Corruption in America

We use a data set of federal corruption convictions in the U.S. to investigate the causes and consequences of corruption. More educated states, and to a smaller degree richer states, have less corruption. This relationship holds even when we use historical factors like Congregationalism in 1890 as an instrument for the level of schooling today. The level of corruption is also correlated with the level of income inequality and racial fractionalization, and uncorrelated with the size of government. There is a weak negative relationship between corruption and economic development in a state. These results echo the cross-country findings, and support the view that the correlation between development and good political outcomes occurs because education improves political institutions.     

An American-Style Transfer Union in Europe,A First Glance at How Much It Might Cost

Since 1992, the European Union has been reallocating resources among its members through, among others, so-called cohesion funds. However, there is a growing perception among economists and politicians that the scope and magnitude of those transfers is inadequate. In this paper we compare the degree of fiscal transfers in the EU to those in the U.S. and estimate the changes needed to make the EU more like the U.S. Data on American inter-state fiscal transfers show that, on average, the most affluent states consistently make significantly larger payments to the federal government than they receive from it and that the opposite is true for the less affluent states. Our research shows that, unlike in the U.S., fiscal transfers in the EU are not closely related to a member state’s standard of living. We also find that, compared to the U.S., the least affluent nations in the EU receive disproportionally small net payments from the common budget. An American-style fiscal union would require more affluent EU members to make net contributions many times over their actual net payments.     

政府规模、市场化与地区腐败

Using a panel data at the provincial level during the period of 1989–2004, this paper examines the effects of social and economic factors such as government scale, privatization, openness, and education on regional corruption. Applying a fixed-effect model and IV estimation, we find that government size positively affects the incidence rate of corruption, and the effect becomes larger with the increase in the size of the core department of the government. 1% increase in the core department of the government leads to a 0.68%–1% increase in the number of corruption cases. While the proportion of FDI is positively associated with the corruption of regional officials, the ratio of the import and export trade to GDP is negatively associated with corruption. The impact of privatization on corruption is ambiguous. We also identify the significant impacts of the size and structure of the government expenditure on corruption. __________ Translated from Jingji Yanjiu 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), 2008, (11): 16–26     

Does corruption slow down innovation? Evidence from a cointegrated panel of U.S. states

I investigate the long-run relationship between corruption and innovative activity using annual data from 48 contiguous U.S. states between 1977 and 2006. Using U.S. data allows me to work with a panel long enough to exploit time series properties of the data. I use two different measures of innovative activity: one measuring the quantity and the other measuring the quality of the patents granted. I also use two different measures of corruption: one based on the number of corruption convictions, the other based on number of corruption stories covered in Associated Press news wires. Following Pedroni (1999, 2000), I estimate the cointegrating relationship between corruption and innovative activity with Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS). The results indicate that corruption indeed slows down innovation in the long-run.     

THE TWO‐WAY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND CORRUPTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH

The existing empirical evidence suggests that in low‐income economies, an increase in government spending leads to a reduction of growth. This article aims to explain this empirical fact by considering a growth model that incorporates a two‐way relationship between corruption and government spending. That is, government spending gives rise to corruption and rent seeking, which feeds back by distorting the structure and size of government spending. In addition, the cost of corruption depends on the wage rate. Therefore, in low‐income economies, increases in government spending tend to generate larger social losses caused by a higher level of rent dissipation and a concomitant rise in corruption and government inefficiency. Consequently, in such economies, an increase in government spending is more likely to result in a decline of economic growth. (JEL H3, O11, O41)     

On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption

We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of values. We show that the economy has two steady states with different levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about future policies. We propose some policy interventions which via parents' efforts have long-lasting effects on corruption and show the success of intensive education campaigns. Educating the young is a key element in reducing corruption successfully. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D10, J13.     

美国R＆D投入情况分析

本文介绍并分析了美国近年全社会R＆D的投入情况,包括总量、结构和美国联邦政府R＆D投入情况,以及金融危机后政府在科技方面的投入趋势。研究并分析了美国科技预算管理体制及联邦政府科技行政部门在科技预算形成中的作用。美国R＆D预算管理具有多渠道、分散的特点。各个联邦部门科技预算的编制、审核和决策具有相对独立性。     

Government size,democracy, and corruption: An empirical investigation

Previous studies on the effect of government size on corruption have produced mixed results. In an attempt to explain these ambiguous results, this study investigates the effect of government size on corruption by taking into account the role of the democracy in each country. Using annual data of 82 countries between 1995 and 2008, the estimation results indicate that an increase in government size can lead to a decrease in corruption if the democracy level is sufficiently high and, in contrast, can lead to an increase in corruption if it is too low. As robustness checks, the estimations using a different index of corruption and a different proxy for government size are also conducted. The results reveal that our main findings are robust. Furthermore, to address endogeneity problems, we conduct the instrumental variables estimation and the system generalized method of moments estimation, the results of which also support our primary findings. These results provide some important implications for policymakers seeking to perform government interventions without aggravating corruption.     

美国政府科技计划概述

美国联邦政府科技计划始于二战时期“曼哈顿”计划,并逐渐从单纯维护国家军事安全扩展到科技、经济领域,以期保持科技竞争优势和新兴产业掌控优势。在国家层面上,美国没有类似国家中长期科技发展规划纲要。联邦政府科技计划大多数是根据美国国会立法而制定,具有高度的权威性和法律的强制性。美国各科技计划的针对性、目的性很强,是为了解决特定领域的重点科技问题,指标清晰,规定详尽。政府科技计划项目产生的知识产权归项目单位所有,不论该单位营利或非营利,政府可以有条件无偿使用。     

美国政府科技计划概述

美国联邦政府科技计划始于二战时期“曼哈顿”计划,并逐渐从单纯维护国家军事安全扩展到科技、经济领域,以期保持科技竞争优势和新兴产业掌控优势。在国家层面上,美国没有类似国家中长期科技发展规划纲要。联邦政府科技计划大多数是根据美国会立法而制定,具有高度的权威性和法律的强制性。美国各科技计划的针对性、目的性很强,是为了解决特定领域的重点科技问题,指标清晰,规定详尽。政府科技计划项目产生的知识产权归项目单位所有,不论该单位营利或非营利,政府可以有条件无偿使用。     

美国联邦政府科研项目经费管理概况

本文对美国联邦政府科研项目经费的分配、经费支持的科目及项目执行过程中经费管理等情况进行了研究。联邦政府所属研究机构从事的研究项目,一般为非竞争性项目,由联邦政府直接拨款,实行预算管理。对于联邦政府的竞争性项目,则一般要经过同行评议,择优支持。美国《信息公开法》规定,经政府批准的科研经费预算执行情况,在不违背国家利益的情况下,必须向社会公众公布,接受公众的监督。     

美国政府对联邦土地及其附属资源的管理模式

美国宪法确立了联邦政府对其拥有的土地及附属自然资源的专属管理权,但这种专属管理权的行使不可能排斥州和地方政府的参与。联邦政府与州政府以及地方政府在对联邦土地及附属自然资源的管理上,实际实行的是联邦政府主导的合作型联邦制。在保证联邦政府对联邦土地管理最终决定权的前提下,联邦政府通过制定法律和签订协议的形式与州和地方政府分享权力,以便对联邦土地及附属自然资源进行富有成效的管理。     

美国政府对外国参与美国研发活动的管理概况

本文主要探讨美国对外国参与美国研发活动的基本态度以及政府管理的基本情况。     

ESTIMATED MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE U.S. STIMULUS BILL

This paper uses a multicountry macroeconometric model to estimate the macroeconomic effects of the U.S. stimulus bill passed in February 2009. The analysis has the advantage of taking into account many endogenous effects. Real U.S. output is estimated to be $554 billion larger when summed over the 12‐year period 2009:1–2020:4 (0.29% of the total sum of output). The average number of jobs is 509 thousand larger (0.37%). There is some redistribution of output and employment away from 2012 to 2015. At the end of 2020, the federal government debt is larger by $637 billion in real terms (the debt/GDP ratio is larger by 3.19 percentage points), which may increase the risk of negative asset‐market reactions. (JEL E17)     

美国政府科技经费监督与绩效评价

美国的科研经费同其他类别的联邦经费一样,由经法律授权的机构按照统一的原则规定、审核标准和操作程序进行监督和评估。如何保证联邦经费的使用效率和效果,保护纳税人的利益,是美国政府一直在努力探索的问题。本文重点研究美政府实施经费监督和对联邦机构及联邦计划进行绩效评价的机制和方法,并以美国立卫生研究院项目监管实践为例做具体分析,旨在为我国经费监管和机构及项目绩效评价提供参考依据。     

美国生物医学研究概况

美国国立卫生研究院（NIH）专司是美国唯一一家国家级公立生物医学研究机构，负责生物医学领域的研究和管理。在关联邦机构中，NIH掌管的研发经费仅次于国防部。本文对NIH的科研投入情况、资助计划和发展方向进行介绍和分析，旨在从宏观上把握美国生物医学的总体发展水平和重点方向。     

美国国家创新体系构成特点分析

美国作为全球头号经济强国,在技术创新与研发方面长期保持着世界领先的优势地位,形成了自己独特的创新体系。通过介绍美国国家创新体系的形成过程,分析了其特点,主要有:以企业为主体,由市场驱动;广纳全球创新人才;联邦政府发挥关键作用;引进民间资本参与;严格研发经费管理;与整体经济发展密切相关。美国国家创新体系在未来发展中,将进一步解决创新源泉和传播机制的问题,国防研发将继续发挥火车头的作用,创新能力将会继续居世界领先地位,当然,也面临诸多挑战,如,削减研发经费,研发成本越来越高,创新能力明显下降等。借鉴美国的经验,我国在创新体系建设中,应鼓励创新的减免税收优惠政策法规对所有企业一视同仁,加大对国防研发和基础研究的投入,统筹人才培养与引进政策等。     

Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? U.S. Senate Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget

Empirical research on the geographic distribution of U.S. federal spending shows that small states receive disproportionately more dollars per capita. This evidence, often regarded as the consequence of Senate malapportionment, in reality conflates the effects of state population size with that of state population growth. Analyzing outlays for the period 1978–2002, this study shows that properly controlling for population dynamics provides more reasonable estimates of small‐state advantage and solves a number of puzzling peculiarities of previous research. We also show that states with fast‐growing population loose federal spending to the advantage of slow‐growing ones independently of whether they are large or small. The two population effects vary substantially across spending programs. Small states enjoy some advantage in defense spending, whereas fast‐growing ones are penalized in the allocation of federal grants, particularly those administered by formulas limiting budgetary adjustments. Hence, a large part of the inverse relationship between spending and population appears to be driven by mechanisms of budgetary inertia, which are compatible with incrementalist theories of budget allocation.     

The evolution of corruption and development in transitional economies: Evidence from China

It is widely accepted in the literature, that the level of corruption is negatively and robustly related to economic development. However, skeptics argue that for transitional economies, this relationship may not hold. Economic reform loosens up the control of local officials and can increase corruption; Corruption and per capita income can be positively related. Using panel provincial data of China from 1995 to 2014 on prosecuted cases of corruption, we discover that during the early phase of China’s economic reform (during Zhu Rongji and Hu-Wen administrations), a positive short-run relationship is indeed observed. But, there is a robust negative long-run cointegration relationship between corruption and per capita income. The development of the market economy improves private wage and income in the long-run. The relatively inefficient and low returns to ordinary corruption cannot compete with rising market returns, which lead to dwindling corruption. However, the share of major corruption cases is increasing over time to be able to compete with rising market wages.     

The Role of State Fiscal Policy in State Economic Growth

Do state policy makers have the ability to affect a state's rate of economic growth? This article examines one possible source of growth and per capita output level disparities by studying the role that state taxation and public expenditure decisions play in fostering economic development. Using pooled annual U.S. state‐level data from 1972 to 1998, a fixed‐effects model is employed to examine the effects of changing tax rates on both state per capita output levels and growth rates. The results indicate that higher tax rates negatively influence short‐run state economic growth, which lowers state output levels. However, long‐run growth is unaffected by changes in state tax rates, even after adjusting for the effects of initial per capita output levels, state expenditures, and aid from the federal government. Nor do changes in state public spending rates and federal aid permanently alter state growth rates, implying that state fiscal policies have only transitory effects on state growth. (JEL H71, O40, R11)