Financial constraints and corporate investments during the current financial and economic crisis: The credit crunch and investment decisions of Slovenian firms

We investigate the effect of financial constraints on the investment decisions of Slovenian firms during the current financial and economic crisis. By estimating the error-correction model and the Euler-equation specification, we found that corporate investments were significantly affected by financial constraints during the crisis. The effect of financial constraints intensified in 2009 and alleviated slightly in 2010, although still being significantly more intense than before the crisis hit the economy. By estimating a switching regression model with unknown sample separation that enabled us to address the problem of judgemental sample separation, we were also able to estimate the error-correction model separately for financially constrained and financially unconstrained firms. The results indicate that financial constraints have a significant effect on both financially constrained and financially unconstrained firms, although corporate investments were more severely affected in financially constrained firms.     

The peer-firm effect on firm’s investment decisions

This study investigates the effect of peer firms on firm investment strategies. We test the peer group effect hypothesis along differing levels of financially constrained firms as well as differing degrees of industry competition. Using idiosyncratic equity returns as the instrument variable, we use 2-stage least squares regression to identify the influence of peer firms’ investment decisions on a firm’s own investment policies. Our analyses empirically confirm that there is a peer group effect in making firm investment decisions. More financially constrained firms show greater dependency on peers’ investment decisions. Tests of peer sensitivity to the increase in industrial competition, however, displayed a U-shaped quadratic curve, which shows that firms have the lowest peer group effect in medium-competition markets. We claim that imitative behavior in investment is presumably weak in the mid-competition market because firms are yet to be distinguished in this market.     

FDI and credit constraints: Firm-level evidence from China

In this paper, we assess the success of the ongoing financial system reforms in China by investigating the extent to which firms are financially constrained. We focus on the role played by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in funding the Chinese corporate sector, and analyze whether incoming foreign investment in China plays an important role in alleviating domestic firms’ credit constraints. Using firm-level data on 1300 domestic companies over the period 2000–2002, we confirm that the development of cross-border relationships with foreign firms helps private domestic firms to bypass both the financial and legal obstacles that they face at home.     

财务报表重述与公司非效率投资行为

以在2006—2010年的年报附注中披露会计差错更正的上市公司为重述样本,运用倾向得分匹配等两种方法产生控制样本,实证检验财务报表重述公告前后公司投资效率的变化,为财务报告信息质量与公司投资效率间的因果联系提供了更为直接的证据。结果发现：（1）财务报表重述之前,存在融资约束的重述公司会投资不足,不存在融资约束的重述公司倾向于投资过度;（2）报表重述公告后,重述公司投资效率显著提高。     

Price dynamics,financial fragility and aggregate volatility

Within a general equilibrium framework à la (Long and Plosser, 1983), we investigate the dynamics emerging from the interactions of households and firms that are adaptive price setters and financially constrained. Adaptive price-setting behavior induces micro-founded out-of-equilibrium dynamics along which agents become heterogeneous in terms of prices and wealth. The stringency of the financial constraints determines the regime into which the model settles: either an equilibrium one or a disequilibrium one conductive to financial fragility and aggregate volatility. In this setting, we investigate how the structure of the production network affects the emergence of aggregate volatility from micro-level price and financial shocks, hence providing a dynamical counterpart to recent results of Acemoglu et al. (2012).     

管理者过度自信与企业投资现金敏感度——基于英国上市公司的实证研究

本文以英国上市公司为样本,发现融资约束公司普遍表现出管理者过度自信与投资现金流敏感性之间显著的正相关关系。与此相反,这种积极的关系不能在融资无约束公司中找到。这个结果和预期相一致,即在融资约束公司中过度自信的管理者的投资决策应该比非过度自信的管理者投资决策对现金流更加敏感。因为,现金流的增加能够促使过度自信的管理者加大投资并达到他们想要的水平。     

Financial factors and company investment decisions in transitional China

We investigate the propensity of Chinese publicly listed firms to invest in response to financial factors, according to the a priori degree of a firm's information problems: industry sector, ownership structure and firm size. The firms in primary and tertiary industries are found to be liquidity‐constrained in their investment decisions. The investment‐cash flow sensitivity of the firms in secondary industry indicates that they lost privileged access to credit in the course of China's market transition. However, we find no evidence that financial liberalization resulted in an easing of financing constraints for small‐ and medium‐sized firms. Our result indicates that agency problems, stemming from a state‐controlling pyramidal ownership structure, are responsible for the misallocation of internal funds. The importance of bankruptcy and agency costs in relation to debt finance for certain types of borrowers reflects the transitional nature of the financial environment facing Chinese firms. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Risk-shifting: Evidence from the 2007 credit crisis

I find empirical evidence that financially distressed firms increase investment risk. I exploit a natural experiment where the treated firms must refinance long-term debt during the 2007–2008 credit crisis. When focusing on firms where the incentive to risk-shift is theoretically greater, such as financially vulnerable firms and those with better governance, I find the increase in investment risk is most prevalent among firms that are the most financially vulnerable and when executives benefit from increased risk. Contrary to previous empirical papers that did not find causal evidence of risk-shifting, these results suggest that the risk-shifting does occur when firms are financially distressed.     

Do adjustment costs explain investment-cash flow insensitivity?

In this paper, I explain two “puzzles” that have been observed in firm level data. First, firms that display a high sensitivity of investment to cash flow (commonly believed to be an indicator of liquidity constraints) usually have large unutilized lines of credit which, presumably, could be used to overcome the shortage of funds. Second, firms that are perceived to be extremely liquidity constrained actually show very little sensitivity of investment to cash flow.I show how a dynamic model of firm investment with liquidity constraints and non-convex costs of adjustment of capital can explain these facts. These two features together imply that firms need to have a certain threshold level of financial resources before they can afford to increase investment. Once they cross this threshold, firms’ investment will be positively correlated with their financial resources until they reach their desired level of capital stock. However, even if investment is sensitive to cash flow, firms may borrow below their credit limit to guard against future bankruptcy or binding liquidity constraints.     

Optimal Precision of Accounting Information in Debt Financing

This paper studies qualitative characteristics of accounting systems that are used in debt financing. We consider a financially constrained firm that provides to lenders information on the value of assets that serve as collateral in a financing contract for a risky investment project. We find that the investor prefers an accounting system that provides biased signals about the value of assets. This bias adjusts the information content of the signals to maximize the probability of undertaking the project. Under fair value accounting, low book values are more precise measures of actual value than high book values, which is consistent with conditional conservatism. Next, we study accounting risk to study the effect of institutions that govern the financial reporting policy based on the optimal precision. We find that fair value measurement introduces greater accounting risk and is preferred by financially constrained firms to measurement at historical cost.     

Performance compensation contracts and CEOs’ incentive to shift risk to debtholders: An empirical analysis

The paper investigates the relationships among CEO incentive contracts, manager ownership, charter value, and bank risk taking. We analyze whether the presence and magnitude of incentive contracts induce CEOs of financially distressed firms and firms with high manager ownership to take unprofitable risks that shift wealth from debtholders to equity holders. Our sample focuses on banks that had both the incentive and opportunity to shift risks, and compares them with those that did not. We compare weak and strong banks in periods when the banks’ principal creditor, the FDIC, was a lenient and then a stringent monitor. The evidence is consistent with bonus compensation inducing CEOs of financially weak firms to shift risk to debtholders only if they do not have large insider ownership. The evidence is also consistent with these contracts rewarding CEOs for their effort to manage unforeseeable risk albeit not their ability. Low charter value banks with high managerial ownership took profitable risk during the lenient regulatory period.     

融资约束对企业生产率的影响——基于系统GMM方法的国企与民企差异检验

本文基于2003～2009年中国制造业上市公司面板数据,运用附加融资约束变量的增广生产函数和系统广义矩估计方法,研究国企和民企资金可获得性在影响生产率方面的差异。结果发现,上市公司生产率从总体上看不受制于内源融资,但按所有制分类后,只有民企存在融资约束并显著影响生产率,生产率高的民企通常拥有丰裕的内源资金;进一步按流动性与负债状况分类后仍不改变结论,而且流动性差、负债率高的民企所受约束更加严重。     

Self-attribution of overconfident CEOs and asymmetric investment-cash flow sensitivity

In this paper, we examine whether overconfidence coupled with a self-attribution bias affects the investment decisions of top corporate managers. First, overconfidence of chief executive officers appears to lead to the downward rigidity of investment-cash flow sensitivity. Additionally, overconfidence intensified by managerial self-attribution exacerbates the stickiness of investment-cash flow sensitivity. These results hold in both financially unconstrained and constrained firms with stronger results in the former. Overall, our findings are in line with the literature that lends support to the excessive investment commitment of overconfident managers.     

Ultimate Controllers,Ownership and the Probability of Insolvency in Financially Distressed Firms

This paper investigates the impact of corporate ownership and control on the outcome of financial distress. It is argued that the likelihood of financial distress resulting in insolvency depends on whether firms have controllers, the type of controllers and their cash flow ownership. Using a sample of 484 UK firms, 81 of which filed for insolvency, we show that financially distressed firms with controllers are more likely to be insolvent than widely held firms, where the probability of insolvency is greater when controllers are family or financial institutions. However, the probability of insolvency reduces significantly as the controllers' cash flow ownership increases beyond 10%. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Financing constraints and the use of performance-sensitive debt

Performance-sensitive debt (PSD) is a popular financial instrument in the corporate private debt market. In a real-options setting, this paper aims to clarify how PSD impacts on investment policy, capital structure, and agency cost of financing constraints when the firm faces the upper limit of debt issuance. We show that the constrained leverage hardly depends on the performance sensitivity. In particular, our conclusions predict that PSD can decrease the severity of financing constraints relative to the fixed-coupon debt case and the loss of firm value arising from investment and financing distortions due to the presence of financing constraints. The higher the performance sensitivity, the less likely that the firm is financially constrained. These findings provide a novel investment-based explanation for issuance of PSD.     

Short-term institutions’ information advantage and overvaluation

Prior literature has documented that institutions which trade more frequently are better able to forecast future returns and have an informational advantage. This study examines a proximate explanation for the differences in performance based on institutions’ investment horizon – short-term institutions are better informed because they are better able to identify overvalued stocks that are short-sale constrained and overvalued in the context of Miller’s (1977) overvaluation hypothesis. Analysis is conducted on 6330 unique firms from 1996 to 2014 using the calendar-time portfolio approach where abnormal returns are estimated from the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor regression model. The results provide evidence that stocks which are extremely overvalued due to short-sale constraints have the greatest decline in short-term institutional ownership, consistent with the notion that short-term institutions are able to correctly assess the components for stock overvaluation.     

Firm performance and the political economy of corporate governance: survey evidence for Bulgaria,Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia

Using survey data for 220 traditional manufacturing firms over 7 years of transition and 4 Central Eastern Europe (CEE) countries, we find firms that produced for the EU market under planning consistently outperform those that produced for the CMEA market. Within the previously CMEA market, the best firms were selected to outside privatisation and outperformed insider/state owned firms. Outside privatisation was resisted in EU oriented firms and ownership was found to have no effect on performance. Path dependent demand shocks and political constraints on the sequencing of state firms to private ownership determine the relationship between firm performance and ownership structure during transition.     

Labor's liquidity service and firing costs

This paper studies the specific effect that firing costs can have on firms facing liquidity constraints. When firing costs are zero and a time gap exists between production and its associated revenues, firing allows firms to hold on to their liquid assets by saving on wages, and thus, allows firms to cope better with liquidity shocks when external financing is too costly or unavailable. I refer to this feature as labor's liquidity service. Higher firing costs reduces the value of labor's liquidity service, and thus, increases firms' incentive for hoarding liquidity and reduces firms' demand for production inputs. In addition to this negative effect at the creation margin of production, firing costs have a relatively higher positive effect on the destruction margin of production of financially restricted firms. This paper presents a model that develops these ideas and shows that the presence of firing costs has a stronger negative effect on the output of firms facing liquidity constraints. Regression analysis, based on country-industry panel data sets, provides empirical evidence consistent with the liquidity service effect of firing costs. I find a relatively stronger negative effect of firing costs on the output of industries with higher liquidity requirements and a relatively stronger negative effect of firing costs on the output of small, and more likely financially constrained, firms.     

资产流动性损失下财务危机重组研究

本文从资产结构的角度探讨资产流动性对财务危机重组的影响，建立了一个考虑资产流动性的财务危机模型。同时根据股东一经理人是否能与债权人协商及公司债务契约中有无优先偿债禁止条款，在不同情形下，分析了财务危机中各个请求权人因应策略和投资效率。本文研究表明，债权人会容忍某些程度的投资无效率以避免无谓的资产流动性损失；当债权人无法协商时，无论投资项目净现值为正或负，股东一经理人都将进行投资，使财务危机公司发生过度投资无效率问题；当债权人可协商时，虽然还是无法完全消除财务危机公司过度投资行为，但是可以改善上述问题。     

The glass ceiling in context: the influence of CEO gender,recruitment practices and firm internationalisation on the representation of women in management

This study examines macro‐level organisational determinants of women in management. Specifically, we examined organisational characteristics and strategies, including firm levels of internationalisation, firm foreign ownership, chief executive officer gender and the active recruitment of women, as predictors of an organisation's level of representation of women in management. Results from a survey of 278 firms indicated that the presence of a female chief executive officer and an organisation's active recruitment of women are positively associated with a firm's percentage of women in management while firm internationalisation and firm foreign ownership are negatively associated with the representation of women in management. Overall, these findings suggest that although firms exercise discretion with respect to hiring and promoting women, they are also constrained by the external environment and organisational characteristics. For example, firms with higher levels of firm internationalisation and that are foreign‐owned may limit their efforts and investment in the advancement of women into management.