecting competition. Research on the first type of policy is relatively new, but suggests that US commodity policies would not be good policy instruments to influence diets, except through the long run impacts of agricultural research. Research on the impacts of information policy continues to demonstrate that it can spur food industry competition to introduce healthier products, but may not result in healthier diets. International comparisons show where the US experience may have relevance for other high income countries.     

Willingness-to-pay for natural,organic, and conventional foods: The effects of information and meaningful labels

Vague food labels and distorted product claims have persisted in the “natural” food industry, while organic claims can be certified by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Using experimental methods and a sample of randomly selected subjects, we test food label and information treatment effects on subjects' willingness-to-pay (WTP) for organic, “natural,” and conventional foods. Random nth-price auctions are used to elicit WTP after subjects received one of five randomly assigned information treatments. We find large information effects, including asymmetric cross-market effects for natural and organic foods. Perhaps surprising is that organic premiums increase in response to subjects seeing the “natural” foods industry's perspective on its products. Demographics effects are also important. The results have practical implications for natural and organic food marketing and valuing products where there are vague claims about their attributes.     

Electronic reverse auctions: Promises, risks and conditions for success

Because reverse auctions hold high promises, it has become a popular tool in the past several years. One estimate is that as much as US$50 billion worth of goods may be purchased with reverse auctions in 2001. However, risks exist with reverse auctions. To better understand purchasers' motivation for using reverse auctions, what they perceive as the risks and the conditions required for successful use, interviews were conducted with 41 purchasing professionals who had used reverse auctions. The interviews revealed three primary motivations, three perceived risks and four conditions for success. The conditions required for success are: (1) the product or service specifications must be clear and comprehensive, (2) the purchase must be large enough to provide an incentive for the supplier to participate in the auction, (3) the appropriate supply market conditions must exist, and (4) the appropriate infrastructure must exist within the buying organization.