股权结构与内部控制质量的相关性研究

本文选取2011年A股上市公司为样本,以深圳迪博内部控制指数量化企业内部控制质量,将股权集中度、股权性质、机构持股比例、高管持股比例作为股权结构的表征变量.通过理论与实证分析相结合,研究股权结构与内部控制质量的相关关系.研究结果表明,不同的股权结构会影响内部控制有效性.     

股权结构对公司业绩的影响:假定与实证

在提出股权结构与公司业绩关系的若干假定的基础上,采用实证研究的方法得出我国上市公司股权集中度与公司业绩的关系结论为:在国有控股型公司中,二者呈显著负相关关系;在法人控股公司中,二者没有显著相关关系;在股权相对分散的公司中,二者呈显著正相关关系.因此,相对于股权高度集中于国有股或法人股的股权结构而言,股权相对分散,同时允许少数几个持股比例相差不大的大股东存在的股权结构有利于提高上市公司的业绩.     

股权集中度、股权制衡与公司绩效关系的实证研究——基于2009年中小板上市公司的经验数据

本文以中小板上市公司公开信息为为依据,基于2009年的样本数据,从股权集中度和股权制衡两个方面,对我国中小板上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的关系进行了实证分析,在公司绩效的评价上也是从盈利能力、成长性能力、股本扩张能力以及市场价值这四个方面进行综合考量。研究结果显示,前五大股东的持股比例对公司绩效的提升呈显著正相关;控股股东的持股比例与公司绩效的关系不显著;股权制衡对公司绩效的影响是不确定的,这说明当股权适度集中在几个大股东手里时是有利于公司股权结构的完善及绩效的提升,而控股股东绝对控股程度的提升却不一定能达到正向的效果,股权制衡也不是影响公司绩效的主因。     

采掘业上市公司股权结构与经营绩效的相关性研究

本文以我国采掘业上市公司为样本,分析了采掘业上市公司股权结构与经营绩效的相关性。研究发现:采掘业上市公司股权集中度与经营绩效呈倒U型关系,股权制衡度对经营绩效无影响,机构投资者持股比例与经营绩效呈弱正相关性。最后基于实证结果提出了优化采掘业上市公司股权结构的相关建议。     

我国零售行业上市公司股权结构与业绩关系的实证分析

本文对2008年至2011年期间沪深两市零售行业76家上市公司为样本,对股权结构与公司业绩之间的关系进行实证分析。将股权结构划分为股权集中度、管理层持股比例和实际控制人股权性质这三个维度,公司的业绩使用总资产收益率进行衡量,使用最小二乘法和面板数据分析技术对假设进行检验。实证结果表明,在零售行业,股权集中度与公司业绩之间呈U形关系,管理层持股与公司业绩之间没有关联关系,个人股与公司业绩之间呈正相关关系。     

浅议创业板上市公司股权结构与企业经营绩效关系

本文通过建立多元线性回归模型,对创业板上市公司股权结构与企业经营绩效的关系进行研究。实证结果发现:第一大股东持股比例与企业的经营绩效具有弱的正相关关系;提高股权制衡度有利于提高企业的经营绩效;增加管理层的持股比例能够提高企业的经营绩效。     

中小板上市公司股权结构对融资偏好的影响研究

本文从代理成本和控制权收益角度分析了股权结构对融资偏好的影响,以2006年年底之前在中小企业板上市的102家公司2007至2009年的数据为样本进行了实证分析。研究结果表明,不同类型的股权结构对公司融资偏好的影响有着很大差异。法人股比例与股权融资率显著正相关,限售自然人持股比例和股权融资率呈负相关关系,国有股、高管持股比例、股权集中度、股权制衡度则对股权融资率影响不显著。中小板上市公司并未表现出主板上市公司＂偏好股权融资＂的特征,但高管持股比例过低、一股独大是中小板与主板上市公司的共性。我国中小板上市公司的高管持股比例需要提高,股权激励制度仍需进一步完善,股权集中度和股权制衡度应适度提高。     

股权分置改革下股权结构变化与信息披露质量——基于厦门上市公司的实证研究

本文以厦门市上市公司作为研究样本,选取2004年-2008年的样本数据,分别从第一大股东持股比例、前五大股东持股比例、第一大股东与第二大股东持股比例之比、前五大股东持股比例平方和等方面来对股权结构与信息披露质量进行相关分析。研究结论是:股权集中度与信息披露质量显著正相关。     

上市公司股权结构与现金持有水平关系的实证分析

从公司治理视角出发,以中国上市公司为样本,对股权结构与企业现金持有决策关系进行了理论与实证分析.结果表明,经理人员持股比例、流通A股比例与企业现金持有水平显著正相关;法人股比例、股权集中度与企业现金持有水平显著负相关;第一大股东持股比例与企业现金持有水平正相关,但不显著;国有股比例与企业现金持有水平负相关,但极不显著.     

我国中小银行股权结构对其风险承担的影响研究 ——基于95家城商行面板数据分析

本文以2011-2019年间95家城商行为研究对象,利用双向固定效应模型研究中小银行股权结构对其风险承担水平的影响,并探究银行对外开放程度与区域经营环境对其股权结构与风险承担关系的调节作用。实证结果表明:中小银行股权集中度同银行风险呈显著正相关,但股权制衡度与银行风险呈显著负相关;中小银行对外开放削弱了股权集中度对其风险承担的正向影响;中小银行优越的区域经营环境对股权集中度与风险承担关系、股权制衡度与风险承担关系均起到负向调节作用。本文提出中小银行应规范股东行为,优化股权结构,提升治理水平;加大对外开放力度,同时注意中小银行外资持股比例上限放开所带来的风险;谨防经济发达地区中小银行大股东“道德风险”、加大经济非发达地区中小银行优质战略投资者引入。     

大股东制衡机制对审计约束有效性的影响

在内部治理机制亟待完善、外部审计约束乏力的情况下,集中持股、具有绝对信息优势的第一大股东(基本为非流通股)不仅有动机也有能力粉饰甚至虚构财务报表,掩盖实际存在的问题,避开外部审计约束；而此时,其他大股东很有可能不选择通过内部治理机制实施对第一大股东的制衡,而是更多地求助于外部治理机制,利用自身的信息优势与外部审计者合作,降低信息不对称性,配合注册会计师审计、发现控股股东的财务粉饰和造假行为,提高外部审计约束的有效性。此外,持股比例和制衡能力的消长以及对成本和收益的权衡。使得大股东持股比例、大股东制衡度和上市公司年报被出具非标准审计意见的可能性之间表现为正“U”形关系。     

对价和信息不对称在股权分置改革中对投票结果的影响

本文总结分析了中国股权分置改革中投票机制的特征,并研究了对价水平、信息不对称等影响投票结果的因素。研究发现,分组投票的机制和流通股股东的理性有效制约了占多数投票权的非流通股股东,并保障了对价方案总体处于双方认为合理的水平。数据显示,流通股的投票率只有33%,而非流通股的投票率将近其三倍;双方的支持率则比较接近,且都处于较高水平。结果表明,对价水平较低的提案能引起流通股较高的投票率;同时伴随着流通股较低的支持率和较高的反对率。此外,流通股股东和非流通股股东之间信息不对称程度的改善能有效增加具有信息劣势的流通股股东投票率,并促使股东双方在对价提案的意见上取得一致,从而得到较高的支持率和较低的反对率。     

The impact of state ownership on share price informativeness: The case of the Split Share Structure Reform in China

This study examines the impact of state ownership on share price informativeness using the unique setting of the Split Share Structure Reform in China. This reform abolishes the trading restriction on shares held mainly by state shareholders. In doing so, it renders state shareholders' wealth more sensitive to share price movements and decreases their conflict of interests with private shareholders. This change is expected to strengthen the corporate governance incentives of state shareholders and reduce the information asymmetry in Chinese listed firms. This prediction is confirmed through empirical evidence of increased share price informativeness among firms that are more sensitive to the impact of this reform, i.e. those with more state ownership or restricted shares. These findings imply that this reform benefits the information environment and minority shareholders in the Chinese stock market.     

Foreign competition for shares and the pricing of information asymmetry: Evidence from equity market liberalization

Using the equity market liberalization of 23 emerging market countries between 1996 and 2006, we examine how the degree of competition for a firm's shares affects the price of information asymmetry. We find evidence of a significant decline in the pricing of information asymmetry as countries remove regulatory restrictions on foreign ownership. Our study provides novel evidence on the link between the degree of competitiveness of equity markets and the price of information asymmetry. The work also furthers our understanding of the economic consequences of foreign stock ownership.     

Do Shareholder Tender Agreements inform or expropriate shareholders?

By signing a Shareholder Tender Agreement (STA) a shareholder pre-commits to tender her shares to a particular bidder, forsaking the right to tender to any subsequent bidder. In a representative sample of tender offers between 1995 and 2010, 60% of the offers contain an STA. STA deals are associated with lower premiums, greater ownership concentration, greater management ownership, and greater information asymmetry. The results support the hypothesis that STAs certify value to uninformed shareholders, thereby increasing the efficiency of the tender offer process. The evidence does not support the view that STAs expropriate value from shareholders of target companies.     

Non-controlling large shareholders in emerging markets: Evidence from China

Non-controlling large shareholders play an important role in corporate governance in emerging markets where controlling shareholder expropriation is a major concern. We argue that non-controlling large shareholders are faced with two non-conflicting incentives: to take advantage of their information advantage and obtain positive abnormal returns when they trade company shares, and to serve as effective monitors and minimize controlling shareholders' appropriation of company wealth. Using a sample of large shareholders' selling events upon the expiration of the lockup period following the split-share structure reform in China, we find that non-controlling large shareholders successfully time the market, as shown by their positive abnormal returns when selling their shares. Their returns are higher if they have a greater information advantage. Furthermore, the positive returns of the controlling large shareholder are negatively related to non-controlling large shareholders' ownership, suggesting that non-controlling large shareholders play a monitoring role and prevent controlling shareholders from looting the company. We also show that large shareholders affiliated with the controlling shareholders are not subject to as high a level of monitoring as those controlling shareholders are. Furthermore, both firm opaqueness and the severity of agency cost affect the quality of non-controlling large shareholders' monitoring.     

Do bond rating changes affect the information asymmetry of stock trading?

Using a sample of 279 upgrades and 310 downgrades from 1996 to 2004, we find that bond rating changes affect the information asymmetry of stock trading and other measures of information risk. Specifically, when a firm's bond rating is upgraded, its stock information asymmetry and its analysts' earnings forecast dispersion are significantly reduced, while the institutional equity holdings of its shares are significantly increased. The reverse is true for a downgrade. In addition, the degree of change in stock information asymmetry is positively associated with the magnitude of the bond rating changes.     

全流通背景下大股东交易与市场效率研究——基于信息优势的视角

全流通背景下大股东交易问题日益成为关注的焦点。以2007年至2010年A股市场大股东交易作为研究对象,验证了不同类型大股东交易利用信息优势程度及其对市场效率的影响。研究表明控股股东具有明显信息优势,其交易行为具有信息传递功能,可以缓解与外部投资者之间的信息不对称,同时控股股东的逆向投资也一定程度上能够提高股票市场定价功能;而非控股股东信息优势不明显,其交易行为更多地受市场波动性影响,对市场稳定性的冲击较大。     

Share repurchases and institutional supply

Consistent with the predictions of Brennan and Thakor's (1990) model of shareholder preferences, we find that, on average, institutional shareholders are net sellers during share repurchases. After controlling for liquidity provision and characteristics investing, we find that a one standard deviation increase in share repurchases during a given quarter is associated with a 0.11 standard deviation decrease in institutional investor demand. We estimate that 37% of the inverse relation is attributed to institutional investors executing liquidity provision strategies, 8% is explained by institutions reacting to the investment characteristics signaled by a repurchasing firm. We attribute the majority, 55%, to the information asymmetry between institutions and individual investors. This work is one of the first to exploit the SEC mandate requiring firms to report the actual number of shares they repurchase each quarter, beginning in 2004. Using actual number of shares repurchased, we find evidence of institutional investors increasing their selling as firms increase their repurchasing. This finding is robust to models of endogeneity and autocorrelation in share repurchases and institutional investor trading.     

Corporate governance and market segmentation: evidence from the price difference between Chinese A and H shares

This paper empirically examines whether the price difference between Chinese A shares, which are traded in the domestic market, and their matching H shares, which are traded in the Hong Kong market, can be explained by firms’ corporate governance characteristics. We find that the A- to H-share price premiums are higher for firms in which the controlling shareholders and corporate insiders have greater potential to expropriate wealth from outside investors. This result is robust when we use a variety of corporate governance variables specific to listed Chinese companies to explain the A-share price premiums and when we control for differences between domestic and foreign investors in required returns, degree of speculative trading, liquidity, information, and demand elasticity. Our findings highlight the important role of corporate governance in explaining the price difference in segmented stock markets.