Political importance and its relation to the federal prosecution of public corruption

In the US, federal prosecutors are appointed by the president, confirmed by the Senate, and have significant discretion over which cases they choose to take to court. Federal prosecutors handling an overwhelming majority of corruption cases invites the possibility of political influence in the monitoring of corruption. Additionally, political disparities across states may result in differences in corrupt behavior. Using individual case level data, I examine the effect political factors have on federal corruption cases, with an emphasis on states that are an important focus in the next presidential election. I find that corruption convictions tend to be higher in politically important states. This effect seems more significant when Democratic administrations are in power. In addition, it seems that these effects are relevant only for corruption crimes labeled as “federal”.     

Politicians at higher levels of government are perceived as more corrupt

The relationship between decentralization and corruption has been discussed extensively, but little is known about the variation of corruption across government levels. Using an original survey where French citizens were asked to assess corruption at all levels of government, we observe that corruption perceived at a government level is higher, the higher the government level in the government hierarchy. Specifically, municipal governments are perceived as the least corrupt, followed by local governments, senators, deputies, and the national cabinet. The president of the Republic is perceived as slightly less corrupt than the national cabinet, but more corrupt than any other level of government. The relationship is robust to alternative specifications, controlling for a series of individual and regional characteristics, and to alternative definitions of the dependent variable. The finding is not reducible to geographic distance. We observe it in several other countries.     

Corruption and economic development nexus: Variations across income levels in a non-linear framework

This article investigates the relationship between income and corruption which provides an insight to the changes in the level of perceived corruption and economic development across countries. An existing shortcoming is that previous studies have focused only on detecting the linear effects of income on corruption. We therefore use the hierarchical polynomial regression to evaluate any existence of a non-linear relationship after controlling for socio-economic and institutional factors. Our results challenge some of the findings of a negative income–corruption association in the literature, and provide some new inferences. The findings indicate a quadratic function that best fits the data, and despite an upsurge of corruption among the low-to-medium income countries, the advanced stages of development eventually reduce corruption level substantially. The results persist when per capita income is instrumented for by latitude distance and life expectancy. The policy implications suggest a combination of economic, institutional and social policies that can effectively, in turn, reduce and lower the effects of corruption on the society, economy and development.     

Electoral cycles in perceived corruption: International empirical evidence

I examine whether elections influence perceived corruption in the public sector. Perceived corruption in the public sector is measured by the reversed Transparency International's Perception of Corruption Index (CPI). The dataset includes around 100 democracies over the period 2012–2016, a sample for which the CPI is comparable across countries and over time. The results show that the reversed CPI was about 0.4 points higher in election years than in other years, indicating that perceived corruption in the public sector increased before elections. The effect is especially pronounced before early elections (1.0 points) compared to regular elections (0.4 points). Future research needs to investigate why perceived corruption in the public sector increased before elections.     

Country governance,corruption, and the likelihood of firms’ innovation

Using a sample of firms from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for the period 2006–2016 in emerging and developing countries, we find that corruption has a negative impact on the likelihood of innovations, thus supporting the “sanding-the-wheels” hypothesis. Our empirical results also show that corruption at the firm level, in the manufacturing industry, and in regions with the worst governance or that are more corrupt has a significant negative effect on innovation. In addition, country governance plays a particularly important role in innovative activity for corrupt firms. The policy implication is that the government or authority should strengthen the positive role of government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of corruption in order to improve firms’ innovation within an environment of corruption.     

Corruption and privatization

This paper analyses the relation between corruption and privatization. In particular, we study how corruption affects the acquisition price and the post-privatization market structure. The model predicts that privatization in countries with highly corrupt government results in a higher degree of market concentration than in countries where governments are less corrupt. The acquisition price is also likely to be higher when a government is highly corrupt than when government officials are honest or moderately corrupt. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, we demonstrate that a stronger propensity to embezzle state revenues may reduce government officials' benefits from corruption. The reason is that the more eager the government officials are to take bribes, the cheaper they are to buy.     

Effects of regulatory burden and corruption on firm performance: Evidence from Moldova

Firms in Moldova face a high level of regulatory burden, as proxied by the number of inspections by public authorities. At the same time, they face high levels of corruption. We examine the effect of frequent inspections on four measures of firm performance: labour and total factor productivity, and levels of tangible and intangible assets. We also investigate how corruption affects the relationship between inspections and firm performance. We perform panel data analysis using firm-level administrative data and survey data from Moldova in 2005–2015. The results show that inspections and corruption each affect firm productivity negatively, but corruption moderates the negative effect of inspections. We also find that inspections and intangible assets are positively correlated, but this correlation is weaker for higher levels of corruption. Finally we examine whether these results differ by industry, firm size and ownership types. Inspections and corruption affect medium and large firms, and state-owned enterprises differently from micro and small firms and private firms respectively.     

The impact of local financial development on firm growth in Vietnam: Does the level of corruption matter?

We examine the effects of province-level financial development and corruption on the performance of Vietnamese firms in terms of the growth rates of sales, investment and sales per worker. Employing a large firm-level dataset of more than 40,000 firms for the period 2009–2013 and applying a heteroskedasticity-based identification strategy, we find that province-level financial development promotes firm growth, while corruption hinders it. Most importantly, the marginal effect of financial development on firm growth depends negatively on the level of corruption. Moreover, financial development exacerbates the growth-retarding effect of corruption.     

东道国腐败对跨国公司进入模式的影响研究

作为东道国投资环境中的重要组成部分,腐败不但会对FDI流入总量产生影响,还会对跨国公司的战略产生影响,而首先受到影响的就是跨国公司的进入模式战略。本研究以19个新兴市场国家的745家跨国公司子公司作为样本,运用MANOVA分析、判别分析、Logistic分析等研究方法得到以下结论:第一,东道国国家层面感知腐败、产业层面感知腐败会使跨国公司采用持股比例较低的合资(控股或非控股)进入模式;第二,东道国腐败程度对跨国公司进入模式战略的影响会受到跨国公司进入东道国战略动机的调节。     

The Effect of Corruption on Investment Growth: Evidence from Firms in Latin America,Sub‐Saharan Africa,and Transition Countries*

Most of the empirical studies that analyze the impact of corruption on investment have three common features: they employ country‐level data on investment, corruption is measured at the country level, and data for countries from several regions are pooled together. This paper uses firm‐level data on investment and measures corruption at the firm and country level, and allows the effect of corruption to vary by region. Our dependent variable is firms' investment growth and we employ six measures of corruption from four different sources—two firm‐level measures and four country‐level measures. We find that the effect of corruption on investments varies significantly across regions: corruption has a negative and significant effect on investment growth for firms in Transition countries but has no significant impact for firms in Latin America and Sub‐Saharan Africa. Furthermore, for Transition countries, corruption is the most important determinant of investment.     

Is corruption grease,grit or a gamble? Corruption increases variance of productivity across countries

The effect of corruption on economic growth has attracted interest in empirical development economics. The conventional view of corruption as impediment for growth has been challenged by the ‘grease-on-the-wheels’ hypothesis. We take a new perspective on the issue and suggest corruption as macro risk, referred to as a ‘gamble’ hypothesis. Using cross-country data and two alternative indicators of corruption, we find corruption to be a significant driver of heteroscedasticity in total productivity. This supports the new gamble hypothesis. We also note some misleading interpretations in the previously published frontier applications. To avoid these shortcomings, we apply a flexible semi-nonparametric estimator.     

Does corruption hinder investment? Evidence from Russian regions

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and fixed capital investment in the setting of a corrupt country. Using different measures of corruption – registered cases of bribe taking and incidents of experienced corruption by the population – we find a negative relationship between investment and corruption. We then address the problem of endogeneity of corruption using an instrumental variables approach: when corruption is instrumented with freedom of the press and violations of journalists' rights, we find an even bigger negative effect. Disaggregating investment by ownership-type shows that only private investment is affected by corruption, but not investment made by state-owned companies. The negative effect is larger for companies with full or partial foreign ownership. Additionally, we look at the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI): similar to the investment in fixed capital, we find a negative relationship; however, its statistical significance varies across specifications with different data sources for FDI and different corruption measures.     

A Crook is a Crook … But is He Still a Crook Abroad? On the Effect of Immigration on Destination‐Country Corruption

This paper analyzes the impact of migration on destination‐country corruption levels. Capitalizing on a comprehensive dataset consisting of annual immigration stocks of OECD countries from 207 countries of origin for the period 1984–2008, we explore different channels through which corruption might migrate. We employ different estimation methods using fixed effects and Tobit regressions in order to validate our findings. Moreover, we also address the issue of endogeneity by using the Difference‐Generalized Method of Moments estimator. Independent of the econometric methodology, we consistently find that while general migration has an insignificant effect on the destination country's corruption level, immigration from corruption‐ridden origin countries boosts corruption in the destination country. Our findings provide a more profound understanding of the socioeconomic implications associated with migration flows.     

The Dynamic Relationship Between Corruption–Inflation: Evidence From Panel Vector Autoregression

This paper aims to explain the mixed causality nexus between corruption and inflation. For that, we apply a panel vector autoregression model on a large sample of 180 countries over the period 1996–2014. Using two corruption indexes and subsample estimations, results provide evidence that the inflation–corruption nexus is bidirectional. The causal effect is more important from corruption to inflation. Interactions remain significant but heterogeneous across subsamples with different income levels. The corruption effect is persistent only in low–middle income economies and its adverse effect on inflation is weaker in high‐income economies. The two‐way relationship between inflation and corruption reflects the inability to control inflation and the situation of the poverty trap in some countries.     

ON THE DETERMINANTS OF EDUCATIONAL CORRUPTION: THE CASE OF UKRAINE

This article utilizes a unique data set to examine the relationship between a group of potential explanatory variables and educational corruption in Ukraine. Our corruption controls include bribing on exams, on term papers, for credit, and for university admission. We use a robust nonparametric approach in order to estimate the probability of bribing across the four different categories. This approach is shown to be robust to a variety of different types of endogeneity often encountered under commonly assumed parametric specifications. Our main findings indicate that corruption perceptions, past bribing behavior, and the perceived criminality of bribery are significant factors for all four categories of bribery. From a policy perspective, we argue that when bribe control enforcement is difficult, anti‐corruption education programs targeting social perceptions of corruption could be appropriate. (JEL K42, J16, C14)     

Does Inequality Foster Corruption?

In this paper, we investigate how inequality affects corruption in the presence of an imperfect credit market. We favor an explanation based on a multimarket framework where corruption in one market (or sector) arises because of imperfections exacerbated by inequality in related markets. We demonstrate that even when an individual's ability to pay bribes and benefit from engaging in corruption are not affected by wealth level, greater (wealth) inequality will lead to an increase in corruption.     

Party Discipline and Environmental Policy: The Role of “Smoke‐filled Back Rooms”*

We adopt the view that greater party discipline induces legislators to commit to promised policies after being elected. We then develop the hypothesis that the effect of party discipline on the stringency of environmental policy is conditional on the degree of government corruption. Our empirical work suggests that greater party discipline results in more stringent environmental policies when the level of corruption is relatively low, but in weaker policies when the level of corruption is comparatively high.     

Government size,democracy, and corruption: An empirical investigation

Previous studies on the effect of government size on corruption have produced mixed results. In an attempt to explain these ambiguous results, this study investigates the effect of government size on corruption by taking into account the role of the democracy in each country. Using annual data of 82 countries between 1995 and 2008, the estimation results indicate that an increase in government size can lead to a decrease in corruption if the democracy level is sufficiently high and, in contrast, can lead to an increase in corruption if it is too low. As robustness checks, the estimations using a different index of corruption and a different proxy for government size are also conducted. The results reveal that our main findings are robust. Furthermore, to address endogeneity problems, we conduct the instrumental variables estimation and the system generalized method of moments estimation, the results of which also support our primary findings. These results provide some important implications for policymakers seeking to perform government interventions without aggravating corruption.     

The effect of corruption on microfinance loan portfolio: A semiparametric analysis

In this paper, we examine the extent to which corruption affects the loan portfolio of microfinance institutions (MFIs). We employ robust econometric estimation on a sample of 507 MFIs across 63 countries from 2005 to 2018. Our results show that corruption is negatively associated with the loan portfolio. However, in semiparametric analysis, we find that lower-level corruption is beneficial to increase the loan portfolio while higher-level corruption is detrimental. The results imply that it is not just corruption that matters as far as its effect on MFIs' loan portfolio is concerned; what matters is the degree of corruption. In further analyses, we find that corruption reduces both the number of active borrowers and average loan per borrower indicating that corruption reduces both coverage and amount of credit extension. The results suggest that the effect of corruption on the loan portfolio is gender-sensitive. Corruption facilitates an increase in loans to female borrowers. Our results are robust to alternative variable measurements and different identification strategies, including two-stage least square.     

Do longer constitutions corrupt?

Tsebelis and Nardi (2016) and Tsebelis (2017) report that constitutional length correlates with lower levels of GDP per capita. They argue that this may be the case because longer constitutions lead to greater corruption. However, uncovering a causal relationship between constitutional length and corruption is difficult. On the one hand, political elites may pressure drafters to include specific provisions that facilitate their rent-seeking efforts. On the other hand, constitutional drafters may be responding to corruption by including a large number of specific safeguards. Our aim in this paper is to explore whether there is a causal effect of constitutional length on corruption. We utilize data from the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) to identify 5 cases when a country experienced a ≥50% increase in constitutional length. For each of those cases, we compare the subsequent change in corruption to that of a synthetic control. We report evidence of a significant post-treatment increase in corruption for 3 out of 5 cases (Ecuador in both 1997 and 2008; Venezuela in 1999). However, the 2008 Ecuador result is not robust to a placebo test; and in the case of Venezuela it is difficult to distinguish a constitutional length effect from a “Chavez effect” (Grier and Maynard 2016). The evidence that longer constitutions corrupt is weak.