Fair allocation in networks with externalities

I prove existence and uniqueness of a component efficient and fair allocation rule when the value of the network is allowed to exhibit any type of externalities across its components. This is done by means of a new specification of the value function, generalizing partial results appearing in Myerson [Myerson, R.B., 1977a. Graphs and cooperation in games. Math. Operations Res. 2, 225–229], Feldman [Feldman, B.E., 1996. Bargaining, coalition formation and value. PhD dissertation. State University of New York at Stony Brook] and Jackson and Wolinsky [Jackson, M.O., Wolinsky, A., 1996. A strategic model of social and economic networks. J. Econ. Theory 71, 44–74]. This component efficient and fair allocation rule is found closely related to an extension of the Shapley value to TU-games in partition function form proposed by Myerson [Myerson, R.B., 1977b. Values of games in partition function form. Int. J. Game Theory 6 (1), 23–31].     

核心企业网络能力、创新网络与科创型特色小镇发展——以杭州云栖小镇为例

科创型特色小镇作为我国推行创新驱动发展战略的重要部署,对当地创新创业发挥着重要作用。拥有核心企业主导的创新网络的科创型特色小镇,具有更强的发展动力。因此,探索核心企业网络能力、创新网络与科创型特色小镇发展之间的关系具有重大意义。运用案例研究方法,以杭州云栖小镇为例展开研究,结果发现：①创新网络演化阶段可以划分为差距清晰化阶段、提升探索阶段和成熟规范化阶段;②核心企业网络能力对创新网络演化发展具有促进作用,并且在创新网络演化不同阶段存在差异性;③核心企业网络能力、创新网络和科创型特色小镇产业发展存在协同演化。     

Networks and farsighted stability

We provide a new framework for the analysis of network formation and demonstrate the existence of farsightedly consistent directed networks. Our framework extends the standard notion of a network and also introduces the notion of a supernetwork. A supernetwork is made up of a collection of directed networks (the nodes) and represents (via the arcs connecting the nodes) preferences and rules governing network formation. By extending Chwe's 1994 result on the nonemptiness of farsightedly consistent sets, we show that for any supernetwork there exists a nonempty subset of farsightedly consistent directed networks.     

中小企业技术创新网络的知识创造研究

中小企业以知识创造为目标构建或加入技术创新网络,以与网络中其它组织之间的优势互补、相互协作的方式来进行合作创新,为中小企业技术创新能力的提高提供了可行性思路。将典型的技术创新网络分为弱连接和强连接两种形态,在分析网络特征及知识创造过程的基础上,分别提出了两种形态在技术创新网络内部知识创造的机制模型。     

Pillage and property

This paper introduces a class of coalitional games, called pillage games, as a model of Hobbesian anarchy. Any coalition can pillage, costlessly and with certainty, any less powerful coalition. Power is endogenous, so a pillage game does not have a characteristic function, but pillage provides a domination concept that defines a stable set, which represents an endogenous balance of power. Every stable set contains only finitely many allocations, and can be represented as a farsighted core. Additional results are obtained for particular games, including the game in which the power of each coalition is determined by its total wealth.     

Trading networks with price-setting agents

In a wide range of markets, individual buyers and sellers trade through intermediaries, who determine prices via strategic considerations. Typically, not all buyers and sellers have access to the same intermediaries, and they trade at correspondingly different prices that reflect their relative amounts of power in the market. We model this phenomenon using a game in which buyers, sellers, and traders engage in trade on a graph that represents the access each buyer and seller has to the traders. We show that the resulting game always has a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and that all equilibria lead to an efficient allocation of goods. Finally, we analyze trader profits in terms of the graph structure — roughly, a trader can command a positive profit if and only if it has an “essential” connection in the network, thus providing a graph-theoretic basis for quantifying the amount of competition among traders.     

基于多层网络视角的核心企业成长位移研究

伴随集群核心企业在其成长发展过程中发生的迁移行为,企业赖以获取重要资源的主要渠道将随之发生网络地理位置的转移。基于企业外部网络成长环境的分层性特点来探讨这种位置转移的不同方式及其影响结果。在首先界定核心企业成长空间三层网络的基础上,探讨了集群核心企业在其成长过程中在三层网络内位置迁移的不同方式,分析了不同位移方式下三层网络上网络资源分布的变化及对企业竞争力提升可能产生的影响,初步构建了核心企业在三层网络内成长位移与竞争力提升相关性研究的二维理论模型。     

技术创新网络核心企业领导力影响因素研究

技术创新网络中核心企业的地位及作用一直是学者们关注的热点问题。近年来,核心企业领导力的概念逐渐引起人们的重视。在梳理技术创新网络、领导力、核心企业及核心企业领导力等相关理论研究成果的基础上,对技术创新网络核心企业领导力的内涵进行了进一步剖析和界定,运用理论探索和问卷调研方法,分析了核心企业领导力影响因素,建立了核心企业领导力影响因素概念模型,并进行了实证研究。结果表明：知识资源、网络能力、网络结构和领导者特质是影响技术创新网络核心企业领导力的主要因素。     

One-way flow networks: the role of heterogeneity

I study a one-way flow connections model in which players are heterogeneous with respect to values and the costs of establishing a link. I show that values and costs heterogeneity are equally important in determining the level of connectedness and the architecture of equilibrium networks. I also show that when asymmetries are independent of the potential partner there are distributions of costs and values for which centrality is a distincitive feature of equilibrium networks. This sharply contrasts with the homogeneous case.I thank an anonymous referee for useful comments. The paper has benefited from discussion with Gabriella Conti, Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez, Fernando Vega-Redondo and Sanjeev Goyal.     

都市圈要素流动网络中节点核的界定及链接作用研究

基于微观企业间关系的层面,研究都市圈要素整合过程中如何判定核心企业及其在网络链接过程中所起到的作用。认为核心企业是处于都市圈要素流动网络关键位置的节点核,并运用节点的强度、强度分布以及相互关系、加权的聚类系数等参数体系来对节点核进行判别,这种判别方法考虑了节点的绝对权重和相关权重。最后,以徐州都市圈内典型产业的发展为例,总结了区域内节点核产生的4种途径,分析了节点核促进产业衍生、控制价值链、产生知识溢出、提高产业竞争力的中介作用。     

Evolution of networks—an experimental analysis

It is the main aim of our paper to study network formation in experimental setups in discrete and continuous time. Our design is inspired by the theoretical model on network formation by Bala and Goyal (Econometrica, 68(5): 1181–1229, 2000) as well as the experiments by Callander and Plott (J. Public Econ., 89: 1469–1495, 2005) and Falk and Kosfeld (IEW Working Paper, University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland, No. 146, 2003). In particular, we analyze the role of star-shaped networks which are strict Nash-equilibria of the corresponding network formation game. Our experimental results show that strict Nash networks prove to be a good indicator for predicting network formation, particularly in continuous time. In explaining our results, it turns out that, among others, the complexity in coordinating on stars, the inequity aversion against unequal payoff distribution in the network, and the groups’ degrees of activity are the most important determinants for the formation of strict Nash networks.      

网络嵌入、知识管理与核心企业自主创新

以2009-2015年华为集团公司在美国专利商标局经授权的无线通信网络技术专利及其引证和被引证专利,构建了核心企业自主创新网络。运用社会网络分析软件UCINET6.0,分析了网络嵌入与核心企业自主创新的关系以及知识管理在其中所起的中介作用。实证结果表明,网络位置对核心企业自主创新能力具有正向影响,网络关系对核心企业自主创新能力具有负向影响,知识管理在核心企业自主创新网络中具有正向调节作用。     

Existence of Nash networks in one-way flow models

This paper addresses the existence of Nash equilibria in one-way flow models in a number of different settings. In these models players form costly links with other players and obtain resources from them through the directed path connecting them. We find that heterogeneity in the costs of establishing links plays a crucial role for the existence of Nash networks. The paper also provides conditions for the existence of Nash networks in models where costs and values of links are heterogeneous. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for useful suggestions. We would also like to thank Hans Haller and participants at the AEA Meetings 2007 for helpful comments. Sudipta Sarangi acknowledges the support of NSF grant HSD-0527315 and the hospitality of CREUSET, Jean Monnet University.     

考虑技术中介的相互依存创新网络系统鲁棒性研究

创新网络系统已成为当前创新领域的研究热点之一。技术中介能够实现不同企业或组织技术需求与技术投入的最优匹配。相互依存网路将创新网络、技术中介网络和技术服务支持网络整合为有机整体。为此,构建了节点负载的相互依存创新网络系统级联失效鲁棒性模型。研究发现,容限系数越高的系统,其鲁棒性越好。在随机失效方式下,随机网络结构比其它两种组织网络结构任务完成效率高;在优先失效方式下,一定比例的组织节点优先失效即可导致整个网络完全瘫痪。该结论为研究创新网络结构以及关键创新技术节点冗余机制的采用提供了新的思路和视角,具有一定的探索意义和实践价值。     

Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games

We study network games in which each player wishes to connect his source and sink, and the cost of each edge is shared among its users either equally (in Fair Connection Games—FCG's) or arbitrarily (in General Connection Games—GCG's). We study the existence and quality of strong equilibria (SE)—strategy profiles from which no coalition can improve the cost of each of its members—in these settings. We show that SE always exist in the following games: (1) Single source and sink FCG's and GCG's. (2) Single source multiple sinks FCG's and GCG's on series parallel graphs. (3) Multi source and sink FCG's on extension parallel graphs. As for the quality of the SE, in any FCG with n players, the cost of any SE is bounded by H(n) (i.e., the harmonic sum), contrasted with the Θ(n) price of anarchy. For any GCG, any SE is optimal.     

核心企业治理机制对模块化网络创新绩效的影响——知识转移的中介作用

从知识转移视角提出核心企业不同治理机制对模块化网络创新绩效影响的概念模型与研究假设。结合268家以模块化方式运行的样本企业调研数据,运用层次回归分析法进行实证检验。结果发现：核心企业规则治理机制、合同治理机制和关系治理机制对模块化网络创新绩效均有显著正向影响,其中,规则治理机制的影响最为显著;显性知识转移在规则治理机制、合同治理机制与模块化网络创新绩效之间发挥完全中介作用;隐性知识转移在关系治理机制与模块化网络创新绩效之间发挥部分中介作用。研究结论可为核心企业更好地管理和运用模块化创新网络提供理论指导。     

On the evaluation of power in parliaments and government formation

This paper is devoted to the study of power in Parliaments. We explain how the power of coalitions can be computed after elections. We add to the existing literature by using this analysis to predict what government may emerge from these elections.