Private good clubs and the core

The incentive for potential club members to form private good clubs is an average cost function that is decreasing over at least part of its range. Benefits to club members are measured by consumer's surplus, and a game theoretic characteristic function is used to describe total club benefits. Then, in the game framework, the optimum club size is examined and related to the existence of the core, which in turn is shown to be crucially dependent on the demand and cost curves.     

Real convergence in Europe: A cluster analysis

In this paper we analyse real convergence in GDP per worker in the EU member states. The aim is to test whether there is evidence of club convergence in the EU, i.e. divergence in GDP per worker. Evidence in favour of cluster or club convergence may be an indication of significant productivity divergences between countries, which may also explain the current turmoil in the euro zone. The results show evidence of different economic growth rates within Europe, which also converge to different steady states, implying divergence in the EU-14. Within the EU-14 member states we observe two convergence clubs, which are not related to the fact that some countries belong to the euro area. Furthermore, Eastern European countries are also divided in two clubs, with a more direct effect of belonging to the euro zone in the composition of the clubs.     

Networks and clubs

We formulate a club model where players’ have identical single-peaked preferences over club sizes as a network formation game. For situations with “many” clubs, we provide necessary and sufficient for non-emptiness of the farsighted core and the direct (or myopic) core. With “too few” clubs, if players are farsighted then the farsighted core is empty. In this same case, if players are myopic then the direct core is always nonempty and, for any club network in the direct core, clubs are of nearly equal size (i.e., clubs differ in size by at most one member).     

Football players’ career and wage profiles

The objective of this article is to look over football players’ career path, from lower leagues to the first league, and the associated wage profile. The information comes from a Portuguese longitudinal matched employer–employee data set defining several career events according to players’ movement across football clubs and across professional and semi-professional leagues. Our identifying strategy relies on coach changes to reduce the potential bias resulting from players’ moves between clubs. The estimated first-difference wage equations indicate that players can expect a wage premium when they get transferred to new clubs in higher leagues or a wage penalty when moving to lower leagues. Players who stay in the same club after the club being relegated can also expect a wage penalty.     

Over the moon or sick as a parrot? The effects of football results on a club's share price

This article considers the impact of match results on the stock returns of English football clubs. We propose that the magnitude of the response to a given result depends on the importance of the game, which is measured in two ways. First, we consider the extent to which the clubs are close rivals vying for similar league positions, as winning such games is particularly significant. Second, we argue that each individual game becomes more important for those clubs likely to be promoted or relegated as the season draws to a close, since a given match will have increasing information content concerning the final league position of the club. Using a fairly large panel comprising data for 19 clubs, we find some support for the notion that stock prices are affected more by the results of important matches than matches of lesser importance. We also observe that the difference between the number of points the club secures from a given match, and the number it was expected to secure, affects its stock price, as does the number of goals that the club under question scores in the match, relative to its competitor.     

Regional convergence clubs in Europe: Identification and conditioning factors

The aim of this paper is to empirically identify convergence clubs in per capita incomes of European regions and to investigate whether initial conditions − as suggested by the club convergence hypothesis − are responsible for club formation. To tackle this issue, we propose a two-step procedure in which we first endogenously identify groups of regions that converge to the same steady state level, and in a second step we investigate the role of starting conditions and structural characteristics for a region's club membership. Our sample comprises 206 European NUTS2 regions between 1990 and 2002. The results strongly support the existence of convergence clubs, indicating that European regions form six separate groups converging to their own steady state paths. Moreover, estimates from an ordered logit model reveal that the level of initial conditions such as human capital and per capita income plays a crucial role in determining the formation of convergence clubs among European regions.     

Who are the members of the international club?

This article proposes pragmatic methods that incorporate recent contributions to public good theory to identify the members of the international club and how they select new members. This article also suggests simple applications to the recent problems in international clubs such as the euro and NATO.     

Social capital access and entrepreneurship

We investigate the effect of social capital access on entrepreneurship. Social capital helps entrepreneurs to overcome resource constraints. This is especially important in small communities where we often see a lack of market-oriented institutions such as venture capital firms. Entrepreneurs gain access to social capital via club memberships. Combining differences in the number of individual club memberships with differences in the importance of social capital across communities, we identify a causal small community mark-up effect of individual club memberships on entrepreneurship. Assuming that unobserved heterogeneity that might influence both the individual's selection into clubs and the occupational choice to be an entrepreneur is independent of community size, we find that the effect of club membership on the propensity to be an entrepreneur is 2.6 percentage points larger in small communities than in large communities. Robustness tests support the validity of our identifying assumption and results.     

Consumer mobility and community tax bases : The financing of local public goods

In a model of economic ‘clubs’, size is fixed and members consuming a public good raise the question of composition; with whom would they rather consume? This depends on the way collective consumption is financed, and three results are proven With a poll tax, clubs must be homogeneous in income for all to be satisfied With a marginal benefit (Lindahl) tax, no consumer is ever satisfied with any composition; and with an income tax, at least one consumer in each club is always dissatisfied. Satisfaction implies there exists no club composition preferred to the existing one.     

A "Tragedy of the Clubs": Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions

We model club formation as a noncooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division. We show how social norms and individual rationality sustain a particular type of collective inefficiency, namely, excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the "tragedy of the clubs." The tragedy of the clubs is a pervasive equilibrium phenomenon.     

Convergence,divergence, or multiple steady states? New evidence on the institutional development within the European Union

Convergence in institutions and in per capita income across the European Union (EU) Member States are key goals of the European integrations process. Especially in the course of the various EU enlargement waves starting in 2004, it was intensively discussed whether institutional and structural homogeneity are necessary preconditions for real convergence and the smooth functioning of the EU or whether a (further) catching up in the institutional and economic development will endogenously occur after the EU accession. Our paper is dedicated to the analysis of these institutional dynamics within the EU. In particular, we analyze the formation of institutional convergence clusters using Phillips and Sul's (2007, 2009) log t-test over the period 2002 to 2018. Our results indicate the existence of multiple institutional clubs with various countries being stuck in a poor institutional trap. Moreover, we find that institutional convergence clubs are formed mainly on the basis of geographic region; in particular, we identify a northwest-southeast divide. When analyzing per capita income clubs, a rather similar picture emerges, suggesting that the underlying institutional clusters might drive the formation of income clubs. We also study the factors that determine institutional club membership by using an ordered probit model. Most importantly, we find that the initial levels of human capital and institutional quality are decisive for determining whether a country is on a high or low institutional growth path.     

Technology clubs, R&D and growth patterns: Evidence from EU manufacturing

This paper investigates the forces driving output change in a panel of EU manufacturing industries. A flexible modeling strategy is adopted that accounts for: (i) inefficient use of resources and (ii) differences in the production technology across industries. With our model we are able to identify technical, efficiency, and input growth for endogenously determined technology clubs. Technology club membership is modeled as a function of R&D intensity. This framework allows us to explore the components of output growth in each club, technology spillovers and catch-up issues across industries and countries.     

On the emergence of an MFN club: equal treatment in an unequal world

Abstract .  Motivated by GATT, we endogenize the formation of a club whose members have to abide by the MFN principle of non-discrimination. The underlying model is that of oligopolistic intraindustry trade. While an MFN club does not alter average tariff levels across countries, it increases aggregate world welfare; makes non-members worse off; and can immiserize its high cost members. These results imply that (i) core WTO rules such as MFN are valuable even if multilateral negotiations deliver limited trade liberalization and (ii) the distributional effects of MFN maybe one reason why developing countries have been granted Special and Differential treatment at the WTO.     

Voting requirements, concessions, international side payments and the European Monetary Union

This paper addresses the question of criteria for selection of EMU members. We identify two factors in the decision process: (1) The costs and benefits which the individual countries attribute to alternative EMU arrangements (`hard-core', medium-sized, all EU members), and (2) the binding institutional restrictions, i.e., the distribution of votes in the European Council and the minimum vote requirements. Within this framework the EU countries are assigned to different groups according to their degree of convergence. Based on stability concessions and side payments these groups decide on the final EMU composition. We show that minimum vote requirements can lead to a suboptimal size of the EMU and can threaten the feasibility of a multi-speed monetary union.     

A Theoretical Analysis of the Influence of Money Injections on Risk Taking in Football Clubs

This paper analyzes the adverse incentive effects produced by money injections of benefactors [sugar daddies (SD)]. We show that the existence of a SD induces the club to choose a riskier investment strategy and the more the SD commits to bailout the club, the more the clubs’ optimal level of riskiness increases. Moreover, a private SD bails out the club less often than a public SD. Our model further shows that a ‘too‐big‐to‐fail’ phenomenon exists because it is optimal to always bailout a club if its market size is sufficiently large.     

Club optimality: Further Clarifications

This article clarifies the bounds of a recent theorem on club optimality. In so doing, the Pareto-optimal conditions for both homogeneous and heterogeneous-member clubs are set forth for a variable-use, fixed number of clubs.     

Club Convergence in Carbon Dioxide Emissions

We examine convergence in carbon dioxide emissions among 128 countries for the period 1960–2003 by means of a new methodology introduced by Phillips and Sul (Econometrica 75(6):1771–1855, 2007a). Contrary to previous studies, our approach allows us to examine for evidence of club convergence, i.e. identify groups of countries that converge to different equilibria. Our results suggest convergence in per capita CO₂ emissions among all the countries under scrutiny in the early years of our sample. However, there seem to be two separate convergence clubs in the recent era that converge to different steady states. Interestingly, we also find evidence of transitioning between the two convergence clubs suggesting either a slow convergence between the two clubs or a tendency for some countries to move from one convergence club to the other.     

Buchanan clubs

This article evaluates the contribution of James M. Buchanan’s theory of clubs. At the outset, the article distinguishes club goods from pure public goods. Next, the article distills the basic mathematical structure of Buchanan’s treatment of clubs. This is followed by some key variants of Buchanan clubs. More general formulations of club theory are also addressed. To demonstrate the wide-ranging importance of Buchanan clubs, the article indicates varied applications of club theory. The article’s message is that club theory remains highly relevant today.     

Delay determinants of European Banking Union implementation

Most countries in the European Union (EU) delay the transposition of European Commission (EC) directives, which aim at reforming banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance. We compile a systematic overview of these delays to investigate if they result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems. Transposition delays pertaining to the three Banking Union directives differ considerably across the 28 EU members. Bivariate regression analyses suggest that existing national bank regulation and supervision drive delays the most. Political factors are less relevant. These results are qualitatively insensitive to alternative estimation methods and lag structures. Multivariate analyses highlight that well-stocked deposit insurance schemes speed-up the implementation of capital requirements, banking systems with many banks are slower in implementing new bank rescue and resolution rules, and countries with a more intensive sovereign-bank nexus delay the harmonization of EU deposit insurance more.     

Relative inflation dynamics in the new EU member countries of Central and Eastern Europe

Following their EU accession, the new member countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) must achieve sustainable price stability as one of the pre-conditions for joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and adopting the euro. This article examines the distribution dynamics of inflation rates in ten new EU members from CEE relative to the EMU accession benchmark inflation over the period 1990–2009. In contrast to previous studies, we use nonparametric methods to test for convergence in inflation rates between CEE and the EMU benchmark as well as within the CEE sample. Over the entire sample period, we detect a general shift in the CEE inflation distribution toward the EMU benchmark along with intradistributional convergence. However, this process is not uniform. In the early years, it was equally likely for CEE inflation rates to move toward or away from the benchmark. The resulting multimodal distribution gave way to a unimodal distribution in the years leading up to the EU accession, accompanied by a marked shift toward the EMU benchmark. In more recent years, emergence of a bimodal distribution signaled the stratification of relative inflation in CEE into two convergence clubs, which has intensified since the start of the global economic crisis.