An evaluation of the relationship between minimum wage and unemployment: does the local cost-of-living matter?

This article examines the relationship between federal, state and municipal minimum wage laws, local cost-of-living (COL) and the unemployment rate. It finds a strong statistically significant positive relationship between minimum wages and unemployment once COL is taken into account. Our results suggest that federal minimum wage policy is likely to have more harmful effects in rural/low cost areas.     

An Efficiency Enhancing Minimum Wage

We consider an economy with a tax on all labor earnings. We discover that a slightly binding minimum wage on one sector can enhance efficiency. The minimum wage attracts high‐reservation wage workers into the minimum‐wage sector. If the labor demand curve in the free sector is quite flat, the vast majority of workers displaced by the minimum wage find employment in the free sector, raising aggregate employment. This displacement of workers by the only slightly binding minimum wage has negligible effects on efficiency. So efficiency and tax revenue rise as the minimum wage pulls labor out of untaxed leisure, where too much of the labor force is lurking, into taxed work.     

The endogenous national minimum wage institution

This paper offers reasoning for the endogenous sustainability of the National Minimum Wage Institution (NMWI). In an economy with asymmetries in productivity among unionized firms, high-tech firms may often opt for minimum wage agreements covering all unionized workers, in order to raise the relative costs of their rival low-tech firms. Their workers’ unions as well as the unions of workers in low-tech firms share this interest, provided that the degree of product substitutability is not too low and the wage agreement is not too high. Hence, since economy-wide minimum wage agreements prove to be compatible with the interest of all unions and high-tech firms, the NMWI can be sustained in equilibrium under politically convenient circumstances.     

Spillover effects of a minimum wage increase – evidence from Slovenia

This article Analysis the effects of a large increase in Slovenia’s minimum wage in March 2010 on the wage distribution using an administrative matched employer–employee panel database. We find that the minimum wage hike increased the concentration of low-paid workers, creating a much more pronounced spike at the minimum, particularly in market services, and for the young, the least educated and those with the least work experience. Our analysis also shows that the March 2010 minimum wage increase also produced sizeable spillover effects. The spillover effects were higher among young and older workers, especially for wage levels near the new minimum wage. The results are based on a difference-in-differences approach comparing changes in wages during the control and treatment periods as experienced by workers in the wage group immediately above the level of the new minimum wage and workers in wage groups higher up in the wage distribution.     

Real Minimum Wage and Growth Theory: Simulations and Some Policy Results

Abstract

A Solow type two‐sector growth model is used to examine several issues related to growth and unemployment in a minimum wage economy. By simulating the model, we demonstrate that given the same percentage increase in wage rate, an economy with a higher capital–labor ratio is more likely to decay. More importantly, a tariff policy reduces the unemployment periods by 92% provided that the current capital–labor ratio is one‐sixth of that of the steady state capital–labor ratio. We assume that the first best policy of uniform wage subsidy is not politically feasible.     

Tournaments, minimum wage, and money non-neutrality

To reconstruct the micro-foundation of Keynesian macro-economics, the efficiency wage theory has generally been considered a success in providing a plausible explanation for the existence of involuntary unemployment. However, little has been said about how monetary policy causes fluctuations in aggregate employment and output in the efficiency wage theory. This paper extends Lin and Yang’s [Econ. Inq. 39 (2001) 644] shirking-type efficiency wage model with tournaments to account for money non-neutrality. A distinct feature of our model is that, due to the adoption of tournaments, there will be a hierarchical wage structure rather than a flat wage in the economy. As will be argued, the labor market characterized in this paper is in a sense a reversion to Keynes’ General Theory, but also an improvement upon it.     

Minimum wage or negative income tax: why skilled workers may favor wage rigidities

In this article, we analyze the political choice of the extent and means of income redistribution between high and low-skilled workers. Redistributive tools encompass both fiscal transfers (a negative income tax) and a minimum wage requirement. We assume the use of fiscal instruments alone to be the first-best means of redistribution. We show that high-skilled workers may favor a second-best, minimum wage requirement because it increases unemployment, hence raising the marginal cost of redistribution, and creates a justification for them to moderate low-skilled workers’ claim for redistribution.      

Minimum wages and the wage distribution in Estonia

Abstract: This article studies how changes in the statutory minimum wage have affected the wage distribution in Estonia, a post-transition country with little collective bargaining and relatively large wage inequality. The analyses show that the minimum wage has had substantial spillover effects on wages in the lower tail of the distribution; the effects are most pronounced up to the twentieth percentile and then decline markedly. The minimum wage has contributed to lower wage inequality and this has particularly benefitted low-wage segments of the labour market such as women and the elderly. Interestingly, the importance of the minimum wage for the wage distribution was smaller during the global financial crisis than before or after the crisis.     

Endogenous wage bargaining institutions in oligopolistic sectors

Summary. This paper explores the endogenous emergence of wage bargaining institutions in a union-oligopoly framework. Technological asymmetries among firms are shown to be the driving force for the emergence of alternative wage bargaining centralization structures that are observable in real life. As wage deals at the sector-level obtain the consensus of all unions and the efficient firms, a regulator has an incentive to authorize those deals by activating/establishing a Minimum Sectoral Wage Institution(MSWI). If productivity differences are high enough, wage setting above the established wage floor may subsequently occur in efficient firms. Otherwise, a completely centralized wage bargaining structure emerges and the sector-level wage deal is simply confirmed as the firms wage rate. If, however, productivity asymmetries are rather insignificant, firms and unions have conflicting interests and a completely decentralized wage bargaining regime prevails in equilibrium.Received: 17 December 2001, Revised: 9 June 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: J50, J31, L13.Correspondence to: Emmanuel PetrakisParticular appreciation is expressed to an anonymous referee who has greatly helped us to improve our work upon an earlier draft of this paper. We also wish to thank T. Kollinzas, J. Padilla, H. Bester, J. Sakovics, K. Uwe-Kühn, J. J. Dolado, J. L. Ferreira, A. Matsui and C. Martinelli for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

The firm in early Modern China

The Chinese shareholding entity had a long history supported by cultural and legal practices pre-dating the introduction of European business forms in China. In the absence of codified or systematic precedent-based private law, a culture in which contract was deeply embedded in daily practice and the state enforced private agreements sustained a growing commercial sector. Kinship practices were adapted to the needs of a merchant community seeking ways to pool capital and sustain firm longevity. These institutional developments help to explain Chinese adaptability to Western practices and the paradoxical persistence of Chinese practices after the promulgation of a Western-style company law.     

Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms

This paper examines the role of affiliation with the ruling Communist Party in the operation of private enterprises in China. Using a nationwide survey of private firms, we find that the Party membership of private entrepreneurs has a positive effect on the performance of their firms when human capital and other relevant variables are controlled. We further find that Party membership helps private entrepreneurs to obtain loans from banks or other state institutions, and affords them more confidence in the legal system. Finally, we find Party membership to be more important to firm performance in regions with weaker market institutions and weaker legal protection.     

Compensating Wage Differentials with Unemployment: Evidence from China

We estimate the economic value of mortality risk in China using the compensating-wage-differential method. We find a positive and statistically significant correlation between wages and occupational fatality risk. The estimated effect is largest for unskilled workers. Unemployment reduces compensation for risk, which suggests that some of the assumptions under which compensating wage differentials can be interpreted as measures of workers’ preferences for risk and income are invalid when unemployment is high. Workers may be unwilling to quit high-risk jobs when alternative employment is difficult to obtain, violating the assumption of perfect mobility, or some workers (e.g., new migrants) may be poorly informed about between-job differences in risk, violating the assumption of perfect information. These factors suggest our estimates of the value per statistical life (VSL) in China, which range from approximately US$30,000 to US$100,000, may be biased downward. Alternative estimates adjust for heterogeneity of risk within industry by assuming that risk is concentrated among low-skill workers. These estimates, which are likely to be biased downward, range from US$7,000 to US$20,000.