逆向淘汰、财政补贴与农业的低效率发展——基于湘北农村的调查研究

农村社会劳动力转移的逆向淘汰趋势将使我国的农业逐渐失去自生能力,而不具备自生能力的农业经济组织是不能依靠财政补贴提高经济效率的。如果在劳动力逆向淘汰使农业生产失去活力的条件下,政府提高对农业的财政补贴,势必导致我国的农业发展陷入低效率均衡的陷阱。     

Effects of Adverse Selection on a Multinational Firm’s Decision on where to Subcontract

This paper analyses the effects of adverse selection on a multinational firm’s decision on where to subcontract. Adverse selection arises since subcontractor firms have more information than the multinational concerning their production costs. The results obtained show that adverse selection confers to subcontractor firms an advantage in their relationship with the multinational, inducing the multinational to subcontract in more than one country. In this way, adverse selection modelling outcomes justify, and are coherent with, the empirical evidence such as, the diversity of countries that multinational firms subcontract and the fast production relocation between countries.      

Rivalry in uncertain export markets: commitment versus flexibility

This paper examines optimal trade policy in a two-period oligopoly model, with a home and a foreign firm choosing capital and output. Demand uncertainty, resolved in period two, gives rise to a trade-off between strategic commitment and flexibility in the firms’ investment decisions. Firms’ investment timing is endogenous and can be manipulated by the home government, which sets a subsidy before firms decide when to invest. We show that when the government wishes to manipulate investment timing, it will choose its policy to deter investment commitment by the home or the foreign firm.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,CREDIBLE POLICY: The Role of Risk Sharing

This article constructs a model of international joint ventures with risk sharing as the main motivation. A foreign firm decides whether to undertake full ownership foreign direct investment, or to form a public-private joint venture with the host country government in an economy in transition. In our framework uncertain taxation is the source of risk. It is demonstrated that start-up investment cost sharing by the host country government encourages foreign investment. Joint financing of investment can act as insurance for the multinational firm because cost sharing serves as a means to sustain the credibility of government policy.     

补贴概念与效果

补贴是一个相当复杂的议题,其复杂性不仅表现在概念上,也表现在它可能产生的效果上。补贴可能增加也可能降低其受体的利润水平;可能对国际贸易产生扭曲效果,其影响也可能仅限于国内;可能有助于政府实现其意欲达成的目标,也可能背离其初衷;可能增加或降低政府收益,也可能无影响。把补贴宽泛地界定为有可能在短期、中期或长期对其受体的利润水平产生影响的政府作为(或不作为),有助于使决策者把关注重点转向补贴效果,从而有利于其做出应否维持、增加、减少或消除特定补贴的判断。     

Predicting Foreign Firms’ Expansion and Divestment Intentions in Host Countries: Insights from Ghana

Foreign firms’ strategic decisions in a host country after the initial investment are important issues worth extensive academic enquiry. This issue is, however, underresearched and the scant literature that does exist is focused on developed countries, despite the increasing interests and investments by firms in developing countries. Using the case of a developing sub‐Saharan African (SSA) country (Ghana), this study attempts to close this gap in the literature, as it explores the factors that can influence foreign firms’ strategic decisions regarding expansion, downsizing, relocation and termination of their operations. The study found that host countries’ business environments play an important role in foreign firms’ subsequent strategic decisions. The study particularly found that favorable government regulations, low cost factors and good infrastructure are important in influencing foreign firms’ expansions decisions. Unfavorability of these factors within the business environment on the other hand will stimulate strategic divestment. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The Use and Abuse of Export Subsidies: Evidence from Colombia

(12033) Christian Helmers and Natalia Trofimenko We evaluate the impact of firm‐specific export subsidies on exports in Colombia. Using a two‐step selection model, we predict firm‐specific subsidy amounts that can be explained by the characteristics that determine firms’ eligibility for government support and its amount. Drawing on the accounts of the discretionary allocation of subsidies in developing countries, we interpret the discrepancy between the predicted and the observed subsidy amounts as a proxy for a firm's ties to government officials. Controlling for observable and unobservable firm characteristics as well as persistence in exporting, we find that although, in general, subsidies exhibit a positive impact on export volumes, this impact is diminishing in subsidy size and in the degree of a firm's connectedness.     

Union legislation and export platform FDI

Abstract

This paper examines Foreign Direct Investment in the presence of labour unions. An oligopoly model is developed in which identical firms locate in a host country in order to export to a foreign country. These firms are unionized and compete with foreign firms on the foreign market. We consider the incentives for social dumping via restrictive labour legislation, which we assume can be used by the host country government to affect the bargaining power of unions. We ask whether it is in the interest of the importing foreign country for the host country to relax or to tighten labour laws.     

Licensing versus direct investment: implications for economic growth

We develop a symmetric two country model of foreign direct investment (FDI) that captures the internalization decision and its implications for both the rate and magnitude of innovations. When mode choice (licensing versus FDI) is fixed, a subsidy to multinational production increases the rate but decreases the size of innovations. When mode can switch, the rate and size of innovations both increase, provided the subsidy is not too large. Although innovation size decreases for industries where firms already were choosing FDI, innovation size increases for industries where firms switch from licensing to FDI because multinationals choose larger innovations than licensors.     

Optimal trade,industrial, and privatization policies in a mixed duopoly with strategic managerial incentives

Abstract

This paper examines optimal trade, industrial, and privatization policies in a home-market model of mixed international duopoly with strategic managerial incentives. Under linear demand and constant marginal costs, the optimal degree of privatization is shown to depend crucially on cost and demand parameters and on the availability of strategic trade and industrial policies. If both firms are equally efficient, optimal trade and industrial policies drive out the foreign firm and the privatization policy loses its effect on national welfare; however, if the home firm is less efficient, then full privatization combined with an import tariff and a production subsidy is optimal for the home country, while an export subsidy is optimal for the foreign country. If trade and industrial policies are unavailable and if both firms are equally efficient, full state-ownership, which drives out the foreign firm, becomes optimal; however, if the home firm is less efficient, only partial privatization is optimal, The state-ownership share is increased if either the market size grows, the home firm's efficiency increases, or the foreign firm's efficiency decreases. Further, the paper demonstrates the potential conflict between privatization and trade liberalization policies.     

外资零售业“价签门”事件理论阐析——异质化信息条件下的逆向选择与三方博弈

文章以近期发生的外资零售业“价签门”事件为背景,深度分析零售市场中信息不对称条件下“逆向选择”引起的外资零售商价格欺诈行为的理论必然性;在此基础上,进一步构建政府、零售商、消费者三方互动的不完全信息博弈模型,分析零售商价格欺诈行为的发生条件。分析结果表明,首先,竞争市场中的零售商不可能对消费者采取严重欺诈行为;其次,严格的政府市场监管确实能有效杜绝零售商欺诈行为;最后依据零售商价格欺诈决策条件,政府可以制定全方位的价格监管体系并有针对性的实施价格欺诈防范对策。     

Trade policy with several goods and ‘market linkages’

In this paper we demonstrate a substantial role for trade policy in a competitive model, finding that: (a) an export subsidy may benefit the exporting country; (b) a ‘voluntary’ export restraint may benefit the importing country; and (c) a countervailing duty may benefit the importing country even if it has no effect on the foreign price of that good. These results are in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom from two-good or partial equilibrium models, and are derived in a framework of several goods. The pattern of substitution and complementarity across goods - or ‘market linkages’ - determines the role for trade policy.     

中间人、转口贸易与加工装配活动关系研究——基于香港与内地的经验

内地加工装配活动对香港中间人的依赖有其历史原因,也与加工产品进出口市场存在不对称信息有关.中间人理论认为,只有存在不对称信息和逆向选择的市场才需要中间人,中间人必须具备鉴定产品质量的资格和能力,必须有良好的信誉、较低的交易成本并能够提高交易效率.通过对香港转口内地产品所进行的实证研究表明,信息不对称、进口方的GDP、内地与有关经济体政治关系等是影响香港中间人地位的主要因素.分析表明,内地对外贸易的发展可以增进市场信息的流动,减轻对中间人的依赖,但信息不对称和逆向选择问题仍将存在,内地开展的加工装配活动仍离不开中间人.     

本地任职、产权性质与政府补助

以2007-2014年中国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,文章从本地任职视角,实证检验了独立董事在获取政府补助中的作用。研究发现独立董事本地任职显著地提高了上市公司获得政府补助的概率和数量。基于产权性质角度的进一步经验证据揭示,国有控股显著地抑制了独立董事本地任职对企业获取政府补助的促进作用。文章的研究表明,独立董事丰富的社会资本如被恰当运用,可以帮助企业获稀缺的补助资源,但这一过程会受限于产权性质,在国有控股企业中难见成效。     

Funding development infrastructure without leverage: A risk‐sharing alternative using innovative sukuk structures

Muslim countries of the developing world suffer indebtedness resulting mostly from funding development infrastructure. Faced with a dire need for development infrastructure but with inadequate resources to fund them domestically, these governments often resort to foreign borrowing. As neither foreign banks nor international debt markets would allow for the debt to be in home currency, the funding is invariably denominated in foreign currency. For the borrowing country, in addition to currency exposure such borrowing increases the country's leverage and economic vulnerability. As these countries typically have a narrow economic base with heavy reliance on commodity exports, they are susceptible to the vagaries of commodity price fluctuation. Leverage increases the amplitude of the economy's fluctuation, resulting if not in outright crisis, then, at least in financial distress and depreciating home currency. As a result, when the foreign currency funded project comes on stream, it is burdened with huge accumulated debt which in many cases makes the project unmanageable without further government help through subsidy of operating costs. This further stresses already stretched government budgets and perpetuates indebtedness. This cycle of borrowing, leverage and vulnerability can be broken by innovative use of sukuk. The problem with debt financing is that the servicing requirements are independent of the underlying project's risk or cash flows. This paper presents two sukuk structures based on the risk sharing principles of Islamic finance. Sukuk that have returns linked to the nation's gross domestic product growth if the funded project is non‐revenue generating and linked to earnings of the project if it is revenue generating can avoid the problems above. The pay‐off profile, estimated cost of funds and returns to investors of these sukuk are discussed. When designed in small denomination, such sukuk can enhance financial inclusion, help build domestic capital markets and enable the financing of development without stressing government budgets.     

Temporary social dumping,union legalisation and FDI: a note on the strategic use of standards

This paper analyses the welfare implications for a developing country of using union legalisation as a policy instrument to attract inward foreign direct investment. While its presence may discourage a foreign multinational (MNE) from locating in the host country, unionisation is an important rent-extracting instrument for the host country. We show that if the MNE benefits from dynamic effects, the host country government may have an incentive to adopt temporary social dumping: banning the union in the short run to extract higher rents in the future. However, if the government can use a fiscal instrument in conjunction with union legalisation, the former can circumvent the need to engage in social dumping.     

政府补贴与股价崩盘风险

本文以中国A股市场2007－2014年上市公司的数据为样本,基于企业寻租理论,实证检验了政府补贴对股价崩盘风险的影响,旨在为财政政策经济后果的研究提供新的经验证据。研究发现,政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间呈显著正相关关系;在制度环境水平较低的地区,政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间正相关关系更强;在产业政策支持的行业,政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间正相关关系更强;进一步分析表明,企业寻租是两者正向关系的主要原因。本文的研究结果表明,管理层可以借助政府补贴粉饰公司业绩和隐藏公司负面消息。     

Understanding Conflicting Interests of a Government and a Tobacco Manufacturer: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Rice is the staple food of nearly half of the population of the world, most of whom live in developing countries. Ensuring a domestic supply of rice from outside sources is difficult for developing countries as less than 5% of the total world’s production is available for international trade. Hence, in order to ensure domestic food security, e.g., food availability and access, governments provide subsidies in agriculture. In many occasions, public money used for the subsidy goes toward promoting undesirable crops like tobacco. Although the strategic interaction between governments and manufacturers is critical, it has not been studied in the literature. This study fills this gap by considering a game between a government (of a developing country) and a tobacco manufacturer in which the government decides on a mix of subsidies and the tobacco manufacturer decides on declaring a purchasing price of tobacco. We provide a numerical study to show that controlling the output harvest price is more effective in reaching the desired end result for both the government and the tobacco manufacturer. A subsidy in fertilizer results in the measurable increase in the government spending but does not have significant effect in reaching the production target. The fertilizer subsidy should be provided only when the output price is too high to be affordable for the population.     

Subsidizing Away Exports? A Note on R&D-policy Towards Multinational Firms

In this paper, I investigate whether instead of strengthening home-based production, government R&D-subsidies can induce R&D-intensive firms to locate production abroad. Investigating firm-level data on Swedish MNEs, however, I find no evidence of such relocation. R&D subsidies rather tend to encourage export production at the expense of foreign production. The theory presented suggests that this is consistent with technology transfer costs, which outweigh trade costs for physical goods.     

Trade policy of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign lobbying

This paper studies the effect of foreign lobbies on trade policy of a country which is a member of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It uses a monopolistically competitive political economy model in which the government determines external tariffs endogenously. The effect of foreign lobbying under the FTA is examined empirically using Canadian industry-level trade data that allow differentiating of lobby groups by the country of origin. The analysis suggests that the presence of foreign lobbying has a significant effect on the domestic trade policy. The heterogeneity of foreign lobbies is also important: the presence of an organized lobbying group in an FTA partner country tends to raise trade barriers while an organized lobbying group of exporters from outside of the FTA is associated with less protection.