Price dispersion and seller heterogeneity in retail food markets

Price dispersion, i.e. a homogeneous product being sold at different prices by different sellers, is among the most replicated findings in empirical economics. The paper assesses the extent and determinants of spatial price dispersion for 14 perfectly homogeneous food products in more than 400 retailers in a market characterized by the persistence of a large number of relatively small traditional food stores, alongside large supermarkets. The extent of observed price dispersion is quite high. When prices in an urban area (where the spatial concentration of sellers is higher) are compared with those in smaller towns and rural areas, differences in search costs and the potentially higher degree of competition do not yield lower prices. Other counteracting factors, including differences in seller costs and consumer incomes, make prices, on average, higher in the urban area for 11 of the 14 products considered. For many, but not all, the products supermarkets proved to be less expensive than traditional retailers, although average savings from food shopping at supermarkets were extremely low. Finally, the results of the study provide evidence that retailers have different pricing strategies and these differences also emerge for supermarkets belonging to the same chain. The results presented in the paper suggest that a variety of factors play a role in explaining price dispersion. In addition to differences in seller costs, the contemporaneous heterogeneity of retailers (in terms of services provided) and consumers (in terms of search costs and preferences) makes the emergence of monopolistic competition possible as well as allowing small traditional food retailers to remain in business.     

Search and price dispersion in online grocery markets

Consumers often purchase multiple products at a time from retailers, creating multi-product incentives for search. In this paper we consider how product variety affects consumer search intensity and the dispersion of prices in multi-product retail markets. We employ online grocery pricing data from four large retailers in the UK to estimate search costs and equilibrium price dispersion for food products under circumstances where: (i) consumers search for single products; and (ii) consumers search for multiple products at once. We compare estimates in each case between a model in which utility increases with product variety and a model in which utility is not a function of variety. Relative to our preferred specification with variety effects in utility, we find estimates of both search cost and search frequency to be biased upwards in single product settings when variety effects are ignored; however, we find estimates of search costs are biased upwards while search frequency is biased downwards in multi-product settings when variety effects in utility are ignored.     

Estimating store choices with endogenous shopping bundles and price uncertainty

We develop a structural model of retail store choices for which household shopping plans and price beliefs are endogenously determined. In our model individual households make their store choices based on their expected basket costs, which are determined by their shopping plans and price beliefs. Previous studies use realized purchases as a proxy for unobserved shopping lists and also assume homogenous price expectation across all households over the entire sample period. Our approach improves the measures of expected basket costs by estimating intended shopping lists of households using a duration model and also by constructing household-, time-, store-, and goods-specific price expectations. In our empirical application using a scanner data set, we find that the store choices become significantly more elastic to prices when the correction is applied.     

Cheap Exclusion in Markets with Multiple Complements

We extend the theory of exclusive dealing in first-mover environments to settings where the incumbent seller’s product is used with multiple complements in a distribution chain and the incumbent can sign exclusive dealing contracts with more than one of them. The model is motivated by the market for biosimilar pharmaceuticals, where incumbent sellers that face a threat of entry can sign exclusionary contracts with both providers and insurance carriers prior to entry. We show that when the incumbent’s complementors are vertically related, it can be profitable for the incumbent to sign exclusive contracts with indirect buyers, who operate downstream from the direct buyers of the product. Under linear pricing, such exclusion is profitable if the pass-through rate is sufficiently low, and under nonlinear pricing and symmetric Nash bargaining, it is profitable for all pass-through rates. Complementors face a more severe coordination problem than independent buyers that can make anticompetitive exclusion more likely and especially cheap.     

Price Discrimination with Demarketing

We study how demarketing interacts with pricing decisions to explain why and when it can be employed as the seller's optimal strategy. In our model, a monopolistic seller offers different price‐quality bundles of the product. A consumer's preference is private information. With demarketing, consumers must make a costly effort to purchase and/or utilize the product, whereas with marketing, the seller instead makes the effort so that the consumer's purchasing decision is independent of the cost of effort. Our result suggests that, for small or large effort costs, it is optimal for the seller to engage in marketing. For intermediate effort costs, however, demarketing can be optimal. With demarketing, the seller induces only the consumers with high valuation to make transaction effort. By doing so, the seller can price discriminate more effectively, thus extracting more surplus. We extend our analysis to the case where the seller can offer special deals through exclusive sales channels along with demarketing. Then, demarketing can be optimal even for large costs of effort.     

基于物联网技术的智能购物车设计

为了有效解决超市中出现的排队等待结账难、手推购物车不方便、寻找目标商品难等问题,设计了基于超高频率射频识别技术和超宽带室内定位技术,并辅以手机网页和云端大数据库完成的智能购物车系统,在车载自助结账系统、购物车智能跟随系统、云端大数据库自主导航系统3个方面做了突破。首先,顾客进入到超市之后,只需要扫码领取一辆智能购物车,然后便可以在手机上完成对购物车的操控,同时手机的网页也会实时显示顾客的购物信息,最后,顾客不再需要排队等待结账,只需要在手机网页上完成支付即可。设计结果表明,智能购物车可以有效解决超市中存在的问题,实现购物过程的全自助。设计方案可应用于智能超市,取代传统超市的人工结账和导购,可以有效缓解超市人员的工作压力。     

The Effect of Refinancing Costs and Market Imperfections on the Optimal Call Strategy and the Pricing of Debt Contracts

This article, which was originally written in 1986, develops a methodology for valuing mortgage-backed securities with refinancing costs. We solve simultaneously for the valuation of the mortgage-backed security (loan) and the borrower's refinancing strategy, pricing all coupon levels simultaneously. Because the borrower may refinance his or her loan and incur costs at many times in the future, the optimal refinancing decisions arise from an optimal dynamic strategy that reflects the costs of all potential future refinancings. Though the borrower faces multiple rounds of refinancing costs, the market value of the loan cannot exceed the call price plus a single round of refinancing costs.     

Exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets

This paper studies the incentives to engage in exclusionary pricing in the context of two-sided markets. Platforms are horizontally differentiated, and seek to attract users of two groups who single-home and enjoy indirect network externalities from the size of the opposite user group active on the same platform. The entrant incurs a fixed cost of entry, and the incumbent can commit to its prices before the entry decision is taken. The incumbent has thus the option to either accommodate entry, or to exclude entry and enjoy monopolistic profits, albeit under the constraint that its price must be low enough to not leave any room for an entrant to cover its fixed cost of entry. We find that, in the spirit of the literature on limit pricing, under certain circumstances even platforms find it profitable to exclude entrants if the fixed entry cost lies above a certain threshold. By studying the properties of the threshold, we show that the stronger the network externality, the lower the thresholds for which incumbent platforms find it profitable to exclude. We also find that entry deterrence is more likely to harm consumers the weaker are network externalities, and the more differentiated are the two platforms.     

Personalized pricing and advertising: Who are the winners?

This paper investigates who wins and who loses when firms depart from a mass advertising/uniform pricing strategy (benchmark model) to a targeted advertising/price discrimination one. Considering a duopoly market in which firms simultaneously compete in prices and advertising decisions, we examine the competitive and welfare effects of personalized pricing with targeted advertising by comparing equilibrium outcomes under customized advertising/ pricing decisions to the results arising under mass advertising and uniform pricing. We show that, when both firms compete in both market segments, all segment consumers are expected to pay higher average prices under the personalized advertising/pricing strategy. We also show that, in the context of our simultaneous game, targeted advertising with price discrimination might boost firms’ profits in comparison to the case of mass advertising and uniform prices. The overall welfare effects of the personalized strategy are ambiguous. However, even when the personalized strategy boosts overall welfare, consumers might all be worse-off. Thus the paper gives support to concerns that have been raised regarding the firms’ ability to adopt personalized strategies to boost profits at the expense of consumers.     

Estimation of Search Frictions in the British Electricity Market

This paper studies consumer search and pricing behavior in the British domestic electricity market following its opening to competition in 1999. We develop a sequential search model in which an incumbent and an entrant group compete for consumers who find it costly to obtain information on prices other than from their current supplier. We use a large data set on prices and input costs to structurally estimate the model. Our estimates indicate that consumer search costs must be relatively high in order to rationalize observed pricing patterns. We confront our estimates with observed switching behavior and find they match well.     

Bundling and Menus of Two-Part Tariffs

Inducing self-selection among different segments of consumers is an important issue in pricing. Some firms induce self-selection by offering a menu of two-part tariffs (e.g., different rate plans) and letting consumers select the tariff and quantity they prefer. Other firms induce self-selection by offering a menu of price-quantity bundles (e.g., different package sizes) and letting consumers select only from among these bundles. We show that bundling is more profitable absent cost considerations. Social welfare may be higher or lower with bundling.     

What types of switching costs to create under behavior-based price discrimination?

We study firms' incentives to create switching costs using a four-period model consisting of two consecutive price-competing stages intervened by options to create switching costs early (before price competition) and late (during price competition). Acknowledging that many real/social switching costs need to be created early while many contractual/pecuniary switching costs are set up late during the competition, we show that firms are better off minimizing real/social switching costs while maximizing contractual/pecuniary switching costs. The results highlight the importance of timing of creation that is embedded in different types of switching costs. We also show that switching costs can actually benefit consumers when firms practice behavior-based price discrimination because consumers can enjoy benefits of deep price discounts without the hassle of actually switching. Therefore, an observed lack of consumer switching should not be immediately interpreted as lack of competition in markets where both switching costs and behavior-based pricing exist.     

The cross-price effect on willingness-to-pay estimates in open-ended contingent valuation

Previous literature has shown that potential buyers use a reference price or product to form their opinion about the value of a new product. Therefore, the pricing decision is an interactive process. We investigate the two generalizations of the cross-price effect (the neighborhood price effect and the asymmetric price effect) on consumer willingness-to-pay (WTP) for multiple similar products in an open-ended contingent valuation context. Results show that the cross-price effect on WTP is prominent, with the neighborhood price effect holding in contingent valuation. No conclusions are reached about the asymmetric price effect.     

Asymmetric price adjustments: A supply side approach

Using a model of dynamic price competition, we provide an explanation from the supply side for the well-established observation that output prices react faster in response to input cost increases than to decreases. When costs decline, the opportunity of profitable storing in anticipation of higher future costs allows competitive firms to coordinate on prices above current marginal costs. The initial price response is only partial and profitable storing relaxes competition. Conversely, when costs rise, storing is not beneficial in anticipation of lower future costs and firms immediately adjust their prices to current marginal costs, which entails the standard Bertrand outcome. Our results shed new light on the empirical evidence about asymmetric pricing and can stimulate further empirical investigation on this puzzle.     

Mergers of complements and entry in innovative industries

I study a merger between producers of complement inputs facing potential entry, with investment by the incumbents in deterministic cost reduction and by the entrants in probabilistic innovation, and then competition in prices. The merger solves Cournot complementarity problems in investment and pricing, which is what makes it profitable but also potentially anti-competitive. When the demand is inelastic the merger harms consumers by reducing R&D of the entrants if the incumbents are efficient enough (always when bundling is adopted). Instead, with a demand elastic enough, the merger increases consumer surplus (even with bundling).     

The Strategic Positioning of Store Brands in Retailer–Manufacturer Negotiations

Store brands are the only brands for which the retailer is responsible not onlyfor promotion, shelf placement, and pricing, but also for positioning the brandin product space. We argue that retailers strongly value control over store brandpositioning because they will be unable to source a national brand with theirdesired product positioning. This is because retailers have an incentive to positionstore brands as close substitutes to leading national brands – a location in productspace which other national brand manufacturers would not find profitable. We presentempirical evidence that is consistent with the results of our model.     

Cursed Consumers and the Effectiveness of Consumer Protection Policies*

We model firms' quality disclosure and pricing in the presence of cursed consumers, who fail to be sufficiently skeptical about undisclosed quality. We show that cursed consumers are exploited in duopoly if firms are vertically differentiated, if there are few cursed consumers, and if average product quality is high. Three common consumer protection policies that work under monopoly, that is, mandatory disclosure, third party disclosure and consumer education, may all increase exploitation and decrease welfare. Even where these policies improve welfare, they often lead to a reduction in consumer surplus. Our conclusions hold in extensions with endogenous quality and horizontal differentiation.     

A New Perspective on Entry in Horizontal Merger Analysis

I analyze horizontal mergers in procurement settings in which sellers incur costs to participate. Considering existing sellers’ contest-level entry differs from antitrust authorities’ typical emphasis on new sellers’ market-level entry to counteract a merger’s anticompetitive harm. I show that profitable mergers can increase consumer and total surplus by inducing more and stronger contest-level entry by the merged seller, which echoes common claims from merging parties that their merger is beneficial because it creates a stronger competitor. This finding suggests caution by antitrust authorities: when contest-level entry costs matter, standard models that ignore those costs prescribe blocking procompetitive mergers.

     

Spatial Price Discrimination: The Use of Parking Coupons by Downtown Retailers

Price discrimination in monopolistically competitive markets affects firms' joint profits through several pecuniary and nonpecuniary externalities. Discrimination is a public good if the net effect is positive. Using a random utility shopping destination choice model we investigate the effect of a downtown parking coupon program that discriminates in favor of suburban consumers and against consumers based downtown. The program appears profitable for downtown stores collectively, but in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium stores do not participate. Participation is thus subject to free-riding. As the subsidy rate required to induce participation rises, profits fall. Whatever the subsidy rate, social surplus declines.     

Consumer Trial,Continuous Use,and Economic Benefits of a Retail Service Innovation: The Case of the Personal Shopping Assistant

Service innovations in retailing have the potential to benefit consumers as well as retailers. This research models key factors associated with the trial and continuous use of a specific self‐service technology (SST), the personal shopping assistant (PSA), and estimates retailer benefits from implementing that innovation. Based on theoretical insights from prior SST studies, diffusion of innovation literature, and the technology acceptance model (TAM), this study develops specific hypotheses and tests them on a sample of 104 actual users of the PSA and 345 nonusers who shopped at the retail store offering the PSA device. Results indicate that factors affecting initial trial are different from those affecting continuous use. More specifically, consumers' trust toward the retailer, novelty seeking, and market mavenism are positively related to trial, while technology anxiety hinders the likelihood of trying the PSA. Perceived ease of use of the device positively impacts continuous use while consumers' need for interaction in shopping environments reduces the likelihood of continuous use. Importantly, there is evidence on retailer benefits from introducing the innovation since consumers using the PSA tend to spend more during each shopping trip. However, given the high costs of technology, the payback period for recovery of investments in innovation depends largely upon continued use of the innovation by consumers. Important implications are provided for retailers considering investments in new in‐store service innovations. Incorporation of technology within physical stores affords opportunities for the retailer to reduce costs, while enhancing service provided to consumers. Therefore, service innovations in retailing have the potential to benefit consumers as well as retailers. This research models key factors associated with the trial and continuous use of a specific SST in the retail context, the PSA, and estimates retailer benefits from implementing that innovation. In so doing, the study contributes to the nascent area of research on SSTs in the retail sector. Based on theoretical insights from prior SST studies, diffusion of innovation literature, and the TAM, this study develops specific hypotheses regarding the (1) antecedent effects of technological anxiety, novelty seeking, market mavenism, and trust in the retailer on trial of the service innovation; (2) the effects of ease of use, perceived waiting time, and need for interaction on continuous use of the innovation; and (3) the effect of use of innovation on consumer spending at the store. The hypotheses were tested on a sample of 104 actual users of the PSA and 345 nonusers who shopped at the retail store offering the PSA device, one of the early adopters of PSA in Germany. Data were analyzed using logistic regression (antecedents of trial), multiple regression (antecedents of continuous use), and propensity score matching (assessing retailer benefits). Results indicate that factors affecting initial trial are different from those affecting continuous use. More specifically, consumers' trust toward the retailer, novelty seeking, and market mavenism are positively related to trial, while technology anxiety hinders the likelihood of trying the PSA. Perceived ease of use of the device positively impacts continuous use, while consumers' need for interaction in shopping environments reduces the likelihood of continuous use. Importantly, there is evidence on retailer benefits from introducing the innovation since consumers using the PSA tend to spend more during each shopping trip. However, given the high costs of technology, the payback period for recovery of investments in innovation depends largely upon continued use of the innovation by consumers. Important implications are provided for retailers considering investments in new in‐store service innovations. The study contributes to the literature through its (1) simultaneous examination of antecedents of trial and continuous usage of a specific SST, (2) the demonstration of economic benefits of SST introduction for the retailer, and (3) contribution to the stream of research on service innovation, as against product innovation.