Existence of a competitive equilibrium when all goods are indivisible

This paper investigates an economy where all consumption goods are indivisible at the individual level, but perfectly divisible at the overall level of the economy. In order to facilitate trading of goods, we introduce a perfectly divisible parameter that does not enter into consumer preferences — fiat money. When consumption goods are indivisible, a Walras equilibrium does not necessarily exist. We introduce the rationing equilibrium concept and prove its existence. Unlike the standard Arrow–Debreu model, fiat money can always have a strictly positive price at the rationing equilibrium. In our set up, if the initial endowment of fiat money is dispersed, then a rationing equilibrium is a Walras equilibrium. This result implies the existence of a dividend equilibrium or a Walras equilibrium with slack.     

Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods

The exchange of heterogeneous indivisible goods is considered among agents with responsive preferences, who may be endowed with several goods. We introduce the segmented trading cycle rules which allow the agents to trade goods, one-for-one, subject to market segmentation. In particular, the market is divided into segments such that each agent in each segment may trade at most one good. The segmented trading cycle rules are characterized by four axioms: strategyproofness, nonbossiness, trade sovereignty, and strong individual rationality.     

Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods

In this paper we study the problem of fair allocation in economies with indivisible goods, dropping the usual restriction that one agent receives at most one indivisible good. We show that most of the results obtained in the literature do not hold when the aforementioned restriction is dropped. Received: 13 July 1995 / Accepted: 2 December 1997     

A graph theoretic approach to markets for indivisible goods

Many important markets, such as the labor market and the housing market, involve goods that are both indivisible and of budgetary significance. We introduce new graph theoretic objects ideally suited to analyzing such markets. We show that the minimum equilibrium price is characterized by a certain optimization problem on these graph theoretic objects.     

Buyers' and sellers' cartels on markets with indivisible goods

This paper analyzes the formation of cartels of buyers and sellers in a simple model of trade inspired by Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1990) bargaining model. When cartels are formed only on one side of the market, there is at most one stable cartel size. When cartels are formed sequentially on the two sides of the market, there is also at most one stable cartel configuration. Under bilateral collusion, buyers and sellers form cartels of equal sizes, and the cartels formed are smaller than under unilateral collusion. Both the buyers' and sellers' cartels choose to exclude only one trader from the market. This result suggests that there are limits to bilateral collusion, and that the threat of collusion on one side of the market does not lead to increased collusion on the other side.     

Consuming durable goods when stock markets jump: A strategic asset allocation approach

In this paper we show the impact of considering jumps in the return process of risky assets when deciding how to invest and consume throughout time. Agents derive their utilities from consumption over time. We consider an agent that invests in the financial market and in durable and perishable consumption goods. Assuming that there are costs for transacting the durable good, we show that an agent who does not consider the possibility of jumps will make suboptimal decisions, not only regarding the fraction of wealth invested in the stock market, but also with respect to the timing for trading on the durable good. Furthermore we also show that jumps cause a non-obvious asymmetric impact on the thresholds that lead the consumer to trade the durable good, even when the jump distribution is symmetric.     

The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible

We consider the generalization of Shapley and Scarf’s (1974) [Shapley, L., Scarf’s, H., 1974. On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 23–37.] model of trading indivisible objects (houses) to so-called multiple-type housing markets. We show that the prominent solution for these markets, the coordinate-wise core rule, is second-best incentive compatible.     

Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets

We prove a natural comparative static for many-to-many matching markets in which agents’ choice functions exhibit size-dependent discounts: reducing the extent to which some agent discounts additional partners leads to improved outcomes for the agents on the other side of the market, and worsened outcomes for the agents on the same side of the market. Our argument draws upon recently developed methods bringing tools from choice theory into matching.     

Competitive equilibrium fraud in markets for credence-goods

This is a study of the nature and prevalence of persistent fraud in a competitive market for credence-quality goods. We model the market as a stochastic game of incomplete information in which the players are customers and suppliers and analyze their equilibrium behavior. Customers characteristics, idiosyncratic search cost and discount rate, are private information. Customers do not possess the expertise necessary to assess the service they need either ex ante or ex post. We show that there exists no fraud-free equilibrium in the markets for credence-quality goods and that fraud is a prevalent and persistent equilibrium phenomenon.     

货运配送中心最新分拣系统

采用货运配送中心最新分拣系统使系统的维护更加容易,处理货物范围更广,适用于集装箱自动搬运。     

Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

The core of a market in indivisible goods can be defined in terms of strong domination or weak domination. The core defined by strong domination is always non-empty, but may contain points which are unstable in a dynamic sense. However, it is shown that there are always stable points in the core, and a characterization is obtained. The core defined by weak domination is always non-empty when there is no indifference, and has no instability problems. In this case, the core coincides with the unique competitive allocation.     

Game contingent claims in complete and incomplete markets

A game contingent claim is a contract which enables both the buyer and the seller to terminate it before maturity. For complete markets Kifer [Finance and Stochastics 4 (2000) 443–463] shows a connection to a (zero-sum) Dynkin game whose value is the unique no-arbitrage price of the claim. But, for incomplete markets one needs a more general approach. We interpret the contract as a generalized non-zero-sum stopping game. For the complete case this leads to the same results as in Kifer [Finance and Stochastics 4 (2000) 443–463]. For the general case we show the existence of an equilibrium point under the condition that both the seller and the buyer have an exponential utility function. For other utility functions such a point need not exist in the context of incomplete markets.     

Arbitrage in stationary markets

We analyse questions of arbitrage in financial markets in which asset prices change in time as stationary stochastic processes. The main focus of the paper is on a model where the price vectors are independent and identically distributed. In the framework of this model, we find conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the absence of arbitrage opportunities. We discuss the relations between the results obtained and the phenomenon of “volatility-induced growth” in stationary markets. Financial support by the Swiss National Center of Competence in Research “Financial Valuation and Risk Management” (NCCR FINRISK) is gratefully acknowledged.     

欧元对我国金融市场的影响分析

欧元从最初构想到进入正式流通历经坎坷,终于成功统一了欧洲多国的货币。在过去半个世纪中,国内、外学者提出并发展了关于最优货币区、国际货币体系改革和金融市场一体化等方面的多项理论,欧元的出现为这些理论提供了一个绝佳的验证机会。文章旨在研究欧元诞生后对国际金融市场以及对我国金融市场的影响。     

External motivators for donation of money and/or goods

This research sought to identify and group the external motivators that encourage individuals in emerging countries to donate money and/or goods. Therefore, 46 external variables were identified in the literature that motivate an individual to donate. They were grouped by similarity into five external donation motivating factors (environmental and/or political motivation, the cause or circumstances of the donation, the organisation's characteristics, influence from third parties, and personal rewards) that resulted in a proposed donation model. This model was supported by semi‐structured interviews with 22 individuals who donate money and/or goods frequently. The results supported the existence of the five proposed factors in the model and three new variables were identified: a “lack of government support,” “service for the donor” and “donation tuition with low value.”     

浅谈计算机在物资管理工作中的应用

文章认为物资管理是企业管理中的一个重要内容,物资管理水平的高低直接影响着整个企业的成本,物资管理涉及的信息量庞大,采用计算机技术是提高物资管理水平的有效途径。     

Afriat’s theorem for indivisible goods

We identify a natural counterpart of the standard GARP for demand data in which goods are all indivisible. We show that the new axiom (DARP, for “discrete axiom of revealed preference”) is necessary and sufficient for the rationalization of the data by a well-behaved utility function. Our results complement the main finding of Polisson and Quah (2013), who rather minimally modify the original consumer problem with indivisible goods so that the standard GARP still applies.