Financial intermediation and growth: causality and causes without outliers

In a seminal paper, Levine et al. (J Monet Econ 46:31–77, 2000) provide cross-sectional evidence showing that financial development has positive average impact on long-run growth, using a sample of 71 countries. We argue that the evidence is sensitive to the presence of outliers.

Common Trends and Common Cycles in Per Capita GDP: The Case of the G7 Countries, 1870–2001

In this paper we analyze per capita incomes of the G7 countries using the common cycles test developed by Vahid and Engle (Journal of Applied Econometrics, 8:341–360, 1993) and extended by Hecq et al. (Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 62:511–532, 2000; Econometric Reviews, 21:273–307, 2002) and the common trend test developed by Johansen (Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 12:231–254, 1988). Our main contribution is that we impose the common cycle and common trend restrictions in decomposing the innovations into permanent and transitory components. Our main finding is permanent shocks explain the bulk of the variations in incomes for the G7 countries over short time horizons, and is in sharp contrast to the bulk of the recent literature. We attribute this to the greater forecasting accuracy achieved, which we later confirm through performing a post sample forecasting exercise, from the variance decomposition analysis.

Optimal simple rules and the lower bound on the nominal interest rate in the Christiano–Eichenbaum–Evans model of the US business cycle

Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (NBER wp 10724, 2004b) analyzes the optimal, simple and implementable monetary policy rules in a medium-scale macromodel, as the one proposed by Christiano et al. (J Polit Econ 113:1–45, 2005). In doing so, they use a sensible, but somewhat arbitrary constraint to account for the lower bound condition on the nominal interest rate. In this work, we check the robustness of their main results to such a criteria. We find that the optimal policies are actually absolutely robust to the easing of this criterion for all the different cases considered.

Mises’ democracy–dictatorship equivalence theorem: A critique

Ludwig von Mises argues that public opinion, not the form of government, is the ultimate determinant of policy. The implication is that, holding public opinion constant, democracies and dictatorships will have the same policies—a result I call Mises’ Democracy–Dictatorship Equivalence Theorem. According to Mises, dictators have to comply with public opinion or else they will be overthrown. I argue that he seriously overestimates the power of revolution to discipline dictators. Mises was perceptive to note that, in practice, “dictatorially imposed” policies are often democratically sustainable, but he neglected several mechanisms—all more plausible than the threat of revolution—capable of explaining this fact.

Price-setting behavior of Austrian firms

This paper explores nominal rigidities by investigating price-setting behavior of Austrian firms based on survey evidence. Distinguishing between two stages of price setting—first the price reviewing phase and second the price changing phase—our results suggest that the main obstacles to price flexibility lie on the second stage. Our main result is that firms postpone price adjustments, because they are afraid to antagonize customers with frequent price changes. Thus, customer relationships - especially those with consumers—are a major source of price stickiness in the Austrian economy.

The concept of choice: why and how innovative behaviour is not just stochastic

The goal of this paper is to highlight the importance of the concept of choice. To do so, a synopsis of the most important contributions to this topic—featuring an eclectic set of scholars across disciplines—is provided. As central to the argument, John von Neumann’s contributions, game theory and simulation techniques on von Neumann machines, are identified. Innovation (economic and theoretic) as the driving force behind human evolution seems to head for a new scientific paradigm based on von Neumann’s ideas.

The unanimity rule and religious fractionalisation in the Polish-Lithuanian Republic

This paper analyses the role of the unanimity rule—known as liberum veto—in medieval Poland. We argue that the primary effect of the liberum veto was that it secured religious freedom and established domestic peace in an otherwise deeply divided and fractionalised country. What is more, this institution succeeded in doing so during an era which was characterised by violent religious conflicts and rise of absolutist monarchies throughout the European continent. Even after 1652, when the liberum veto seemed to have practically paralysed the decision-making of Polish-Lithuanian parliament, there were still reasons—related to religious issues—why its use could have been preferable to less inclusive voting rules. It can be argued, however, that the use of unanimity was not warranted in questions related to defence, especially in situations of national emergency, although it is questionable to which extent the sole presence of the liberum veto was susceptible to bring about the demise of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic.

A simple note on herd behaviour

In his ‘Simple model of herd behaviour’, (Banerjee A (1992) A simple model of herd behaviour. Q J Econ CVII:797–817) shows that—in a sequential game—if the first two players have chosen the same action, player 3 and all subsequent players will ignore his/her own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. In this paper, we analyse the role played by the tie-breaking assumptions in reaching the equilibrium. We show that: players’ strategies are parameter dependent—an incorrect herd may be reversed; a correct herd is irreversible.

A reassessment of the Feldstein-Horioka hypothesis of perfect capital mobility: evidence from historical data

This short paper explores the relationship between investment and saving rates in a sample of 13 OECD countries over the period 1885–1992. To this end, I employ panel cointegration tests based on the maximum likelihood approach developed by Johansen (J Economic Dynamics Control 12:231–254, 1988) instead of conventional panel cointegration residual based tests, in order to draw sharper conclusions. Using estimation techniques appropriate for heterogeneous panels I find a low degree of capital mobility for the sub-periods 1921–1992 and 1950–1992. The findings overwhelmingly support the hypothesis of perfect capital mobility in the short run.

Transaction tax and stock market behavior: evidence from an emerging market

This study examines the impact of a stamp tax rate increase on market behavior, using data from two stock exchanges in China. We find that when the tax rate increases from 0.3 to 0.5% (which implies that the transaction cost increases by about 1/3) trading volume decreases by 1/3. This implies an elasticity of turnover with respect to a stamp tax of −50% and an elasticity of turnover with respect to transaction cost of −100%. The markets’ volatility significantly increases after the increase in the tax rate. Furthermore, the change in the volatility structure indicates that the markets become less efficient in the sense that shocks are less quickly assimilated in the markets.

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Buchanan’s constitutional political economy: exchange vs. choice in economics and in politics

This article discusses the methodological foundations of Buchanan’s constitutional political economy. We argue that Buchanan is a constitutional economist because he is an economist or a political economist. In other words, Buchanan is a constitutional economist—he insists on the necessity of focusing on constitutions and to analyze the “rules of the social game”—because he defines economics as a science of exchange. Buchanan’s definition of economics is not only specific, it is also opposed to the definition of economics that other economists retain and, above all, opposed to the definition of economics that many public choice theorists use. The latter have, in effect, adopted the Robbins 1932 definition of economics as a science of choice that Buchanan criticizes and rejects. Buchanan’s constitutional economics can be a branch of public choice only under certain conditions.

The value of rents and the likelihood of conflicts

This paper extends the prey–predator model of Grossman and Kim (J Political Econ 103:1275–1288, 1995) to analyze the relation between the value of a contested rent and the emergence of conflict. We show that an increase in the value of the rent makes a conflict equilibrium more likely. We also analyze the case where the valuation of the rent is different for the two players. We find, for example, that a conflict equilibrium may occur even though the predator has an important disadvantage in warfare. That is when his valuation of the rent is sufficiently high compared to that of the prey.

Conformism and cooperation in a local interaction model

We analyze a local interaction model where agents play a bilateral prisoner’s dilemma game with their neighbors. Agents learn about behavior through payoff-biased imitation of their interaction neighbors (and possibly some agents beyond this set). We find that the Eshel et al. (Am Econ Rev 88:157–179, 1998) result that polymorphic states are stochastically stable in such a setting is not robust. In particular, whenever agents use information also of some agents beyond their interaction neighbors, the unique stable outcome is one where everyone chooses defection. Introducing a sufficiently strong conformist bias into the imitation process, we find that full cooperation always emerges. Conformism is thus identified as a new mechanism that can stabilize cooperation.

Legal positivism and property rights: a critique of Hayek and Peczenik

Scholars such as Friedrich Hayek and Aleksander Peczenik have criticized legal positivism for undermining constitutionalism and the rule of law, an implication of which is weakened private property rights. This conclusion is far from evident. First, I contend that legal positivism is compatible with a strong support for property rights. Second, the causal relationship between legal positivism and the degree to which property rights are applied and protected is analyzed. The main arguments for a negative relationship—that legal positivism centralizes and politicizes legislation and that it makes the legal culture servile in relation to the political sphere—are considered unconvincing.

The rise and fall of monopolistic competition revolution

The widespread idea among economists is that monopolistic or imperfect competition is a set of realistic models that were invented in the 1930s and their purpose was to fill the gap between the polar and, at the same time, hypothetical models of perfect competition and pure monopoly. The main argument of this paper is that the monopolistic competition revolution set in motion a reaction—partly driven by methodological considerations, partly ideological—that ultimately led to the restoration of perfect competition, as the benchmark for evaluating market outcomes. In the end, monopolistic competition eclipsed, and perfect competition from the fridges of economic analysis that was up until the 1920s was placed to the very core of microeconomic model-building.

Social Market Economy: origins,meanings and interpretations

This paper investigates various possible meanings of ‘Social Market Economy’—60 years after its political initiation in Germany. We focus on the variety of intellectual sources that influenced the formation and interpretation of the concept in Germany during the first half of the last century. Our particular attention is on Müller-Armack’s definition of a rather dualistic concept of ‘social’ versus ‘market economy’ and the subtle differences it has with an original (Freiburg School) view of ordo-liberalism that lends itself more easily to a constitutional economics perspective.

A switching ARCH (SWARCH) model of stock market volatility: some evidence from Latin America

We use the Markov regime-switching ARCH (SWARCH) model of Hamilton and Susmel (J Econometrics 64:307–333, 1994) to document the presence of high volatility regimes in six Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela). We found four high volatility episodes, each associated to either a local (the Mexican crisis of 1994, the Brazilian crisis of 1998–1999, the Argentinean crisis of 2001–2002) or a worldwide financial crisis (the Asian financial crisis of 1997). However, we found that the effects of each financial crisis are short-lived and that between 2 and 4 months after each crisis, all markets return to low volatility regimes.

Changing of the guards: New coaches in Austria’s premier football league

Professional team sports provide an ideal real world experiment to explore the effect of top executive replacement due to the availability of excellent performance data. This paper investigates how replacing the coach affects the performance of football teams. Analyzing almost 2,000 matches of the Austrian premier football league by ordinal (probit) regression techniques we find that a new coach tends to enhance team performance in home matches but to weaken it in away matches. However, neither of these effects turns out to be statistically significant. Nevertheless, the much discussed coach effect—ousting an underperforming coach in order to improve team performance at least temporarily—may make sense despite the costs involved by providing stronger ex-ante incentives for effort.

Building blocks in the economics of mandates

The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers’ insurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more ‘deserving’ workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market contracts—separating the various worker types—the more likely it is that such output effects will on balance serve to reduce welfare. It is shown that adverse effects can be reduced by restricting mandates to larger firms. An alternative to a mandate is direct government provision. We demonstrate that direct government provision has the advantage over mandates of preserving separations.

Efficiency and Equity in School Funding: A Case Study for Kansas

This study measures cost inefficiency of Kansas public school districts and applied both mathematical programming and stochastic frontier approach. The empirical study uses two-stage data envelopment analysis model and the cost inefficiency effects model proposed by Battese and Coelli (Empirical Economics 24:325–332, 1995) and applied to a panel data. The results found mean inefficiencies from these two models are very close. The results indicate that Kansas school districts, on average, exhibit cost inefficiency in their operations, however, there is a tendency for inefficiencies to decline over time. The study does not find any strong evidence for lower efficiency due to lower expenditure per-pupil. Instead, we found inconclusive evidences where lower efficiency for certain school districts could be assigned to unfavorable environmental cost conditions.