The effect of risk-sharing government subsidy on corporate R&D investment: Empirical evidence from Korea

Despite the wide belief that the high social rates of returns to R&D investment justify government subsidy policy in advanced countries, there are only limited studies about whether the R&D subsidy as a means of risk-sharing stimulates R&D investment of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries. This paper empirically investigates the issue, using a unique data set on government subsidy for new technology development of Korean manufacturing firms, listed and non-listed, for the period from 2000 to 2007. The paper employs the DID estimation procedure and controls for simultaneity of the subsidy for new technology development using 2SLS and two step Tobit procedure. Our empirical results show that there is no solid evidence for crowding-out effects of the government subsidy. These results suggest that government subsidies could help SMEs to overcome the barriers to risky R&D projects through sharing R&D failure risk with government and by reducing capital costs to undertake new technology development projects, and thus the subsidy policy for new technology development seems to be partly successful in promoting the R&D investment of the Korean SMEs.     

Spillovers,subsidies, and second‐best socially optimal R&D

This paper provides a thorough second‐best welfare analysis of the standard two‐stage model of R&D/product market competition with R&D spillovers. The planner's solution is compared to the standard non‐cooperative scenario, the R&D cartel, and the cartelized research joint venture (or joint lab). We introduce the notion of a social joint lab, as a way for the planner to avoid wasteful R&D duplication. With no spillovers, the non‐cooperative scenario, the joint lab, and the second‐best planner's solutions coincide. However, with spillovers, all three scenarios yield R&D investments that fall short of the socially optimal level. To shed light on the role of the spillover level on these comparisons, we observe that the gaps between the market outcomes and the planners solutions widen as the spillover parameter increases. Finally, we establish that a social planner and a social joint lab solutions may be achieved starting from any of the three scenarios by offering firms respective suitably weighted quadratic R&D subsidization schedules.     

The impact of external R&D financing on innovation process from a supply-demand perspective

This paper sheds light on the effects of two different types of R&D financing sources respectively from a supply-demand combined perspective, namely subsidy from government and venture capital in market, on the innovation process. Our empirical analysis is based on a unique data set of industrial enterprises located in Beijing ZhongGuanCun Science Park during the period 2008–2015. In terms of the two stages of the innovation process, this paper untangles and compares the effects of the two financing sources on R&D input, patent output as well as profit outcome. We find that both supply- and demand-side external R&D financing channels have differential effects on the innovation process in terms of input, output or outcome as well as the different-sized enterprises. Supply-side subsidy tends to be more effective at the front end of the innovation process, while venture capital shows a demand-side consideration on technology evolution by focusing more on the back end of the innovation process. Both government subsidy and venture capital can have a significantly positive impact on the entire innovation process of small and micro enterprises, whereas for large and medium-sized enterprises, subsidy has no significant impact on profit outcome and venture capital can only affect patents positively. These findings suggest that the Chinese government should focus more on small and micro firms and increase such firms’ access to venture capital through a process of certification, so as to achieve an effective combination of government functions and market functions.     

政府产品创新补贴下的企业R＆D策略选择

为了研究在政府产品创新补贴政策下企业的R＆D策略选择问题,建立了双寡头市场中面向工艺R＆D的三阶段博弈模型：第一阶段政府以社会福利最大为目标选择产品创新补贴率;第二阶段企业进行R＆D投资以降低生产成本;第三阶段企业在产品市场中进行古诺竞争。根据双寡头在第二和第三阶段是否合作,给出了研发竞争、研发卡特尔、技术共享联盟和研究共同体等四种R＆D策略,得到了相应的政府最优R＆D补贴率。研究表明：从企业的R＆D投入和产品产量的角度看,当溢出效应较高时,研发竞争策略优于研发卡特尔策略;当溢出效应较低时,研发卡特尔策略优于研发竞争策略。研发卡特尔策略与研发竞争策略相比,研发卡特尔更能推动企业利润的提高并且可以改善社会总福利。从产品产量、企业利润和社会总福利最大化角度考虑,研究共同体为四种策略中的最优策略。     

A computational analysis of R&D support programs

We compare two common government R&D support programs, R&D tax credits and direct R&D grants. To study their effectiveness and the extent to which their design matters, we analyze these programs within a dynamic equilibrium model of imperfectly competitive industries. Adopting comprehensive welfare measures that take into account government, producer and consumer surpluses, we find that both schemes exhibit positive social returns. Mid-range R&D-intensive sectors exhibit higher social returns than either high or low R&D-intensive sectors. Both incentive schemes generate positive measures of R&D input additionality of magnitudes consistent with empirical R&D research. However, R&D grants that require firms to allocate subsidy funds to R&D spur less R&D than a more flexible R&D tax credit. Subsidy schemes can even induce competing firms to over-spend on R&D, generating negative producer surplus and possibly negative social returns.     

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies

In this paper, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is analyzed in an oligopolistic model that we apply to the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation. We find that the existence of asymmetric information among firms on whether a rival (or partner) is being subsidized or not may play a key role in explaining whether subsidies are effective or not in increasing R&D investments. In particular, it is shown that if the existence of the subsidy is made public (e.g. because strict information release regulation about R&D subsidies is enforced) and depending on the strategic relationship between the firms’ R&D efforts, an R&D subsidy could even hurt the subsidized firm.     

Should environmental R&D be prioritized?

An innovator may not be able to capture the full social benefit of her innovation and, therefore, governments support private R&D through various measures. We compare a market good innovation—to develop a more efficient technology to produce a standard market good—with an environmental innovation—to develop a more efficient abatement technology—that has the same potential to increase the social surplus. In the first-best outcome, which can be achieved by offering an R&D subsidy and a diffusion subsidy, the R&D subsidy should be greatest for an environmental innovation, whereas the diffusion subsidy should be greatest for a market good innovation. The ranking of the two types of subsidies reflects that the appropriability problem is greater for an environmental innovation than for a market good innovation.     

Does government R&D stimulate or crowd out firm R&D spending? Evidence from Chinese manufacturing industries

We examine whether receiving a government R&D grant stimulates or crowds out a firm’s own R&D spending in Chinese manufacturing industries. Using a database that spans the population of large and medium size privately owned Chinese manufacturing firms for the period from 2007 to 2011, a matching estimator and a matching and difference in‐differences estimator, we find a large firm R&D promoting effect of government R&D: receiving a government R&D grant led to a 4 to 9‐million‐yuan increase in a firm’s own R&D expenditures. This is a significant effect since the average R&D expenditures ranged from 5 to 9 million yuan in the year before receiving the grant. To understand the mechanisms behind this effect, we compare the before‐ and after‐treatment performance and behaviour of the treated and the control firms. We find that the government R&D receiving firms became more profitable following their receipt of the grant. We also find that receiving a government R&D grant increases the likelihood of a firm continuing its R&D performance after receiving the initial grant.     

International R&D Rivalry with Spillovers and Policy Cooperation in R&D Subsidies and Taxes

Abstract

We have investigated non-cooperative and jointly optimal R&D policies in the framework of Spencer & Brander (1983) in the presence of R&D spillovers. When R&D activities are strategic substitutes and the R&D game exhibits a positive externality, the result of Spencer & Brander (1983) reverses: the non-cooperative policy is a tax while the jointly optimal policy is a subsidy. Moreover, when R&D activities are strategic complements, the usual result of the prisoners' dilemma in the strategic subsidy game does not hold, implying that a welfare intervention is preferable over laissez-faire. When spillovers are sufficiently large, the joint welfare increases with subsidies being higher than those under non-cooperation.     

THE OPTIMAL RISK CHOICE OF COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVE R&D IN DUOPOLY WITH SPILLOVERS

This study examines the R&D risk choice in a duopoly market with technology spill overs. The firms conduct R&D programmes with different degrees of risk but an identical expected outcome and they compete or cooperate in R&D. Findings indicate that, in equilibrium, the R&D risk level decreases in the spill over rate under noncooperative R&D, while it may increase under cooperative R&D. Firms are more likely to engage in higher R&D risks under cooperative R&D than they are under non‐cooperative R&D. Moreover, the equilibrium R&D risk level both under competition and cooperation R&D is always too low from the perspective of social welfare, and the extent of this inefficiency increases with the spill over rate if the size of the spill over is large, but the opposite may occur if the size of the spill over is small.     

Research Joint Ventures with Asymmetric Spillovers and Symmetric Contributions

The paper proposes a new type of R&D cooperation between firms endowed with asymmetric spillovers, which we call symmetric Research Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization, based on reciprocity in information exchange. In this setting, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures and also share information, but such that the asymmetric spillover rates are increased through cooperation by equal amounts. It is found that this type of cooperation reduces R&D investment by the low spillover firm when its spillover is sufficiently low and the spillover of its competitor is sufficiently high. But it always increases the R&D of the high spillover firm, as well as total R&D (and hence effective cost reduction and welfare). A firm prefers no cooperation to symmetric RJV cartelization if its spillover rate is very high and the spillover rate of its competitor is intermediate. The profitability of symmetric RJV cartelization relative to other modes of cooperation is analyzed. It is found that symmetric RJV cartelization constitutes an equilibrium for a very wide range of spillovers, namely, when asymmetries between spillovers are not too large. As these asymmetries increase, the equilibrium goes from symmetric RJV cartelization, to RJV cartelization, to R&D competition, to R&D cartelization.     

Quantitative growth effects of subsidies in a search theoretic R&D model

Should government subsidize R&D and does it matter how these subsidies are allocated? We examine these questions in a dynamic model where R&D is described as sequential sampling from a distribution of new ideas. Successful discoveries affect future available resources and incentives for further R&D. Consequently, there may be under-investment in R&D. We study the effect of government interventions aimed at fostering growth through R&D. Calibrating the model with aggregate data from the Israeli business sector allows us to quantitatively compare two forms of support resembling those actually used to encourage R&D in the Israeli business sector: (i) an unrestricted subsidy that may be used at the recipients' discretion to finance R&D or other investments, (ii) a subsidy earmarked by the government for R&D activities only. While there is no theoretical way to determine which of the two subsidies will have a greater impact on search for new ideas and growth, we find that in the calibrated economy both subsidies have a significant but similar impact on the economy's output and TFP growth rates. Accordingly, in the case of the Israeli business sector, the incentives to conduct R&D were sufficiently strong, and no R&D-specific encouragement was needed. However, a sensitivity analysis reveals that for economies characterized by other parameter values this result may not be true. Correspondence to: B. Bental     

COOPERATIVE MANAGERIAL DELEGATION,R&D AND COLLUSION

Existing literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an oligopoly game through cooperative managerial delegation. In contrast, this paper shows that, if managers are delegated to choose R&D, in addition to choosing production levels, full‐collusive outcomes cannot be achieved through cooperative delegation. Moreover, (i) under cooperative delegation, semi‐collusion always yields lower profit, higher R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than that in the case of competition and (ii) cooperative delegation leads to a higher profit lower R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than the no delegation case, irrespective of product market conduct.     

R&D policy in a vertically related industry

In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of public policy aimed to stimulate business-performed R&D in a vertically related market. We examine the role of an R&D active upstream supplier in a four-stage R&D model, where we incorporate public funding. The considered policy instrument is direct funding of firms’ R&D efforts. We calculate the optimal policies and show that they have a positive impact on firms’ R&D investments. From a welfare point of view, it is optimal to differentiate the subsidy rates between the upstream and the downstream markets. Competition in the product market leads to a higher subsidy rate to the upstream supplier than to the downstream firms. When concentration is high in the downstream market, the optimal solution is an R&D subsidy for these firms, otherwise the optimal solution is an R&D tax for the downstream firms.     

Multilateral subsidy games

This paper examines the rationale for multilateral agreements to limit investment subsidies. The welfare ranking of symmetric multilateral subsidy games is shown to depend on whether or not investment levels are “friendly”, raising rival profits in total, and/or strategic complements, raising rival profits at the margin. In both Cournot and Bertrand competition, when spillovers are low and competition is intense (because goods are close substitutes), national-welfare-maximizing governments over-subsidize investment, and banning subsidies would improve welfare. When spillovers are high, national governments under-subsidize from a global welfare perspective, but the subsidy game is welfare superior to non-intervention. For helpful comments we are grateful to two referees, to Arijit Mukherjee, and to participants in seminars at Prague and UCD, at the EEA Conference in Lausanne and at the GEP Conference on “New Directions in International Trade Theory” at the University of Nottingham, June 2007. Dermot Leahy acknowledges the support of the Science Foundation Ireland Research Frontiers Programme (Grant MAT 017).     

Environmental Research Joint Ventures under Emission Taxes

The effect of environmentalpolicy depends crucially on the strategicbehavior of firms. Firms can undertakepollution abatement innovation cooperativelythrough environmental R&D joint ventures(RJVs). Environmental RJVs have not onlyenvironmental but also economic impacts. Threetypes of environmental RJV are discussed inthis paper: R&D cartelization in which firmschoose R&D efforts to maximize the jointprofit, RJV competition in which firms sharethe R&D fruits to maximize their own profits,and RJV cartelization in which firms share R&Dfruits and maximize the joint profit. An R&Dcartelization minimizes output quantities,maximizes the total emission, and minimizes thesocial surplus. An RJV cartelization with asufficiently high spillover coefficientmaximizes R&D efforts, minimizes the totalemission, and maximizes the social surplus.     

Emissions abatement R&D: Dynamic competition in supply schedules

This paper investigates the optimal environmental policy (the mix of emissions tax and research and development [R&D] subsidy) in a dynamic setting when two firms, producing differentiated products, compete in the output market over time. Firms compete in a differential game setting over supply schedules, which encompasses a continuum of imperfect competition equilibria from Bertrand to Cournot. Although production generates environmentally damaging emissions, firms can undertake R&D that has the sole purpose of reducing emissions. In addition to characterizing the optimal policy, we examine how the optimal tax and subsidy, and the optimal level of abatement, change as competition intensifies, as the dynamic parameters change, and as the investment in abatement technology changes. In this setting, competition increases welfare through its impact on the final goods price. However, lower prices result in larger quantities and more pollution. Our key contribution is to show how the impact of increased competition on welfare depends on the extent of the market and the nature of preferences and technology.     

The impact of R&D subsidy on innovation: evidence from New Zealand firms

This study examines the impact of government subsidy through R&D grants on innovation output for firms in New Zealand. Using a large database that links administrative and tax data with survey data, we find that R&D grants have a stronger effect on more novel innovation (e.g. applying for a patent or introducing new products to the world) than on incremental innovation (e.g. any product innovation) and that larger, project-based grants are more effective at promoting innovation than smaller, non-project-specific grants. There is little evidence that R&D grants have differential effects between smaller (<50 employees) and larger firms.     

R&D Returns,Spillovers and Firm Incentives: Evidence from China

Using a new data set of 12,000 firms in China, this paper estimates the returns to R&D investment and its spillover effects, and investigates how the returns to R&D depend on firm incentives. For the firms in the sample, the results show that on average firm output increases around 0.4 yuan for each additional 1 yuan spent on R&D in the previous year, and there is high R&D return regardless of whether the endogeneity of R&D intensity is dealt with or not. Interestingly, the marginal return to R&D is significantly higher in firms whose CEOs were not appointed by the government, and lower when CEO pay is directly related to annual performance. The return to R&D is higher in relatively poor regions and for firms with worse access to finance. There are also non-trivial R&D spillover effects.     

An Empirical Evaluation of The Effects of R&D Subsidies

R&D subsidies are a common tool of technology policy, but little is known about the effects they have on the behavior of firms. This paper presents evidence on the effects that R&D subsidies have on the R&D effort of recipients, and on the probability that a firm will participate in a program granting R&D subsidies. The empirical model consists of a system of equations: a participation equation; and an R&D effort equation. Endogeneity of public funding is controlled for. Estimates are obtained with a cross-section sample of Spanish firms. The main findings are that: 1) small firms are more likely to obtain a subsidy than large firms, probably reflecting one of the public agency's goals; 2) overall, public funding induces more private effort, but for some firms (30% of participants) full crowding out effects cannot be ruled out, and 3) firm size remains related to effort, whether or not a firm gets public funding.