What drives the short-run costs of fiscal consolidation? Evidence from OECD countries

We investigate how the short-term effects of fiscal consolidation on output and employment vary with the state of the business cycle, monetary policy, public debt, the current account, and private credit. By examining the response of a large number of variables, we are also able to shed light on the transmission channels of fiscal policy. Our main finding is that short-term output multipliers are below unity, even in states in which multipliers are expected to be larger (eg when the output gap is negative or monetary policy tight). Key offsetting factors that reduce the size of multipliers and explain differences across states are the extent to which the external sector improves and monetary policy eases.     

When and why do countries break their national fiscal rules?

This paper identifies determinants of compliance with various types of national numerical fiscal rules. Based on 51 fiscal rules in force in EU member states from 1995 to 2015, the analysis identifies determinants among specific rule characteristics and their fiscal frameworks, as well as their political, (socio-)economic and supranational environments. While the average compliance across all rules and countries is around 50%, compliance with rules constraining stock (rather than flow) variables, set out in coalitional agreements, as well as rules covering larger parts of general government finances is significantly higher. Furthermore, independent monitoring and enforcement bodies (issuing real-time alerts) turn out to be significantly associated with a higher probability of compliance. Several theories of the deficit bias of governments due to government fragmentation, decentralization and political budget cycles are also significant with regards to compliance with fiscal rules. However, neither the economic environment or business cycle, nor forecast errors (except for an unexpectedly higher primary balance) on average seem to play a significant role.     

How does population aging affect the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus over the business cycle?

What is the impact of population aging on the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus over the business cycle? We address this question by estimating state-dependent fiscal multipliers in member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). A government spending shock is identified as a forecast error of government spending and its output effect is estimated by using the local projection method. We find that there is no effect of population aging on output effects of fiscal spending shocks in expansionary times, whereas in recessions the output effects of fiscal spending shocks are weakened as population ages. This result points to important policy implications in that population aging would call for a larger fiscal stimulus to support aggregate demand during recession. Thus, this requires a larger fiscal space to allow for a wider swing of the fiscal position without creating concerns for fiscal sustainability.     

Tax-spending policies and economic growth: Theoretical predictions and evidence from the OECD

We present an endogenous growth model to study the growth effects of the composition of government expenditure and the associated tax burden. When we use data from a set of 23 OECD countries during 1970–2000, our econometric results support the predictions of the theory. The share of productive government expenditure is associated with higher growth, and this result is more robust when we use effective average tax rates and statutory tax rates as measures of the tax burden. With respect to the tax burden, different tax rates have different growth effects.     

Production subsidies and redistribution

Who gains from stimulating output? We explore a dynamic model with production subsidies where the population is heterogeneous in one dimension: wealth. There are two channels through which production subsidies redistribute resources across the population. First, poorer agents gain from a rise in wages, since—to the extent there is an operative wealth effect in labor supply—they work harder. Second, because a current output boost will raise consumption today relative to the future, thus lowering real interest rates, poor agents gain in relative terms since their income is based less on interest income. We examine optimal redistribution from the perspective of an arbitrary consumer in the population. We show that, if this consumer has commitment at time zero to set all present and future subsidy rates, and for a class of preferences that admits aggregation in wealth, then output stimulation, and hence redistribution, will only occur at time zero; after that, subsidies are zero. A byproduct of our analysis of this environment is a median-voter theorem: with direct voting over subsidy sequences at time zero, the sequence preferred by the median-wealth consumer is the unique outcome. We also study lack of commitment, since interest-rate manipulation is associated with time inconsistency. We analyze this case formally by looking at the Markov-perfect (time-consistent) equilibrium in a game between successive identical decision makers (e.g., the median agent). Here, subsidies persist—they are constant over time—and are more distortionary than under commitment. Moreover, whereas under commitment asset inequality changes initially—in favor of the consumer who decides on policy—it does not under lack of commitment.     

Starving the beast? Intra-generational conflict and balanced budget rules

A balanced budget requirement does not only prevent fiscal policy makers from smoothing tax distortions but also affects their preferred choice of government spending. The paper analyzes the conditions under which groups opposed to government spending might want to implement a balanced budget requirement in order to induce the government to spend less. It shows that relaxing a balanced budget requirement need not be associated with higher government spending.     

Government Spending Shocks and Rule‐of‐Thumb Consumers with Steady‐State Inequality*

In the body of literature concerning fiscal policy, a central result is that government spending might stimulate private consumption because only some households save, while others spend their entire income each period. Although such heterogeneity naturally causes inequality, this complication is commonly avoided by assuming that transfers redistribute steady‐state wealth. I show that this steady‐state assumption drives short‐run results. Without redistribution, the equilibrium is indeterminate, and the labor‐market structure that is imposed to support the expansive result is theoretically inconsistent. On a more positive note, I propose a labor‐market formulation under which the expansive effects of government spending might arise.     

Increasing Public Expenditure: Wagner's Law in OECD Countries

Abstract. The paper proposes a panel cointegration analysis of the joint development of government expenditure and economic growth in 23 Organization Economic Cooperation and Development countries. The empirical evidence provides indication of a structural positive correlation between public spending and per‐capita gross domestic product (GDP), which is consistent with the so‐called Wagner's law. A long‐run elasticity larger than 1 suggests a more than proportional increase of government expenditure with respect to economic activity. In addition, according to the spirit of the law, we found that the correlation is usually higher in countries with lower per‐capita GDP, suggesting that the catching‐up period is characterized by a stronger development of government activities with respect to economies in a more advanced state of development.     

Fiscal discipline in EMU? Testing the effectiveness of the Excessive Deficit Procedure

The Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), central to the Stability and Growth Pact, has been criticized from opposite ends. Some blame the EDP for imposing too much fiscal austerity. Others question whether the EDP has any disciplining power at all. To test its actual effects, we construct a real-time database of EDP recommendations and estimate augmented real-time and ex-post fiscal reaction functions for a panel of EMU member states. Overall, we find that a 1% of GDP larger EDP recommendation leads to 0.8–0.9% of GDP of additional fiscal consolidation plans, and 0.6–0.7% of actual consolidation. This result does not extend to countries subject to financial support programs: we find that, while they did implement substantial consolidation measures, in these countries required and delivered consolidation efforts are less connected. Overall, our results suggest that EDP recommendations have substantially shaped fiscal policies in the euro area, especially in the years 2010–2014, when EDP recommendations were most frequent.