Technology licensing or cost-reducing outsourcing? Game theoretical analysis on consumers' home bias effects and firms' optimal strategies

International cost-reducing outsourcing lowers consumers' perceived quality of products due to home bias. This paper envisages a vertically differentiated Cournot duopoly associated with international, cost-reducing outsourcing and non-outsourcing schemes in both licensing and non-licensing cases. It examines the impacts of home bias effect on the behaviour of firms and welfare. It shows that the optimal strategy of the patent holder varies from situation to situation associated with the home bias effect. In equilibrium, the dominant strategy for the patent holder is licencing and no outsourcing. If a licensee will outsource its inputs after upgrading the quality of its products, then the patent holder will earn higher profits than one in a case where the licensee does not outsource. If both the patent holder and the licensee produce without outsourcing, a welfare-reducing licensing occurs. On the other hand, if the licensee outsources its production inputs but the patent holder does not outsource, then a welfare-improving licensing generates a win-win situation for the patent holder and for society. Furthermore, the smaller the quality gap between two goods prior to implementing licensing, the lower the royalty rate imposed by the patent holder.     

Tariffs, licensing and market structure

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing against another firm. Competition against a less-efficient firm weakens the power that a host country can exert on the incumbent in the form of its tariff policy. We show that this gives a motive for a monopolist to license its technology to another foreign firm. A host country gains more from increased competition if it can induce the foreign incumbent to transfer technology to the host country firm. We show that the host country can do so by tariff commitment. We also discuss the implications of bargaining under licensing and Bertrand competition in the product market. Hence, this paper qualifies and extends the recent work of Kabiraj and Marjit [Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer. European Economic Review 47, 113-124].     

The Cournot-Bertrand model and the degree of product differentiation

We consider a duopoly model with a Cournot-type firm and a Bertrand-type firm. Both survive and the equilibrium is stable when there is sufficient product differentiation. With no differentiation, only the Cournot-type firm survives, and the outcome is perfectly competitive.     

Can product differentiation mitigate conflicts of interest between principal stakeholders? A cournot-bertrand comparison

This paper aims to investigate the impact of product differentiation on the extent of conflict of interest between principal stakeholders (shareholders, employees, and consumers), which is one of the most important concerns of stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. We consider a differentiated duopoly competing either in price or quantity after the wages of employees are negotiated with a labor union. We find that price competition and quantity competition have drastically different implications on whether product differentiation mitigates stakeholders' conflicts. Specifically, product differentiation can mitigate stakeholders' conflicts when firms compete in price, but not when they compete in quantity. Therefore, the product differentiation effect in mitigating stakeholders' conflicts differs across markets characterized by price competition versus quantity competition.     

A Review of Heinrich von Stackelberg's Book: ‘Market Structure and Equilibrium’

In this note, we review the recent translation in English by Bazin et al. of Stackelberg's book ‘Marktform und Gleichgewicht’ (1934).     

The impact of product innovation on firm-level markup and productivity: evidence from China

This article empirically evaluates the impact of product innovation on firms’ markup and productivity. Based on a large sample of Chinese manufacturing firms, we estimate firm-level markup using the wedge between output elasticities of intermediate input and its cost share in total revenue. Firm productivity is measured as revenue productivity and adjusted with the estimated markup. The results suggest that product innovation increases firm-level markup and revenue productivity. However, the effect of product innovation on the adjusted productivity is mostly negative or insignificant. The observed relationships also vary in response to market structures. Our results indicate that the positive impact of product innovation on revenue productivity is mainly driven by price-cost markup changes rather than physical productivity improvements. Our study suggests the widely observed positive relationship between product innovation and revenue productivity should be interpreted with caution.     

Disentangling the effects of process and product innovation on cost and demand

ABSTRACT

We explore in this note different structural models of the impact of process and product innovation on firms' demand and production cost functions. We find that the introduction of process and product innovations affects them differently as could be expected. Both product and process innovation shift forward the demand for the products of the firm. Process innovation reduces production marginal cost, but not always. A possibility, that we cannot prove or reject with the current specification of our models and available data, is that process innovation associated with product innovation raise marginal cost. Interestingly, we also find that advertising significantly augments demand but does not affect production marginal cost. To obtain broader conclusions, richer data will be needed allowing an enlargement of the model, in which process and product innovations could be specified distinctively and well identified.     

‘To sell or not to sell’: Licensing versus selling by an outside innovator

We study various modes of technology transfer of an outside innovator in a spatial framework when the potential licensees are asymmetric. In addition to different licensing options, we also look into the option of selling the property rights of innovation and find the optimal mode of technology transfer. For licensing we find the optimal policy is to offer pure royalty contracts to both licensee firms when cost differentials between the firms are relatively small compared to the transportation cost, otherwise offer a fixed fee licensing contract to the efficient firm only. Interestingly, we show the innovator is always better-off selling the innovation to any one of the firms who further licenses it to the rival firm. The result holds irrespective of the size of the innovation (drastic or non-drastic) and the degree of cost asymmetry between the licensees. Social welfare is greater under selling than licensing.     

Trade and product market policies in upstream sectors and productivity in downstream sectors: Firm-level evidence from China

This paper explores the heterogeneous productivity impact of trade, product market and financial market policies over the last decade in China. The paper makes a critical distinction between downstream and upstream industries, focusing on the indirect effects of regulation in upstream industries on firm performance in downstream manufacturing industries. We identify the differential effect of these policies on firm productivity growth depending on how far incumbents are relative to the technological frontier. Trade and product market reforms are found to deliver stronger gains for firms that are closer to the industry-level technological frontier, while the reverse holds for financial market reforms. The key conclusion that can be derived from the empirical analysis is that further product, trade and financial market reforms would bring substantial gains in China and could therefore speed up the convergence process. Taken at face value, the empirical estimates would imply that aligning product, trade and financial market regulation to the average level observed in OECD countries would bring aggregate manufacturing productivity gains of respectively 9%, 3% and 6.5% after 5 years.     

Managerial incentives and collusive behavior

I characterize the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives on long-run oligopolistic competition. When managers have a preference for smooth time-paths of profits - as revealed by the empirical literature on “income smoothing” - manager-led firms can sustain collusive agreements at lower discount factors. Capped bonus plans and incumbency rents with termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor, independent of contracts' duration. When managers have these preferences/incentives and demand fluctuates, “price wars during booms” need not occur: the most collusive price may then be pro-cyclical.     

Competition for exclusive customers: comparing equilibrium and welfare under one-part and two-part pricing

Abstract.  This paper compares one-part and two-part pricing in a discrete-continuous choice model, providing more extensive welfare results than prior literature. Under two-part pricing, firms may set fixed fees with or without 'unit-price commitment,' where the lack of unit-price commitment is consistent with 'after-market monopolization.' We find that two-part pricing with unit-price commitment is firms' dominant unilateral and joint pricing policy. Two-part pricing without unit-price commitment is the least desirable policy from a welfare standpoint. Under appropriate conditions, one-part pricing produces the highest consumer and social welfare, but the lowest profits.     

Product differentiation and location decisions under demand uncertainty

We investigate Hotelling's duopoly game of location-then-price choices with quadratic transportation costs and uniformly distributed consumers under the assumption that firms are uncertain about the exact location of demand. We characterize the unique equilibrium and the socially optimal locations. Contrary to the individual-level random utility models, location uncertainty is a differentiation force. In equilibrium, increases in the variance of the uncertainty lead to greater differentiation, higher expected equilibrium prices and profits, and a greater welfare loss.     

The impact of product market regulation on productivity through firm churning: Evidence from European countries

Productivity performance in European countries has been a policy concern for several decades. This paper shows that productivity can be enhanced by product market policies which, by increasing competition and efficiency, facilitate higher rates of firms’ entry and exit (i.e. firm churning). Drawing on annual country-sector data for the period 2000–2014 across the EU countries, we find that: (i) competition-enhancing regulation is associated with a higher rate of firm churning; (ii) firm churning, in turn, appears to be positively related to higher total factor productivity at the sector level by facilitating the entry of new competitive firms and the exit of less productive ones. Overall, we conclude that stringent product market regulation can be indirectly associated, via its impact on business dynamism, with the somewhat weak productivity performance in a number of EU countries. Thus, our results point towards substantial productivity gains that could follow from the introduction of further competition-enhancing measures in product markets.     

Enrollment expansion and quality differentiation across higher education systems

While the impact of a higher college wage premium on enrollment expansion is well understood, the link between university quality differentiation and student outcomes in this context has received less attention. To address this issue, we model different higher education systems. Academic standards decline in a differentiated, U.S.-type education system - as a low-quality segment emerges - but also in a system in which a uniform standard is politically determined, as in most European countries, since the interests of marginal students matter for the chosen standard. In the absence of full information about graduates' skills, employers put more weight on university reputation than on individual human capital signal. Thus, higher differentiation can decrease the effort and skill of medium-ability students. Obtaining the preferred academic standard is particularly important for high-and low-ability students, hence the trend toward more unequal societies raises political support for strongly differentiated systems.     

IMPERFECT SUBSTITUTES FOR PERFECT COMPLEMENTS: SOLVING THE ANTICOMMONS PROBLEM

An integrated monopoly, where two complements forming a composite good are offered by a single firm, is typically welfare superior to a complementary monopoly. This is ‘the tragedy of the anticommons’. We analyse the robustness of such result when competition is introduced for one or both complements. Particularly, competition in only one of the two markets may be welfare superior to an integrated monopoly if and only if the substitutes differ in their quality so that, as their number increases, average quality and/or quality variance increases. Then, absent an adequate level of product differentiation, favouring competition in some sectors while leaving monopolies in others may be detrimental for consumers and producers alike. Instead, competition in both markets may be welfare superior if goods are close substitutes and their number in each market is sufficiently high, no matter the degree of product differentiation.     

Quality Competition and Social Welfare in Markets with Partial Coverage: New Results*

We use a vertical product differentiation model under partial market coverage to study the social welfare optimum and duopoly equilibrium when convex costs of quality provision are either fixed or variable in terms of production. We show the following new results. First, under fixed costs, the social planner charges a uniform price for the single variant that just covers costs of quality provision. Like the duopoly equilibrium, this socially optimal pricing entails a partially uncovered market, but a smaller share of the market is served compared with the duopoly equilibrium. Second, for the variable cost case, it is socially optimal to provide both high‐ and low‐quality variants, but market shares need not be equal. This differs from the result in fully covered markets. Third, in the duopoly equilibrium, the quality spread is too wide under variable costs relative to the social optimum. Under fixed costs, the duopoly produces two variants, but quality is too low relative to the social optimum, which has only one variant.     

Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics

Jean Tirole was awarded the 2014 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for his analysis of market power and regulation. This paper provides an overview of some of that work, and of his related contributions to game theory.     

Why are social enterprises good candidates for social innovation? Looking for personal and institutional drivers of innovation

The last few years witnessed theoretical and practical contributions to the field of social innovation and social enterprise. However, analysis of the interplay between these two different realms is still limited. This article aims to fill some gaps in this respect. We deal with historical reconstruction of the concept of Social Enterprise and Social Innovation, and their conceptual premises. We consider the process of creation of social innovation in social enterprises. As members’ motivations, ownership rights and governance rules in social enterprises create a new relational context and new routines, which are germane to the production of social knowledge and deliberation, social innovation can be considered one of the main outcomes of this setting. Social motivations, collective action of a cooperative kind, multi‐stakeholder governance and socialization of resources, and their interplay are singled out as main drivers of innovation. Social innovation is seen as akin to novelty in social interaction, a non‐standardized and non‐standardizable outcome of the operation of this organizational form.