Tax evasion,social norms,and economic growth

We propose a theoretical model to account for the negative relationship between tax evasion and economic development. More precisely, we integrate tax morale into a dynamic OLG model of tax evasion. Tax morale is modeled as a social norm for tax compliance. We show that accounting for such nonpecuniary costs of evasion may explain (a) why the share of evaded taxes over GDP decreases when countries grow and (b) that tax morale is positively correlated with the level of GDP per capita. Finally, a higher tax rate increases aggregate evasion and the number of evaders when taxpayers decisions are interdependent.     

Tax evasion and tax morale: A social network analysis

We study the effects of tax morale and social norms on tax evasion when individuals interact in a network. We present a model that incorporates incentives for tax compliance in the form of punishment and fines, tax morale, and reputation for social behaviour. We assume that individuals adjust their tax morale by observing the neighbours' tax morale. We simulate the model for different values of the parameters and show that the steady-state share of taxpayers as opposed to tax-evaders is affected by the probability of finding like-minded peers in the reference group (network integration), the weight that individuals attribute to reputation, and the share of individuals who update their tax morale. Last, we consider the possibility of a fiscal authority using the knowledge of the network structure and targeting ‘central’ individuals. We show that by positively affecting the tax morale of individuals whose influence within the network is high, a fiscal authority can increase tax compliance.     

Does a lower (higher) labour force participation rate imply greater (lower) income tax evasion? An exploratory empirical inquiry for the U.S.

This exploratory study seeks to add to the income tax evasion literature by investigating a heretofore ignored potential determinant of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion in the U.S., namely, the labour force participation rate. It is hypothesized that the higher (lower) the labour force participation rate, the lower (greater) the degree of tax evasion. The empirical estimation supports this hypothesis, finding that a one unit (one percentage point) increase (decrease) in the labour force participation rate leads to a 9.1% decrease (increase) in income tax evasion. Thus, the declining labour force participation in recent years implies increased tax evasion problems for the U.S.     

Elderly labor supply and fertility decisions in aging-population economies

With a longer life expectancy, individuals who plan to work when they are old may increase the number of their children. Therefore, when individuals choose the time of retirement, the fertility rate may not necessarily decline but even rise.     

A contest with the taxman - the impact of tax rates on tax evasion and wastefully invested resources

We develop a moral hazard model with auditing where both the principal and the agent can influence the probability that the true state of nature is verified. This setting is widely applicable for situations where fraudulent reporting with costly state verification takes place. However, we use the framework to investigate tax evasion. We model tax evasion as a concealment-detection contest between the taxpayer and the authority. We show that higher tax rates cause more evasion and increase the resources wasted in the contest. Additionally, we find conditions under which a government should enforce incentive compatible auditing in order to reduce wasted resources.     

Tax evasion by tax deferment: Sham litigation with an informal credit market

We show theoretically how tax evasion is facilitated by informal credit market through tax deferment. Our model is empirically based. Using sham litigation, tax evaders earn a higher rate of return than the stipulated penalty rate for tax evasion while the government loses tax revenue. We propose an upfront part–payment of the disputed amount of tax as a solution to the form of tax evasion we describe.     

Genetic distance,economic growth and top income shares: Evidence from OECD countries

The relationship between economic growth and income inequality remains a puzzle in the literature. The main problem has been finding a way to account for the endogeneity of growth. Using century-long data of 14 OECD countries, this study disentangles the growth–inequality relationship. In doing so, our main contribution is employing genetic and geographical distances as instruments for economic growth. The instruments are constructed on the premise that the growth of one country spills over to the others if they are connected through trade and other forms of exchange; however, the genetic and geographical distances between countries represent barriers to such spillovers. Using alternative specifications and measures, we find that growth reduces the inequality measured by top income shares. As capital share increases in the growth process and capital substitutes labour, inequality-reducing strength of growth declines. Another important finding is that the effect of growth on top income shares is more significant among the highest income groups.     

Income inequality and economic growth

Despite the extensive existing literature on income inequality and economic growth, there remains considerable disagreement on the effect of inequality on economic growth. Existing literatures find either a positive or a negative relationship. In this paper, we attempt to theoretically examine that relationship with a stochastic optimal growth model. We make the disagreement clear within a single model. We conclude (i) that both are possible – that is, higher inequality can retard growth in the early stage of economic development, and can encourage growth in a near steady state, (ii) that income redistribution by high income tax does not always reduce income inequality. Income inequality can be reduced by higher income tax in a near steady state, but it cannot be reduced in the early stage of economic development, and (iii) that two government polices – rapid economic growth and low income inequality – can be achieved by low income tax in the early stage of economic development, but both cannot be achieved simultaneously in a near steady state.     

Is there a relation between labor investment inefficiency and corporate tax avoidance?

This paper investigates the relation between labor investment inefficiency and corporate tax avoidance. Employing a large sample of 61,542 U.S. firm-year observations over the 1962–2014 period, our regression results show that labor investment inefficiency is significantly positively related to tax avoidance. More specifically, we find that a one standard deviation of labor investment inefficiency leads to a 0.71% reduction in the accounting effective tax rate. Our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns, alternative proxy measures of tax avoidance and labor investment efficiency, and additional control variables pertaining to accounting quality and managerial ability. Taken together, our regression results show that labor investment inefficiency is an important determinant of corporate tax avoidance.     

On the interaction between risk sharing and capital accumulation in a stochastic OLG model with production

We analyze the interaction between risk sharing and capital accumulation in a stochastic OLG model with production. We give a complete characterization of interim Pareto optimal competitive equilibrium allocations. Furthermore, we provide tests of Pareto optimality/suboptimality based on (risky) rates of return only.     

Environmental tax policy in a model of growth cycles

Summary. The purpose of this paper is to consider environmental taxation which would control emissions of firms in a model of growth cycles. In the model presented below, the economy may experience two phases of growth and environmental quality: “the no-innovation growth regime” and “the innovation-led growth regime”. Aggregate capital and environmental quality remain constant in the no-innovation growth regime, while they perpetually increase in the innovation-led growth regime. The paper shows that the tax plays a key role in determining whether the economy stably converges to one of the two regimes or fluctuates permanently between them. It also shows that there is a critical level of the tax and that the economy obtains higher growth rates of capital and environmental quality by raising (or reducing) the tax if the initial tax is below (or above) the critical level. Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 21, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This research reported here was conducted within the research project “Project on Intergenerational Equity” at Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. I am deeply grateful to an anonymous referee for his or her insightful comments, which greatly improved the paper. I also thank Hiroshi Honda, Yasuo Maeda, Yuji Nakayama, and participants in workshops at Hitotsubashi University, Kyoto University, Nagoya University, Osaka University, University of Tsukuba, Yokohama National University, and University of Tokyo for their valuable comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are mine.     

Public deficits and economic growth

Considering an integrated area, this paper deals with the balance between the positive effects in the degree of economic cohesion resulting from R&D subsidies, temporarily granted from an imitator and less developed country, and the external negative effects arising from the eventual creation of excessive public deficits.We propose and numerically solve a model of a monetary union between two countries, one being innovator and the other imitator. Results suggest the pertinence of allowing for a temporary differentiation of fiscal discipline rules in favour of the less developed country. R&D subsidies granted by this country seem to lead to an easier catching-up without producing important negative external effects, also as not hurting severely the conditions for long-run sustainability of public accounts.     

Social norms and female labor force participation in urban China

This study investigates the impact of social norms on the labor supply decision of married women in urban China. Our estimation results indicate that men raised by non-working mothers are more likely to support traditional gender roles, are more averse to having working wives, and tend to be less productive or less willing to engage in housework than other men. Consequently, the labor force participation rate of married women with non-working mothers-in-law is 5–18 percentage points lower than that of married women with working mothers-in-law in urban China.     

Forms of democracy and economic growth volatility

Using a panel of 140 countries over the 1975–2007 period, we disaggregate democracies across five institutional dimensions (government forms, electoral rules, state forms, number of veto players, and age of democracies), to study the precise forms of democracy that may explain the lower economic growth volatility (EGV) in democracies compared to dictatorships, usually emphasized by the literature. We find that, while all government forms decrease EGV to the same extent, proportional electoral rules outperform majoritarian and mixed electoral rules, suggesting a role for a more inclusive political decision-making process. In addition, EGV is significantly lower in unitary states, suggesting a role for a limited separation of power between the central government and the local authorities, while the effect of the number of veto players and the age of democracies is significant only in developed countries. Consequently, the choice between various forms of democracy may not be neutral for EGV, and, possibly, for countries' development path.     

Distribution and development in a model of misgovernance

This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality, and a negative relationship between corruption and development.     

Population and economic growth with human and physical capital investments

We present a two-sector endogenous growth model with human and physical capital accumulation to analyze the long-run relationship between population growth and real per capita income growth. Formal education and investment in physical capital are assumed to be two separate components of human capital production. Along the balanced growth path equilibrium, population change may have a positive, negative, or else neutral effect on economic growth depending on whether physical and human capital are complementary/substitutes for each other in the formation of new human capital and on their degree of complementarity.

Corruption and economic growth: New empirical evidence

The nexus between corruption and economic growth has been examined for a long time. Many empirical studies measured corruption by the reversed Transparency International's Perception of Corruption Index (CPI) and ignored that the CPI was not comparable over time. The CPI is comparable over time since the year 2012. We employ new data for 175 countries over the period 2012–2018 and re-examine the nexus between corruption and economic growth. The cumulative long-run effect of corruption on growth is that real per capita GDP decreased by around 17% when the reversed CPI increased by one standard deviation. The effect of corruption on economic growth is especially pronounced in autocracies and transmits to growth by decreasing FDI and increasing inflation.     

Human capital, inequality, endogenous growth and educational subsidy: A theoretical analysis

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with dualism in human capital accumulation of two types of individuals. The government imposes a proportional income tax on rich individuals and uses the tax revenue to finance the educational subsidy given to poor individuals. We find out the properties of the optimal tax financed educational subsidy policy in the semi-stationary equilibrium of the model using the technique of Stackelberg differential game.     

The effect of education subsidies on regional economic growth and disparities in China

This paper examines the impact of education subsidies on regional economic growth and the disparities between two Chinese regions, Jiangsu and Liaoning, by simulating their economies in a six-period overlapping generations model in which individuals decide their length of education. This study estimates the long-run growth rates, that is, the steady growth paths of the regional economies based on current education subsidies, and explores their effect on human capital accumulation, namely in terms of economic growth while considering the increase in education subsidies. Because greater government subsidies in education induce individuals to invest in human capital, both regions achieve higher economic growth. Moreover, because of the large differences in productivity between the regions, the growth gap widens with evenly raised education subsidy rates.     

Social security in a Classical growth model

This paper develops a growth model with overlapping generationsof workers who save for life-cycle reasons and Ricardian capitalistswho save from a bequest motive. The population of workers accommodatesgrowth, so that the rate of capital accumulation is endogenousand determines the growth of employment. Two regimes are possible,one in which workers' saving dominates the long run and a secondin which the long-run equilibrium growth rate is determinedcompletely by the capitalist saving function, sometimes calledthe Cambridge equation. The second regime exhibits a versionof the Pasinetti paradox: changes in workers' saving affectthe level, but not the growth rate, of capital in the long run.Applied to social security, this result implies that an unfundedsystem relying on payroll taxes reduces workers' lifetime wealthand saving, creating level effects on the capital stock withoutaffecting its long-run growth rate. These effects are mitigatedby the presence of a reserve fund, various levels of which areexamined. Calibrating the model to realistic parameter valuesfor the US facilitates an interpretation of the controversiesover the percentage of the national wealth originating in life-cyclesaving and the effects of social security on saving. The modelis offered as an analytical framework for the review of currenttopics in fiscal policy, in particular identifying the socialsecurity reserve fund as a potential vehicle for generatingcapital accumulation and effecting a progressive redistributionof wealth.