Government guarantees and self-fulfilling speculative attacks

We develop a model in which government guarantees to banks’ foreign creditors are a root cause of self-fulfilling twin banking-currency crises. Absent guarantees, such crises are not possible. In the presence of guarantees banks borrow foreign currency, lend domestic currency and do not hedge the resulting exchange rate risk. With guarantees, banks will also renege on their foreign debts and declare bankruptcy when a devaluation occurs. We assume that the government is unable or unwilling to fully fund the resulting bailout via an explicit fiscal reform. These features of our model imply that government guarantees lead to self-fulfilling banking-currency crises.     

Regional foreign banks and financial inclusion: Evidence from Africa

Regional foreign banks expanded quickly over the past decade in developing and emerging countries and have a growing influence in banking systems. We question whether the development of African regional foreign banks, also called Pan-African banks, influences financial inclusion of firms and households. To this end, we combine the World Bank Global Findex database and the World Bank Enterprise Surveys with a hand-collected database on the presence of regional foreign banks. We find that Pan-African banks presence increases firms’ access to credit and limited evidence that they favor financial access of the middle class by restoring confidence in banks. We suggest that this impact is related to the adoption of an aggressive strategy aiming at gaining market shares rather than through the exploitation of informational and technological advantages.     

Profitability of foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe

This article uses data for 418 banks operating in Central and Eastern Europe between 1993 and 2004 to analyse the impact of the mode of foreign bank entry and of the parent institutions’ characteristics on bank profitability. The results show that foreign banks are affected both less and differently by domestic economic conditions, but do react to the health of the parent banks and the economic situations in their home countries. Their mode of entry is important: profits of banks entering via greenfield investment exhibit a complementary relationship with their parent banks, whereas profits of banks acquiring domestic institutions are negatively related to the opportunity costs in their home markets.     

Explaining foreign bank entrance in emerging markets

This paper provides a theoretical framework that can explain the empirical observation that foreign banks from industrialized countries tend to increase their involvement in emerging markets in periods of market instability. In this model, domestic banks have (through past lending operations) more soft information on their borrowers available compared to foreign banks. Foreign banks, however, have a superior screening technology that allows them to obtain more hard information about their borrowers’ investment projects. The model has an important implication: Foreign banks increase their market share when credit market conditions deteriorate. The rationale for this finding is that the comparative advantage of the domestic bank loses value in unstable credit market conditions. Thus, the advantage of having a screening technology becomes more important and allows the foreign bank to increase market share. In times of crisis hard information on projects is relatively more important than soft information on the borrower’s history.     

Law and credit constraints in transition economies1

Using a survey of over 4,000 firms in 21 transition economies, this paper investigates how legal extensiveness (law on the books) and legal effectiveness (law in practice) affect availability of bank finance. Our findings suggest that both law on the books and law in practice are important, but that they impact firms of different sizes differently. Small firms appear to be the most credit constrained in countries with weak creditor rights and with weak contract enforcement, while large firms are the most credit constrained in countries with weak courts and unclear and inconsistent laws pertaining to firms’ business operations.     

Bankruptcy voting process and corporate reorganization

This study investigates the main legal determinants of corporate reorganization use. Three legal aspects of bankruptcy voting process were examined, such as the voting right of secured creditors (1), bankruptcy voting rule (2), and court's legal right to overrule creditors’ decision (3). Using a sample of 20 countries, our estimations confirm that granting a voting right to secured lenders tends to be associated with more corporate reorganizations. Secured creditors’ voting right may send a signal about firm's capacity to recover from financial distress. Such signal can encourage unsecured creditors to support the reorganization plan.     

Microeconomic determinants of acquisitions of Eastern European banks by Western European banks1

A considerable number of Western European banks acquired banks in Central and Eastern Europe from the mid‐1990s onwards. The question is whether or not this will improve the efficiency and profitability of the Central and Eastern European banking sectors. We test the relative strength of the efficiency versus the market power hypotheses by investigating the bank‐specific characteristics of the banks involved in the cross‐border acquisitions. We also examine the determinants of the post‐acquisition target banks’ performance. Our results indicate that large Western European banks have targeted relatively large and efficient Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) banks with an established presence in their local retail banking markets. We find no evidence that cross‐border bank acquisitions in the CEEC are driven by efficiency motivations. The evidence supports the market power hypothesis, raising concerns about the optimal balance between foreign ownership and competition.     

Foreign banks,financial crises and macroeconomic fluctuations

Understanding the implications of increased foreign bank presence is especially compelling in periods of financial crisis. In this paper, we explore this issue by examining the relationship between the involvement of foreign banks in the banking systems and the volatility of key macroeconomic variables in normal and crisis periods. Using a sample of 20 Emerging European countries from 1998 to 2013, we find that an increase in the assets of foreign banks in the banking system reduces output and consumption growth volatility in general but does not significantly affect the volatility of investments. However, these banks were found to play a significant role in increasing output, consumption and investment volatility in 2009. Our findings suggest that foreign banks’ harmful impact during the global crisis was only temporary and that they seem to help Emerging European countries stabilize macroeconomic volatility in normal times and after the global crisis.     

Modes of foreign bank entry and effects on lending rates: Theory and evidence

Policy makers who decide to liberalize foreign bank entry frequently put limitations on the mode of entry. We study how different entry modes affect the lending rates of foreign and domestic banks. In our model, the mode of entry determines whether a foreign bank inherits a customer base. This, in turn, affects how information is distributed between foreign and domestic banks. We show that this distribution of information about incumbent customers leads to stronger competition if foreign entry occurs through a greenfield investment. As a result, domestic bank lending rates are lower after greenfield entry. We find empirical support for this prediction for a sample of banks from 10 Eastern European countries for the period 1995–2003.     

Severe or gentle bankruptcy law: Which impact on investing and financing decisions?

This research investigates how legal sanctions prevailing under bankruptcy may impact on debt contracting and on investing decision. We model firms having the opportunity to engage (or not) faulty management. In case of default, the firms may escape costly bankruptcy by reaching a private agreement with the bank. We show that such renegotiation process may depend on the level of severity of bankruptcy law.Our approach helps in answering the following key questions: can bankruptcy costs always be internalized? Who benefits from accrued severity? Should the creditors accept a certain level of moral hazard from their debtors? Should bankruptcy law be extremely severe in order to ensure ex-ante efficiency? Does such severity depend on the financial environment?The model focuses on three equilibriums. The first equilibrium describes honest firms that choose the best investment project (ex-ante efficiency). Here, we show that bankruptcy costs can be avoided through private renegotiation (ex-post efficiency). Yet, the legislator cannot directly implement this equilibrium as it does not depend on the level of legal sanctions. A second equilibrium describes tricky firms turning to the less profitable and riskiest project. Here, default is still privately resolved: the occurrence of such equilibrium can be avoided owing to a minimal amount of legal sanctions that depend on the level of interest rate. Last, we consider firms that adopt mixed strategies regarding their investment policy. Here, two post-default bargains prevail (pooling or separating) and costly bankruptcy may occur.Simulations illustrate how the bank finally chooses between these equilibriums while the legal environment becomes more severe. For moderate levels of legal sanctions, banks may accept a certain level of faulty management, expecting to take advantage of bankruptcy punishment. An increase in sanctions, however, has a compelling effect on the companies towards honoring their commitments. Once the optimal equilibrium prevails, any additional increase in sanctions is ineffective as the players' strategies no longer depend on the legal environment. As a result, extreme severity is not required to ensure both ex-ante and ex-post efficiencies. Last, we find that a more severe bankruptcy law increases the protection of banks and may result in reduction of the contractual interest rate, which on the other hand benefits the debtors.     

外资银行资本充足率监管比较研究及启示

资本充足率是公认的银行审慎监管的核心指标,文章通过对比我国和有关国家银行法中有关外资银行资本充足率的监管规定,指出主要应从两方面完善现有资本充足率监管制度体系,一是建立以杠杆比率(LeverageRatio)为核心,风险加权资本充足率为补充的双层混合动态监管制度框架;二是应根据外资银行法律地位的不同,在与外资银行母国签订双边监管合作协议的框架下,对外资银行子行、合资银行和分行提出不同的监管资本充足率要求。     

Bankruptcy costs,economic policy uncertainty,and FDI entry and exit

In this paper, we examine how the effect of economic policy uncertainty on foreign direct investment (FDI) entry and exit varies with the cost of bankruptcy resolution. Using a sample of bilateral FDI entry and exit for 23 countries and areas from 2004 to 2012, we find that an increase in bankruptcy costs in a country exacerbates the dampening effect of economic policy uncertainty on both FDI entry and exit. Subsample analysis reveals that the bankruptcy resolution channel only exists in high political risk countries. We also find that the bankruptcy resolution channel does not exist for foreign portfolio investment, which is consistent with real option theory. Broadly put, our contribution is at the nexus of institutional theory and FDI, as we identify the bankruptcy resolution channel through which economic policy uncertainty affects FDI entry and exit.     

基于商业银行理财产品论金融消费者权益的法律保护

近年来,商业银行理财产品销售火爆的同时,发生了许多消费者因购买理财产品受害的事件。究其原因,主要是我国缺乏相应的法律制度体系。而国外发达国家都在金融消费者保护方面有系统的法律规范。因此,我国应在借鉴发达国家立法经验的基础上,构建适合我国国情的金融消费者保护法律体系,以使金融消费者的权益保护获得立法上的支撑。     

Matching Bankruptcy Laws to Legal Environments

We study a model of optimal bankruptcy law in an environmentwhere legal quality can vary along two dimensions: the expertiseof judges and the quality of contract enforcement. We analyzea model in which a judicially influenced bankruptcy processcan enhance the efficiency of incomplete contracts by conditioningthe allocation of control rights in bankruptcy on firm quality.We consider the optimal balance of debtor and creditor interestsas a function of the legal environment and show that the optimaldegree of "creditor-friendliness" in the bankruptcy code increasesas judicial ability to recognize firm quality falls and as thequality of contract enforcement deteriorates. Our model showsthat a bankruptcy law that attempts to preserve going-concernvalue, such as US Chapter 11, requires judicial expertise tobe effective. Where such expertise is unavailable, a law thatfocuses more on creditor recovery is preferred. (JEL D86, G33,G34, K22)     

Human rights protection and foreign direct investment: The case of post‐socialist countries

The main aim of the paper is to evaluate the impact of respect for human rights in post‐socialist countries on the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI). The methodology used in the study consists of the two econometric model specifications–GMM spatial panel Durbin error model and panel gravity ordinary least squares model. The main results indicate a positive and significant relationship between respect for human rights and foreign investment. The outcomes of the spatial model suggest the presence of competition and reinforcement effects of particular kinds of human rights on FDI as well as significance of the ‘human rights distance’.     

论我国破产重整程序存在的问题——以英国法为视角

我国2006年颁布的《企业破产法》首次引入了重整制度,试图给陷入财务困境又有重生希望的企业提供一个法律保障机制。但实践中重整程序应用的不多且条文本身也存在着各种问题。在制度设计上,如程序的启动、自动冻结的效果、破产管理人权利的分配、法院的介入以及强制裁定权的运用等方面存在着缺陷。英国公司重整制度自上世纪八十年代以来进行了多次重大修改,其制度的改革和完善给我国立法者提供了很多启示。     

Global banking,global crises? The role of the bank balance-sheet channel for the transmission of financial crises

We examine whether shocks to leveraged creditors with cross border holdings have an incidence on debtor countries׳ risk of suffering financial turmoil. We construct a new proxy of shocks to international banks׳ balance-sheets using credit ratings and the structure of their international assets. This allows us investigating the effect of (foreign) bank balance-sheet shocks on domestic financial turmoil in a large sample of 146 developed and emerging economies from 1984 to 2011. Our proxies of shocks towards bank balance-sheets are strong predictors of systemic banking crises in their debtor countries. Confirming these results, bilateral bank flows significantly decrease when creditor banks׳ assets are hit by negative shocks, as measured by credit rating downgrades from third-party countries. Short-term liabilities towards global banks appear to increase roll-over and funding risks, thereby amplifying the impact of shocks to foreign lenders’ balance-sheets. Domestic banking sectors vulnerabilities, such as illiquid assets and a low deposit-asset ratio, are found to increase crisis contagion risk. In contrast, a high level of global liquidity attenuates the transmission of shocks to international banks׳ assets to debtor countries.     

外资银行监管法律制度的完善

随着金融的国际化以及我国加入WTO后金融市场的逐步开放,外资银行大量抢滩国内市场,这对我国金融乃至整个经济运行将产生深远影响,并使加强对外资银行的监管显得尤为必要。为此,作者在分析对外资银行监管的必要性的基础上,针对我国外资银行监管法律制度的不足,借鉴国际经验,从监管目标入手,阐述了我国外资银行监管法律制度的完善。     

The political economy of the G20 agenda on financial regulation

The paper empirically examines the implementation record of international financial regulation of the banking sector. The study finds that the size of the banking sector and the presence of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) are positively associated with a stronger implementation record. These results suggest that cooperative motives of internalising externalities, creating a level playing field and preserving financial stability play a role in explaining the implementation record. We find evidence that this cooperative behaviour may be driven by the self-interest of global players as the positive record is particularly strong in countries where large banking sectors and big banks are both present, and where regulation only applies to large players. Sectoral concentration, bank health and the share of foreign ownership yield more mixed results as regards their impact on implementation.     

Foreign Banks and Credit Volatility: The Case of Latin American Countries

The number of foreign banks in Latin America increased substantially over the period 1995–2001, prompting a debate on the potential consequences for host countries. Discussions focused on efficiency, the impact on competition and product market diversification in the banking industry, and the quality of the regulatory environment, among other issues. Against this background, this paper uses ARCH techniques to test the impact of foreign banks on both the level and the volatility of real private bank credit in a panel of eight Latin American countries, using quarterly data over the period 1995–2001. The empirical findings show that, together with financial development, the presence of foreign banks has contributed to reducing real credit volatility, improving the buffer shock function of the banking sector.