Wage indexation,migration, and unemployment

This article sets up a two-goods model with wage indexation and migrants. A dual labor market is introduced where the domestic workers receive an indexed wage while migrants receive a market-determined wage. The traded sector may be assumed to be unionized while the non-traded goods sector is non-unionized giving rise to flexible wages. This provides an example of segmentation and wage indexation. The wage indexation creates unemployment in the traded sector and the segmentation allows this unemployment to persist. The main results obtained are: sector-specific migration of labor may raise domestic welfare, while with capital accumulation such migration necessarily raises the relative price of the non-traded goods, leading to structural adjustment.     

Central Bank Independence and the Cost of Disinflation: Why the Wage Contracts Length Matters?

Recent empirical contributions demonstrate that countries with less independent central banks enjoy lower output losses during disinflationary cycles. To explain these somewhat surprising empirical findings, some authors suggest that independent central banks probably face a flatter short-run Phillips curve. In this paper, we provide both theoretical and empirical arguments to rationalize this intuition. We demonstrate that, since central bank independence reduces the mean inflation rate and its variance, wage setters opt for a lower degree of nominal wage indexation leading to more wage and price inertia and, thus, to a flatter short-run Phillips curve. Consequently, this paper put forward a channel of positive influence of central bank independence on the sacrifice ratio through its impact on nominal wage indexation. Empirical tests, performed using a sample of 19 OECD countries during the 1960–1990 period, show that these theoretical results hold also empirically.     

Union objectives and indexation externalities in a monopolistically competitive economy

This paper extends the literature on indexation externalities by analyzing equilibrium and efficient indexation in a unionized economy characterized by a monopolistically competitive goods market. The assumption that union objectives relate to both employment and the real wage implies that union indexation decisions are associated with a negative externality and, as a consequence, the equilibrium degree of indexation is inefficiently high. This feature is characteristic of both passive and activist policy environments.     

The effects of indexation of wage contracts on macro-economic stability

The paper develops a simple analytical framework in which the shortrun affects of wage indexation on the dynamic stability of inflation can be analyzed. It consists of a unlonized labor market faced by a competitive demand. Without indexation, the wage contract is based upon the union's prediction of the price level during the period of the contract. With indexation, the same objective is achieved by contracting only once at some initial period, subject to the stipulation that the nominal wage is linked to the price level. The main result is that when the demand for money is sensitive to changes in the expected rate of inflation, nominal variables like prices and wages are more likely to yield an unstable dynamic response with wage indexation, thus endangering the monetary system.     

INFLATION AND THE DISPERSION OF REAL WAGES*

The article studies the effects of inflation on real wage dispersion in a search‐monetary framework. The economy is characterized by frictions in both the goods and the labor markets. In the goods market, buyers and sellers bargain over prices, whereas in the labor market firms post wage offers. In equilibrium, a lower inflation rate increases the dispersion of real wages. This result is consistent with both the observed trends in wage dispersion and the inflation rate witnessed in the 1980s and the 1990s in the United States and the empirical literature linking reduced inflation to greater wage dispersion.     

Implications of Economic Interdependence for Endogenous Wage Indexation Decisions

This paper shows how economic interdependence affects the indexation decisions of atomistic wage setters in an environment in which monetary authorities do not observe stochastic disturbances before making their policy choices. If stochastic disturbances are common across countries, interdependence has no effect on equilibrium indexation choices in identical countries. However, if disturbances are country specific, numerical simulations show that interdependence is likely to reduce equilibrium indexation choices relative to a small open economy. We also show that indexation choices may be either strategic complements or strategic substitutes, but that strategic complementarity becomes more likely as the degree of interdependence rises.     

WELFARE COSTS OF SHIFTING TREND INFLATION: STAGGERED WAGE AND PRICE CONTRACTS

We develop a New Keynesian model featuring staggered price and wage contracts to study welfare costs of exogenous variations in trend inflation. The analyses show that the consequences of constant positive trend inflation and shifting trend inflation are severe, especially when trend inflation is high. Among two channels, staggered wage contracts play a vital role in transmitting adverse impacts of constant and shifting trend inflation into the economy. Without the staggered wage channel, these costs are modest. We also conduct exercises to examine the sensitivity of welfare costs to a wide range of plausible parameters. The results show that if the price and wage friction are sufficiently large, the price and wage indexation level are sufficiently small, or there is upward biased trend inflation process, the welfare costs become larger.     

Employee share ownership in a unionised duopoly

Profit sharing schemes have been analysed assuming Cournot competition and decentralised wage negotiations, and it has been found that firms share profits in equilibrium. This paper analyses a different remuneration system: employee share ownership. We find that whether firms choose to share ownership or not depends on both the type of competition in the product market and the way in which workers organise to negotiate wages. If wage setting is decentralised, under duopolistic Cournot competition both firms share ownership. If wage setting is centralised, only one firm shares ownership if the degree to which goods are substitutes takes an intermediate value; otherwise, the two firms share ownership. In this case, if the union sets the same wage for all workers neither firm shares ownership. Therefore, centralised wage setting discourages share ownership. Finally, under Bertrand competition neither firm shares ownership regardless of how workers are organised to negotiate wages.     

Inflation in Argentina during the 2000s

The paper presents a neo-structuralist econometric analysis of the monthly inflation rates. The model breaks down the CPI into different components based on their price-formation mechanisms. The basic breakdown defines three components: PFLEX (fruits and vegetables, 3.6% of the basket), PREGUL (prices regulated by the government, 20.1% of the basket) and PFIX (the rest of goods and services, 76.3% of the basket). PFIX is the focus of the econometric analysis while PFLEX and PREGUL are considered exogenous. The explanatory variables are the monthly rates of: the price of bovine cattle at the domestic market, the international soy price, the price by ton of imported intermediate goods, the nominal exchange rate, the average wage of workers that are registered in Social Security and the productivity, measured by the GDP by employed worker. There was an informal indexation mechanism in the labor market. Average monthly wages rose at annual rates that were almost always higher than the sum of past annual inflation plus the annual increase in productivity. The over-indexation of the unit labor cost was the main inflationary factor in the period. The inertial component, represented in the model by the previous monthly rate, determines 60% of the current rate.     

Competing wage claims,cost inflation,and capacity utilization

This paper develops a theory of competing wage claims and cost inflation, and attempts to integrate this theory into the core of modern macroeconomic analysis. Specifically, the paper proposes an explanation for wage inertia and wage interdependence based on an application of duopoly theory to labor unions, and incorporates this microeconomic theory of labor union behavior into a macroeconomic general equilibrium model with goods, money, and bonds as well as two kinds of labor. Special emphasis is placed on the interplay between demand and cost factors in the inflation process and on the implications of wage competition among labor unions for the relationship between inflation and unemployment in the short and long run.     

Goods market responses to trade shocks and trade and wages decompositions

Abstract.  Trade and wages literature asks whether trade or technology has been the major factor behind increases in wage inequality in OECD countries since the 1980s. In this literature, little attention has been paid to how goods market responses to trade shocks affect conclusions. Using an Armington heterogeneous goods trade model we capture demand side effects, and show how trade shocks affecting the price of unskilled‐intensive importable goods can be absorbed on the demand side of goods markets, with little or no impact on relative wage rates. No wage impact occurs if the elasticity of substitution in preferences between imports and import substitutes is one. As this elasticity increases, trade plays an ever larger role in explaining wage inequality changes, and as the elasticity goes below one the sign of the effect changes. We present some results of general equilibrium decompositions of total wage change into trade and technology components using UK data. We suggest that since many import demand elasticity estimates are in the neighbourhood of one, there is a prima facie case that goods market considerations further lower the significance of trade as an explanation of recent trends in OECD wage inequality beyond that claimed in the literature.     

LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY IN A PANEL OF OECD COUNTRIES

In this paper we analyze empirically how labor market institutions influence business cycle volatility in a sample of 20 OECD countries. Our results suggest that countries characterized by high union density tend to experience more volatile movements in output, whereas the degree of coordination of the wage bargaining system and the strictness of employment protection legislation appear to be only of limited importance. We also find some evidence suggesting that highly coordinated wage bargaining systems have a dampening impact on inflation volatility.     

How flexible are real wages in EU countries? A panel investigation

We estimate the degree of real wage flexibility in 19 EU countries in a wage Phillips curve panel framework. We find evidence for a reaction of wage growth to unemployment and productivity growth. The degree of real wage flexibility tends to be larger in the central and eastern European (CEE) countries than in the euro area; weaker in downturns than during upswings. There exists an inflation threshold, below which real wage flexibility is low. We also find that a part of the heterogeneity in real wage flexibility and unemployment may be related to differences in the wage bargaining institutions.     

Marginal Tax Rate Uncertainty and Wage Indexation

Frequent changes in American tax laws over the last 30 years have led to uncertainty regarding the marginal tax rate on labour income. Using a multisector framework, this paper considers the implications of the tax rate uncertainty for wage flexibility. The Fiscal Authority sets the marginal wage tax rate, and is assumed to be the leader in a Stackelberg game. Wage setters in this game determine the degree of optimal indexation and are assumed to be followers. Increases in tax rate uncertainty lead to greater nominal wage flexibility, and a decrease in optimal progressivity. Additionally, indexation to nominal shocks is complete even if the product market is monopolistically competitive.     

Conflict and inflation in industrial countries

This paper examines expirically the conflict theory of inflation, using a sample of pooled time-series, cross-section data over the period 1971–87 for 10 industrial countries: USA, Japan, Canada, Germany, France, UK, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Sweden. To this end a wage-price adjustment model based on the ideas of distributional conflict in wage formation and mark-up pricing in goods markets is set out. The model provides a satisfactory explanation of the inflationary process in industrial countries. It is shown that conflict between workers and capitalists over the distribution of income exerts a significant influence on the pattern of inflation. Import prices, inflationary expectations and labour market conditions are also important, with the latter acting as a regulator of class conflict.     

Optimal tax progressivity in unionised labour markets: What are the driving forces?

In labour markets with collective wage bargaining higher progressivity of the labour income tax creates a trade-off. On the one hand, wages are lowered and unemployment decreases, on the other hand, the individual labour supply decision is distorted at the hours-of-work margin. The optimal level of tax progressivity within this trade-off is determined using a numerical general equilibrium model with imperfect competition on the goods market, collective wage bargaining and a labour-supply module calibrated to empirically plausible elasticity values. The model is calibrated to macroeconomic and institutional parameters of both the OECD average and a number of individual OECD countries. In most cases the optimal degree of tax progressivity is below the actual level. A decomposition approach shows that the optimal level is increased by high unemployment and by the general tax level.     

Partial inflation indexation and long-run inflation targeting in a growing economy: A comparison of Calvo and Rotemberg pricing models

The observed 2% long run inflation target in most developed industrial nations is in variance with the zero or negative optimal inflation rates predicted by prominent monetary theories. Using a calibrated simple New-Keynesian model with endogenous growth and nominal rigidity, we compare two price setting environments of Calvo (1983) and Rotemberg (1982). In our growth model, the steady state welfare maximizing inflation takes into account the growth effect as well as the price distortionary effects of inflation. The long-run welfare maximizing trend inflation could be positive in economies with nominal rigidity in the form of partial inflation indexation and price stickiness. A higher degree of inflation indexation lowers the steady state price distortion in the Calvo model and steady state price adjustment cost in Rotemberg model and raises the long run optimal inflation. Since the productive inefficiency caused by partial inflation indexation is higher in Calvo economy compared to Rotemberg, the long run optimal trend inflation is higher in Rotemberg than in Calvo. In both models, a two percent long run inflation target is attainable for a reasonable degree of inflation indexation.     

The Economic Situation

Throughout the first nine months of 1976 the Australian economy has remained virtually stagnant, with output and employment increasing only marginally and unemployment rising also. With the government following a severely contractionary policy in an attempt to break inflation the economy seems poised for a further modest downturn in the next nine months so that a self-sustaining recovery from the current recession does not seem to be in prospect before the second half of 1977. On the basis of existing policies our forecasts indicate a rate of growth of real GDP of only about 1.0 per cent in 1976–77, implying a further significant rise in unemployment during the financial year. There have been some hopeful signs in recent months of a reduction in inflation — the consumer price index increases in the first three quarters of 1976 were modest and wage rate increases remain closely in line with the wage indexation guidelines — but three factors have emerged to cast doubt on whether this improving trend will continue. The first is the effect of the recent drought on prices of foodstuffs, particularly meat, and the second is the expected 1.5 to 2.0 per cent increase in the consumer price index as a result of the changes in the method of financing hospital and medical services. These two factors mean that the December quarter increase in the consumer price index may be more than 5 per cent, threatening a further stimulus to inflation in 1977. Thirdly, present government policies could easily lead to a breakdown of the wage indexation system and a return to some form of collective bargaining over wage rates. Assuming nevertheless, a de facto continuation of partial indexation in 1977, we expect increases in male award wages and male average earnings of about 13 per cent during 1977, these increases being similar to those during 1975 and 1976 but much below the increases of 36 per cent and 28 per cent respectively recorded during 1974. Our forecasts also indicate increases in the consumer price index of 14 per cent during 1976 and 11 per cent during 1977, following increases of 16.3 per cent and 14.0 per cent during 1974 and 1975 respectively. These forecasts indicate that the government's fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and wage policies are likely to come under heavy challenge early in 1977, and decisions taken at that time are likely to be major determinants of economic developments in Australia in the next few years. The Institute would again urge a shift to a co-operative package including full wage indexation, with cuts in indirect taxes and public sector charges to wind down inflation and expand the economy. On current indications, labour productivity will be no higher in 1976–77 than in 1973–74, because of the weakness of total output, so that the whole burden of wage increases in that three year period has fallen on unit costs of production. It is our belief that the twin problems of inflation and unemployment will only be defeated in Australia when both cuts in indirect or direct taxes and increases in productivity are applied to reducing inflation in the context of an orderly system of wage and price determination.     

NOMINAL WAGE INDEXATION,QUASI‐EQUILIBRIA AND REAL WAGE DYNAMICS

In contrast to the traditional static approach to indexation, this paper analyses the dynamic consequences for real wages of the mechanism that links nominal wages to inflation. Revisiting a contribution by Dehez and Fitoussi on macroeconomic fluctuations , I analyse a monetary overlapping generations small open economy in which full indexation is interpreted as the occurrence of a dynamic ‘quasi‐equilibrium’. In the suggested framework, the nominal wage is linked to the inflation rate by a specific indexation formula whose shape relies on unions' bargaining positions. Assuming a constant peg for the real interest rate and the superneutrality of money, I show that the economy has a unique long‐run quasi‐equilibrium allocation whose stability depends only on the behaviour of the monetary authority. Moreover, I show how the operating of a ‘wage‐aspiration effect’ might lead to the persistence of involuntary unemployment.     

Monopolistic Competition and Different Wage Setting Systems

In this paper, we present a disequilibrium unemployment model without labor market frictions and monopolistic competition in the goods market within an infinite horizon model of growth. We consider different wage setting systems and compare wages, the unemployment rate, and income per capita in the long‐run at firm, sector, and national (centralized) levels. The aim of this paper is to determine under which conditions, the inverted‐U hypothesis between unemployment and the degree of centralization of wage bargaining, reported by Calmfors and Driffill [Economic Policy, 6, 14–61, 1988], is confirmed. Our analysis shows that a high degree of market power normally produces the inverted‐U shape for unemployment. Moreover, we also illustrate that this inverted‐U shape can be reversed when the ability of trade unions to internalize the provision of social services is great enough at sector level.