Measuring systemic importance of financial institutions: An extreme value theory approach

This paper proposes a set of market-based measures on the systemic importance of a financial institution or a group of financial institutions, each designed to capture different aspects of systemic importance of financial institutions. Multivariate extreme value theory approach is used to estimate these measures. Using six big Canadian banks as the proxy for Canadian banking sector, we apply these measures to identify systemically important banks in Canadian banking sector and major risk contributors from international financial institutions to Canadian banking sector. The empirical evidence reveals that (i) the top three banks, RBC Financial Group, TD Bank Financial Group, and Scotiabank, are more systemically important than other banks, while we also find that the size of a financial institution should not be considered as a proxy of systemic importance; (ii) compared to the European and Asian banks, the crashes of the U.S. banks, on average, are the most damaging to Canadian banking sector, while the risk contribution to the Canadian banking sector from Asian banks is quite lower than that from banks in the U.S. and euro area; (iii) the risk contribution to Canadian banking sector exhibits “home bias”, that is, cross-country risk contribution tends to be smaller than domestic risk contribution.     

改进的效率测算模型、影子银行与中国商业银行效率

商业银行及其效率的高低是金融供给侧结构性改革的关键环节,而可以压缩的“坏”投入和影子银行对商业银行效率产生重要影响。本文首次建立理论模型并分析影子银行影响商业银行效率的路径;方法上,同时区分投入和产出的“好”或“坏”,拓展只区分产出的“好”或“坏”的效率测算模型;实证上,首次测算并分析“坏”投入、影子银行业务对商业银行利润、风险和效率的影响。结果表明:理论上,影子银行会同时增加风险承担和利润,但无法确定经风险调整后的利润增加能否提升效率;只区分产出的模型高估了效率,尤其是显著高估四大行和股份制商业银行第一阶段的效率,大型商业银行依靠网点的扩张不利于效率的提升;影子银行业务提升了四大国有银行尤其是股份制银行的效率,但对中小型商业银行效率影响较小。总的来看,压缩“坏”投入和规范影子银行是增加有效金融供给、优化金融供给结构和提升银行效率的重要途径。     

基于动态因子Copula模型的我国银行系统性风险度量

本文基于2007年至2019年我国14家上市银行的股票收益率,构建偏态t-分布动态因子Copula模型,利用时变荷载因子刻画单家银行与整个系统的相关性,计算联合风险概率作为系统性风险整体水平的度量,基于关联性视角提出了新的单家机构系统脆弱性和系统重要性度量指标——系统脆弱性程度和系统重要性程度。该方法充分考虑了银行个体差异性和系统的内在关联性以及收益率的厚尾性和非对称性,从而能够捕捉到更多的信息且兼具时效性。研究表明:银行机构在风险聚集时期相关程度更大,联合风险概率能够准确识别出系统性风险事件且在我国推行宏观审慎评估体系以后有明显降低;整体而言,大型商业银行系统重要性水平最高,同时风险抗压能力也最强;本文使用的度量方法降低了数据获取成本且更具时效性,有助于为宏观审慎差异化监管工作提供借鉴和参考。     

基于动态因子Copula模型的我国银行系统性风险度量

本文基于2007年至2019年我国14家上市银行的股票收益率,构建偏态t-分布动态因子Copula模型,利用时变荷载因子刻画单家银行与整个系统的相关性,计算联合风险概率作为系统性风险整体水平的度量,基于关联性视角提出了新的单家机构系统脆弱性和系统重要性度量指标——系统脆弱性程度和系统重要性程度。该方法充分考虑了银行个体差异性和系统的内在关联性以及收益率的厚尾性和非对称性,从而能够捕捉到更多的信息且兼具时效性。研究表明:银行机构在风险聚集时期相关程度更大,联合风险概率能够准确识别出系统性风险事件且在我国推行宏观审慎评估体系以后有明显降低;整体而言,大型商业银行系统重要性水平最高,同时风险抗压能力也最强;本文使用的度量方法降低了数据获取成本且更具时效性,有助于为宏观审慎差异化监管工作提供借鉴和参考。     

The extreme risk connectedness of the new financial system: European evidence

The paper empirically analyses the tail risk connectedness between FinTech and the banking sector in the European context over 2015–2022. For this purpose, we use the Tail-Event driven NETworks (TENET) risk model, i.e., we can capture the behaviour of extreme (negative and positive) risk spillover within the financial system. The results highlight how most tail risk spillovers are from banks to FinTech firms. Also, the findings suggest that the spillovers of cross-sector tail risk are more significant in downside (bearish) risk conditions than in upside (bullish) one. We find evidence of an asymmetric effect of extreme risk spillover to the real economy. Finally, we evaluate the monetary policy’s impact on extreme risk. Our findings highlight the importance of closer monitoring risk spillover between FinTech institutions and the European banking system to maintain financial stability.     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

Determinants of risk in the banking sector during the European Financial Crisis

Risk assessment in the banking sector has been a prominent topic in the banking literature and has gained attention especially since the recent financial crises. In particular, the European crisis, which was the first since the formation of the Eurozone, underlined a number of significant problems and increased concerns on the tail or crash risk of banks. In the present study, we seek to examine whether information asymmetry, the importance of banks in the financial system and systemic risk play significant roles in the evolution of stock crashes in the banking sector. Information asymmetry is proxied by opacity, the importance of a bank in a financial network is proxied by network centrality, and systemic risk is proxied by clustering. The research framework considers a number of regulatory, reporting and financial market factors that have also been determined to relate to stock crashes and shows that all of the above factors are related to (idiosyncratic) stock crash risk under specific conditions.     

金融错配、非金融企业影子银行化与经济“脱实向虚”

当前,我国一些非金融企业通过直接或间接的方式从事影子银行业务。本文利用2004-2015年上市公司数据研究发现,金融错配程度的提高整体上会提高企业影子银行化规模,并且这种效应仅在金融深化程度较高、经济资源市场化配置程度偏低的地区显著;僵尸企业和盈利性较差的企业,分别受到“利润追逐”和“投资替代”机制的影响,金融错配对其影子银行化趋势的正向作用更为明显。机制检验发现,金融错配水平的上升通过提高融资约束程度从而降低企业实体投资水平,这种效应在资产专用性较强的企业中更为明显;金融错配主要通过融资约束程度和实体投资规模,而非资本回报率渠道作用于企业影子银行化行为。本文研究对于提高信贷资源配置效率,防范经济“脱实向虚”具有较强的政策意义。     

Systemic Risk in the Chinese Shadow Banking System: A Sector-Level Perspective

We propose to measure the systemic risk in the shadow banking sector. Instead of testing how many institutions will fail due to the initial breakdown of one institution as extant network models do, we associate the systemic risk of one shadow banking sector with the total amount of unexpected losses it might generate both directly and indirectly. Our model focuses on balance sheet contagion and applies a loop algorithm to risk transfer. The result shows that trust companies were the main culprit of financial instability and commercial banks assumed the main risks over 2007–12 in the Chinese shadow banking system.     

Efficiency in Turkish banking: post-restructuring evidence

Turkish banking sector went through a significant restructuring process in the aftermath of the country's financial crisis of 2000–2001. In this paper, we analyze the evolution of banking performance using a novel approach due to Ray [(2007). “Shadow Profit Maximization and a Measure of Overall Inefficiency.” Journal of Productivity Analysis 27, 231–236]. We derive ‘shadow unrealized profit scores’ as well as ‘shadow input–output prices’ for each year and bank in the sector from 2002 to 2011. We argue these scores operationalize the Hicksian concept of ‘monopolistic quiet life’. We provide some evidence the sector came closer to the ‘zero profit condition’ as well as displaying a closer approximation to the ‘law of one price’ over time. We show the variability of these ‘shadow prices’ essentially coincides with that of corresponding actual prices. We utilize shadow price information to show that business models and competitive choices of banks differ across ownership types with foreign banks competing on the broadest front compared to state-owned and privately owned Turkish banks.     

Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability

We develop a macroeconomic model in which commercial banks can offload risky loans to a “shadow” banking sector, and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets. The model can account both for the business cycle comovement between output, traditional bank, and shadow bank credit, and for the behavior of macroeconomic variables in a liquidity crisis centered on shadow banks. We find that following a liquidity shock, stabilization policy aimed solely at the market in securitized assets is relatively ineffective.     

金融错配、非金融企业影子银行化与经济“脱实向虚”

当前,我国一些非金融企业通过直接或间接的方式从事影子银行业务。本文利用2004-2015年上市公司数据研究发现,金融错配程度的提高整体上会提高企业影子银行化规模,并且这种效应仅在金融深化程度较高、经济资源市场化配置程度偏低的地区显著;僵尸企业和盈利性较差的企业,分别受到“利润追逐”和“投资替代”机制的影响,金融错配对其影子银行化趋势的正向作用更为明显。机制检验发现,金融错配水平的上升通过提高融资约束程度从而降低企业实体投资水平,这种效应在资产专用性较强的企业中更为明显;金融错配主要通过融资约束程度和实体投资规模,而非资本回报率渠道作用于企业影子银行化行为。本文研究对于提高信贷资源配置效率,防范经济“脱实向虚”具有较强的政策意义。     

我国金融机构尾部风险影响因素的非线性研究——来自面板平滑转换回归模型的新证据

“十三五”期间,我国防范化解金融风险攻坚战取得决定性成就,而在“十四五”规划开局之际,我国的金融风险形势面临新的挑战,防范风险仍是金融业的永恒主题。在此背景下,本文采用相对重要性分析技术方法,考察机构规模以及相关基本面因素对我国上市金融机构尾部风险的贡献程度。接着,本文结合边际效应分析技术考察机构规模对风险的异质性效应,深入分析“太大而不能倒”假说在中国的适用性。在此基础上,进一步运用前沿的面板平滑转换估计模型,研究机构规模与尾部风险的非线性关系,并分析基本面因素对该异质性效应的影响力度。研究结果表明,我国上市银行等金融机构规模的增加能够有效缓释我国金融系统的尾部风险,但该影响效应将随着特许权价值、资产质量、杠杆水平、成本水平、收入结构、贷款结构等基本面指标的变化而出现显著的非线性转变。在此基础上,对强化我国金融系统中的风险防控薄弱环节、提高金融机构的风险吸收能力提出建议,以期为我国深化金融业改革开放、推动高质量发展提供理论分析与实证检验的参考依据。     

Back to the basics in banking? A micro-analysis of banking system stability

This paper analyzes the relationship between banks’ divergent strategies toward specialization and diversification of financial activities and their ability to withstand a banking sector crash. We first generate market-based measures of banks’ systemic risk exposures using extreme value analysis. Systemic banking risk is measured as the tail beta, which equals the probability of a sharp decline in a bank’s stock price conditional on a crash in a banking index. Subsequently, the impact of (the correlation between) interest income and the components of non-interest income on this risk measure is assessed. The heterogeneity in extreme bank risk is attributed to differences in the scope of non-traditional banking activities: non-interest generating activities increase banks’ tail beta. In addition, smaller banks and better-capitalized banks are better able to withstand extremely adverse conditions. These relationships are stronger during turbulent times compared to normal economic conditions. Overall, diversifying financial activities under one umbrella institution does not improve banking system stability, which may explain why financial conglomerates trade at a discount.     

Systemic risk spillovers in the European banking and sovereign network

We propose a framework for estimating time-varying systemic risk contributions that is applicable to a high-dimensional and interconnected financial system. Tail risk dependencies and systemic risk contributions are estimated using a penalized two-stage fixed-effects quantile approach, which explicitly links time-varying interconnectedness to systemic risk contributions. For the purposes of surveillance and regulation of financial systems, network dependencies in extreme risks are more relevant than simple (mean) correlations. Thus, the framework provides a tool for supervisors, reflecting the market's view of tail dependences and systemic risk contributions. The model is applied to a system of 51 large European banks and 17 sovereigns during the period from 2006 through 2013, utilizing both equity and CDS prices. We provide new evidence on how banking sector fragmentation and sovereign-bank linkages evolved over the European sovereign debt crisis, and how they are reflected in estimated network statistics and systemic risk measures. Finally, our evidence provides an indication that the fragmentation of the European financial system has peaked.     

Systemic risk and bank consolidation: International evidence

This paper analyzes the systemic risk effects of bank mergers to test the “concentration-fragility” hypothesis. We use the marginal expected shortfall as well as the lower tail dependence between a bank’s stock returns and a relevant bank sector index to capture the merger-related change in an acquirer’s contribution to systemic risk. In our empirical analysis of a dataset of international domestic and cross-border mergers, we find clear evidence for a significant increase in the merging banks’, the combined banks’ as well as their competitors’ contribution to systemic risk following mergers, thus confirming the “concentration-fragility” hypothesis.     

政策连续性、非金融企业影子银行化与社会责任承担

基于2006-2017年非金融类A股上市公司数据,本文考察了非金融企业影子银行化对社会责任承担的影响,并进一步研究了政策连续性对非金融企业影子银行化与社会责任承担之间关系的影响。研究发现,非金融企业影子银行化会抑制社会责任承担行为,且这种效应在市场套利动机强、公司治理水平较低、外部融资能力弱的企业中更为明显。政策连续性程度提高会减弱非金融企业影子银行化与社会责任承担之间的负向关系。因此,本文提出抑制经济“脱实向虚”,增强政策稳定性和连续性,促进实体经济平稳发展的政策建议。     

The impact of central bank transparency on systemic risk—Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of central bank transparency on systemic risk in emerging banking markets using a sample composed of 34 banks from Central and Eastern Europe for a period spanning from 2005 through 2012. Results indicate a positive and significant relationship between central bank transparency and financial institutions’ contribution to systemic risk. On the other side, increased central bank transparency significantly reduces the idiosyncratic risk of banks. The relationship is influenced by the restrictiveness of regulatory framework. We argue that a more transparent central bank is beneficial for the banking sector from a microprudential perspective. However, it may create incentives for financial institutions to engage in risky activities and through herd behavior may increase individual contribution to the risk of the banking system.     

Leaving the darkness: The emergence of shadow banks

This paper studies the interaction between bank capital regulation, moral hazard and co-existence of traditional and shadow banks. Bank managers can choose between traditional banking and off-balance sheet special purpose vehicles (SPV), in a setup with deposit insurance and moral hazard. We first show that in the absence of SPV intermediation, capital requirements are ineffective at preventing the moral hazard problem originated by deposit insurance. We find that shadow banks can improve financial stability, when there is full information sharing. Finally, we analyze the case of neglected tail risk. We find that under such circumstances, the SPV will increase financial risk by exposing the system to extreme events.     

互联网金融对中国商业银行系统性风险的影响——基于SVAR模型的实证研究

首先运用主成分分析法测算我国商业银行的系统性风险,接着运用突变分析和 SVAR 模型等计量方法实证互联网金融对我国商业银行系统性风险的影响。结果表明：互联网金融发展影响商业银行系统性风险的路径为：“互联网金融—商业银行的资产负债结构—商业银行的成本收入比—商业银行的系统性风险”,且它对银行系统性风险的影响存在“期限结构效应”,即互联网金融在短期内会增加我国银行系统性风险,但从中长期来看,对我国银行系统性风险的影响并不大,两者可作为互利共生的事物共同发展。互联网金融的存在对我国金融改革有很好的倒逼作用,能在一定程度上促进金融监管的创新。