Randomization under ambiguity: Efficiency and incentive compatibility

We generalize de Castro and Yannelis (2018) by taking into account the use of randomization. We answer the following questions: Is each efficient allocation of de Castro and Yannelis (2018) still Pareto optimal? Are all efficient allocations still incentive compatible under the Wald’s maxmin preferences? We provide positive answers and give applications.     

Bargaining over incentive contracts

The incentive contract theory assumes that the principal holds all of the bargaining power. By introducing alternating offers and strategic delay into the nonlinear pricing model, we relax this assumption and analyze an infinite-horizon contract bargaining game. We attain either the “sequential separating equilibrium” or the “simultaneous separating equilibrium”, depending on the parameter values. We prove the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium, and claim that multidimensionality and strategic delay can help resolve the multiple equilibria problem of bargaining theory. When the time between offers approaches zero, either quantity distortion or delay persists.     

A two-dimensional problem of revenue maximization

We consider the problem of finding the mechanism that maximizes the revenue of a seller of multiple objects. This problem turns out to be significantly more complex than the case where there is only a single object (which was solved by Myerson, 1981). The analysis is difficult even in the simplest case studied here, where there are two exclusive objects and a single buyer, with valuations uniformly distributed on triangular domains. We show that the optimal mechanisms are piecewise linear with either 2 or 3 pieces, and obtain explicit formulas for most cases of interest.     

物流工程项目管理中“激励机制”构建的几点思考

物流工程项目管理中,对激励实现途径的探寻一般根据:需求层次理论、双因素理论等经典模型。这些基于人性Y理论假设的命题,固然是符合经验的,但是,这种激励途径的获得更多在于对个体主观偏好的把握,这样就使得方案的随机扰动性增强。为此,在机制设计理论与声誉约束机制这两个框架内,来思考物流工程项目管理中激励机制的构建,则形成该文的任务。     

独立董事参与公司治理的激励因素分析

我国的独立董事制度还很不成熟,有效的激励机制还未形成。笔者试图通过构造模型,分析独立董事参与公司治理的激励因素,说明独立董事参与公司治理的动机与理论中所描绘的不同,不同的价值目标取向是产生差异的重要原因的结论。     

初探民营企业激励机制

中国民营企业发展已经到了相对成熟的阶段,但是仍然存在着一些问题。在人力资源管理上,民营企业突出的问题就是激励机制的缺失。为了留住人才,规范企业人力资源管理,从而在人力方面保证企业正常的持续的发展,这必将需要建立和完善我国民营企业的激励机制。由于我国民营企业存在自身的特点,其激励机制就必须建立在充分了解企业特点的基础上,从而根据权益层、经营管理层和操作层的不同工作任务和工作目标,需要采用不同的激励手段和措施,以达到最佳的效果。     

Incentive compatibility constraints and dynamic programming in continuous time

This paper is devoted to the study of infinite horizon continuous time optimal control problems with incentive compatibility constraints that arise in many economic problems, for instance in defining the second best Pareto optimum for the joint exploitation of a common resource, as in Benhabib and Radner [Benhabib, J., Radner, R., 1992. The joint exploitation of a productive asset: a game theoretic approach. Economic Theory, 2: 155–190]. An incentive compatibility constraint is a constraint on the continuation of the payoff function at every time. We prove that the dynamic programming principle holds, the value function is a viscosity solution of the associated Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation, and that it is the minimal supersolution satisfying certain boundary conditions. When the incentive compatibility constraint only depends on the present value of the state variable, we prove existence of optimal strategies, and we show that the problem is equivalent to a state constraints problem in an endogenous state region which depends on the data of the problem. Some economic examples are analyzed.     

考虑声誉效应的外包中服务商激励机制

在考虑声誉的情形下,建立一个博弈模型,探讨了外包中服务商激励约束机制的内在机理。分析表明：声誉对服务商激励有重要影响,可以提高服务商在前期的努力程度,在某种程度上,声誉效应能很好地解决来自服务商的道德风险问题。同时,文章还提出了基于服务商声誉的约束机制建设的建议。     

Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints

We analyze the nonlinear pricing problem faced by an incomplete information monopolist operating in a market populated by agents with budget constraints. We show that if other goods are available and if the monopolist's goods are nonessential relative to other goods, then there exists an optimal, individually rational, and incentive compatible selling mechanism for the monopolist (Theorem 1). Moreover, we show that a solution to all such nonlinear pricing problems exists if and only if the monopolist's goods are nonessential (Theorem 2). In the absence of nonessentiality, we show that if the monopolist's profit function is independent of quantity (e.g., if all costs are fixed), then an optimal selling mechanism exists (Theorem 3). Finally, we show that if there is reporting (of types by agents) and partial recognition of types (by the monopolist), then an optimal selling mechanism exists, even in the absence of nonessentiality, provided agents' utility functions are affine and continuous in goods (Theorem 4).     

On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making

Holmström (Groves' schemes on restricted domains,Econometrica 47, 1979, pp. 1137–1144) showed for public decision making problems with a smoothly connected domain of preferences that Groves' schemes are the unique direct revelation mechanisms satisfying incentive compatibility. This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions on the domain of preferences for which these Groves' schemes are the unique incentive compatible transfer schemes when the number of alternatives is finite. Furthermore, we give an example of a decision making problem that arises from a sequencing problem for which budget balanced Groves' schemes exist and show that these transfer schemes are not individually rational.     

企业技术创新动力与利益激励机制

企业技术创新活动需要相应的动力来推动和加速.企业技术创新动力是由多种动力要素相互作用的结果.这些动力要素本质上都隐含着一定的利益关系,即与创新主体的利益相关性,这是企业技术创新的动力本源.本文以创新主体的利益相关性为基点,分析了决定企业技术创新动力的利益因素,企业技术创新激励的体制和制度障碍,进而提出了企业技术创新利益激励系统的基本框架.     

Optimal mechanisms with simple menus

We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design for the case with one buyer and two items, when the buyer’s valuations are independent and additive. We obtain two sets of structural results of the optimal mechanisms, which can be summarized in one conclusion: under certain distributional conditions, the optimal mechanisms have simple menus.The first set of results states that, under a condition that requires that the types are concentrated on lower values, the optimal menu can be sorted in ascending order. Applying the theorem, we derive a revenue-monotonicity theorem which states that stochastically dominated distributions yield less revenue.The second set of results states that, under certain conditions which require that types are distributed more evenly or are concentrated on higher values, the optimal mechanisms have a few menu items. Our first result states that, for certain such distributions, the optimal menu contains at most 4 menu items. The condition admits power density functions. Our second result works for a weaker condition, under which the optimal menu contains at most 6 menu items. Our last result in this set works for the unit-demand setting, it states for uniform distributions, the optimal menu contains at most 5 items.     

Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types

We extend the conditions for incentive compatibility in mechanism design problems to a more general structure of preferences than that found in the literature, for the case where type is one-dimensional but the outcome function becomes multidimensional. This is so, at least, as long as preferences can be represented by means of sub-utility functions, it is adopted a weak single-crossing property and direct mechanisms turn out to be differentiable. When direct mechanisms are not differentiable, local incentive conditions still remain fully incentive compatible, provided utility is weakly separable in the outcome function, or else, it exhibits linearity in the type.     

Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values

This paper presents a model for housing markets with interdependent values. We introduce private information on the quality of a house (i.e., high or low), which is known only to the initial owner. Interdependency means that the ex-post preference of an agent depends on the private information of the other agents with regard to the quality of houses. We prove that on a domain satisfying a richness condition, the no-trade rule is the only rule that satisfies ex-post incentive compatibility and ex-post individual rationality.     

国有企业激励机制中存在的问题及改进措施

现代企业越来越重视激励机制在人力资源管理中的运用。当前,在国有企业激励机制中还不同程度地存在一些问题,不利于调动员工的积极性、主动性和创造性,影响到企业的创新和发展。该文通过对国有企业激励机制中存在的主要问题进行了梳理和分析,提出了改进和完善国有企业激励机制的相关措施。     

The values and incentive effects of options on the maximum or the minimum of the stock prices and market index

In this study, we employ the certainty equivalent principle to investigate cost efficiency and incentives of the options on the maximum or the minimum of the stock prices and market index levels. In addition, the options with averaging features are also considered. Numerical results show that options on the maximum are more cost efficient and incentive-efficient than traditional ones. As for options on the minimum, they are more cost efficient than traditional ones only when the weight in the options is not very large. However, options on the minimum also provide stronger incentives to increase stock prices than traditional ones.     

植物纤维与热塑性塑料复合界面相容性研究

文章介绍了植物纤维/热塑性塑料复合材料的研究现状,对植物纤维与热塑性塑料复合界面不相容的原因进行了分析,对提高其复合界面相容性的物理和化学方法进行了综述。     

Product co-development in an emerging market: The role of buyer-supplier compatibility and institutional environment

In emerging markets, supply chains increasingly serve as critical value chains through which ideas, practices and knowledge flow to and from suppliers and buyers. Drawing on buyer-supplier collaboration literature and organizational learning theory, we examine the antecedents and underlying mechanisms of product co-development. Due to emerging markets' unique institutional environments, we further investigate how government intervention and guanxi importance moderate supplier-buyer collaborative outcomes. Dyadic data from 323 supplier-buyer pairs in China largely support our theoretical framework. Partners' knowledge commonality has a curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship to product co-development, whereas goal compatibility has a positive impact on product co-development. Mutual learning partially mediates the main effect. Furthermore, government intervention weakens the positive effect of mutual learning on product co-development whereas guanxi importance strengthens this relationship. This research provides fresh theoretical and managerial implications to supply chain collaboration in emerging markets.     

我国独立董事制度及其激励机制

文章探讨了我国独立董事制度的现状,分析了独立董事的激励机制。