Regional development and national identity in sub-Saharan Africa

We study how regional development affects identification with the nation state using a sample of 192 African regions in 16 countries. We measure national identification with survey data from the fourth wave of the Afrobarometer and proxy regional development with night lights data. To account for the endogeneity of regional development, we employ an instrumental variables approach and use a proxy for mineral resource wealth as our main instrument. Our results show that inhabitants of more prosperous regions are more likely to identify with their nation rather than their ethnic group. Regarding transmission channels, we find suggestive evidence consistent with the interpretation that national identification is higher in richer regions because of different cultural beliefs and a lower reliance on traditional ethnic networks. Overall, our research implies that African governments can foster national identification by ensuring that all parts of a country participate equitably in economic development.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Consumer Boycotts: Does Trust in Law-Making and Law-Enforcing Institutions Matter?

This article estimates the effects of trust in political and judicial institutions on individuals’ propensity to take part in consumer boycotts. In particular, this study disentangles the effects of institutional trust and quality. The analysis relies on data from the 2010 European Social Survey, which is a path breaking comparative study of how justice is perceived and allows a valid measure of judicial and political trust to be constructed. A two-step instrumental variable method was used to measure the effects of institutional trust, controlling for micro- and macro- level factors. The results indicate that trust in law-making institutions is negatively associated with boycott participation, whereas the relationship between judicial trust in institutions and an individual’s likelihood to boycott is U-shaped. The findings are robust to the introduction of social capital and sociodemographic variables.     

腐败犯罪境外追逃措施探析

腐败犯罪的国际化的趋势要求中国必须借助外交和司法等多种途径抓捕外逃贪官。引渡是国际刑事司法协助的主要形式之一,引渡条约的签订受制于多种因素,这对国内司法产生一定影响;遣返作为一种行政手段,成为引渡的一种常规替代措施;劝返适用于境外追逃效果显著,但其存在合法性的质疑;异地刑事诉讼节省司法资源,不需要让渡法律的公正性;绑架、诱捕等西方国家经常适用的非常规手段中国尚未适用,其合理性有待认证。     

Does cultural diversity increase the rate of entrepreneurship?

In the economic development literature, cultural diversity (for example, ethnolinguistic fractionalization) has been shown to have a negative impact on economic outcomes in many underdeveloped countries. We hypothesize that the impact of diversity on economic performance depends on the quality of a country's institutions. Under bad institutions diversity leads to conflict and expropriation, while under good institutions diversity leads to economic progress. A culturally diverse society or interaction among different cultures encourages exchange of, and competition between ideas and different world views. Under good institutions, this amalgamation of ideas and views leads to greater entrepreneurial initiatives. We show that higher levels of cultural diversity increase the rate of entrepreneurship in the presence of good institutions using evidence from the USA.     

Formal institutions and subjective well-being: Revisiting the cross-country evidence

A long tradition in economics explores the association between the quality of formal institutions and economic performance. The literature on the relationship between such institutions and happiness is, however, rather limited, and inconclusive. In this paper, we revisit the findings from recent cross-country studies on the institution–happiness association. Our findings suggest that their conclusions are qualitatively rather insensitive to the specific measure of ‘happiness’ used, while the associations between formal institutions and subjective well-being differ among poor and rich countries. Separating different types of institutional quality, we find that in low-income countries the effects of economic–judicial institutions on happiness dominate those of political institutions, while analyses restricted to middle- and high-income countries show strong support for an additional beneficial effect of political institutions. Our results bear important implications that we discuss in the concluding section of the paper.     

Import to invest: Impact of cultural goods on cross-border mergers and acquisitions

Existing studies have demonstrated the necessities of formal institutions and negativity of cultural distance in international investments. Surprisingly, China’s exponential increase of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and its low-quality institutions and distinct cultural norms contradict these studies. This paper aims to tackle this puzzle by examining the role of cultural imports in cross-border M&As. Our empirical evidence suggests that the trade of cultural goods significantly increases the volume and realized economic gains of M&As from importing to exporting countries. Our results are robust to alternative measures and an instrumental variable approach. On exploring potential channels, we find that imported cultural goods could drive cultural convergence between countries and also mitigate the adverse effect of cultural distance on merger outcomes. We further show that cultural imports could help firms in overcoming contractual barriers at target countries. This paper provides practical implications for cross-border investments in the current world with intensified cultural conflicts.     

Family,religion and economic performance: A critique of cultural determinism

Arguing that some attitudes that may constitute an obstacle to the development process are culturally funded, cultural determinism pleads that underdevelopment is essentially generated endogenously, in other words, that people in developing countries, with their beliefs and their attitudes, are the more liable for the poverty in which they live. The simplicity of these arguments has seduced a large number of scholars but what seems to be a cultural brake on economic development could be explained otherwise. This critique of cultural determinism's arguments attempts to supply an alternative version of the interaction of culture and development, from which power, class, domination and the international division of labour will not be excised. In order to simplify this study only two of the cultural features most often referred to will be brought into focus: religion and family and patterns of kinship.     

Natural resources, democracy and corruption

We study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our game-theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor, but not otherwise. We use panel data covering the period 1980-2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction. Our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our main results hold when we control for the effects of income, time varying common shocks, regional fixed effects and various additional covariates. They are also robust across different samples, and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources, democracy and corruption.     

Unfair inequality,governance and individual beliefs

Unfair inequality arises when incentives are not fairly tied to effort or investment across the socio-economic spectrum. The actual limitations on economic activity from this failure may depend on whether people believe the system is unfair, and how well governing institutions safeguard fair-play. In this paper, I study whether unfair wealth inequality is correlated with beliefs about fairness, and whether good governance can be a substitute in belief formations for decreases in unfair inequality. I find a that people in countries with recent increases in unfair wealth inequality are less likely to believe that inequality is due to fair processes. This relationship holds when“fair” determinants of inequality include effort, as well as moral and meritocratic components. The relationship is strongest in countries with poor quality governance. In countries with high quality governance, people appear to be more tolerant of unfair inequality, as it is only weakly reflected in their beliefs about process fairness.     

试论我国环境刑事政策

我国正在建设“资源节约型、环境友好型”社会。“两型”社会的建设目标就是保护环境和资源。这就需要我们运用各种手段，采取各种措施，加大保护环境资源的力度。政策手段是一个主要的调控杠杆，环境刑事政策作为运用刑法手段控制环境违法行为和惩治环境犯罪的策略和方针，近年来在环境资源保护方面发挥的作用越来越大。环境刑事政策既是刑事政策，也是环境政策，既是立法政策、司法政策，也是执行政策，理论上对环境刑事政策进行研究，可以指导决策机关制定符合“两型”社会建设需要的方略，进而更好地运用刑事手段保护环境和资源。     

Social memory,evidence, and conflict

This paper examines an equilibrium model of social memory — a society's vicarious beliefs about its past. We show that incorrect social memory is a key ingredient in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts.We analyze an infinite-horizon model in which two countries face off each period in a game of conflict characterized by the possibility of mutually destructive “all out war” that yields catastrophic consequences for both sides. Each country is inhabited by a dynastic sequence of individuals. Each individual cares about future individuals in the same country, and can communicate with the next generation of their countrymen using private messages. Social memory is based on these messages, and on physical evidence — a sequence of imperfectly informative public signals of past behavior. We find that if the future is sufficiently important for all individuals, then regardless of the precision of physical evidence from the past there is an equilibrium in which the two countries engage in all out war with arbitrarily high frequency, an outcome that cannot arise in the standard repeated game. In our construction, each new generation “repeats the mistakes” of its predecessors, leading to an endless cycle of destructive behavior.Surprisingly, we find that degrading the quality of information that individuals have about current decisions may “improve” social memory. This in turn ensures that arbitrarily frequent all out wars cannot occur.     

Endogenous business networks

Business networks are a feature of the organizational landscapeof many countries, though they vary in magnitude. This articledevelops a theory of business networks where they are endogenousto the reliability of the legal system. Networks are a substitutefor reliable institutional support that guarantees written contracts.The existence of networks exerts a negative effect on the functioningof the anonymous market. This is because the network absorbshonest individuals, raising the density of dishonest individualsengaged in anonymous market exchange. Since this lowers thepayoff from market exchange, larger networks may be easier toenforce. We find that networks are economically inefficientunless they are relatively large. This is consistent with theview that informal contract enforcement institutions may beinefficient in general equilibrium even though they enhanceefficiency in partial equilibrium.     

Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities

This paper explores how individual preferences for redistribution depend on future income prospects. In addition to estimating the impact of individuals' socioeconomic background and of their subjective perceptions of future mobility, we employ panel data to construct ‘objective’ measures of expected gains and losses from redistribution for different categories of individuals. We find that such measures have considerable explanatory power and perform better than ‘general mobility’ indexes. We also find that preferences for redistribution respond to individual beliefs on what determines one's position in the social ladder. Ceteris paribus, people who believe that the American society offers 'equal opportunities are more averse to redistribution.     

General budget support as an aid instrument—impact on economic growth

Since the change of the new millennium, general budget support (GBS) has become a prominent, yet controversial and heavily debated, modality for delivering aid. We study GBS as an aid instrument from a cross‐country perspective. We examine if any growth impacts can be identified as a result of the use of GBS. We use data covering nine 4‐year intervals from 1976 to 2011. We modify two supply‐side IV strategies from previous aid–growth literature. In our main approach, we employ an interaction of an exogenous supply‐side variable (donor government fractionalization) and an endogenous variable (probability of receiving GBS) as an instrument for GBS, and in the alternative approach we construct an instrument following a supply‐side approach. Our results suggest that GBS receiving countries have grown faster than countries receiving other types of aid. Selection bias does not explain this result. The growth effect is not only attributed to lagged GBS but also to contemporaneous GBS flows.     

Parasitical cultures? The cultural origins of institutions and development

Do cultural attitudes affect institutions and economic performance? This paper suggests they do. To measure the impact of cultural attitudes we use prevalence rates of the common parasite Toxoplasma gondii which is known to affect individual attitudes and societal values in predictable ways. By using prevalence rates of Toxoplasma as instrument for cultural variation, we are able to isolate the effects of cultural attitudes on institutions, distinguishing them from effects of institutions and economic outcomes on culture. We find that our indicators of cultural attitudes are significant determinants of institutional quality, and strong predictors of long-run economic performance.     

Institutions,innovation and growth

This paper looks at the link between the quality of economic institutions and innovation, and innovation and growth. We construct a measure of the innovation content of individual manufacturing industries and show that countries with stronger economic institutions specialize in more innovation‐intensive industries. Our results also provide evidence that industries involving higher levels of innovation grow relatively faster in countries with better economic institutions. The results suggest that innovation is an important channel through which higher quality economic institutions contribute to better growth performance in the long run.     

Money,Trust, and Culture: Elements for an Institutional Approach to Money

The development gap between countries in tropical and temperate zones has been attributed to a variety of factors. Using data from the World Values Survey, we find that social norms about thrift, as opposed to sharing, vary with the length of the winter season. We also show that this cultural dimension “thrift versus sharing” and institutional quality both have an independent effect on contemporary economic outcomes. This suggests that the tropical development gap might be the consequence of deep-rooted effects of pre-industrial agro-climatic conditions on both the quality of institutions and social norms about thrift versus sharing that fostered development in the industrial era.     

Entrepreneurship,trust and corruption

I propose a theoretical model where trust towards strangers is a channel through which institutions determine economic outcomes, in particular, entrepreneurship and corruption. More importantly, I show that the role of trust has been overlooked since high levels of trust do not always enhance desirable economic outcomes. Trust helps individuals to participate in economic exchanges aligned with social welfare, but it also facilitates individuals to cooperate for the achievement of corrupt deals. Under this more general view of trust, the model generates a non-trivial new prediction at the individual level. Specifically, the individual-level relationship between honesty and trust changes depending on the institutional quality of a country. Dishonest individuals are the more trusting individuals in countries with poor institutions, and the less trusting in countries with good institutions. Using individual-level data of 80 countries from the World Value Survey and the European Values Study, I present empirical evidence in support of this prediction.     

Press freedom,market information,and international trade

We consider a framework in which freedom of the media can alleviate barriers to trade, while in the absence of trustworthy market information, firms optimally withhold part of their export activity and opt for testing-the-waters strategies. We employ data on export flows among a large group of Western and Latin American countries combined with the Freedom House measure of press freedom to examine the main theoretical implication. In a standard set-up of gravity equations, we find evidence that the effects are partially conditional on the political institutions of the importing country: press freedom is strongly associated with trade with autocracies.