Owner-occupancy fraud and mortgage performance

We identify occupancy fraud—borrowers who misrepresent their occupancy status as owner-occupants rather than investors—in residential mortgage originations. Unlike previous work, we show that fraud was prevalent in originations not just during the housing bubble but also persists through more recent times. We also demonstrate that fraud is broad-based and appears in government-sponsored enterprise and bank portfolio loans, not just in private securitization; these fraudulent borrowers make up one third of the effective investor population. Occupancy frauds obtain credit at lower interest rates, suggesting a motivation for undertaking fraud. These fraudulent borrowers perform substantially worse than similar declared investors, defaulting at a 75% higher rate. We also provide evidence consistent with fraudulent borrowers’ defaults being more “strategic,” suggesting that this population poses a risk in the face of declining house prices.     

Financial Literacy,Broker–Borrower Interaction and Mortgage Default

This article examines the relationship between broker–borrower interaction in the origination process and subsequent mortgage performance. I show that face‐to‐face interaction between a mortgage broker and borrower before the loan funds is associated with lower levels of ex post default. The relation between face‐to‐face broker–borrower interaction and mortgage performance holds only for borrowers that have characteristics associated with low levels of financial literacy. Specifically, face‐to‐face interaction is negatively related to default for minorities, borrowers located in areas with low levels of education, low‐income borrowers and borrowers with low FICO scores. My results suggest that face‐to‐face interaction between the mortgage broker and borrower may reduce problems associated with financial illiteracy.     

Do Borrowers Make Rational Choices on Points and Refinancing?

Utilizing individual mortgage data, we find that borrowers with points are less likely to refinance, and when they do, they take longer to refinance. This finding supports the separating equilibrium prediction of earlier studies that borrowers with higher (lower) refinancing costs self‐select into mortgages with higher‐point/lower‐rate (lower‐point/higher‐rate) loans.     

Do Riskier Borrowers Borrow More?

Conventional wisdom in the mortgage industry holds that loan-to-value (LTV) ratios are positively correlated with mortgage default rates. However, not all empirical studies of mortgage loan performance support this view. This paper offers a theoretical signaling model of why the correlation between LTV ratios and default risk is contingent upon the default costs of the borrower. Specifically, the model proposes that when default costs are high there exists a separating equilibrium in which risky borrowers will self-select into lower LTV loans to reduce the probability of facing a costly default, while safe borrowers will self-select into higher LTV loans as a signal of their enhanced creditworthiness. This adverse selection process gives rise to the possibility of higher default probabilities for lower LTV loans. Conversely, when default costs are low the conventional result, in which risky borrowers select higher LTV loans than safe borrowers, is obtained. Empirical results, based on a sample of 859 single-family residential mortgage loans drawn from the portfolio of a national mortgage lender, are consistent with the separating equilibria predicted by the model.     

Market power and banking failures

We investigate whether more competition in the banking industry necessarily results in a higher probability of banking failures, as it is often suggested. In our model borrowers face a moral hazard problem, which induces banks to choose between costly monitoring and credit rationing. We show that investment decreases with the lending rate and increases with monitoring effort. Since incentives to monitor are enhanced by market power, the relationship between market structure and investment is ambiguous. In the presence of non-diversifiable risk and decreasing returns to scale, more investment implies higher failure rates. As a result, the relationship between market power and banking failures is ambiguous.     

Estimating Borrower Mobility from Observed Prepayments

This article describes a method used to estimate parameters describing the mobility of borrowers choosing fixed-rate mortgages. Using a mortgage valuation model that predicts prepayments contingent upon parameters describing the distribution of expected tenure in the home, the average mobility of borrowers can be estimated from observed prepayment behavior. This article estimates the mobility of borrowers who chose fixed-rate mortgages before 1980 and borrowers who chose similar mortgages in the second half of the 1980s, when adjustable-rate mortgages were widely available. The empirical results support the claim that the average mobility of fixed-rate borrowers has declined.     

Collusion and leadership

The paper explores the role of price or quantity leadership in facilitating collusion. It extends the standard analysis of tacit collusion by allowing firms to make their strategic choices either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that price leadership indeed facilitates collusion by making it easier to punish deviations by the leader. In case of pure Bertrand competition, price leadership restores the scope for (perfect) collusion in markets where collusion would not be sustainable otherwise. When firms face asymmetric costs or offer differentiated products, price leadership can also enhance the profitability of collusion—in case of asymmetric costs, the less efficient firm must act as the leader. Finally, such leadership is less effective in case of Cournot competition since, following an aggressive deviation by the leader, the follower would rather limit its own output, making it more difficult to punish the deviation. Still, quantity leadership may enhance collusion when it is already somewhat effective in a simultaneous move setting.     

Spatial Heterogeneity in Mortgage Terminations by Refinance, Sale and Default

This article investigates the impact of spatially correlated unobservable variables on the refinancing, selling and default decisions of mortgage borrowers. Virtually the entire mortgage literature acknowledges that borrower-specific characteristics, such as culture, education or access to information, play an important role in mortgage termination decisions. While we do not observe these variables directly, we note that borrowers of similar background tend to cluster together in neighborhoods. We estimate a competing risks hazard model with random effects using a three-stage maximum likelihood estimation approach. We utilize the space-varying coefficient method to modify the covariance structure according to the spatial distribution of the observations. Beyond a significant improvement of the model performance, this yields a number of insightful implications for mortgage termination behavior. For instance, borrowers of the affluent "West Side" of Los Angeles County both refinance and move at a higher rate than predicted by the standard maximum likelihood estimation method. At the same time, borrowers from some lower-valued neighborhoods tend to stay longer than expected with their mortgages and properties.     

Origination Channel,Prepayment Penalties and Default

This article presents evidence that nonbank‐originated subprime mortgages have a higher probability of default than bank‐originated subprime mortgages, but only for loans with prepayment penalties. Evidence also indicates that nonbanks price prepayment penalties less favorably to borrowers than banks do, and nonbanks originate disproportionately more loans with prepayment penalties in locales with less financially sophisticated borrowers. State antipredatory lending law provisions restricting the use of prepayment penalties eliminate the elevated default risk of nonbank originations relative to bank originations. These findings are consistent with incentives generated by nonbank compensation via yield spread premiums on loans with prepayment penalties.     

Differential Access to and Pricing of Home Mortgages: 2004 through 2009

This article documents trends and drivers of the residential mortgage market during the years 2004 through 2009, specifically focusing on the access to and pricing of mortgages originated by African‐American and Hispanic borrowers, and by borrowers living in low‐income and minority communities. Our analysis relies on a rich set of proprietary data that allow more expanded insights than can be obtained from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) alone. We show that access to mortgage credit increased between 2004 and 2006 for the borrowers we focus on in our study and declined dramatically thereafter. Trends in access to credit were driven primarily by the changing credit mix of mortgage applicants and secondarily by the replacement of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) for subprime as the dominant mode of nonprime originations and tighter underwriting standards. Throughout our entire period of study, these borrowers also consistently paid higher prices for their mortgages; however, the extent of this differential varied considerably over time and across groups. These pricing trends were driven primarily by changes in the FHA and subprime shares as well as by the market's increasingly aggressive pricing of credit risk.     

Unobservable Risks in Mortgage Contract Choice

This study proposes a lifetime utility maximization model where borrowers choose optimal mortgage bundles including mortgage type, loan‐to‐value and loan size to maximize their allocation of limited budgets between housing and nonhousing consumptions. The model predicts that the mortgage bundle choices by borrowers of different income and risk attributes explain significant variations in the ex post default risks of the borrowers. The empirical tests using sampled mortgages pooled in nonagency residential mortgage backed securities support the hypothesis that the optimal choice of mortgage bundles reveals hidden risk factors of borrowers, which, if ignored, could lead to misjudgment of ex post default of borrowers.     

浅析利率调整对住房抵押贷款违约风险的影响

住房贷款利率的变化对房地产价格产生着巨大影响,房地产价格又是住房抵押贷款中重要因素,与住房抵押贷款风险密切相关。违约风险是住房低押贷款风险中最基本最主要的风险,也称信用风险。论文将从理论上分析利率政策调整对住宅抵押贷款违约风险的影响,并提出相应的防范措施。     

Foreclosure's Wake: The Credit Experiences of Individuals Following Foreclosure

While a substantial literature has examined the causes of mortgage foreclosure, there has been relatively little work on the consequences of foreclosure for the borrowers themselves. Using a large sample of anonymous credit bureau records, observed quarterly from 1999 through 2010, we examine the credit experiences of 330,000 borrowers before and after a foreclosure start. Our analysis documents the substantial declines in credit scores that accompany a foreclosure start and examines the length of time it takes individuals to return their credit scores to predelinquency levels. The results suggest that, particularly for prime borrowers, credit score recovery comes slowly, if at all. The lack of recovery appears to be driven by persistently higher delinquency rates on consumer credit (such as auto and credit card loans) in the years that follow their foreclosure start. Our results also indicate that the experiences of individuals whose mortgages entered foreclosure from 2007 to 2009 have followed a similar path to borrowers foreclosed earlier in the decade, though their postforeclosure‐start delinquency rates have been higher and, consequently, credit score recovery appears to be taking longer.     

Mortgage Choice: What's the Point?

This article shows that, in the presence of transaction costs payable by borrowers on refinancing, it is possible to construct a separating equilibrium in which borrowers with differing mobility select fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) with different combinations of coupon rate and points. We also show that, in the absence of such costs, no such equilibrium is possible. This provides a possible explanation for the large menus of FRMs typically encountered by potential borrowers, and suggests that the menu available at the time of origination should be an important predictor of future prepayment. We numerically implement the model, developing the first contingent claims mortgage valuation algorithm that can quantify the effect of self-selection on real contracts in a realistic interest rate setting. The algorithm allows investors to account for self-selection when valuing mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. It also, for the first time, allows lenders to determine the optimal points/coupon rate schedule to offer to a specified set of potential borrowers, given the current level of interest rates.     

Thy Neighbor’s Mortgage: Does Living in a Subprime Neighborhood Affect One’s Probability of Default?

This article focuses on the potential externalities associated with subprime mortgage origination activity. Specifically, we examine whether negative spillover effects from subprime mortgage originations result in higher default rates in the surrounding area. Our empirical analysis controls for loan characteristics, house price changes and alternative loan products. Our results indicate that, after controlling for these characteristics, the concentration of subprime lending in a neighborhood does not lead to greater default risks for surrounding borrowers. However, we do find that more aggressive mortgage products (such as hybrid adjustable rate mortgages and low/no‐documentation loans) had significant negative spillovers on other borrowers. Stated differently, the aggressive alternative mortgage designs were more toxic to the housing and mortgage market than previously believed.     

Risk and the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage

This article analyzes the risks involved with reverse mortgage insurance and explains the pricing model developed for the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) demonstration. The paper demonstrates how borrower longevity, interest rates and property value changes all affect pricing, and why the HECM model focuses on property value as the primary source of uncertainty. It goes on to explain why a random walk specification was chosen to forecast property values, and how the principal limit factors, which determine cash payments to borrowers in the HECM program, are calculated.     

The Performance of Low-Income and Minority Mortgages

This article analyzes the performance of low-income and minority mortgages (LIMMs) from a large sample of fixed-rate conventional conforming mortgages. We find that low-income borrowers are less likely to prepay when it is optimal, whereas black and Hispanic borrowers prepay more slowly than other borrowers, regardless of the option's value. After controlling for equity, credit history and some other variables, LIMMs default slightly more frequently and have about the same loss severity as other loans. Our results suggest that, for most yield curve situations, differences in LIMM prepayment behavior have little effect on pricing.     

The Borrower's Perceived Risk in Mortgage Choice

We investigate how borrowers perceive the risk in the adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) versus fixed rate mortgage (FRM) choice. We develop a mortgage choice model where the coefficient on the long‐term bond risk premium is conditional on the borrower's perceived risk. We show that the perceived risk fluctuates over time according to the short‐term interest rate level and housing market conditions. We find that when the short‐term rate level is high (low), the borrowers perceive low (high) risk of a short‐term rate rise, thus opting for ARMs (FRMs). Also, during a down housing market they become more risk‐averse perceiving higher risk in choosing ARMs. The perceived risk level alters the borrowers’ sensitivity to the long‐term bond risk premium.     

The Impact of Second Loans on Subprime Mortgage Defaults

An estimated 12.6% of primary mortgage loans were simultaneously originated with a second loan from 2004 until 2008, although relatively little is known about how the presence of such subordinate loans affects the default decisions of borrowers. We use a novel data series of loan servicing records from 2002 until 2010 to identify such borrowers and find evidence that the default behavior of these borrowers significantly differs from borrowers without second loans. Estimating a discrete‐time proportional odds hazard model, we find borrowers with a second loan were 62.7% more likely to default each month on their primary loan when conditioning alone on the attributes of the primary loan. However, borrowers of second loans were 58.3% less likely to default on their primary loan as compared to single‐loan borrowers with equivalent current combined attributes (i.e., loan‐to‐value, balance and interest rate). We hypothesize and provide empirical evidence that this occurs because borrowers with second loans have the option to sequentially default on each loan since subordinate lenders will not pursue foreclosure if borrowers have insufficient equity. Lenders of defaulted subordinate debt may revisit their decision to foreclose in the future after housing markets start to recover, thus prompting a new round of foreclosures.     

Credit Rationing and Government Loan Programs: A Welfare Analysis

Asymmetric information about borrower default probabilities may lead to inefficient credit rationing of low-risk borrowers in otherwise competitive markets. In a simple model having these properties, we show that some types of government loan programs, such as loan guarantees issued through lenders, might improve economic efficiency. But the incentive for high-risk borrowers to misrepresent their loan quality is worsened by other government loan programs, notably those that try to target aid directly to rationed borrowers. As such, cost-effective programs may increase inefficiency. This surprising result highlights the need to conduct model-specific policy analyses, as opposed to analyses based on model-free performance indicators.