Unanimity,anonymity, and infinite population

This paper is concerned with the implications of unanimity and anonymity for the Arrovian social choice theory when population is infinite. Contrary to the finite population case, various unanimity and anonymity axioms can be formulated. We show a tension between unanimity and anonymity by providing possibility and impossibility results. We also examine the case in which social preferences are allowed to be quasi-transitive.     

Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: Characterizations

In school choice problems, a list of restrictions have been imposed on priorities to achieve desirable properties of rules. However, it is difficult to verify these “acyclicity” conditions and identify the structure of the restricted priority profiles. To improve visibility and verifiability, we provide characterizations of these conditions. We also present the logical relations among the conditions by using our characterizations.     

我国农村宅基地市场化改革的基础、问题及对策

农村宅基地市场化改革是农村集体建设用地市场化改革的一部分,也是我国城镇化进程的一个重要组成部分。目前,我国农村包括宅基地在内的集体建设用地市场化运行明显滞后,很有必要对农村宅基地进行市场化改革。本文从土地的基础性理论入手,对农村宅基地市场化改革的可行性进行分析,以期寻找其存在的问题,进而提出一些对策建议。     

Simple collective equilibria in stopping games

At each moment in time, an alternative from a finite set is selected by a stochastic process. Players observe the selected alternative and sequentially cast a yes or a no vote. If the set of players casting a yes vote is decisive for the selected alternative, it is accepted and the game ends. Otherwise the next period begins. We refer to this class of problems as stopping games. Collective choice games, quitting games, and coalition formation games are particular examples. When the core of a stopping game is non-empty, a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure stationary strategies is shown to exist. But in general, even subgame perfect equilibria in mixed stationary strategies may not exist. We show that aggregate voting behavior can be summarized by a collective strategy. We insist on pure strategies, allow for simple forms of punishment, and provide a constructive proof to show that so-called two-step simple collective equilibria always exist. This implies the existence of a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium. We apply our approach to the case with three alternatives exhibiting a Condorcet cycle and to a model of redistributive politics.     

On the merit of non-specialization in the context of majority voting

This study shows that independence between voters’ skills and states of nature improves the majority voting efficiency relative to the case when such independence does not exist. This implies that specialization (state of nature wise) is not advantageous under the simple majority rule.     

Job congruence, academic achievement, and earnings

This study combines a widely held view of how earnings are related to education and job tenure (The Mincer model¹) with the notion that earnings are associated with the quality of an employer–employee job match. The quality of an individual's occupational choice is measured using job congruence, a commonly-used construct in the psychometric literature. Better-matched individuals should be more productive and, as a result, have higher earnings. Previous studies were unable to address the importance of job preferences to earnings because available data do not include both job congruence and individual earnings. The Alumni Outcomes Survey, recently produced by ACT Inc., is among the first data sets to include both variables. We use these data to estimate the importance of job congruence on earnings after controlling both for job tenure and for academic achievement, measured by an individual's ACT score. Results indicate that job congruence is positively correlated with earnings, and has effects on earnings that are of almost equal magnitude with years of education.     

Generalized coalitions and bargaining sets

We introduce new notions of bargaining set for mixed economies which rest on the idea of generalized coalitions (Aubin, 1979) to define objections and counter-objections. We show that the bargaining set defined through generalized coalitions coincides with competitive allocations under assumptions which are weak and natural in the mixed market literature. As a further result, we identify some additional properties that a generalized coalition must satisfy to object an allocation.     

Issues in New Political Economy: An Overview

A brief overview of the historical background, nature, and rapid growth in volume and scope of new political economy since the early 1980s is provided. the paper continues with some general reflections on the strengths and weaknesses of the new political economy approach, illustrated by the other contributions to this special issue of the Journal of Economic Surveys . The final Section summarises these contributions.     

Data analysis and statistics, report of a discussion

A report is given of a discussion by De Leeuw, Molenaar, and audience on the role of models and generalization in statistical inference.     

Collective memories,propaganda and authoritarian political support

Can experience with democracy affect political support for a dictator? We develop a political economy model with endogenous reference points, where a dictator strategically reactivates traumatic collective memories about a past experience with democracy, to convince the population that a democratic alternative is inferior to the autocratic status quo. We find that a more traumatic experience with democracy in the past renders propaganda more efficient and increases the level of authoritarian political support per unit of memory recollection. We support these findings with panel data evidence from 103 countries.     

A characterization and an impossibility of finite length anonymity for infinite generations

In the context of ranking infinite utility streams, the impartiality axiom of finite length anonymity requires the equal ranking of any two utility streams that are equal up to a finite length permutation ( Fleurbaey and Michel, 2003). We first characterize any finite length permutation as a composition of a fixed step permutation and an “almost” fixed step permutation. We then show that if a binary relation satisfies finite length anonymity, then it violates all the distributional axioms that are based on a segment-wise comparison. Examples of those axioms include the weak Pareto principle and the weak Pigou-Dalton principle.     

Choice functions and hard choices

A hard choice is a situation in which an agent is unable to make a justifiable choice from a given menu of alternatives. Our objective is to present a systematic treatment of the axiomatic structure of such situations. To do so, we draw on and contribute to the study of choice functions that can be indecisive, i.e., that may fail to select a non-empty set for some menus. In this more general framework, we present new characterizations of two well-known choice rules, the maximally dominant choice rule and the top-cycle choice rule. Together with existing results, this yields an understanding of the circumstances in which hard choices arise.     

Objective Formalization,Perceived Formalization and Perceived Red Tape

Abstract

This research uses survey data and count data of formal rules in a Dutch organization to investigate the relationships between an objective measure of formalization and subjective measures of formalization and red tape. We find that red tape perceptions are related to perceptions of formalization. Second, we find that perceived formalization is weakly, significantly related to objective measures of formalization but that objective formalization measures do not correspond to higher levels of red tape perceptions. We conclude that red tape and formalization are distinct concepts, but question the claim that formalization is a necessary condition for red tape.     

Price impact,strategic interaction and portfolio choice

This paper studies the portfolio choice of two large investors who act strategically because their trading affects interest rates. Each investor chooses her optimal portfolio conditional on the portfolio of the opponent. Equilibrium portfolios and their performance depend on the investor’s characteristics (risk aversion and return impact) and on the characteristics of the opponent (risk aversion and return impact). Depending on the interplay among these characteristics, strategic interaction can (i) increase or decrease risk taking incentives, as compared to the Merton-style portfolio, (ii) induce the more risk-averse investor to invest relatively more in the risky asset and (iii) change the role of inflation-linked bonds from hedging instrument to borrowing opportunity.     

Public infrastructure investment,output dynamics,and balanced budget fiscal rules

We study the dynamic macroeconomic effects of public infrastructure investment under a balanced budget fiscal rule, using an overlapping generations model of a small open economy. The government finances public investment by employing distortionary labor taxes. The balanced budget rule implies a negative short-run output multiplier that exceeds (in absolute terms) the positive long-run output multiplier. Larger public capital spillovers sharpen the intertemporal output tradeoff. In contrast to conventional results regarding public investment shocks, we obtain dampened cyclical responses for plausible parameter values. The cyclical dynamics arise from the interaction between the labor tax rate, the tax base, and the intergenerational spillover effects. We show that financing scenarios involving public debt creation can substantially reduce the short-run output contraction and the transitional macroeconomic fluctuations induced by public investment.     

Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent,two-good economies

In exchange economies where agents have private information about their preferences, strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions are in general not efficient. We provide a restricted domain, namely the set of preferences representable by Leontief utility functions, where there exist mechanisms which are strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational. In two-agent, two-good economies we are able to provide an even stronger result. We characterize the class of efficient and individually rational social choice functions, which are fully implementable in truthful strategies.Received: 28 April 2003, Accepted: 23 June 2003, JEL Classification: D51, D71The author thanks Matthew Jackson, Jordi Massó and James Schummer for fruitful discussions, William Thomson for many valuable comments on an earlier version. A particular thank to Salvador Barberá for his fundamental help.     

Interest on reserves,policy rules and quantitative easing

Hundred percent reserve transaction banking system is proposed with tax-free interest on demand deposits and interest bearing reserves. To eliminate shadow banking arrangements, a 100% tax on net interest income is proposed for limited liability businesses. All financing of businesses would be mutual as currently most is. With this arrangement there would be no bank runs associated giving rise to a financial crisis.     

Hazard rate,stochastic choice and consideration sets

Manzini and Mariotti (2014) define the menu-independent random consideration set rule, where the decision maker considers each alternative with a menu-independent probability known as the attention function. We relax the assumption of menu-independence and allow for any restriction to be imposed on the attention function. We show that there is an equivalence between the attention function and the hazard rate. This equivalence is used to characterize the menu dependent random consideration set rules that correspond to (i) specific conditions on the probability rule, and (ii) different stochastic choice models from the literature.     

国有企业改革中的管理层收购:几个关系、收购原则及风险

管理层收购是国有企业产权改革的一种有效途径。但收购必须在国有资产管理部门的主持下,按照市场化的规则进行;如果收购过程本身处于管理层的主导之下,许多问题很难避免。本文论述了进行管理层收购需要正确认识的几个关系,然后提出了管理层收购必须遵循的原则,最后指出了收购过程中可能出现的几种风险。