中国国有企业的独特作用:基于知识溢出的视角

国有企业是政府解决市场失灵的工具。本文从知识溢出角度研究中国国有企业的作用。基于上市企业样本的分析发现:国有企业的知识溢出大于私有企业,国有企业的知识溢出对私有企业创新产出有显著正向影响,而私有企业则不具有这种作用。本文构建模型阐述国有企业和私有企业的研发行为、知识溢出及其影响差异。研究发现,不同所有权企业知识溢出和作用的不对称性,在于国有企业比私有企业从事了更多的基础性研究。基于四个基础研究代理变量的经验分析支持了理论模型的结论。因此,中国国有企业实现了政府弥补基础研发市场失灵的目标,对经济增长的影响是独特的。     

国有企业实施人力资本产权改革的原因分析

国有企业改革问题引起越来越多的讨论,而焦点也集中在国有企业是应该实行公有产权还是走私有化道路。然而对于国有企业,公有产权和私有产权都有其缺陷。事实上,人力资本产权的残缺才是造成经营者和职工生产经营努力与能力＂双重不足＂,进而造成国有企业经济效率低下的最根本原因。实施良好的人力资本产权改革,不仅可以解决两条改革道路的矛盾,而且更有利于其建立现代企业制度,提高企业经营利润。     

国有企业管理层收购的经济学分析

由于国有企业产权模糊,所有权与经营权分离带来的问题比私有企业要严重得多,因此,国有企业的管理层收购比私有企业等非国有企业管理层收购有更深远的意义.本文分别从非现金利益消费的分析视觉、金融合同理论分析视觉、所有权结构、激励与效率的分析视觉以及公司治理结构的分析视觉对国有企业管理层收购进行经济学分析.当然,这些分析(或理论假说)是否成立还有待实证检验.     

俄罗斯私有化中的国有资产流失

俄罗斯的产权改革是在私有化的概念下进行的。通过私有化，俄罗斯的所有制结构发生了根本变化。截至2000年底，在企业比重上，国有企业占11％，非国有企业占89％(其中私有企业占75％)；在就业比重上，国有企业占38％，非国有企业占62％(其中私有企业占45％)；在资产比重上，国有资产占42％，非国有资产占     

国有企业改革:不同思路的碰撞与选择

纵观国内外关于国有企业改革方向性选择的争论,存在主张私有化、反对私有化,和强调竞争比产权更重要三种思路.联系国有企业改革与发展实际,我们认为:私有化不是万能的、国有企业并非天然的低效率应是基本共识.因此,要坚定国有企业是可以搞好的信心.我们提出坚定搞好国有企业的信心,不是指搞好所有的国有企业,在现阶段我们认为要立足于中央企业和省(市)管企业,以完善公司治理结构为目标.本文还详细阐述了现阶段我国国有企业改革方向性选择的依据.     

国外国有企业改革经验借鉴——世界国有企业发展趋势的启示

随着新世纪的到来，国有企业改革与脱困3年目标基本实现，但这只是一个阶段性的成果，我国即将加入WTO，国有企业要在国际竞争中取胜，就必须加快企业改革和发展的步伐。纵观世界国有企业的发展趋势，对我国深化国有企业改革有深刻的启示。 一、世界范围的私有化浪潮的兴起与发展 世界范围大规模的私有化浪潮起源于70年代末的英国，目前已波及所有发达国家和前苏联东欧地区以及绝大多数发展中国家，但市场经济国家与前苏联东欧国家在私有化动机、方法和后果等方面则有很大差异。 市场经济国家形成私有化浪潮最直接的原因是国有企业微观经…     

自然垄断领域国有企业改革相关研究

本文分析了自然垄断领域含义和特征,面对自然垄断领域国有经济成分占主导地位的现实,公正评价自然垄断领域国有企业在资本主义发展史上所起的关键作用,借鉴国外国有企业私有化改革的经验并结合我国实际情况分析了国有成分和私有资本之间该如何“让步”。最后,可观全面地提出我国自然垄断领域国有企业改革应该注意的问题,以便避免盲目私有化。     

自然垄断领域国有企业改革相关研究

本文分析了自然垄断领域含义和特征，面对自然垄断领域国有经济成分占主导地位的现实，公正评价自然垄断领域国有企业在资本主义发展史上所起的关键作用，借鉴国外国有企业私有化改革的经验并结合我国实际情况分析了国有成分和私有资本之间该如何“让步”。最后，可观全面地提出我国自然垄断领域国有企业改革应该注意的问题，以便避免盲目私有化。     

私有产权并非完美——金融危机的教训

私有产权由于其竞争性和市场性被当作改革的目标,但是私有企业逐利性也产生了许多弊端,2007年以来的金融危机证实了这一点.金融危机带给我们的启示就是在非竞争性领域不能盲目私有化,而应当作到国有企业的盈利性目标与政策性目标相分离.     

西方国家企业国有化和私有化问题研究

20世纪上半叶,西方国家的国有企业经历了两次大的扩张浪潮。20世纪70年代以后,西方国家政府开始对政府过度干预经济进行反思,私有化成为潮流,西方国家企业国有化和私有化的反复过程反映了政府职能和市场机制二者关系的动态演化。从国有企业本身来分析,股权结构仅仅是决定其绩效的因素之一,对不同行业的国有企业来说,私有化的后果也是不同的。因此,对大型国有企业要采取多种具体措施来提高其绩效,而不是仅仅从股权私有化来入手。     

Optimal privatization and uniform subsidy policies: A note

The privatization neutrality theorem states that the share of public ownership in a firm does not affect welfare under an optimal uniform tax‐subsidy policy. We revisit this neutrality result. First, we investigate the case in which the private firm is domestic. We show that this neutrality result does not hold unless public and private firms have the same cost function. Next, we investigate a case in which both domestic and foreign investors own the private firm. We show that the optimal degree of privatization is never zero, and thus, the neutrality result does not hold, even when there is no cost difference between public and private firms.     

Lack of commitment to future privatization policies may lead to worst welfare outcome

We investigate the welfare consequences of a lack of commitment to future privatization policies. The government implements a privatization policy after the competition structure is determined by the entry of private firms. We find that in an equilibrium, the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) a public firm if private firms expect that the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) the public firm. This is because an increase in the number of firms entering a market increases the government's incentive to privatize the public firm, which mitigates future competition and stimulates entries. The full-privatization equilibrium is the worst privatization policy among all possible (either equilibrium or non-equilibrium) privatization policies for welfare because it causes excessive market entry of private firms. Partial commitment of a minimal public ownership share may mitigate this problem.     

An analysis of entry-then-privatization model: welfare and policy implications

This study formulates a new model of mixed oligopolies in free entry markets. A state-owned public enterprise is established before the game, private enterprises enter the market, and then the government chooses the degree of privatization of the public enterprise (termed the entry-then-privatization model herein). We find that under general demand and cost functions, the timing of privatization does not affect consumer surplus or the output of each private firm, while it does affect the equilibrium degree of privatization, number of entering firms, and output of the public firm. The equilibrium degree of privatization is too high (low) for both domestic and world welfare if private firms are domestic (foreign).     

Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance: The role of private ownership concentration,identity and board composition

We examine and analyze the post-privatization corporate governance of a sample of 52 newly privatized Egyptian firms over a period of 10 years, from 1995 to 2005. We look at the ownership structure that results from privatization and its evolution; the determinants of private ownership concentration; and the impact of private ownership concentration, identity and board composition on firm performance. We find that the state gives up control over time to the private sector, but still controls, on average, more than 35% of these firms. We also document a trend in private ownership concentration over time, mostly to the benefit of foreign investors. Firm size, sales growth, industry affiliation, and timing and method of privatization seem to play a key role in determining private ownership concentration. Ownership concentration and ownership identity, in particular foreign investors, prove to have a positive impact on firm performance, while employee ownership concentration has a negative one. The higher proportion of outside directors and the change in the board composition following privatization have a positive effect on firm performance. These results could have some important policy implications where private ownership by foreign investors seems to add more value to firms, while selling state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to employees is not recommended. Also, the state is highly advised to relinquish control and allow for changes in the board of directors following privatization as changing ownership, per se, might not have a positive impact on firm performance unless it is coupled with a new management style.     

Mixed oligopoly, optimal privatization, and foreign penetration

This paper examines the impact of foreign penetration on privatization in a mixed oligopolistic market. In contrast to the simple framework of single domestic market with foreign entry by entry mode of foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports, our result shows that government should increase the degree of privatization along with increasing proportion of domestic ownership of multinational firms. Furthermore, we show that an increase in domestic ownership of multinational firms raises all domestic private firms' profit and social welfare, while it may either increase or decrease public firm's profit. With the aid of numerical example, intensive competition from private firms in general will enhance the degree of privatization gradually; in particular, the degree of privatization is lower in the presence of multinational firms.     

The determinants of privatization prices: evidence from Turkey

This paper analyses the determinants of privatization prices in a multi-industry study using a sample of 68 recently privatized firms from Turkey. Results show that revenue and market characteristics are significant determinants of privatization prices while current cost and profit indicators are not. It is argued that potential buyers regard these state firms as inefficient, therefore do not take into consideration their current costs and profits in determining their value. When the dependent variable is altered by dividing the firm's privatization price by the firm's sales (revenues), it is found that sales-adjusted privatization prices are responsive to firms profit margins. However, this result does not hold when the sample is restricted to a single industry. Profit margins along with other profitability and firm efficiency measures are no longer significant determinants of sales-adjusted privatization prices in the cement industry analysis. Unexploited production opportunities measured by capacity utilization ratios, and complete private ownership resume a more important role.     

企业改制模式和改制绩效——基于企业数据调查的经验分析

本文以上世纪90年代后半期的企业调查数据为基础,通过建立经济计量模型来研究公有企业的改制绩效,通过相应的技术处理消除企业的各种先天因素或改制前固有的优势,试图测试改制是否能够确实激发出显著的效率效应。分析发现,向私有产权方向改制的企业效率得到显著提高;不同的改制模式是改制绩效的重要决定因素,经营者持大股从效率上来讲是最优的改制方式,而平均分配的股份合作制的改制方式则具有较差的业绩效果。我们还讨论了其原因,以及为什么中国现阶段特定制度环境下最优的公司治理结构是大股东控股。我们认为给定当前制度背景下,最佳的改革方案之一是股权向经营者集中,股权合理定价。因为只有市场的初次分配是有效率的,才能得到收入再分配的源泉。在此基础上,国家可通过各种税收设计,进行较为公平合理的收入再分配。     

Are private banks more efficient than public banks?

We study whether bank efficiency is related to bank ownership in Russia. We find that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic private banks and, surprisingly, that domestic private banks are not more efficient than domestic public banks. These results are not driven by the choice of production process, the bank's environment, management's risk preferences, the bank's activity mix or size, the econometric approach, or the introduction of deposit insurance. The policy conclusion is that the efficiency of the Russian banking system may benefit more from increased levels of competition and greater access of foreign banks than from bank privatization.     

Regulation and state ownership: conflicts and complementarities in eu telecommunications

Abstract ** :  In many countries infrastructure liberalization proceeded faster than the privatization of former state monopolies. Regulatory agencies, established to oversee the transition and safeguard the preconditions for competition, therefore monitor state‐owned firms in addition to privately owned firms. The research on public‐private firms has generated heterogeneous findings, with some pointing to the advantages and other to the disadvantages of this arrangement. Government regulation of mixed public‐private firms raises additional complicated issues, of which the paper studies two using the example of European telecommunications between 2000 and 2004. It examines, first, whether the dual role of the state as owner and regulator could be abused to disadvantage private competitors. Second, it probes whether, conversely, the combination of government ownership and regulation might help overcome some of the shortcomings of the regulation of private firms. We find weak evidence that public and mixed regulated firms were subject to more favourable regulation of interconnection prices. However, this effect weakened as more independent regulation was established. In the area of universal service provision, there is no clear evidence that public and mixed telecommunication service providers were more likely than private ones to be utilized in pursuit of social output goals without explicit compensation. Overall, it seems that the presence of independent regulation, appeals processes, and competition review is a safeguard against capture of the regulator, by public and mixed firms .     

Ownership and Productive Efficiency: Evidence from Estonia

Privatization in Estonia has produced varied ownership configurations. This enables hypotheses on the productivity effects of different ownership forms to be tested. Findings are based on fixed-effects production function models and are estimated using a large, random sample of firms. Depending on the particular specification (and relative to state ownership), (i) private ownership is 13–22% more efficient; and (ii) all types of private ownership are more productive, though managerial ownership has the biggest effects (21–32%) and ownership by domestic outsiders has the smallest impact (0–15%). The joint hypothesis that privatization coefficients are equal is rejected. Findings are robust with respect to choice of technology and the use of instrumental variable estimates. These results provide only partial support for the standard theory of privatization, but stronger support for theorists who argue that some forms of insider ownership may constitute preferable forms of corporate governance in some circumstances.