COSTLY BUYER SEARCH IN LABORATORY MARKETS WITH SELLER ADVERTISING*

In this experiment, sellers simultaneously choose prices and advertising strategies. Buyers either purchase at an advertised price or search sequentially for other prices. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, sellers charge a high unadvertised price or advertise a price chosen from a lower interval. Increases in search or advertising costs raise equilibrium prices and affect equilibrium advertising intensity. Empirical results are consistent with most comparative static predictions. Sellers, however, price much lower and advertise more intensely than predicted. Consequently, market outcomes more closely resemble a perfect information, Bertrand‐like equilibrium than the imperfect information, mixed strategy equilibrium with significant seller market power.     

PRICE DISPERSION AND COMPETITION WITH DIFFERENTIATED SELLERS*

I measure price dispersion among differentiated retail gasoline sellers and study the relationship between dispersion and the local competitive environment. Significant price dispersion exists even after controlling for differences in station characteristics, and price differences between sellers change frequently. The extent of price dispersion is related to the density of local competition, but this relationship varies significantly depending on the type of seller and the composition of its competitors. These findings are consistent with interactions between seller and consumer heterogeneity that are not well understood in the existing price dispersion literature.     

Price dispersion and seller heterogeneity in retail food markets

Price dispersion, i.e. a homogeneous product being sold at different prices by different sellers, is among the most replicated findings in empirical economics. The paper assesses the extent and determinants of spatial price dispersion for 14 perfectly homogeneous food products in more than 400 retailers in a market characterized by the persistence of a large number of relatively small traditional food stores, alongside large supermarkets. The extent of observed price dispersion is quite high. When prices in an urban area (where the spatial concentration of sellers is higher) are compared with those in smaller towns and rural areas, differences in search costs and the potentially higher degree of competition do not yield lower prices. Other counteracting factors, including differences in seller costs and consumer incomes, make prices, on average, higher in the urban area for 11 of the 14 products considered. For many, but not all, the products supermarkets proved to be less expensive than traditional retailers, although average savings from food shopping at supermarkets were extremely low. Finally, the results of the study provide evidence that retailers have different pricing strategies and these differences also emerge for supermarkets belonging to the same chain. The results presented in the paper suggest that a variety of factors play a role in explaining price dispersion. In addition to differences in seller costs, the contemporaneous heterogeneity of retailers (in terms of services provided) and consumers (in terms of search costs and preferences) makes the emergence of monopolistic competition possible as well as allowing small traditional food retailers to remain in business.     

Selling Time and Selling Price: The Influence of Seller Motivation

We consider the role that seller motivation plays in determining selling time, list price and sale price. A new survey of home sellers suggests that sellers are heterogeneous in their motivation to sell. Our findings are that a seller who, at the time of listing, has a planned date to move sells more quickly than one who does not. Also, the shorter the planned time until a move at the time of listing, the shorter the actual duration of marketing time. We find that seller motivation affects sale price, but not the list-price markup. Our results suggest that theoretical models of the housing search process should be recast to allow for heterogeneous sellers.     

House Price Changes and Idiosyncratic Risk: The Impact of Property Characteristics

Although the average change in house prices is related to changes in fundamentals or perhaps market-wide bubbles, not all houses in a market appreciate at the same rate. The primary focus of our study is to investigate the reasons for these variations in price changes among houses within a market. We draw on three theories for guidance, one related to the optimal search strategy for sellers of atypical dwellings, another focusing on the bargaining process between a seller and potential buyers and the third relying on the concept of land leverage. We hypothesize that houses will appreciate at different rates depending on the characteristics of the property and the change in the strength of the housing market. These hypotheses are supported using data from three New Zealand housing markets.     

Market Mechanism Choice and Real Estate Disposition: Search Versus Auction

We propose a model of mechanism choice in the disposition of real estate assets where we consider two alternatives: a search market and an auction. Within the search framework, we derive an equilibrium whereby buyers incur search costs and sellers incur holding costs for the period during which the property is not sold. In the auction alternative, the seller joins an existing pool of sellers in undertaking a multiple–object auction and pays a commission upon sale. Buyers and sellers freely choose their mechanisms, which in equilibrium are optimal given each group's conjectures about the mechanism choice of their counterpart. In equilibrium, an agent cannot benefit from deviating from his choice and each agent's beliefs are consistent with the equilibrium outcome. It is shown that (a) buyers with high search costs will choose auctions because the auction payoff imposes an upper bound on buyers' gains from search, and (b) prices at auctions will be higher. Using vacant lot sales data and a method–of–moment estimator which accounts for the presence of an endogenous discrete mechanism choice variable, we estimated a hedonic regression to detect the price effect. It was determined that, on average, lots sold for $1.44 per square foot more in auctions than in the search market, as predicted by our model.     

Warranty,Seller Reputation,and Buyer Experience: Evidence From EBAY Used Car Auctions

Using data from the eBay car auction market, we test several predictions regarding warranties, seller reputation and buyer experience in the determination of the final price. We find that the presence of a warranty generates a price premium, but that its magnitude decreases when the seller has a more established reputation. Compared to private sellers, professional dealers, who are ‘repeated‐game players’ in the market, benefit less from a warranty and its substitutability for seller reputation is relatively small. In addition, a buyer with greater experience tends to pay less for a warranty or for a professional dealership.     

When Do Large Buyers Pay Less? Experimental Evidence

The rise of mega‐retailers has precipitated a growing literature on large‐buyer discounts. According to Rotemberg and Saloner [1986] and Snyder [1998], large buyers' ability to obtain price discounts depends on their relative size and the degree of seller competition. I test experimentally implications of this theory concerning the number of sellers and the sizes of buyers in the market. The results track the comparative‐statics predictions to a surprising extent. Subtle changes in the buyer‐size distribution or number of sellers can create or negate large‐buyer discounts. The results highlight the previously unexplored role of the demand structure in determining buyer‐size discounts.     

基于商品质量偏好的双边市场定价策略分析

本文研究了双边市场一方用户群体提供商品或服务的质量在垄断市场情形和单归属（接入）寡头垄断市场情形下对双边市场平台定价问题。研究结果表明：在寡头垄断情形下,消费方和厂商的接入费用和其本身对质量的敏感程度及质量成本系数相关,平台具有鼓励符合条件的用户接入平台的动机。在单归属的寡头垄断情形下,平台之间的厂商无质量差异时,平台倾向于定高价以获取由商品质量引起的双边市场的剩余价值,而消费者和厂商均没有提高商品质量的要求和激励;在寡头平台之间的商品或服务质量差距小,质量信息不透明时,优势平台会随着质量差距扩大而提高厂商的接入费用,其消费者的数量也会增多;若质量信息透明,质量劣势平台为了保持市场份额,其价格与另一寡头平台的消费者市场的接入费用差距与质量差距成正比,而在厂商市场的接入费用差距与质量差距成反比。     

Platform most-favored-customer clauses and investment incentives

This paper examines the effects of platform most-favored-customer (PMFC) clauses on incentives for platforms to invest in demand-enhancing investments that might involve spillover effects. In a bilateral duopoly model incorporating competition between sellers and between platforms, we show that the industry-wide adoption of PMFC clauses raises the platforms’ investment level and the resulting retail price if the substitution between platforms is large compared to the substitution between sellers. Additionally, we assess the respective effects of PMFC clauses on the demand, profit of sellers, profit of platforms, consumer surplus, and social welfare. The results suggest a possible conflict between platforms and competition authorities.     

List Prices,Sale Prices and Marketing Time: An Application to U.S. Housing Markets

Many goods are marketed after first stating a list price, with the expectation that the eventual sales price will differ. In this article, we first present a simple model of search behavior that includes the seller setting a list price. Holding constant the mean of the buyers’ distribution of potential offers for a good, we assume that the greater the list price, the slower the arrival rate of offers but the greater is the maximal offer. This trade‐off determines the optimal list price, which is set simultaneously with the seller's reservation price. Comparative statics are derived through a set of numerical sensitivity tests, where we show that the greater the variance of the distribution of buyers’ potential offers, the greater is the ratio of the list price to expected sales price. Thus, sellers of atypical goods will tend to set a relatively high list price compared with standard goods. We test this hypothesis using data from the Columbus, Ohio, housing market and find substantial support. We also find empirical support for another hypothesis of the model: atypical dwellings take longer to sell.     

Assessing the Market Value of Real Estate Property with a Geographically Weighted Stochastic Frontier Model

In this study we consider the problem of sellers, buyers and real estate appraisers in determining the price for a house, taking into account the characteristics of the house and its location as well as the goals of these three different parties. The appraiser's job is to determine the fair market value of the house, while the buyer and seller want to find, respectively, the lowest and highest feasible price for it. We combine recent developments in geography and econometrics to develop an approach that determines local estimates of property values from the perspectives of the buyer, seller and appraiser, taking into account the characteristics of the house as well as its location. We illustrate our approach analyzing closing prices in one residential real estate market.     

Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition*

A monopoly seller advising buyers about which of two goods fits their needs may be tempted to recommend the higher margin good. For the seller to collect information about a buyer’s needs and provide truthful advice, the profits from selling both goods must be similar enough, i.e., within an implementability cone. The optimal regulation controls pricing distortions and information-collection incentives separately via price regulation and fixed rewards respectively. This no longer holds when the seller has private information about costs as both problems interact. We study whether competition and the threat by buyers to switch sellers can substitute for regulation.     

COMPETITION AND DISCLOSURE*

There are many laws that require sellers to disclose private information about the quality of their products. But the theoretical justification for these laws is not obvious: economic theory predicts that a seller will voluntarily disclose such quality information, however unfavorable, as long as it is costless to do so. Here we show that competitive pressures between firms can undermine this full disclosure result, and explain why it may be the case that only high‐quality firms choose to disclose. In this setting, mandatory disclosure laws can promote competition and raise consumer surplus at the expense of firm profits, potentially increasing the efficiency of the market.     

Seller reputation: From word-of-mouth to centralized feedback

Reputation is one of the most important incentives for trade and cooperation. Using the complete selling history of 125,135 sellers on Eachnet.com (an eBay equivalent in China), we show that sellers with a longer successful selling record enjoyed more repeat business, reached more buyer regions, sold in more product categories, and had a higher completion rate even before Eachnet introduced a centralized feedback system. Since the centralized feedback system, the difference between reputable and non-reputable sellers has decreased in terms of repeat business but enlarged in terms of market expansion. These findings suggest that while reputation can facilitate trade through buyer experience and word-of-mouth, it is not as effective as centralized feedback. Our study also shows that, although completion rate and transaction price are the two outcomes most often examined in the literature, seller reputation is important for buyer clientele, market reach, business scope and market survival.     

Entry and Exit Behavior in the Absence of Sunk Costs: Evidence from a Price Comparison Site

This paper explores entry and exit at a price comparison site (PCS) where the sunk costs of participation are effectively zero. We first use an unbalanced panel of 295 products on NexTag.com to estimate an error correction model of net entry. Although the results support our characterization of the PCS as a zero sunk cost market in which potential sellers behave as Kirznerian entrepreneurs in responding to opportunities, it is clear the net entry flow involves participants with widely differing behavior. This is investigated by examining exit and re-entry decisions at the seller level, which reveal that size and reputation determine individual responses to market opportunities.     

A Spatiotemporal Solution for the Simultaneous Sale Price and Time‐on‐the‐Market Problem

There exists an important methodological challenge when dealing with sale price and time‐on‐the‐market variables because both variables are simultaneously determined and related to the motivation of the sellers and buyers. Exploiting the fact that transactions occur over space and time, we propose a two‐stage approach based on instrumental variables (IV) built from information collected from previous transactions. The unidirectional temporal property and the fact that other transactions are exogenous from the perspective of a single buyer or seller are exploited to evaluate the effect of the sale price on time‐on‐the‐market, and the effect of time‐on‐the‐market on the sale price. Based on 29,471 transactions occurring in the suburban neighborhood of Montréal (1992‐2000), the results suggest that, everything else being equal, houses staying longer on the market provide negative information to the market, which results in a lower final sale price, while the final sale price is negatively related to time‐on‐the‐market, indicating that houses of better quality (better amenities) stay less time on the market.     

Exclusionary discounts

We consider a two-period model with two sellers and one buyer. Although we assume it is efficient for the buyer to purchase from both sellers in each period, we show that when the buyer's valuations are inter-temporally linked and at least one seller is financially constrained, exclusion can sometimes arise in equilibrium (i.e., the buyer purchases all of its requirements from the same seller in each period). The exclusionary equilibria are supported by contract offers in which the excluding seller's incremental price to supply the contestable part of demand is below its marginal cost and sometimes negative. Our findings contribute to the literatures on market-share contracts, bundling, all-units discounts, and loyalty discounts.     

Price competition when three are few and four are many

I examine price competition in a market for a homogeneous good when consumers observe prices subject to a random shock (perception error). When firms have symmetric costs, there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, which is symmetric. When there are up to three sellers in the market, the sellers extract the entire consumer surplus. However, with at least four firms, assuming that the marginal cost is sufficiently low relative to consumers’ valuation, both consumers and producers may enjoy a positive surplus. The marginal-cost pricing is never observed in an equilibrium with finitely many firms. Potential policy implications are discussed.     

Platform Investment and price parity clauses*

Platforms use price parity clauses to prevent sellers setting lower prices when selling through other channels. They claim these restraints are needed so platforms have incentives to invest in providing search services—without them, consumers would search on the platform but then switch to buy in a cheaper channel. In a model incorporating these effects, we find that wide price parity clauses lead to excessive platform investment while narrow (or no) price parity clauses lead to insufficient platform investment. Taking these investment effects into account, wide price parity clauses lower consumer surplus but have ambiguous effects on total welfare.