Buyer power and exclusion in vertically related markets

Suppliers and consumer organizations have become increasingly concerned by the build-up of buyer power of retailers in many markets. A major concern is that strong retailers will abuse their power to exclude products and rival retailers from the market to be able to increase prices to consumers. As a consequence, remedies to limit buyer power are discussed and implemented in many countries. In this paper we compare the incentives for exclusion, and the effect on consumers prices, under both buyer and seller power. We study a model with a dominant upstream manufacturer and a competitive fringe of producers offering their products to two differentiated downstream retailers. We compare the equilibrium outcome of this model when i) the dominant supplier holds all the bargaining power, and (ii) the retailers have all the bargaining power. We show that full or partial exclusion of either the competitive product or downstream retailers occurs when inter and intrabrand competition are strong. This is true both under seller and buyer power. However, in contrast to the received literature, we find that buyer power weakly enhances welfare compared to seller power because buyer power will lead to both more product variety (less exclusion) and lower retail prices.     

Vertical mergers in procurement markets

This paper uses computational methods that reveal ambiguous strategic effects of vertical mergers in a duopoly setting featuring incomplete information about sellers' costs, and differences in sellers' productive capabilities. First, vertical mergers can be jointly unprofitable. Second, the buyer's preferred merger partner is almost always the seller with lower expected costs, and is typically the larger seller. Third, vertical mergers always reduce the unintegrated seller's profits, sometimes dramatically. Finally, vertical mergers can increase total welfare. Some of the results contrast qualitatively with unambiguous findings from models with symmetric sellers, which suggests that caution should be used in drawing general inferences from those models.     

On commodity taxation in vertically differentiated markets

We examine the impact of commodity taxation on vertically differentiated product markets when entry is allowed. We show that an ad valorem tax may have a dramatic effect on market structure by inducing the entry of a large number of firms in what was previously a natural monopoly. The producers of high quality products reduce market share after an increase in their unit production cost, leaving more room for lower quality products. While within a given market structure aggregate quality decreases monotonically with the tax rate, quality jumps upwards at tax rates that cause a change in market structure.     

The effects of mergers in markets for differentiated products

Several authors have studied conditions in which price-increasing forces associated with mergers in ahomogenous oligopoly might be offset by price-decreasing forces associated with rationalization of production. Analogously, in the case of mergers between producers ofdifferentiated products, economies of scope are a possible price-decreasing force. The interrelationship of demands can be another one. Edgeworth showed the possible strength of this latter force in demonstrating that the imposition of taxes on substitute products can cause the prices of all of them to fall. That paradoxical result is directly relevant since effects of mergers are shown to be equivalent to those of properly chosen taxes. Nevertheless, it is shown that the Edgeworth phenomenon does not carry over to mergers i.e., demand forces on their own are not sufficient for mergers to lead to reductions in all prices — although some price reductions are possible. The paper also develops conditions for all prices to rise after a merger. General conjectural variation models in both price and quantity are considered. Finally, it is shown that mergers cannot increase welfare in linear models with Bertrand or Cournot competition. The implications of the results for merger policy are briefly discussed.     

Cooperative R&D between vertically related firms with spillovers

This paper analyzes the effects of cooperative R&D in two vertically related duopolies, which are two final-good manufacturers and two input suppliers, with horizontal and vertical spillovers. Vertical R&D cartels yield a larger social welfare than non-cooperative R&D and, if the horizontal spillover rate between the input suppliers is not sufficiently high, than horizontal R&D cartels. Technological improvement is accelerated by forming vertical research joint ventures (RJVs), whether or not their member firms' R&D decisions are coordinated. Vertical RJV cartels yield the largest social welfare when the vertically related firms can coordinate their R&D decisions and/or share useful knowledge fully.     

Spatial competition and price discrimination with capacity constraints

We characterize mixed-strategy equilibria when capacity-constrained suppliers can charge location-based prices to different customers. We establish an equilibrium with prices that weakly increase in the costs of supplying a customer. Despite prices above costs and excess capacities, each supplier exclusively serves its home market in equilibrium. Competition yields volatile market shares and an inefficient allocation of customers to firms. Even ex-post cross-supplies may restore efficiency only partly. We show that consumers may benefit from price discrimination whereas the firms make the same profits as with uniform pricing. We use our findings to discuss recent competition policy cases and provide hints for a more refined coordinated-effects analysis.     

Stock rationing under service level constraints in a vertically integrated distribution system

This paper addresses a rationing problem in a two-level, vertically integrated distribution system composed of one manufacturer and several retail points. The motivating case, developed in the vending machine sector and modeled as a newsvendor-like problem, is representative of many real settings where short-term changes in demand can be substantial while capacity modification is not a viable option. The paper provides an analytical discussion of the problem from two different standpoints: a pure profit-maximization perspective and a minimum service-level perspective, both subject to a product availability constraint that affects the service level the company can provide, and the related expected profit. By analyzing the Lagrangean formulation of the problem, we devise efficient computational procedures based on dichotomy search to find the optimal allotments to retailers, maximizing the expected profit and ensuring a minimum service level. Then, we extend the analysis to the evaluation of the highest service level that can be provided, under a product availability constraint. We identify conditions such that the proposed search procedures succeed in finding the optimal solutions, as well as bounds for the search domains. The proposed approach is legitimated under several demand distribution functions subject to a few commonly adopted restrictions that encompass many of the usually adopted continuous distributions. Finally, the paper presents a three-step decision-making framework using the proposed procedures, summarizing the decision paths the manufacturer might follow in order to optimize the allocation decision.     

Supply function equilibria with capacity constraints and pivotal suppliers

The concept of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) has been widely used to model generators' bidding behavior and market power issues in wholesale electricity markets. Observers of electricity markets have noted how generation capacity constraints may contribute to market power of generation firms. If a generation firm's rivals are capacity constrained then the firm may be pivotal; that is, the firm could substantially raise the market price by unilaterally withholding output. However the SFE literature has not fully considered the impact of capacity constraints and pivotal firms on equilibrium predictions. We characterize the set of symmetric supply function equilibria for uniform-price auctions when firms are capacity constrained and show that this set is increasing as capacity per firm rises. We provide conditions under which asymmetric equilibria exist and characterize these equilibria. In addition, we compare results for uniform-price auctions to those for discriminatory auctions, and we compare our SFE predictions to equilibrium predictions of models in which bidders are constrained to bid on discrete units of output.     

Cultural differences and shareholder value in related mergers: Linking equity and human capital

Merger literature suggests that the relationship between shareholder gains and the relatedness of merging firms is contingent upon the compatibility of the two firms' top management cultures. This hypothesis is tested by surveying the perceptions of cultural differences of top management teams of recently acquired firms, and then relating these perceptions to related stock market gains to the buying firms. The findings suggest a strong inverse relationship between perceptions of cultural differences and shareholder gains, after controlling for perceptions of the buying firm's tolerance for multiculturalism and the relative size of the merging firms.     

Solutions for flexible container leasing contracts with options under capacity and order constraints

The container–shipping market becomes prosperous with the development of the global economy. As shipping networks become more complex and heterogeneous, container capacity planning becomes more difficult. This paper tackles the container planning problem from the carrier’s perspective in a two-echelon container shipping service chain (CSSC), which includes one carrier and one upstream rental company. A flexible contract with options is introduced into the one-period container planning mechanism. With the flexible options contract, the rental company requires the carrier to make a commitment or place an order in advance. Options give buyer the right to modify the initial orders to better match the supply with the demand. Based on the carrier’s decision tendency, i.e., aggressive or conservative, we analyze the application strategies of the unilateral options and the bidirectional options in different practical scenarios. In particular, for the applicability of the decision models, we further consider the shipping capacity and the minimum order constraints and formulate the carrier’s option policies with constrained nonlinear programs. Numerical examples show that the proposed decision strategies with option contract cannot only effectively increase the container trading quantity between the rental company and the carrier, but also significantly reduce the carrier’s container capacity risk while increasing its profit.     

Inter-temporal inventory competition and the effects of capacity constraints

This paper addresses an intertemporal inventory competition between a supplier (a provider, manufacturer) and a retailer engaged in a supply chain. The paper's focus is on the effect of capacity constraints on both parties when demands are seasonal. The paper provides a comparative study of two solution approaches, one is based on supply chain competition and the other is based on system wide optimization. Our results demonstrate that with dynamic inventory competition, the retailer reduces inventory costs by reducing the response period to higher demands while increasing the supply requests compared to the system-wide optimal approach. As a result, the supplier's inventory costs increase. An example illustrating these particular facets of the problem and its application is presented and discussed in light of the supplier and the retailer coordinating policies.     

Signaling in Technology Licensing with a Downstream Oligopoly

Review of Industrial Organization - We analyze licensing contracts in an oligopolistic downstream market where an outside innovator has private information with regard to its technology. Under...     

The success of mergers in Germany

This paper presents empirical evidence of the success of mergers in the Federal Republic of Germany. In general, the results show that the mergers are not successful. The shareholders of acquiring firms have to accept cumulative abnormal losses of −9.38 per cent. Returns on assets show also significant declines. According to the pattern of diversification it was found that product extending acquiring firms performed best. High cash flow enables to limit losses. Firms that have frequent experience of mergers tend to gain from their mergers.     

Regulating commissions in markets with advice

The paper explores the implications of regulating commissions in markets with advice. It provides a review of recent contributions dealing with policies that mandate disclosure, impose caps on commissions, restrict the steepness of commissions, or require the deferral of commissions.     

Investment dynamics in markets with endogenous demand

I examine entry into markets where demand is an increasing function of past sales because of learning, networks, or fashion. Demand is initially unknown (with firms learning in Bayesian fashion) and grows endogenously over time. The competitive expansion path and the efficient/monopoly solution differ not only with respect to levels (the market's investment is too low), but also time patterns : externalities contribute to S-shaped diffusion. There is also path-dependence: small initial differences may determine whether the market will grow or not open. Policy arguments for subsidizing entry into new markets, especially in infant export industries, are examined.     

Modeling the effects of mergers in procurement

In procurement settings, mergers among suppliers reduce buyers' choice sets and can harm buyers by eliminating their preferred supplier or reducing their negotiating leverage. I develop a stochastic economic model that predicts the effects of mergers based on information that commonly is available to antitrust authorities. I derive general expressions for the ex ante expected changes in price, buyer utility, and supplier profit. Each becomes tractable under certain distributional assumptions. The model predicts that average prices will increase by more than 40% due to the recently litigated acquisition of Power Reviews by Bazaarvoice, in the absence of an effective remedy.     

Horizontal mergers with synergies: Cash vs. profit-share auctions

We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning the synergy effect of merging with a takeover target and bidders can influence rivals' beliefs through their bids. We compare cash and profit-share auctions, first- and second-price, supplemented by entry fees. Since non-merged firms benefit from a merger if synergies are low, bidders are subject to a positive externality with positive probability; nevertheless, pooling does not occur. Unlike cash auctions, profit-share auctions are not revenue equivalent, and the second-price profit-share auction is more profitable than the other auctions.     

R&D in markets with network externalities

This paper studies the consequences of network externalities on R&D rivalry between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. In the model, all differences between the R&D projects chosen in market equilibrium and the socially best projects are solely due to network externalities. From a welfare perspective, the incumbent chooses a too risky and the entrant a too certain R&D project. Rothschild and Stiglitz's mean preserving spread criterion is used as a measure of risk. Adoption of a new standard is more likely in equilibrium than in the social optimum.     

Leveraging brand equity in business-to-business mergers and acquisitions

Every acquisition provokes a branding decision—should the acquirer absorb the acquired business by renaming it under its own name to convey to the market that ownership and the way of doing business has changed, or should it allow the acquired company to continue trading under its old name so as to avoid damage to its existing customer franchise? This is a complex management decision but one which apparently receives little attention. This paper draws on the B2B branding and M&A literatures to create a model of brand equity transfer. The model assumes that rebranding of an acquired company under the name of the new parent can yield positive benefits if the new parent has higher brand equity than the acquired company. A case study of an acquisition of a national construction materials company by a larger international group provides an illustration of the transfer process.     

Ecological investigation of firm effects in horizontal mergers

Using an ecological lens, we extend strategic management and industrial organization theory to investigate the performance effects of horizontal mergers. We theorize that firms differ in their ability to benefit from horizontal mergers; that the products involved in the merger differ in their ability to attain and sustain any increase in performance above their premerger level; and that resource niches in which each product competes differ in terms of competitive constraints. We then test these predictions using longitudinal data specified at the product–market level, a unit of analysis that is less influenced by aggregation bias than are industry, firm, and even line-of-business level data. Our findings demonstrate how organizational ecology, when coupled with strategic management and industrial organization economic theories, can enrich our understanding of horizontal mergers. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.