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1.
An overlapping generation’s small open economy with endogenous fertility and time cost of children is analysed to show that the command optimum can be decentralised in a market setting using a PAYG transfer from the young to the old and a tax-cum-subsidy policy (i.e., a linear wage tax on labour income collected and rebated in a lump-sum way within the younger working-age generation). Indeed, the latter instrument stimulates fertility and then reduces the opportunity cost of children. Moreover, by applying the generalised notion of Pareto efficiency introduced by Golosov et al. (2007) in a context of endogenous population, some normative conclusions can be drawn: since only the utilities of those who are actually born are evaluated, we apply the concept of A-efficiency and conclude that when PAYG pensions are in existence, the tax-cum-subsidy policy can effectively be used as an alternative to the child allowance to internalise the externality of children, while also representing an A-Pareto improvement. 相似文献
2.
Motivated by the recent increase of public debt experienced by many developed countries, we develop an OLG model to provide the fiscal policies needed for any public debt level to be sustainable in steady state and the consequences that such policies produce on saving and fertility in a small open economy. Our main finding is that a reduction of public debt (an event currently publicly debated) needs tax adjustments that eventually will be detrimental for both fertility and saving under a low-interest-rate regime (possibly similar to the current world regime), with opposite transitional effects on fertility and saving. On the contrary, the needed fiscal adjustments will eventually increase saving and fertility under a high-interest-rate regime, with opposite transitional effects on fertility and saving. Besides providing clear-cut policy implications, our analysis offers possible testable implications concerning the pattern of fertility, taxes and public debt observed in many developed economies. 相似文献
3.
In a two‐period life‐cycle model with ex ante homogeneous households, earnings risk, and a general earnings function, we derive the optimal linear labor tax rate and optimal linear education subsidies. The optimal income tax trades off social insurance against incentives to work. Education subsidies are not used for social insurance, but they are only targeted at offsetting the distortions of the labor tax and internalizing a fiscal externality. Both optimal education subsidies and tax rates increase if labor and education are more complementary, because education subsidies indirectly lower labor tax distortions by stimulating labor supply. Optimal education subsidies (taxes) also correct non‐tax distortions arising from missing insurance markets. Education subsidies internalize a positive (negative) fiscal externality if there is underinvestment (overinvestment) in education because of risk. Education policy unambiguously allows for more social insurance if education is a risky activity. However, if education hedges against labor‐market risk, optimal tax rates could be lower than in the case without education subsidies. 相似文献