Organizational attention to corporate social responsibility and corporate social performance: the moderating effects of corporate governance

Many studies have explored the antecedents of corporate social performance (CSP), such as institutional forces and stakeholder pressures. However, few studies examine CSP from a socio‐cognitive perspective. To address this research void, this study adopts an attention‐based approach to examine the relationship between managers' attention to social issues and CSP. More important, this study reports that this relationship will be moderated by governance mechanisms that constrain managerial discretion. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, this study provides empirical support for these arguments. Therefore, our study adds new insights to the literature addressing CSP from a socio‐cognitive perspective and speaks to the structural features, both inside and outside organizations, that guide managers' attention.     

Corporate governance: Assessing corporate performance by boardroom attributes

The corporate boardroom, once an inner sanctum where the secret ritual of top-level policymaking takes place, is slowly opening its doors and letting in a bit of sunshine. As the investing public begins to peer into the corporate “kiva,” it will want to know more about board structure and performance. In anticipation, this study provides an assessment model to correlate 15 boardroom attributes, or directorate dimensions, with company performance. As a major conclusion, the study finds that as yet there is no substitute for technical experience and internal managerial expertise. Neither is there an optimal formula. No two firms have identical boardroom dimensions. As the newer dimensions begin to make contributions, this diversity will be even greater. This accentuates the need for more precise measurement of board structure and effectiveness.     

Environmental disclosure quality: Evidence on environmental performance,corporate governance and value relevance

This study focuses on common-law Malaysia, which is classified as an advanced emerging market. It assesses the association between environmental disclosure and environmental performance and examines the financial attributes of companies with different environmental disclosure scores. It investigates the relation between environmental disclosure quality and corporate governance, and also examines the extent to which effective environmental disclosures are value relevant and how they influence investor perceptions. The findings of the study show that environmental disclosure is positively linked to environmental performance. Company attributes, such as large size, the need for capital, profitability and capital spending, are positively associated with environmental disclosure quality. High quality environmental disclosers display effective corporate governance and would tend to face less difficulties in accessing capital markets. They generally are audited by a big 4 auditor or cross-listed on foreign stock exchanges and display significant levels of managerial and institutional ownership. High quality environmental disclosures are value relevant and improve investor perceptions. High quality disclosers overall belong to beverages, chemicals, food producers, forestry and paper, and industrial metals and mining.     

Foreign listings, corporate governance, and equity valuations

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign listing on equity valuations and relates it to an improvement in corporate governance. It documents abnormal returns around the announcement to list foreign shares on the London Stock Exchange. These are partially explained by a reduction of agency costs that is consistent with the enhanced monitoring and investor protection that prevail in a superior information and legal environment. The results are consistent with predictions derived from theoretical models of agency costs and illustrate an interesting implication of more open global equity markets.     

Liquidity,exchange listing,and common stock performance

The liquidity of securities—the relationship between volume of trading and changes in market price—has won increasing recognition as an element of investment strategy in recent years. Relatively high liquidity is deemed to be a desirable characteristic of a stock, especially for the institutional investor, who typically trades in large volume. Thus, firms can generally be expected to seek means of enhancing the liquidity of their shares. One of the supposed means of accomplishing this is by listing one's stock on a national securities exchange. This paper examines the relationship of common stock liquidity to both exchange listing and price behavior during major up and down movements in the market. Our conceptual and empirical analyses indicate that liquidity is linked to price behavior; and we suggest that the view held by at least some corporate officers—that exchange listing increases liquidity—may be erroneous. More specifically, it appears that when the amount of firm capitalization is taken into account, exchange listing does not result in greater stock liquidity.     

The ethics of corporate governance

The failure of the critics of corporate governance to agree on what should be done to improve the governance process can, in most cases, be traced to a different understanding of the role of corporate directors in that process. This article analyzes and contrasts the obligations of directors under two legal theories, the fictional person theory and the organic theory, of the corporation. A comparison of the director's obligations under each theory indicates that the organic theory provides a better basis for assessing the performance of directors and initiating reform.Among the boards of directors of Fortune 500 companies, I estimate that 95% are not fully doing what they are legally, morally, and ethically supposed to do. And they couldn't, even if they wanted to.E. Eugene Arthur, S.J., is Associate Professor of Management and Economics at Rockhurst College. He is a Visiting Fellow at Trinity Center for Ethics and Corporate Policy.     

Value relevance,earnings management and corporate governance in China

This study investigates whether earnings management reduces the level of value relevance and whether good corporate governance restrains earnings management. Using hand-collected data comprising 1012 firm-year observations from all companies listed on the Shanghai SSE 180 and the Shenzhen SSE 100, the results show that the negative impact of value relevance for the companies engaged in earnings management is greater than the companies that have not engaged in earnings management engagement. Furthermore, the companies with good corporate governance practices are more likely to constrain earnings management than those without.     

An evaluation of corporate governance evaluation, governance index (CGI NK ) and performance: Evidence from Chinese listed companies in 2003

In the present paper, based on samples of 2003, empirical analyses of Corporate Governance Index (CGI ^NK ) and its six dimensions of listed companies in China, the index of controlling shareholders’ behaviors, board governance index, top management governance index, information disclosure index, stakeholders’ governance index, and supervisors committee governance index, are carried out and the results show that CGI ^NK is positively associated with the return on assets (ROA), net assets per share (NAPS), earnings per share (EPS), operating cash flow per share (OCFPS), total assets turnover (TAV), rate of total assets growth (ITA) and Z-score. These indicate that good corporate governance mechanisms improve profitability, stock expansion ability, operating efficiency, growth and development potential, as well as financial flexibility and safety of listed companies. Corporate governance mechanisms of controlling shareholders, board of directors, top management, information disclosure, stakeholders and supervisors committee are largely responsible for decision-making and decision-execution mechanisms, and furthermore, they have direct and profound effects on the performance and value of listed companies. Translated from Zhongguo Gongye Jingji 中国工业经济 (China Industrial Economy), 2006, (4): 98–107     

Dual-class unifications and corporate governance in Brazil

We investigate dual-class unifications in a period following the successful inception of a premium single-class listing segment. Firms that unified increased their market liquidity. Investment opportunities and shareholder rights convergence drove unification of firms that later joined the new premium list. Financial constraints impelled unification firms that remained in the least demanding list. All unified firms that joined the new list remained there five years later. Half of the others delisted or were in serious financial distress. The motivations for unification may differ according to the ability of firms to improve their corporate governance and transparency later.     

Enough chit-chat,strike! Deliberation and agonism in corporate governance

This conceptual paper contributes to the critique of a body of literature that will be named ‘deliberative corporate governance’ by defending non-deliberative acts performed by stakeholders. It first argues that this literature introduces to the corporation a decision-making process where it does not belong, given the corporation's economic role. This leads to an ‘efficiency constraint’ on any attempt to justify deliberation – deliberative governance theorists must show that it is the most efficient and cost-effective way to address the issues that concern them. A real case example where deliberation would have been counter-productive in that regard will show that this is not the case. Building on this example, the paper uses the theory of democratic agonism to argue that non-deliberative acts should be part of governance. A sketch of managerial duties vis-à-vis such acts is attempted as well. The paper does not seek to reject deliberative corporate governance entirely, but rather to defend the importance of non-deliberative practices in addressing its theoretical concern. It makes a conceptual contribution to corporate governance theory, from which it draws practical implications for stakeholders-oriented management.     

浅谈公司治理对企业社会责任的影响

文章从公司的治理研究入手,详细的分析了企业社会责任与公司治理的关系,并有效地进行了内部和外部的治理机制验证,得到企业社会责任的进一步升华.     

Firm performance,corporate ownership,and corporate social responsibility disclosure in China

The existing literature provides conflicting results on the association between firm performance and corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure. This paper empirically examines the effect of firm performance on CSR disclosure in terms of disclosure frequency and quality among Chinese listed firms and the possible mediating effect of corporate ownership on the relationship between firm performance and CSR disclosure. Our findings show that better‐performing firms are more likely than worse‐performing ones to disclose CSR information and to produce higher quality CSR reports. In addition, the link between firm performance and CSR disclosure is found to be weaker among state‐owned enterprises compared with non‐state‐owned ones.     

浅议风险资本与高新技术企业的公司治理

当前,由于风险投资在高新技术企业中所占的股权巨大,使得高新技术企业的公司治理变得复杂、特殊.风险资本市场本身具有风险性强、涉及范围广等特点,只有使其功能充分发挥出来,才能促进风险资本的合理开发,促进高新技术企业的技术创新,才能使高新技术企业的公司治理顺利开展.本文主要从风险资本最基本的运作原理入手,分析目前高新技术企业的公司治理过程中存在的风险,以及高新技术企业如何在各种风险中吸引风险投资.     

Cash holdings and corporate governance in family-controlled firms

This study examines the association between corporate governance and cash policy within family-controlled firms. Family businesses are complex, because, in addition to dealing with common business requirements and opportunities, they must consider the needs and desires of the family owners. The results of this study show that the impact of corporate governance, with its separation of control rights and cash flow rights, director-ownership-in-pledge ratio and proportion of independent directors on cash policy, differs between family-controlled and nonfamily-controlled firms. Separation of seat control rights and cash flow rights, as well as chair duality, significantly affects the cash policy within different levels of cash holdings in firms.     

Corporate governance,ownership and firm value: Drivers of ownership as a good corporate governance mechanism

This study analyses the role of ownership as a good corporate governance mechanism. We study cross-national differences between companies with different level of investor protection. In addition, we account for the type of owner (young family vs. non-young family businesses) and the owner’s relationship with a second significant shareholder (monitoring vs. collusion). When the main owner has effective control over the firm (i.e., absolute control or less than absolute control but without the control of a second significant shareholder), the relation between ownership concentration and firm value is U-shaped. Our findings also suggest that the conflicts between majority and minority shareholders are weaker for companies with higher investor protection and young family-owned businesses.     

In search of corporate governance in franchising

Abstract

A firm’s governance structure and business model might explain the firm’s failure or success. Franchising is a business model that has not received much attention within the corporate governance (CG) literature even though it obviously brings several unique CG challenges. Therefore, we review articles at the interface of CG and franchising. We identify and thematize the literature in four focus areas, each with a different relationship to CG: 1) traditional CG, 2) governance challenges unique to franchising, 3) governance modes, and 4) contracts. We find that the literature largely ignores the traditional view of CG when examining many aspects of franchising. We also find that the franchising literature covers governance topics when discussing governance modes, which provides a basis for developing CG theories. Altogether, our findings open a promising avenue for future research that incorporates CG into studies of franchising.