National culture and bank risk-taking

We investigate the relation between national cultural values and bank risk. Despite the rigid transnational regulatory oversight of systemic European banks, we find evidence of an economically significant association between cultural values and domestic bank risk. Specifically, we report a positive (negative) association between the cultural values of individualism and hierarchy (trust) and domestic bank risk-taking. Consistent with our predictions, this relation weakened during the recent financial crisis and does not hold for global banks, regardless of the period under investigation. Our findings are robust to endogeneity tests that mitigate concerns regarding reverse causality and confounding effects affecting our conclusions.     

Financial liberalization and bank risk-taking: International evidence

This paper analyzes the channels through which financial liberalization affects bank risk-taking in an international sample of 4333 banks in 83 countries. Our results indicate that financial liberalization increases bank risk-taking in both developed and developing countries but through different channels. Financial liberalization promotes stronger bank competition that increases risk-taking incentives in developed countries, whereas in developing countries it increases bank risk by expanding opportunities to take risk. Capital requirements help reduce the negative impact of financial liberalization on financial stability in both developed and developing countries. However, official supervision and financial transparency are only effective in developing countries.     

Political institutions and bank risk-taking behavior

This paper examines the impact of political institutions on bank risk-taking behavior. Using an international sample of banks from 98 countries over the period 1998–2007, I document that sound political institutions stimulate higher bank risk-taking. This is consistent with the hypotheses that better political institutions increase banks’ risk by boosting the credit market competition from alternative sources of finance and generating the moral hazard problems due to the expectation of government bailouts in worst economic conditions. While it is contrary to the hypotheses that better political institutions decrease banks’ risk by lowering the government expropriation risk and the information asymmetries between banks and borrowers. The results are robust to a number of sensitivity tests, including alternative proxies of bank risk-taking and political institutions, cross-sectional bank- and country-level regressions, endogeneity concerns of political institutions, country income levels, explicit deposit insurance schemes and sample extension from 1998 to 2014. I also examine the interdependence between political and legal institutions and find that political and legal institutions complement each other to influence bank risk-taking behavior.     

Chair-CEO generation gap and bank risk-taking

Poor bank governance has disastrous consequences for economies as the 2007–2009 financial crisis has shown. In the aftermath, board diversity is identified as an effective mechanism to enhance bank governance. Diversity, creating cognitive conflict between board members, is expected to enhance board's independence of thought to better perform monitoring and advising functions. Age is a key demographic measure and age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO in non-financial firms leads to better economic outcomes (Goergen, Limbach, & Scholz, 2015). In this paper, we examine whether chair-CEO age dissimilarity can mitigate banks' excessive risk-taking behaviour. Using a unique sample of 100 listed banks in Europe between 2005 and 2014, we find that age difference between the chair and the CEO reduces bank risk-taking. A chair-CEO generational gap –defined as a minimum of 20 years' age difference– has a larger impact in reducing risk-taking.     

National culture and corporate cash holdings around the world

This paper examines whether cultural dimensions explain the variation in corporate cash holdings around the world as well as within the United States. We establish four major findings. First, in an international setting, corporate cash holdings are negatively associated with individualism and positively associated with uncertainty-avoidance. Second, individualism and uncertainty avoidance influence the precautionary motive for holding cash. Third, firms in individualistic states in the United States hold less cash than firms in collectivistic states. Fourth, we show that individualism is positively related to the firm’s capital expenditures, acquisitions, and repurchases while uncertainty avoidance is negatively related. Our findings remain unchanged after controlling for governance factors, firm attributes, and country characteristics.     

The conditioning role of performance on the bank risk-taking channel of monetary policy: Evidence from a multiple-tool regime

The study investigates how monetary policy affects bank risk-taking under a multiple-tool regime of Vietnam during 2007–2018. Particularly, we also consider the conditioning role of bank performance, broken down by bank profitability and cost efficiency, in this nexus. Using both dynamic and static panel models, we show that the liquidity injection initiated by the central bank’s asset purchases induces banks to take more risks, captured by the traditional Z-score and two alternative measures of credit risk. However, monetary policy easing through decreased interest rates is beneficial to the credit portfolio and financial stability of banks, which therefore challenges the functioning of the bank risk-taking channel. This startling result is robust across three different interest rate measures, including lending rates, refinance rates and rediscount rates. Further analysis reveals that our observed effects are alleviated for banks with higher performance — i.e., more profitable and efficient banks. This in-depth finding offers more insights into the “search for yield” incentive, based on the theory of information asymmetry and the two competing hypotheses of “bad management” and “cost skimping”.     

National culture and bank performance: Evidence from the recent financial crisis

We examine whether the prevailing national culture has been material in determining bank performance during the recent financial crisis. In this paper, we focus on three particular national culture dimensions: uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, and power distance. We expect banks from high uncertainty avoidance and power distance societies to perform relatively better during the recent financial crisis. On the other hand, banks in individualistic (collectivist) societies are likely to perform worse (better) during the crisis. Using an international sample of 3438 banks from 48 countries, we find support for our main conjectures. Specifically, we establish that uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, and power distance have a first order impact on bank performance during the crisis. Our results are robust to a battery of additional checks, including additional variables, alternative samples, and correcting for potential endogeneity.     

Overconfidence and optimism: The effect of national culture on capital structure

This study assesses whether variations in capital structure across countries can be explained by cultural traits. We analyze capital structure choices of firms in 42 countries and provide evidence that these decisions are affected by the degree of individualism of the country where the firm is located. We assert that managers in countries with high level of individualism exhibit strong optimism and overconfidence which cause an upward bias in perception of supportable debt ratios. Our results are robust to controlling for other firm- and country specific determinants of capital structure choices and to using alternative model specifications and estimation techniques.     

Capital regulation,deposit insurance and bank risk: International evidence from normal and crisis periods

In this paper, we examine the impact of capital regulation on bank risk and the moderating role of deposit insurance on the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk during both normal and crisis periods. Using an international sample of banks from 111 countries, our results show that stringent capital regulation reduces bank default risk, in general, during normal growth period, and this effect is not conditioned by the existence of explicit deposit insurance. Further, stringent capital regulation in place during the pre-crisis period reduces bank default risk during the crisis period, and this effect is stronger for countries with explicit deposit insurance during the pre-crisis period. These results have important policy implications to design the optimal bank regulations.     

Minimum capital requirements,bank supervision and special resolution schemes. Consequences for bank risk-taking

This paper analyzes the incentive effects of special bank resolution schemes which were introduced during the recent financial crisis. These schemes allow regulators to take control over a systemically important financial institution before bankruptcy. We ask how special resolution schemes influence banks’ risk-taking and whether regulators should combine them with minimum capital requirements. We model a single bank which is supervised by a regulator who receives an imperfect signal about the bank's probability of success. We find that capital requirements are better than resolution from a welfare point of view if the quality of the signal is low, if it is difficult for the bank to attract deposits, or if the project return is low.     

Foreign bank subsidiaries’ risk-taking behavior: Impact of home and host country national culture

This paper examines whether the risk-taking behavior of foreign affiliates of multinational banks is more influenced by the national culture of their parent banks’ home country or the national culture of foreign affiliates’ host country. The study uses a dataset of 292 foreign affiliates (i.e., subsidiaries or branch operations) operating in 66 countries having parent banks in 26 countries for empirical analysis. National culture of both home and host countries is measured with four dimensions—uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity and power distance—of Hofstede's framework of national culture. Findings suggest that the national culture of parent banks’ home country has higher impact on the risk-taking behavior of foreign affiliates of multinational banks than the national culture of their host country. Specifically, foreign affiliates’ risk-taking is higher if parent banks’ home country has low uncertainty avoidance, high individualism and low power distance cultural values. This study extends our understanding that how informal institutions, such as the national culture, influence the financial decisions in multinational banks.     

Risk-taking begets risk-taking: Evidence from casino openings and investor portfolios

We provide evidence that casino openings can have spillover effects on an individual's portfolio risk-taking. Using investor-level brokerage data and the initial legalization and opening of commercial casinos in the United States as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that, after a casino opens in close geographical proximity to investors, those with a high propensity to gamble (PTG) increase their idiosyncratic portfolio risk by 12.88% relative to those unlikely to gamble. This effect lasts for approximately 3 months and does not affect systematic portfolio risk. These results suggest that increased access to gambling can temporarily increase portfolio risk-taking for those with a PTG.     

National cultural effects on leverage decisions: Evidence from emerging-market ADRs

We examine leverage decisions in the context of national culture over the 1996–2010 period. Cultural characteristics can explain capital structure decisions from emerging-markets cross-listings. The results show that firms from countries with high Individualism and Indulgence employ more debt. Firms located in countries with high Power Distance, Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Long-term Orientation are less leveraged. Additionally, Exchange-traded and capital-raising ADRs are more likely to be from countries with weaker corporate governance. Univariate tests show that capital-raising ADRs employ less debt relative to non-capital-raising ADRs, and notably, in the post-cross-listing period. Interestingly, the home country's cultural characteristics of capital-raising and exchange-traded ADRs exert less influence on their capital structure decisions. Our findings suggest that there is a value discount associated with increased firm leverage. Our insights have practical implications for portfolio managers attempting to enter emerging markets through the use of ADRs. Moreover, investors can evaluate the often neglected effect of cultural values into firm performance.     

Capital ratios and bank lending: A matched bank approach

This paper examines the impact of bank capital ratios on bank lending by comparing differences in loan growth to differences in capital ratios at sets of banks that are matched based on geographic area as well as size and various business characteristics. We argue that such comparisons are most effective at controlling for local loan demand and other environmental factors. For comparison we also control for local factors using MSA fixed effects. We find, based on data from 2001 to 2011, that the relationship between capital ratios and bank lending was significant during and shortly following the recent financial crisis but not at other times. We find that the relationship between capital ratios and loan growth is stronger for banks where loans are contracting than where loans are expanding. We also show that the elasticity of bank lending with respect to capital ratios is higher when capital ratios are relatively low, suggesting that the effect of capital ratio on bank lending is nonlinear. In addition, we present findings on the relationship between bank capital and lending by bank size and loan type.     

The developing influence of Chinese culture on finance: A literature review and case-study illustration

Since significant economic reforms forty years ago, China has been a very attractive market for foreign investors. However, foreign investors face various challenges while cooperating with Chinese partners. This research focuses on examining the developing influence of Chinese culture on finance. Literature review is aimed to investigate existing theories and to apply them to research findings in order to provide answers to the research questions. A case study in the form of an interview was conducted with German entrepreneur examining their business cooperation with Chinese partners. Results of the research show that Chinese business practices have specific characteristics and norms embedded in Chinese society and culture. Chinese culture core values shape people’s behaviors, their way of thinking, and that influence international partnerships. To do a very successful cross-cultural investment, it is necessary to learn about and understand partners from China.     

Fleeing entrepreneurs: Foreign residency right and corporate risk-taking

We use a unique sample of Chinese firms to investigate the impact of the foreign residency right (FRR) of a firm’s controlling person on corporate risk-taking. Our findings suggest that the controlling person’s FRR is negatively associated with corporate risk-taking, and the effect of FRR on risk-taking is significantly reduced by Operation Fox Hunt (a program for actively pursuing fled criminals) or when the foreign country has an extradition treaty with China. Our results are robust to tests for endogeneity, alternative metrics of FRR, and risk-taking. We also find that severe financial constraints and a decline in R&D activities are the channels through which FRR reduces corporate risk-taking. Additional analyses show that the effect of FRR on corporate risk-taking is more pronounced when (a) controlling persons hold foreign nationality, (b) controlling persons are powerful or older, or (c) the investors of the firm face greater information asymmetry.     

Commercial bank mutual fund activities: Implications for bank risk and profitability

This paper examines the risk structure of bank holding companies and the effect of mutual fund activities on bank risk and profitability over the period 1987–1994. Findings from structural change tests indicate a significant decline in bank risk occurred near the mid-point of the study. Results from a confirmatory factor analytic model employed to examine the impact of mutual fund activities on banks suggest that mutual fund activities moderated bank industry systematic risk during the sample period. Mutual fund activities also increased the profitability of banks. These results suggest that mutual funds represent a productive avenue of expansion for bank holding companies.     

Inside debt and firm risk-taking: Evidence from the UK pension reform

This paper provides new evidence on the relation between CEO inside debt and firm risk-taking by exploiting the change in the tax treatment of UK pensions following two pension amendments. The 2006 pension reform introduces the annual and lifetime allowance for UK pension schemes, significantly increasing income taxes associated with CEO inside debt. The 2011 allowance cut, which substantially reduces the annual allowance introduced in 2006, further increases income taxes on inside debt. We find that CEO inside debt, in the form of executive pensions declines after the 2006 reform while cash-in-lieu increases significantly. This effect is more severe after the 2011 allowance cut than the 2006 pension reform. UK firms appear to substitute away from pensions towards cash-in-lieu, where income taxes are less punishing. If the association between CEO inside debt and firm risk-taking is causal, we should observe a change of risk-taking after the decline of inside debt. Our results, which exploit the exogenous nature of the reforms, show that the decline of CEO pensions does not lead to any change in firm risk-taking. This result suggests that no causal relationship exists between CEO inside debt and firm risk-taking. Our results extend the inside debt literature, where empirical evidence is mainly documented in the US. Contrary to findings in the US, our evidence suggests that the use of CEO inside debt is motivated to minimise income tax rather than a tool to moderate firm risk.     

Rethinking bank shareholder equity: The case of Deutsche Bank

We introduce and apply an innovative accounting approach to analyse the equity position of a European systemically important financial institution, Deutsche Bank, between 2001 and 2015. According to our findings, the actual contribution by shareholders to bank equity capital was limited, while shareholder payout policies, including share buybacks and trading on its own shares, were both material. These findings raise concerns on the actual capacity by shareholder equity to assure protection against (residual) risk and loss absorption. Customer and investor protections appear to lay with bank entity equity dynamics. These findings have implications for bank financial sustainability and resilience, company capital maintenance, and regulatory capital requirements. Further developments based upon this innovative methodology may improve on existing prudential and accounting regulations.     

National politics and bank default risk in the eurozone

We study the impact of national politics on default risk of eurozone banks as measured by the stock market-based Distance to Default. We find that national electoral cycles, the power of the government as well as the government’s party ideological alignment significantly affect the stability of banks in the eurozone member countries. Moreover, we show that the impact of national politics on bank default risk is more pronounced for large as well as weakly capitalized banks.