Automatic bankruptcy auctions and fire-sales

We test for fire-sale tendencies in automatic bankruptcy auctions. We find evidence consistent with fire-sale discounts when the auction leads to piecemeal liquidation, but not when the bankrupt firm is acquired as a going concern. Neither industry-wide distress nor the industry affiliation of the buyer affect prices in going-concern sales. Bids are often structured as leveraged buyouts, which relaxes liquidity constraints and reduces bidder underinvestment incentives in the presence of debt overhang. Prices in “prepack” auctions (sales agreements negotiated prior to bankruptcy filing) are on average lower than for in-auction going-concern sales, suggesting that prepacks may help preempt excessive liquidation when the auction is expected to be illiquid. Prepack targets have a greater industry-adjusted probability of refiling for bankruptcy, indicating that liquidation preemption is a risky strategy.     

Hedging,financing, and investment decisions: Theory and empirical tests

In this paper we theoretically and empirically examine the interaction between hedging, financing, and investment decisions. A simple equilibrium model with costly financial distress suggests that as firms become more efficient at risky investments vis a vis low risk investments, they will borrow less, invest more in risky assets, and hedge more. The model also predicts a positive relationship between hedging and leverage – a result consistent with debt capacity arguments. We test the model empirically using a simultaneous equations framework to investigate the determinants of firm-level hedging, financing and investing decisions. The results strongly support the hypothesis that the hedging, financing and investment decisions are jointly determined. In addition, we find strong support for the central hypothesis that firms more efficient investing in risky technologies more aggressively hedge and use less debt financing in order to maximize their comparative advantage.     

破产融资中政府的导向功用

本文对美、德、法、中四国部分企业的破产保护、破产融资事件进行了总结和对比,分析了政府的行政调控职能在破产法律事务中的导向功能.     

企业上市要提前考虑好种种弊端

企业上市有种种好处,但是,也有种种弊端,如财务要公开,不能一个人说了算,花钱的地方也多了     

Collusion in uniform-price auctions: experimental evidence and implication for treasury auctions

We provide experimental evidence that nonbinding preplay communicationbetween bidders in auctions of shares facilitates the adoptionof equilibrium strategies: collusive strategies in uniform-priceauctions, and the unique equilibrium in undominated strategiesin discriminatory auctions. When communication between biddersis introduced, clearing prices and auctioneer profits in uniform-priceauctions fall below those observed in discriminatory auctions.This evidence suggests that uniform-price auctions of Treasurysecurities may result in lower revenues than the currently employeddiscriminatory procedure.     

Creditor Learning and Discrimination in Lending

I study the implications of creditor learning for the estimated racial disparity in access to credit. Utilizing a dataset of mortgage lending, I find that the estimated racial disparity in loan approval rates declines with the length of the borrower??s credit history. In addition, minority borrowers improve significantly their chances of obtaining a loan by accumulating longer credit histories, with the improvements being the largest for those with no credit history. Importantly, I find no significant racial disparity among borrowers with long credit histories, suggesting that one cannot reject the null hypothesis of no taste-based discrimination taking place. I also conduct a number of tests to detect statistical discrimination, which yield inconclusive results.     

中国第一破产案:广东国投破产案

今年2月,广东省高级人民法院宣布,号称“中国第一破产案”的广东国际信托投资公司破产案终结破产程序。“广东国投”破产案涉及十个中国第一;财产标的第一;涉外债权第一;单笔破产财产拍卖价的最高纪录;首设债权人主席委员会;第一个聘请境外中介机构;第一例全国法院予以配合支持审理的破产案件;第一例中国法院关于破产的裁定在境外得到承认的破产案等等,它留给我们许多思考和启示。请看     

Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects

In 2007, countries in the euro zone periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and low spreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising their deficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and, surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocated from the private sector to the public sector, reducing investment and deepening the recessions even further. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debt can be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereign debt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This provides incentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowing is limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productive investment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead to self-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countries in the euro zone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level.     

Investment opportunities and bankruptcy prediction

A firm's mix of growth options and assets in place is an important determinant of its optimal default strategy. Our simple model shows that shareholders of a firm with valuable investment opportunities would be able/willing to wait longer before defaulting on their contractual debt obligations than shareholders of an otherwise identical firm without such opportunities. More importantly, we show empirically using a dataset of recent corporate bankruptcies that measures of investment opportunities are significantly related to the likelihood of bankruptcy. Augmenting existing bankruptcy prediction models by these measures improves their out-of-sample forecasting ability.     

Revenue and optimality in unequal-sized share auctions

This paper analyzes unequal-sized share auctions with symmetric private-value buyers. The property that each buyer can win at most one unit, but variable-sized, makes share auctions situated between single-unit auctions and multiunit auctions. We calculate revenue and optimality of efficient share auctions and discuss how the optimal reserve valuation varies according to risk attitude towards share size.     

IPO auctions and private information

IPO auctions, which provide an impartial way of determining IPO pricing and share allocations, offer a natural setting for examining whether institutional investors possess private information, and for measuring how valuable their information is. Analyzing detailed bidding data from Taiwan’s discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions, we find that, relative to retail investors, institutional investors tend to bid higher in auctions when IPO shares are more valuable, and that underpricing is larger in auctions with relatively higher institutional bids. These results imply that institutional investors are better informed about IPO value, and that they obtain higher information rents when they bid higher relative to retail investors. We estimate the value of institutional investors’ private information to be worth about 8.68% of return, which is the extra rate of return they command on their informational advantages over retail investors.     

Variable selection and corporate bankruptcy forecasts

We investigate the relative importance of various bankruptcy predictors commonly used in the existing literature by applying a variable selection technique, the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO), to a comprehensive bankruptcy database. Over the 1980–2009 period, LASSO admits the majority of Campbell et al. (2008) predictive variables into the bankruptcy forecast model. Interestingly, by contrast with recent studies, some financial ratios constructed from only accounting data also contain significant incremental information about future default risk, and their importance relative to that of market-based variables in bankruptcy forecasts increases with prediction horizons. Moreover, LASSO-selected variables have superior out-of-sample predictive power and outperform (1) those advocated by Campbell et al. (2008) and (2) the distance to default from Merton’s (1974) structural model.     

Real estate auctions: A survey of theory and practice

Recent downturns in real estate markets combined with a general acceptance of auctions have resulted in an unprecedented number of auction sales. A need therefore exists for the further development of real estate auction models that can provide insights into this emerging market institution. To facilitate this task a survey of auction theory as pertaining to its application in real estate markets is provided in this paper. Topics addressed includes bidding equilibria, the role of reserve prices, information disclosure, the decision to use auctions, bidder participation, and multiple-object sales. An overview of empirical studies in this area is also provided.     

The timing of financing decisions: An examination of the correlation in financing waves

Why do corporate financing events occur in waves? We challenge recent evidence of the importance of valuation cycles in driving financing waves by documenting that the aggregate pattern of stock repurchases mirrors that of equity issuance and mergers, despite repurchases involving an opposite transaction. We then show that trends in financing decisions result from differing responses to the same economic stimulus: growth in GDP. Specifically, economic expansion reduces the cost of equity relative to the cost of debt, inducing firms to issue equity, and increases cash flow and also causes varying degrees of uncertainty, increasing stock repurchases. We document similar trends and provide similar motivation for merger waves.     

Consumer durables and risky borrowing: The effects of bankruptcy protection

There exist substantial differences in the generosity of bankruptcy protection across U.S. states. This paper exploits cross-state variation in exemption levels to assess the dual role of durable goods as informal collateral for unsecured debt and self-insurance against bad shocks to earnings. The generosity of bankruptcy protection is found to change both the incentives and the ability of households to accumulate durable wealth. The gains from a high level of insurance are reduced by the effect of tighter credit constraints, so that the net effects of a change in exemption are very small. A more generous bankruptcy regulation reduces net durable wealth in the first half of the life cycle. In addition, the optimal level of exemption is positive but low.     

银行业债权人委员会制度:理论基础、现实需求与优化路径——以河南省为例

在中国经济发展处于下行期且系统性、区域性金融风险等问题蔓延的背景下,银行业金融机构通过组建债权人委员会,一方面,可以加强债权行的沟通协调,联合行动,维护债权人的合法权益,化解金融风险;另一方面,有利于在依法合规的前提下,运用市场化原则实现企业债务重组,逐步恢复企业的偿债能力,避免单独追债引发的企业破产等问题。推进债权人委员会制度,既是降低银行不良资产的重要途径,也是帮助困难企业渡过难关、提高企业竞争力的重要手段。本文以河南省为例,就银行业金融机构利用债权人委员会支持优质企业、帮扶困难企业发展的问题进行了探索和研究。本文首先概述了推行债权人委员会制度的背景及国内外发展现状进行描述;然后结合我国经济的具体情况,分析了实施债权人委员会制度的必要性,并对债权人委员会制度在河南的具体实施路径进行了研究探讨,同时提出了相关建议。     

希法亭的企业融资方式理论及其对我国的启示

在市场经济条件下,融资方式的选择与合理融资结构的确立对于企业的长远发展至关重要。本文力图从希法亭在其《金融资本》一书中所阐述的企业融资方式理论出发,探究我国企业尤其是中小企业选择融资方式和确立合理融资结构的有效策略。     

Reorganization in bankruptcy and the issue of strategic risk

The decision by creditors to force the firm into bankruptcy, where bankruptcy includes reorganization, is shown to involve the valuation of a lottery over (cooperative) games rather than a lottery over specific monetary outcomes. In the absence of assumptions about strategic (negotiating) risk, the value of creditor claims is seen to be ambiguous. This paper extends Van Horne's model of the optimal initiation of bankruptcy proceedings to include the reorganization option and strategic risk. A modified decision rule is obtained to determine the optimal solution.