The adjustment of external tariffs in the Kemp‐Wan‐Grinols compensation scheme

Abstract.  This paper considers the adjustment of external tariffs when two countries integrate and implement the Kemp‐Wan‐Grinols compensation scheme. Attention is also paid to the restrictions set by Article XXIV of GATT. This paper shows how the external tariffs would change in a three‐good, three‐country model under the assumption of gross substitutability. The results are sensitive to the initial trade pattern. In particular, they depend on the number of goods initially traded between the member countries. The analysis can be extended to a multi‐commodity model if the preferences of the countries have identical CES representation. JEL classification: F11, F15     

On the evolution of conditional cooperation

A long series of laboratory and field experiments, as well as conventional empirical studies, has established that (1) individuals voluntarily provide themselves with public goods at levels exceeding those predicted by the Nash voluntary contributions mechanism, and (2) agents reciprocate increases in the contributions of their counterparts in such settings (conditional cooperation). This paper presents a simple model of the evolution of preferences for conditional cooperation in the presence of a public good, which explains these two empirical findings without employing reputational or group selection arguments. In this model, individuals inherit preferences to match other agents' contributions to the provision of a public good, at some specified “matching rate.” Agents whose preferences induce them to be relatively successful – in material terms – increase in number, from one generation to the next. Under complete information and with randomly matched groups of N agents who have quasilinear preferences over the public good and a private good, the unique evolutionarily stable matching rate is 1, leading to Pareto optimal voluntary provision of the public good, regardless of group size N. The evolutionarily stable matching rate can be viewed as an endogenous social norm.     

Estimating Quality‐adjusted Price Changes: Method and Application to VCRs

This paper uses scanner data to generate estimates of quality‐adjusted price changes for video‐recorders. We use hedonic regressions to derive estimates of the changing worth of each quality component. These are then applied to weighted changes in the mix of quality attributes of products to derive estimates of quality‐adjusted price (QAP) changes. The data source used is electronic‐point‐of‐sale (EPOS) scanner data that are available for a wide range of goods. This study provides an example of how such methods can be more widely applied. The estimates of QAP changes correspond to constant‐utility, (hedonic) cost‐of‐living indexes defined in economic theory as the ratio of expenditure functions at constant utility allowing for changing prices and characteristics of goods. This method is proposed as an improvement on the existing direct method , which takes its estimates directly from the coefficients associated with 'time dummies' in a hedonic regression. We finally undertake a matching process, akin to that used by statistical offices, and compare the results. Direct comparisons with RPI estimates and these hedonic approaches are not easy since the approaches use quite different data sets. Our replication of a procedure akin to that used for the RPI on the scanner data set provides insights into sources of potential bias.     

A Simple Characterization of the Second‐best Two‐part and Block‐rate Tariffs Theory and Applications

The general necessary optimality conditions for second‐best discrete multipart tariffs are rather complex. In this paper, we derive a simplified characterization of these conditions for two‐part tariffs and for block‐rate tariffs for given thresholds of these tariffs. The simplified necessary optimality conditions are equivalent to the necessary conditions for a Ramsey‐optimum for goods with continuously variable individually demanded quantities. We demonstrate that this characterization of second‐best multipart tariffs can be helpful, when applying the usual regulatory mechanisms to these tariffs. In particular, we consider Vogelsang–Finsinger (1979) regulation as well as a particular form of price‐cap regulation which is related to the Laspeyres index of prices.     

Innis Lecture: Explorations in medium‐run macroeconomics

Abstract.  Medium‐run macroeconomics refers to aggregate economic phenomena that manifest over periods of 10 to 25 years. This area of research has emerged over the last decade as a new and distinct field of enquiry. In this paper, I overview a set of personal attempts aimed at understanding certain medium‐run phenomena such as: changes in the wage structure, changes in the world distribution of income‐per‐capita, and changes in growth patterns across OECD countries. The goal of the paper is to extract general lessons from these experiences. In particular, I will discuss why models of endogenous technological choice may be a good starting point for studying medium‐run phenomena. JEL classification: E00, O00     

The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax‐competition Paradox

Information sharing between governments is examined in an optimal‐taxation framework. We introduce a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital‐income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange. The model reproduces the conclusion found in earlier literature that integration of international caopital markets may lead to the under‐provision of publicly provided goods. However, in contrast to previous results in the literature, under‐provision occurs due to inefficiently coordinated expectations. We show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of public‐good provision as well as complete and voluntary information exchange between national tax authorities.     

Partial Communication in a Voluntary‐Contribution‐Mechanism Experiment

This paper presents results of a voluntary‐contribution‐mechanism experiment with partial communication. It was found that the trend of mean investments depended on whether a communication network was connected and on how fast all subjects could share information. When each subject could communicate with two other subjects and the network was connected, the mean investment increased from 33 percent to 58 percent of the optimal investment. On the other hand, when each subject could communicate with only one other subject and the network was not connected, the mean investment decreased from 34 percent to 19 percent of the optimal investment.     

Incomplete Information, Trading Costs and Cross‐autocorrelations in Stock Returns

This paper provides an economic rationale for the cross‐autocorrelation patterns in stock returns in the context of a microstructure model in which investors have incomplete information. The paper shows that in a market in which investors are informed about only a sub‐set of stocks, the emergence of lead‐lag, cross‐autocorrelations is a function of the cost of trading in other stocks based on information about the sub‐set of stocks. If cross‐trading costs are high, informed investors will trade only in the sub‐set of stocks they are informed about; if cross‐trading costs are moderate, informed investors will randomize between trading and not trading in other stocks; and if cross‐trading costs are low, they will trade in all stocks. When informed investors trade only in a sub‐set of stocks, prices of stocks with more informed trading will adjust to common factor information faster than the prices of stocks with less informed trading giving rise to asymmetric lead‐lag cross‐autocorrelations. When informed investors trade in all stocks, asymmetric lead‐lag cross‐autocorrelations will disappear as a result of their cross‐market arbitrage trading. These results provide a number of testable implications for lead‐lag cross‐autocorrelation patterns. The data is consistent with the empirical predictions .
(J.E.L.G12, G14).     

Public Goods Provision: On Generalizing the Jackson–Moulin Mechanism

Jackson and Moulin (1992) proposed a simple mechanism to implement a wide class of cost‐sharing rules for the provision of a binary public good. Bag (1997) generalized this mechanism to divisible public goods under the assumption of “constant marginal benefit.” This paper generalizes the Jackson–Moulin mechanism to a broader setting, including the cases of both decreasing and constant marginal benefit. Moreover, this paper shows the impossibility of generalizing the mechanism further.     

Public Good Provision Under Monopolistic Competition

This paper presents a model of voluntary private provision of public good under monopolistic competition following Pecorino. Consumers prefer product varieties and a public good. Marginal utility of income depends inversely upon the aggregate consumption of private goods in this model. As population size increases, aggregate consumption of private goods goes up and marginal utility of income falls. This explains the positive relationship between population size and public good provision. Any technological changes in the production of private goods are shown to be neutral to the aggregate provision of public good. These results are in contrast to Pecorino.     

ω‐Homothetic Preferences: Theory and Applications

This paper develops a new class of homothetic preferences which generate Marshallian demand curves for individual goods which can be concave, convex or linear in own price under the assumption that agents treat aggregate price indices as given (as in Dixit‐Stiglitz, 1977). The preferences are represented by a cost function which has two parameters: one determining the curvature of the Marshallian demand; the other determining the elasticity of demand when all prices are equal. The elasticity of demand varies with relative prices. Illustrative examples are given of Cournot duopoly and exchange rate pass‐through.     

Funding Public Goods with Lotteries: Experimental Evidence

Why do individuals participate in charitable gambling activities? We conduct a laboratory investigation of a model that predicts risk-neutral expected utility maximizers will participate in lotteries when they recognize that lotteries are being used to finance public goods. As predicted by the model, we find that public goods provision is higher when financed by lottery proceeds than when financed by voluntary contributions. We also find support for other comparative static predictions of the model. In particular we find that ticket purchases vary with the size of the fixed prize and with the return from the public good: lotteries with large prizes are more effective, and ticket purchases drop dramatically when the public good is not valued by subjects.     

Multiple Buyers, Rent‐Defending and the Observed Social Costs of Monopoly

This paper uses analytical and experimental methods to assess the effects of fracturing the interests of agents seeking to maintain the competitive status quo in a rent‐seeking contest for a monopoly franchise. Theoretically, it is shown that while "rent‐defending" can ameliorate the social costs of rent‐seeking, these beneficial effects deteriorate quickly as the interests of those seeking to maintain the status quo become fractured. Experimental results indicate that overbidding is persistent when bidders have different sharing rules. In fact, the observed social costs of rent‐seeking often increase just when rent‐defending has the greatest predicted ameliorative effect.     

Efficiency and Program‐Contract Bargaining in Spanish Public Hospitals

Abstract This paper analyses the evolution of productivity in Spanish public hospitals during the period characterised by the use of program‐contracts. The results demonstrate that a significant improvement has occurred. The decomposition of the Malmquist productivity index shows that efficiency change has been the main contributor to productivity improvement. We also analyse the dynamic implications of program‐contract bargaining. In particular, the data support the hypothesis that the bargaining process has been subject to a ratchet effect, i.e., the more a hospital does today, the more the hospital is asked to do in the future. This result threatens the credibility of the program‐contract as an incentive system .     

公共品供给机制:作用边界变迁及影响因素

公共品供给机制是从供给主体和运行机理的角度抽象出的公共品供给模式,包括政府供给、市场供给和自愿供给.某一公共品的供给方式不是一成不变的,其供给机制的作用边界处于变迁之中,主要表现为政府供给与私人供给的相互转化.在公共品供给机制的变迁中,公共品的性质特征、技术进步、政府职能理念、公平效率准则、政府政策倾向、需求状况以及私人资本规模都产生了一定的影响作用.     

Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods

Public provision of a private goods is justified on efficiency grounds in a model with no redistributive preferences. A government’s involvement in the provision of a private good generates information about preferences that facilitates more efficient revenue extraction for the provision of public goods. Public provision of the private good improves economic efficiency under a condition that is always fulfilled under independence and satisfied for an open set of joint distributions. The efficiency gains require that consumers cannot arbitrage the publicly provided private good, so our analysis applies to private goods where it is easy to keep track of the ultimate user, such as schooling and health care, but not to easily tradable consumer goods.     

An Empirical Analysis of Cost Efficiency in Non‐profit and Public Nursing Homes

Abstract *** :  This paper examines the issue of cost‐efficiency in Switzerland's nursing homes, an issue of concern to policy makers because of the rapid growth of elderly care expenditure and the aging of the population. The fact that nursing homes in Switzerland exist in different institutional forms, private for‐profit, government and non‐profit status, raises the issue of their relative cost efficiency. A panel data of 17 public and 19 nonprofit nursing homes operating over the 9‐year period from 1993 to 2001, in one of the 26 Swiss cantons, Ticino, is studied. Ticino's nursing homes are heavily regulated and monitored by the canton's authorities. However, given that in public firms there are more bureaucratic constraints and agency problems, one can expect a relatively low level of cost‐efficiency. In this paper the effect of institutional form on efficiency is studied using a translog stochastic cost‐frontier model. Several specifications are used to study the robustness of the results. The results suggest that the institutional form influences the efficiency of the studied nursing homes in that non‐profit foundations are likely to be more cost‐efficient than the nursing homes operated by government administration. The results also suggest that a great majority of the nursing homes in the sample do not fully benefit from scale economies. This implies that efficiency gains can be obtained with larger capacities or joint operations .     

Improving Voluntary Public Good Provision Through a Non-governmental,Endogenous Matching Mechanism: Experimental Evidence

Social norms can help to foster cooperation and to overcome the free-rider problem in the private provision of public goods. This paper focuses on the endogenous establishment of an average-oriented norm which sanctions deviations from average public good contributions. In a laboratory experiment, we analyse whether subjects are willing to implement a punishment and reward scheme at their own expense by applying the theory of non-governmental norm enforcement put forward by Buchholz et al. (J Public Econ Theory 16(6):899–916, 2014). Based on their theory, which omits a central authority but introduces an endogenously determined enforcement mechanism, we implement a two-stage public good game. In the first stage, subjects determine the strength of the sanctioning mechanism on their own. In the second stage, they decide on their personal contributions to the public good based on the established mechanism. In line with comparable pool punishment experiments, we find that subjects are apparently willing to contribute funds in order to establish a norm enforcement mechanism. Groups over-invest in the mechanism, but this over-investment decreases over time. These investments seem to be driven by the subjects’ previous individual contributions and partly by a number of strategic considerations, i.e. the previous average contribution made to the public good lowers the investment in the sanctioning mechanism. In the second stage of our experiment, higher norm enforcement parameters tend to lead to higher public good contributions. The earnings with the mechanism are on average higher than without.     

Trade, market size, and industrial structure: revisiting the home‐market effect

Abstract.  This paper shows that the issues in the recent discussion over the 'home‐market effects' are more complicated than previously thought. It is shown that, in general, market size matters for industrial structure even when both the homogeneous and the differentiated goods face transport costs. The home‐market effect for production structure can arise, disappear, or even reverse in sign. The analysis shall change a common perception about de‐industrialization of (small) economies and may also have important implications for the empirical research strategies in this area. JEL classification: F12, L1