公司治理理论的现代演变——从股东利益最大化到相关利益者理论

全球的公司治理模式简要分为两类:股东模式和相关利益者模式。以最大化股东利益为目标的股东模式在董事会、大股东和公司控制权市场这些内部和外部治理机制上都存在明显的缺陷或失败。相关利益者理论的发展导致了公司治理理论的现代演变。相关利益者理论认为,公司治理从本质上说是各相关利益者之间制衡关系的有机整合,其目标是最大化整个公司的财富创造。相关利益者公司治理成为可替代股东模式的公司治理形式。     

所有利益相关者参与公司治理并非最有效率

利益相关者公司治理模式强调所有利益相关者的利益最大化,从其目标本身来看,是无可非议的。但该模式通过管理层的广泛任务和分享控制权来内部化股东行为的负外部性,容易产生管理层激励设计难、融资和决策效率低等问题。本文认为,所有利益相关者参与公司治理并不是保护其利益的有效制度安排,而应该在坚持股东价值的范式下,通过契约和法律形式实现其他利益相关者的利益保护。     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN AND THE UK: CODES,THEORY AND PRACTICE

We reflect on the evolution of corporate governance and the role of institutional investors in enhancing governance in Japan and the UK. Japan places emphasis on stakeholder capitalism, whereas the UK places emphasis on shareholder capitalism. Nonetheless, in both countries, institutional investors have exerted significant influence on the evolution of corporate governance. Institutional investors in the UK have more power over company management than their Japanese counterparts, although it is alleged that these powers are not exercised to their best potential in either country.     

公司治理与技术创新：综述及启示

在技术创新的决定因素中,除了政府层面、市场层面和企业层面外,近年来公司治理因素日益引起关注。然而公司治理的主流理论（股东理论和利益相关者理论）均没有涉及创新,将关注点放在剩余收益的分配。新兴的组织控制理论认为公司治理应关注剩余收益的产生,即企业创新的条件和过程,提供了一个关于治理与创新关系的理论框架。现有治理与创新关系的研究涉及公司内外部治理的各个方面,获得诸多共识,但在一些重议题上仍存在争议。进一步研究应从实证分析转向理论分析,关注第三方因素及不同公司在治理实践中的结构性差异。     

Hybrid Corporate Governance and its Effects on Innovation: A Case Study of AstraZeneca

This case study looks at the relationship between the UK/Swedish pharmaceutical firm, AstraZeneca, and its shareholders from the point of view of its effects on innovation. It uses a theoretical framework on corporate governance and innovation that differentiates sectors according to the novelty, visibility and appropriability of technological change. High novelty requires a corporate governance system with strong industry-specific expertise; low visibility requires good firm-specific perceptiveness. High appropriability favours shareholder supremacy as against stakeholder inclusion. The pharmaceutical industry appears to be high in all three, and this (according to accepted stereotypes) should favour the outsider-dominated corporate governance system of the UK as against the insider-dominated Swedish system. It is found that the corporate governance that resulted from the merger could indeed be described as hybrid, but that (following the building up of one major US shareholding) it was a UK/Swedish/US hybrid. In spite of the apparent similarity of the UK and US 'outsider-dominated' systems, the US element made a crucial difference, in giving engagement by a strong and well-informed shareholder who had some influence on other shareholders. This in turn helped to protect the firm to a significant extent from short-term pressures within the UK stock market, and thus to allow it to maintain its emphasis on long-term innovation.     

Hybrid Corporate Governance and its Effects on Innovation: A Case Study of AstraZeneca

This case study looks at the relationship between the UK/Swedish pharmaceutical firm, AstraZeneca, and its shareholders from the point of view of its effects on innovation. It uses a theoretical framework on corporate governance and innovation that differentiates sectors according to the novelty, visibility and appropriability of technological change. High novelty requires a corporate governance system with strong industry-specific expertise; low visibility requires good firm-specific perceptiveness. High appropriability favours shareholder supremacy as against stakeholder inclusion. The pharmaceutical industry appears to be high in all three, and this (according to accepted stereotypes) should favour the outsider-dominated corporate governance system of the UK as against the insider-dominated Swedish system. It is found that the corporate governance that resulted from the merger could indeed be described as hybrid, but that (following the building up of one major US shareholding) it was a UK/Swedish/US hybrid. In spite of the apparent similarity of the UK and US ‘outsider-dominated’ systems, the US element made a crucial difference, in giving engagement by a strong and well-informed shareholder who had some influence on other shareholders. This in turn helped to protect the firm to a significant extent from short-term pressures within the UK stock market, and thus to allow it to maintain its emphasis on long-term innovation.     

债转股企业的共同治理模式研究

通过分析案例企业的债转股协议,发现由于资产管理公司对债转股企业治理的积极参与,导致构成企业控制权的股东投票权、董事会权、职工参与权、优先转让权、剩余现金流权等都体现出强烈的权力制衡关系和保护弱势股东的特征。各投资主体平等地参与董事会决策权是构成共同治理模式的根本基础。改善债转股企业的治理质量,应在继续发挥政策效应的同时逐步强化市场原则。     

Corporate governance and investment-cash flow sensitivity: Evidence from Russian unlisted firms

This paper investigates how corporate governance of unlisted firms in an emerging market economy affects financing constraints, measured by the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. In order to evaluate the quality of corporate governance, we develop two corporate governance indices based on a large-scale survey of Russian enterprises – one for shareholder protection and one for transparency. We estimate standard investment regressions where the cash flow variable is interacted with our corporate governance indices and variables capturing the ownership structure. The central result is that better shareholder protection diminishes the cash flow sensitivity of investment, particularly in firms with an outside controlling owner. In contrast, we do not find such an effect for transparency, which can be partially explained by the threat of hostile takeovers. We address the problem of the endogeneity of corporate governance by using fixed-effects regressions and a novel instrumental variable based on particular legal provisions for corporate governance in Russia depending on the number of shareholders.     

The governance of innovative firms: An evolutionary perspective

Corporate governance has been in the recent years one of the most debated issues in conventional economic approaches. Agency theory combined with financial indicators has particularly contributed to the development of shareholder value as a key concept in companies’ governance both at a theoretical and empirical level. We argue that an evolutionary perspective can be developed on the governance of innovative firms since (1) conventional economic approaches only consider a restricted part of this complex issue, and (2) this restricted vision applied in practice has driven the economic system into major coordination problems and turbulences. On the basis of empirical investigations into the telecommunications industry, and guided by a simple model of evolutionary game, we propose new principles of corporate governance centered upon managerial entrepreneurship and its role on innovation and industry dynamics. The outcome is a set of rules of conduct for the manager and the shareholder.     

金字塔结构下股权激励的双重效应研究——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

在金字塔结构下,股东与经营者之间以及控股股东与中小股东之间的两类治理关系普遍存在,对于上市公司治理问题的研究也从单一治理关系分析框架向两者权衡分析转变。在双重治理关系视阈下,股权激励成为利益主体之间博弈的重要工具。本文在提出双重治理关系分析框架的基础上,运用2006～2009年我国上市公司面板数据对股权激励的双重效应及其与控股股东之间的关系进行实证检验。研究发现,股权激励对于第一类代理问题具有显著的治理效应,但对第二类代理问题的治理效应并未显现,这与控股股东对其存在显著的抑制作用有关,股权性质能够对股权激励与控股股东不同效应的体现以及两者关系产生影响。     

第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析

本文以 1 997年以前在中国上市的 50 8个上市公司 1 997— 2 0 0 0年 4年间的2 0 3 2个观察值为样本 ,研究了第一大股东的所有权性质、第一大股东的变更对公司治理效力和企业业绩的影响。本文的研究发现 ,上市公司第一大股东的所有权性质不同 ,其公司业绩、股权结构和治理效力也不同。第一大股东为非国家股股东的公司有着更高的企业价值和更强的盈利能力 ,在经营上更具灵活性 ,公司治理的效力更高 ,其高级管理层也面临着更多的来自企业内部和市场的监督和激励。另外 ,本文的研究还发现 ,对于不同性质的公司 ,第一大股东的变更带来的影响也有所不同 ,但基本上都是正面的。第一大股东的变更有利于公司治理效力的提高 ,有利于公司规模的扩大和管理的更加专业化。本文的研究为国有股减持和股权多元化提供了经验证据 ,论证了控制权转移市场对深化改革和完善公司治理的重要性     

大股东减持作为一种支持行为之探析

＂掏空＂和＂支持＂行为对公司来说是两种作用对称的行为。大股东减持作为＂掏空＂行为之一已有研究,作为支持行为还未见研究报道,然而大股东减持是能够作为支持行为的。大股东减持既可能用套现获得的资金直接支持上市公司,也可能是通过引进战略投资机构、优化公司的股权结构提升公司治理效率实现支持。两个案例的分析进一步说明了大股东在公司处于财务困境时减持可能是大股东支持行为之一,但这还有待于对大股东减持与其支持行为关系进行实证研究。     

COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY BETWEEN COOPERATIVE,SAVINGS AND COMMERCIAL BANKS IN EUROPE USING THE FRONTIER APPROACH

We test competing hypotheses concerning the comparative behavior of shareholder‐owned commercial banks and stakeholder‐orientated cooperative and savings banks in European banking. One hypothesis is that the risk culture and business models of stakeholder and shareholder‐owned banks have become more alike and so cost efficiency has converged between bank ownership structures. The alternative hypothesis suggests that institutional differences do matter and lead, amongst other things, to variation in network effects and monitoring mechanisms producing differing behaviors and efficiency outcomes. By using a novel panel data set of 521 European banks during 1994–2010, we find: (i) mean inefficiency scores vary by ownership type and are lower for cooperative banks than for commercial and savings banks; (ii) there is a large variation in inefficiency scores among banks within each ownership type but the lower variance for cooperative banks indicates that they are the most homogeneous group; (iii) the inefficiency distribution of savings and commercial banks appear to arise from the same distribution, but this does not hold for cooperative banks. As such our findings are more consistent with the alternative hypothesis. Our first two findings buttress those studies that found significant differences between European banks with differing ownership structures, while our third finding on the significance of the cycle to the distribution of inefficiency is novel.     

利益相关者间的谈判与企业治理结构

企业的契约性与利益相关者理论具有一致性 ,它们都隐含了企业是一种再谈判机制。利益相关者对企业的所有权分配进行谈判 ,谈判结果决定出企业的治理结构。在这个过程中 ,各方的谈判破裂结果效用、谈判力和对谈判破裂的担心程度是关键变量。我们使用Nash谈判模型及其推广模型分析了这个过程。我们的结论是 ,企业治理结构是内生的 ,每个企业的治理结构都是特殊的个案 ,一种治理结构并不具有普适性。这个结论具有重要的立法含义。     

基于制约理论的超限超载形成机理与治理思路研究

超限超载现象及治理是国内外公路运输管理研究的热点。运用制约理论对超限超载行为的产生、恶化及自加强机制进行分析,认为各利益相关主体对超限超载的支撑作用、监管缺失条件下治理者自由裁量权和选择性执法导致的寻租行为,都加强了运输者超限超载动机。对超限超载行为的治理,不仅要突出对超限超载运输者的治理,也要突出对政府治理行为代理人的治理。提出从超限超载系统的构成入手,从路上治理向源头治理和利益相关者治理转变,从阶段性治理向日常性、程序化治理转变,从行政手段治理为主向制度化治理转变,最终形成公路运输超限超载控制的长效机制。     

Board effectiveness in Chinese fund management companies

With a generally weak investor protection environment and no governance voice in the fund management companies (FMC) to which their investment is entrusted, fund investors in China are left with the internal governance mechanisms to safeguard their interest. Using a panel data of 288 firm‐year observations covering more than 98% of FMC in China from the period between 2006 and 2010, the present paper examines the corporate governance challenges confronting the fledging Chinese fund management industry by analysing how key governance settings affect the performance of the board of directors in protecting the interest of fund investors. The results show that board effectiveness can be enhanced if a listed company is the controlling shareholder. In addition, having a female CEO or board chairperson and a small‐sized board may help to reduce investors’ fees. Other internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as shareholder concentration, having state‐owned financial companies as controlling shareholders and board independence, are found to exhibit no significant impact on the effectiveness of FMC boards.     

中小股东近乎全部出席股东大会的公司治理模式

只有小部分中小股东参加股东大会,客观上将公司的经营管理委托给控股股东,中小股东付出了巨大的委托成本,导致他们亏多盈少。通过创新制度：在出席股东大会的中小股东当中,由他们选举若干名＂补全代表＂,由这些＂补全代表＂行使未出席股东大会股份的表决权,中小股东近乎全部参加股东大会;中小股东以其持股总量按每5%持股量选派一名董事,每一位大股东分别以每5%持股量直接派出一名董事,董事会中既有控股股东的代表又有中小股东的代表,控股股东与其他股东相互约束并制衡,框架出一个全体股东同生共死、同等收益的治理模式。     

Determinants of Corporate Governance in the Italian Financial Market

We evaluate the determinants of corporate governance of companies listed at the Italian Stock Exchange. We consider ownership structure, balance sheet data, company performance and some qualitative features as determinants. We evaluate the convergence of Italian companies' governance towards a system with effective governance mechanisms. Our analysis shows definitely that companies with a large shareholder and/or minority blockholders controlling a large stake and companies belonging to a pyramidal group or controlled by a shareholders' coalition are characterized by a poor governance/shareholders' protection standard. Institutional investors play a positive role .     

机构投资者持股和会计盈余质量

本文从会计盈余质量的角度来研究机构投资者(’在公司治理中的作用。我们从盈余管理程度、盈余信息含量和盈余稳健性等三个方面来衡量会计盈余的质量。三方面的研究结果显示,机构投资者持股有助于改善会计盈余的质量:机构投资者持股公司的会计盈余质量显著高于其他公司,并且会计盈余的质量随着机构投资者持股比例的增加而增加。进一步研究发现,机构投资者还能够缓解大股东对会计盈余信息含量的恶化,起到一定的制衡作用。本文的研究表明,机构投资者能够在一定程度上改善上市公司的盈余质量,其快速成长有助于公司治理结构的改善,也有助于资本市场信息披露环境的良性发展。     

大数据环境下个人数据隐私治理机制研究——基于利益相关者视角

大数据环境下,个人数据在商业、公共事业及科研等领域的应用日趋频繁,隐私泄露事件发生频率与危害程度极大增高,平衡个人数据挖掘与隐私保护之间的矛盾关系是大数据发展面临的重大难题。文章应用利益相关者理论,将个人数据隐私治理过程中的利益相关者划分为个人、个人数据收集者、个人数据处理者、个人数据应用者及监督者5种角色,涉及个人、个人数据企业、政府、媒体、第三方隐私保护组织及非政府组织等6大利益主体。通过权力利益矩阵分析,将6大主体归纳为核心利益相关者、重要利益相关者、间接利益相关者及直接利益相关者4大类,并据此提出构建多元主体协同治理机制,针对核心利益相关者建立竞争性治理机制,针对直接、间接利益相关者建立激励性治理机制,发挥重要利益相关者的主导作用。希望个人数据隐私治理机制能为平衡数据挖掘和隐私保护提供参考。