2009全球1000家大银行排行榜

本次全球1000家大银行排行榜的主要特色是,受经济危机的影响,银行盈利大幅跳水85．3％,1000家上榜银行的盈利总额从7800亿美元降至115亿美元,资本回报率也从2008年的20％降至2．69％。     

2007年全球1000家大银行排名

2007年全球1000家大银行的总体盈利能力继续大幅增长,资本回报率达到创记录的23.4%,较2006年上升0.7个百分点。1000家大银行税前利润总额达到惊人的7863亿美元,较前一年增长了21.7%。2007年全球1000家大银行的一级资本和资产分别增长18.4%和16.3%,达到33651亿美元和742322亿美元。新兴市场国家的银行信贷增长速度很高:中国四大国有商业银行的总资产在新的一年内增长了27.4%,其中两家中国银行2007年进入世界银行前10强,而且它们都具有冲击1000强排行榜中处于统治地位的前六家银行巨人的实力。前25家银行(按一级资本排序)的总资产和总利润分别占世界1000家银行总资产和总利润的42.8%和40.8%。     

热烈祝贺中信银行世界银行排名升至188位

英国《银行家》杂志（The Banker，July 2006）发布按一级资本排出的“世界1000家银行”最新排行榜。中信银行排名从去年的200位升至188位，其总资产排名，也由152升至134，两项指标均位居中国银行业第7位。同时，中信银行实际利润增长率和平均资本利润率分别位居中国上榜银行第2位和第7位。     

全球银行大比拼——2006年度全球千家大银行排名述评

2006年7月,英国《银行家》杂志再次公布了世界1000家大银行的最新排名情况,它不仅反映了全球银行业的变化和现状,也反映了世界银行业未来的发展趋势。全球经济稳步增长、银行利润增长放缓2005年全球千家大银行一级资本增长3.7%,达到2.8万亿美元。总资产增长5.5%,达到6.4万亿美元。税前利润及资产收益率(ROA)连续三年创下历史记录,税前利润达到了6451亿美元,资产收益率首次突破20%,平均达到22.7%,远远高于2004年19.86%以及2000年17.91%的纪录。资本收益率(ROE)超过去年的0.9%,达到1.0%。但是利润增长率在经历了2002年的复苏、2003年的超常…     

山东省贸易进口付汇近年高速增长原因简析

山东省2000、2001、2002年贸易进口付汇分别为63．7亿、75．5亿、91．6亿美元，同比分别增长28．1％、18．6%、21．1％。2003年1—12月贸易进口付汇135．7亿美元．同比增长达到48％，表现出持续高增长的特点。2004年1月份贸易进口付汇9．17亿美元，同比增长23．1％．增幅虽有回落，但考虑到春     

疏堵结合方能解决个人跨境收支失衡

个人跨境收支是指个人通过我国境内银行发生的所有对境外的资金收付。2005年，个人跨境资金收支规模达到717亿美元，是2000年的4倍，年均增长60％以上。但收、支增长不平衡，个人跨境收入达到633亿美元，2000-2005年年均增长46％，但支出仅为84亿美元，年均增长不足10％．     

欧债危机对鄂尔多斯市跨境资金流动的影响分祈

一、跨境资金流动主要项目及原因分析（一）资本和金融项目分析。2009年以来，鄂尔多斯市资本和金融流入呈逐年增加趋势。2009年净流入1．07亿美元，同比下降53．88％；2010年净流人1．36亿美元，同比增长26．19％；2011年净流人3．53亿美元，同比增长159．7％；2012年一季度净流人1．07亿美元，同比增长945．52％。     

国内国际金融大事件

纽约当地时间9月28日，国家开发银行在纽约成功发行等值10亿美元的全球债券，这是该行时隔5年后再次进入国际资本市场进行融资。开发银行此次发行的全球债券，包括美元债券6亿元，期限10年，票面利率为4．75％；欧元债券3．25亿元，期限5．5年，票面利率为3．875％。本期债券由高盛、美林、摩根斯坦利、汇丰、法国巴黎银行以     

宁波商行:小银行与大作为

宁波市商业银行成立于1997年,现有资本18亿元。按照一级资本排名,宁波商行居浙江省内法人资格银行排名第一位,全国第18位;按照中国银监会2004年度综合排名,在全国城市商业银行中位居第二位;列英国《银行家》杂志2004年度全球1000家银行排名第933位。截至2005年底,宁波商行的总资产为421．4亿元,各项存款372．5亿元,各项贷款196．2亿元,存贷款额在全市16家商业银行里,总排名第五。国际业务结算量34亿美元。主要财务指标中,不良贷款率0．56％,资本充足率12．6％,核心资本充足率10．02％,拨备覆盖率268．3％, 净资产收益率16．06％,股本收益率18．9％,总收益在宁波地区排名第六。     

我6家银行在世界1000大中的最新排名

我６家银行在世界１０００大中的最新排名银行世界１０００大排行９６／９７年度９５／９６年度一级资本（亿美元）总资产（亿美元）税前盈利（亿美元）资本充足比率（％）中国银行１５２６１３７．３７２９２５．５４２２．８３１２．５中国工商银行２５２８１１１．７２...     

Paulson's gift

We calculate the costs and benefits of the largest ever US government intervention in the financial sector announced during the 2008 Columbus-day weekend. We estimate that this intervention increased the value of banks’ financial claims by $130 billion (bn) at a taxpayers’ cost of $21–$44 billion with a net benefit between $86 and $109 bn. By looking at the limited cross section, we infer that this net benefit arises from a reduction in the probability of bankruptcy, which we estimate would destroy 22% of the enterprise value. The big winners of the plan were the bondholders of the three former investment banks and Citigroup, while the losers were JP Morgan shareholders and the US taxpayers.     

美国银行“被瘦身”

随着新的关于另类资产监管条款的出台,面对严苛的政策法规,美国各个银行不得不开始新一轮的"瘦身"潮。     

中国银行业与国际同业的优势、差距与对策——兼评2011年全球1000家大银行排行榜

2011年全球1000家大银行排行榜展示了后危机时代国际银行业的最新发展与整体格局。在目前国内外银行业发展形势下,尤其是部分欧洲银行在全球金融运行背景和自身主权债务危机冲击下经营困难,甚至被拆分背景下,全面、深刻认识和剖析我国银行业与国际同业间优劣之势,对我国银行业有效应对复杂局势、推进稳健发展意义重大。《银行家》在上期刊发《2011年全球银行1000强排名透视》一文基础上,将主要侧重点转移到我国银行业与国际同业间的优劣势对比,选登中国银行国际金融研究所就此次全球银行排行的分析报告,以此为切入,为国内银行业正视差距、调整奋进提供参考。     

When time is not on our side: The costs of regulatory forbearance in the closure of insolvent banks

In this paper, we empirically estimate the costs of delay in the FDIC's closures of 433 commercial banks between 2007 and 2014 based upon a counterfactual closure regime. We find that the costs of delay could have been as high as $18.5 billion, or 37% of the FDIC's estimated costs of closure of $49.8 billion. We think that these findings call for a more aggressive stance by bank regulators with respect to the provisions for loan losses and write-downs of banks’ non-performing assets. More aggressive (and earlier) provisions and write-downs, or adoption of a capital ratio that penalizes nonperforming loans, would allow the concept of “prompt corrective action” (PCA) to play the role that it was meant to play in reducing FDIC losses from insolvent banks.     

Corporate cash and governance: A global look into publicly-traded companies' aggregate cash ratios

I conduct international panel-data regressions to investigate the determinants of cash holdings by publicly-traded firms for 20 countries over the period 2007–2017. The precautionary, transaction-costs, and agency motives explained ratios of the firms' aggregate cash to their total assets. On the last motive, higher cash ratios were associated with managers with worse ethical behavior, lower accountability, weaker investor protection, harsher auditing and reporting standards, and greater potential to face holdup problems by lending banks. The agency motive had a greater marginal impact than the precautionary and transaction-costs motives while having a limited explanatory power over total variation in the cash ratios.     

Local Bank Financial Constraints and Firm Access to External Finance

I exploit the exogenous component of a formula‐based allocation of government funds across banks in Argentina to test for financial constraints and underinvestment by local banks. Banks are found to expand lending by $0.66 in response to an additional dollar of external financing. Using novel data to measure risk and return on marginal lending, I show that the profitability of lending does not decline and total borrower debt increases during lending expansions, holding investment opportunities constant. Overall, financial shocks to constrained banks are found to have a quick, persistent, and amplified effect on the aggregate supply of credit.     

A Crisis of Banks as Liquidity Providers

Can banks maintain their advantage as liquidity providers when exposed to a financial crisis? While banks honored credit lines drawn by firms during the 2007 to 2009 crisis, this liquidity provision was only possible because of explicit, large support from the government and government‐sponsored agencies. At the onset of the crisis, aggregate deposit inflows into banks weakened and their loan‐to‐deposit shortfalls widened. These patterns were pronounced at banks with greater undrawn commitments. Such banks sought to attract deposits by offering higher rates, but the resulting private funding was insufficient to cover shortfalls and they reduced new credit.     

Banks’ external financing costs and the bank lending channel: Results from a SVAR analysis

We analyze the dynamic response of banks’ financing costs to structural, macroeconomic shocks, which we identify by imposing combinations of zero and sign restrictions on impulse responses. For the estimation we combine US bank balance sheet data from the Call reports with macroeconomic aggregates over the period from 1984Q1 to 2007Q3. We find that banks’ financing costs mainly respond to monetary policy and aggregate demand shocks. Furthermore, funding costs of undercapitalized and illiquid banks increase more strongly after a contractionary monetary policy shock as compared to better capitalized and more liquid banks. These results provide support for the view that banks’ financing costs represent an important element of the bank lending channel.     

Sizing Up Repo

To understand which short‐term debt markets experienced “runs” during the financial crisis, we analyze a novel data set of repurchase agreements (repo), that is, loans between nonbank cash lenders and dealer banks collateralized with securities. Consistent with a run, repo volume backed by private asset‐backed securities falls to near zero in the crisis. However, the reduction is only $182 billion, which is small relative to the stock of private asset‐backed securities as well as the contraction in asset‐backed commercial paper. While the repo contraction is small in aggregate, it disproportionately affected a few dealer banks.     

Securitization without risk transfer

We analyze asset-backed commercial paper conduits, which experienced a shadow-banking run and played a central role in the early phase of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We document that commercial banks set up conduits to securitize assets worth $1.3 trillion while insuring the newly securitized assets using explicit guarantees. We show that regulatory arbitrage was an important motive behind setting up conduits. In particular, the guarantees were structured so as to reduce regulatory capital requirements, more so by banks with less capital, and while still providing recourse to bank balance sheets for outside investors. Consistent with such recourse, we find that conduits provided little risk transfer during the run, as losses from conduits remained with banks instead of outside investors and banks with more exposure to conduits had lower stock returns.