The geography of natural resources,ethnic inequality and civil conflicts

We study whether the spatial distribution of natural resources across different ethnic groups within countries causes spatial inequality and the incidence of armed conflict. By providing a theoretical rent-seeking model and analysing a set of geo-coded data for mines, night-time light emissions, local populations and ethnic homelands, we show that the spatial distribution of resources is a major driving factor of ethnic income inequality. Moreover, a spatially unequal distribution of natural resources induces rent-seeking behaviour and thus increases the risk of civil conflicts. Consequently, we extend the perspective of the resource curse to explain cross-country differences in income inequality and the onset of civil conflicts.     

‘Us’ and ‘Them’: the origin of identity,and its economic implications

Abstract We investigate the origins of identity and the innate proclivity to draw a distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. We propose an evolutionary explanation: we argue that identity arises because it facilitates survival. In an evolutionary setting we endogenize preferences and demonstrate that the evolutionarily stable preferences fashioned by natural selection would distinguish between insiders and outsiders. We then work out the implications of such preferences in two contemporary scenarios, one entailing rent‐seeking behaviour and the other involving public good provision. Our results are in conformity with empirical evidence.     

Poverty and the resource curse: Evidence from a global panel of countries

This paper contributes to the literature in an attempt to shed further light on the mixed evidence about the link between poverty and the abundance of natural resources, i.e. the resource curse hypothesis effect. It makes use of a large country sample, the Headcount Poverty Index, and a number of panel data methodological approaches, spanning the period 1992–2014. The findings document that fossil energy resources exacerbate poverty, while both democracy and economic freedom alleviate it, with corruption increasing it. These results highlight the need these economies to reinvestment their energy revenues in social programmes.     

The economic growth impact of natural disasters in developing countries: Evidence from hurricane strikes in the Central American and Caribbean regions

In this paper we investigate the macroeconomic impact of natural disasters in developing countries by examining hurricane strikes in the Central American and Caribbean regions. Our innovation in this regard is to employ a wind field model on hurricane track data to arrive at a more scientifically based index of potential local destruction. This index allows us to identify damages at a detailed geographical level, compare hurricanes' destructiveness, as well as identify the countries that are most affected, without having to rely on potentially questionable monetary loss estimates. Combining our destruction index with macroeconomic data we show that the average hurricane strike caused output to fall by at least 0.83 percentage points in the region, although this depends on controlling for local economic characteristics of the country affected and what time of the year the storm strikes.     

Religion and unproductive entrepreneurship: The role of risk aversion

Institutions can shape the reward structure in the economy and thereby influence the allocation of entrepreneurship between productive and unproductive activities. This paper investigates the effect of religion, one important component of informal institutions, on unproductive entrepreneurship. Using a nationally representative survey on private enterprises in China, we find that religious entrepreneurs devote more of their resources, both in terms of money and time, to unproductive activities such as building social relations than their nonreligious peers. We further find that religion plays a significant role only in regions with weak regulatory institutions and/or for entrepreneurs vulnerable to institutional risks. Drawing on the close link between risk-aversion and religion, our results suggest that religious entrepreneurs engage in unproductive activities so as to reduce institutional risks in their business operations.     

The Climate Policy Hold‐Up: Green Technologies,Intellectual Property Rights,and the Abatement Incentives of International Agreements

The success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffusion of “green” technologies. Using a simple model, we highlight a conflict between international environmental agreements (IEAs) on emissions reductions and international systems of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on abatement technologies. When IPRs are strong and global, IEA signatories anticipate rent extraction by innovators. This hold‐up effect reduces abatement, potentially to levels below those of non‐signatories, and it reduces the number of signatories to self‐enforcing IEAs. We explore policy options that respect existing property rights, but avoid the strategic interaction between signatories to an IEA and innovators.     

Effects of runoff voting rules on number of parties and candidates' political experience: Evidence from a law change in Peru

We study the effect of a change in electoral rules on political competition, measured by the number of candidates and their political experience. We explore the effects of a change in legislation, introduced a year before the gubernatorial elections in Peru on the number of parties that participated in these elections. We also investigate how the legislative change affected the political experience of the candidates. Given that the legislative change did not apply to elections for provincial mayors, we use those elections as a control group, in a difference-in-differences design. Our estimates show the number of parties registered increased by a margin of around 2.2 after the legislative change. The change also increased the candidates' years of accumulated political experience, particularly in the subsequent gubernatorial elections.