European policy and markets: Did policy initiatives stem the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area?

We investigate how European policy initiatives influenced market assessments of sovereign default risk and banking sector fragility during the sovereign debt crisis in four adversely affected countries — Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy. We focus on three broad groups of policies: (a) ECB policy actions (monetary and financial support), (b) EU programs (financial and fiscal rules as well as financial support in crisis countries), and (c) domestic austerity programs. We measure immediate market impact effects: what policies changed risk perceptions, using CDS spreads on sovereign bonds and banks in this assessment. We employ dynamic panel and event study methodologies in the empirical work. We find that a number of programs initially stabilized sovereign and bank bond markets (e.g. Outright Monetary Transactions program), although announcement and implementation impacts on markets differed in some cases (e.g. second Covered Market Bond Program). Actions designed to shore up sovereign markets often lowered risk assessments in bank bond markets and policies designed to ensure safety and soundness of the European banking system in some cases significantly impacted sovereign debt markets. Finally, a number of policies designed to stabilize markets had surprisingly little immediate impact on either sovereign or bank bond market risk assessments.     

Macroeconomic variables and the sovereign risk premia in EMU,non-EMU EU,and developed countries

This project studies and models key macroeconomic variables and their impact on sovereign risk premia across select European economies and developed countries. The sample is divided into three groups of countries: those in the European Monetary Union (EMU); the standalone economies outside the EMU but members of the broader European Union (EU); and other developed economies. The main subject of examination across all three groups is the impact of macroeconomic variables on sovereign borrowing costs. EU countries have experienced high financial stress and a rapid rise in the credit default swaps (CDS) spreads during the EMU debt crisis. A nonlinear vector smooth transition autoregressive model is applied to investigate such a regime change in the finance-output link using sovereign CDS and industrial production index. The paper finds that regime-switching takes place rather suddenly in most EMU countries. The study concludes that due to the potential spillover effects in the EU as a whole, the individual country macroeconomic indicators were less reflected in the financial stress and spillover and contagion effects became dominant.     

Firm credit risk in normal times and during the crisis: are banks less risky?

Bank solvency was a major issue during the financial crisis of 2007–2009, but bank credit default swap (CDS) spreads were almost always below nonbank CDS spreads. What is the reason for this gap? Are banks perceived to be less risky? This study empirically decomposes CDS premia for 45 major banks and 167 large industrial firms from Europe and the US. It turns out that expected losses are usually somewhat lower for banks than for nonbanks, but expected losses contribute relatively little to the observed CDS premia. CDS spreads for banks and nonbanks differ mainly because market participants require a lower compensation for bearing bank credit risk. The quite persistent difference in the credit risk premia for banks and nonbanks disappears only temporarily during the crisis.     

Fundamentals and Sovereign Risk of Emerging Markets

We empirically assess the relative importance of various economic fundamentals in accounting for the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads of emerging markets during 2004–2012, which encompasses the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. Inflation, state fragility, external debt and commodity terms of trade volatility were positively associated, while trade openness and a more favourable fiscal balance/GDP ratio were negatively associated with sovereign CDS spreads. Yet the relative importance of economic fundamentals in the pricing of sovereign risk varies over time. The key factors are trade openness and state fragility in the pre‐crisis period, the external debt/GDP ratio and inflation in the crisis period, and inflation and the public debt/GDP ratio in the post‐crisis period. Asian countries enjoy lower sovereign spreads than Latin American countries, and this gap widened during and after the crisis. Trade openness was the biggest factor behind Asia's lower sovereign spreads before the crisis, and inflation during and after the crisis. The results imply that external factors were paramount in pricing sovereign risk prior to the crisis, but internal factors associated with the capacity to adjust to adverse shocks gained prominence during and after the crisis.     

Risks of Latin America sovereign debts before and after the financial crisis

We investigate the financial determinants of the return and volatility of sovereign CDS spread from six major Latin American countries before and after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Other than CBOE VIX index, we also find that global factors including US Baa–Aaa default yield, TED spread and US Treasury rate all contribute to the changes in these sovereign CDS spread. Although global risk aversion (VIX) is a significant determinant of sovereign debt spread, in the years after the crisis, the emphasis has shifted towards short-term refinancing risk (TED). Furthermore, the risk of Greek sovereign debt crisis also transmitted Latin American CDS spreads immediately, but only in the post-Lehman sub-period. These findings provide implications for international bonds and credit derivatives trading strategies.     

Sovereign default risk and state-owned bank fragility in emerging markets: evidence from China and Russia

In this paper we investigate the interdependence of the sovereign default risk and banking system fragility in two major emerging markets, China and Russia, using credit default swaps as a proxy for default risk. Both countries’ banking industries have strong ties with their governments and public sector, even after a series of significant reforms in the last two decades. Our analysis is built on the case studies of each country’s two biggest banks. We employ a bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) and vector error correction (VECM) framework to analyse the short- and long-run dynamics of the chosen CDS prices. We use Granger causality to describe the direction of the discovered dynamics. We find evidence of a stable long-run relationship between sovereign and bank CDS spreads in the chosen time period. The more stable relationship is found in cases where the biggest state-owned universal banks in emerging markets are closely managed by the government. But the fragility of those banks does not directly affect the state of public finances. However, in cases where state-owned banks directly participate in large governmental projects, banking fragility may result in the deterioration of state funds, while raising the risk of sovereign default.     

Sovereign credit ratings in the European Union: A model-based fiscal analysis

We present a model-based measure of sovereign credit ratings derived solely from the fiscal position of a country: a forecast of its future debt liabilities, and its potential to use fiscal policy to repay these. We use this measure to calculate credit ratings for 14 European countries over the period 1995–2012. This measure identifies a European sovereign debt crisis almost two years before the official ratings of the credit rating agencies.     

Tree networks to assess financial contagion

We propose a two-layered tree network model that decomposes financial contagion into a global component, composed of inter-country contagion effects, and a local component, made up of inter-institutional contagion channels. The model is effectively applied to a database containing time series of daily CDS spreads of major European financial institutions (banks and insurance companies), and reveals the importance of monitoring both channels to assess financial contagion. Our empirical application reveals evidence of a high inter-country and inter-institutional vulnerability at the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 and during the sovereign crisis in 2011. The results identify France as central to the inter-country contagion in the Euro area during the financial crisis, while Italy dominates during the sovereign crisis. The application of the model to detect contagion between sectors of the European economy reveals similar findings, and identifies the manufacturing sector as the most central, while, at the company level, financial institutions dominate during the 2008 crisis.     

Sovereign risk and deposit dynamics: evidence from Europe

The unprecedented expansion of sovereign balance sheets since the beginning of the global crisis has given a new meaning to the term sovereign risk. Developments in Europe since early 2010 revealed new challenges for the functioning of private banks in an environment of heightened sovereign risk and may have contributed to deleveraging. The article uses an innovative way of measuring the perception of sovereign risk and its impact. Using an extension of a common market discipline framework, it shows that exposure to sovereign risk may have limited the ability of banks in Europe to collect deposits. Potential identification issues between deposits and bank efficiency are controlled by using data envelopment analysis (DEA). The results are robust to inclusion of conventional measures of bank performance and the sector-wide holdings of foreign sovereign debt.     

Do bank bondholders price banks’ ability to manage risk/return?

In this paper, we empirically investigate whether bank bondholders value risk management, measured as risk-return efficiency (RRE), when pricing bond spreads. Based on a sample of 2,452 bonds issued by 78 European listed banks, for the period 2001–2015, we find evidence that the ability of banks to manage risk affects bond spreads: banks with more capable managers obtain a lower cost of debt. In particular our results show that bank bondholders are even more sensitive to RRE during the crisis period, for relatively poorly rated bonds, for unsecured/subordinated debt, and for long maturity debt. Our findings highlight that bondholders’ monitoring of banks is effective and takes into account the efficiency of risk management during financial and economic downturns, but during sound periods bank bondholders should strengthen their monitoring of risk management.     

Sovereign credit ratings,growth volatility and the global financial crisis

Using monthly data from January 1996 to May 2010 for a panel of 76 developed and emerging economies and adopting an instrumental variable (IV) estimation technique by correcting for both heterogeneity and endogeneity with the generalized two-stage least squares (G2SLS, EC2SLS) procedure method suggested by Balestra and Varadharajan-Krishnakumar (1987) and Baltagi and Li (1995), this article provides empirical evidence that volatility of per capita GDP growth is reduced when there are positive changes in credit ratings; in other words when sovereign credit risk improves. To deal with potential simultaneity between sovereign credit ratings and output volatility, a system (3SLS) approach is undertaken, and our findings remain robust. By weakening the volatility dampening effects of ratings changes, it is found that the global financial crisis (GFC) has enhanced macroeconomic volatility. One of the channels via which sovereign rating changes affect growth volatility is the financial markets’ repricing of sovereign default risk that is reflected in sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads and its volatility.     

Do stress tests matter? A study on the impact of the disclosure of stress test results on European financial stocks and CDS markets

During the recent sovereign debt crisis, the European Banking Authority conducted two stress tests on European banks in order to gauge their capital needs, core Tier-1 ratios and ratios of resilience to adverse shocks. We assess the informational content of the disclosure of the stress test outcomes. We conclude that the stress tests conveyed new information and that the outcomes were not anticipated by the stock market but were partially anticipated by the credit default swap (CDS) market. However, while the stock market reacted to the disclosure of the stress test outcomes, in the CDS market there is some evidence of a ‘reverse’ reaction. Moreover, the publication of the outcomes of the stress tests had a stronger impact on the stock prices of riskier financial institutions. A similar pattern is evident in the CDS market, albeit narrowed to one of the stress tests and amid the financial institutions with higher perceived credit risk.     

Credit in Times of Stress: Lessons from Latin America during the Global Financial Crisis

The 2008–2009 global financial crisis disrupted the provision of credit in Latin America less than in previous crises. This paper tests whether specific characteristics at both the bank and country levels at the onset of the global crisis contributed to the behavior of real credit growth in this region during the crisis. As shown, financial soundness characteristics of Latin American banks, such as capitalization, liquidity, and bank efficiency in the pre‐crisis period, played a role in explaining the dynamics of real credit during the crisis. We also found that foreign banks and banks that had expanded credit growth more before the crisis were also those that cut credit the most. Among country‐specific characteristics, we found evidence that balance sheet measures such as the economy's overall currency mismatches and external debt ratios (measuring either total debt or short‐term debt) were key variables in explaining credit growth resilience.     

TIME‐VARYING VOLATILITY,DEFAULT, AND THE SOVEREIGN RISK PREMIUM

This article studies how volatility changes affect sovereign spreads in strategic default models. Volatility changes affect savings and sovereign spreads. However, the impact of volatility shocks is state dependent; when the economy has a low debt, an increase in volatility is prone to generate precautionary savings. Instead, with high debt, an increase in volatility is likely to induce an even further increase in debt and spreads, both in endowment and production economies. I document a positive correlation between sovereign spreads and aggregate income volatility for a set of European economies during the debt crisis, consistent with the model's implications.     

Insolvency regimes and firms' default risk under economic uncertainty and shocks

One of the arguments often advanced for implementing a stronger insolvency and bankruptcy framework is that it enhances credit discipline among firms. Using a large cross-country firm-level dataset, we empirically test whether a stronger insolvency regime reduces firms' likelihood of defaulting on their debt. In particular, we examine whether it reduces default risk during increased economic uncertainty and various external shocks. Our results confirm that a stronger insolvency regime moderates the adverse effects of economic shocks on firms' default risk. The effects are more pronounced for firms in the top half of the size distribution. We also explore channels through which improved creditor rights influence firms' default risk, including dependence on external finance, corporate leverage, and managerial ethics. Our main results are robust to an alternative measure of default risk, inclusion of currency and sovereign debt crisis episodes, and alternative estimations.     

Effects of asset purchases and financial stability measures on term premia in the euro area

We study the effects of the announcements of ECB asset purchases and of financial stability measures in the euro area in the wake of the global financial crisis and the euro area sovereign debt crisis on 10-year government bond term premia in 11 euro area countries. We find that the term premia of euro area countries with higher sovereign risk, as measured by sovereign CDS spreads, decreased more in response to the announcements of asset purchases and financial stability measures. Term premia of countries with lowest sovereign risk either increased as in Germany, or were not significantly affected or fell slightly, as in the Netherlands and Finland.     

Credit Risk Determinants for the Bulgarian Banking System

Using an autoregressive distributed lag model, this paper examines the factors that influence the credit risk of the Bulgarian banking system over the decade 2001–2010, as measured by non-performing loans. Recent papers aim to identify the determinants of non-performing loans using a cross-country modelling framework. As the South East European region (SEE) is non-homogeneous, our analysis is country-specific and captures the timeline between the bank privatisation era up to the global financial crisis and the ensuing Greek crisis. The contribution of our paper is twofold: it uses the ARDL modelling framework that is scarcely employed in related studies but also investigates spillover effects from the Greek crisis in view of the material presence of Greek banks in Bulgaria. In accordance with previous studies, the findings suggest that the credit risk determinants of Bulgarian banks should be sought endogenously in macroeconomic variables and industry-specific factors but also in exogenous factors. We evidence a pronounced role of the global financial crisis and the country’s bank regulatory framework. The Greek debt crisis appears to play an immaterial role indicating that Greek banks have not been a Trojan horse in the Bulgarian banking system.     

Bank ownership type and temporal evolution of long‐term bank funding in the period 2005–2017

This study uses a large panel dataset of Western European banks to examine the determinants of bank funding stability. Banks are divided into three categories by bank ownership type; the ownership types in this study are commercial banks, cooperative banks and savings banks. Three sources of stable bank funding are investigated: customer deposits, equity, and long‐term liabilities. Furthermore, the sum of these funding components is used as a proxy variable for a bank's total available stable funding (ASF). A special focus is on the temporal evolution of these funding types. The regression results show that commercial banks’ funding became much more stable in the period 2005–2017. However, that funding remains, on average, less stable than does cooperative and savings banks’ funding. In addition, funding stability has remained at the pre‐crisis level in cooperative and savings banks, despite a steep dip in cooperative banks’ ASF during the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, banks substantially decreased financing from long‐term liabilities after the financial crisis, replacing it with customer deposits and equity.     

Sovereign risk,interbank freezes,and aggregate fluctuations

This paper shows how spillovers from sovereign risk to banks׳ access to wholesale funding establish a bank-sovereign nexus. In a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium set-up, heterogeneous banks give rise to an interbank market where government bonds are used as collateral. Government borrowing under limited commitment is costly ex ante as bank funding conditions tighten when the quality of collateral drops. These spillovers, by impeding interbank intermediation, lower the penalty from defaulting due to an interbank freeze during a recession and propagate aggregate shocks to the macroeconomy. The model is calibrated using Greek data and is capable of reproducing stylized facts from the European sovereign debt crisis. In an application, we show that the ECB׳s non-standard financing operations mitigate the adverse feedback mechanism.     

Do Market‐based Indicators Anticipate Rating Agencies? Evidence for International Banks

This paper analyses the ability of credit default swap (CDS) spreads, bond spreads and stock prices to anticipate the decisions of the main rating agencies, regarding the largest international banks. Conditional on negative rating events, all the three indicators show significant abnormal changes before both announcements of review and actual credit rating changes, but rating actions still seem to convey new information to the market. Results for positive rating events are less clear‐cut with the market indicators generally showing abnormal behaviours only in conjunction with the events. As for the predictive power of the financial indicators examined, the CDS market is particularly useful for negative events and stock prices for positive events. However, all indicators also send many false signals and are to be interpreted with care.