The impact of corporate debt on long term investment and firm performance

Prior research indicates a linkage between debt, research and development (R&D) and physical investment, and that the relationship varies depending on the type of firm (science versus non–science). Leverage also plays a multidimensional role in corporate performance and growth. The relationship between financial leverage and R&D expenditure is analysed using a sample of large United States (US) manufacturing firms. Then, the impact of leverage on R&D expenditure is studied using corporate performance drivers as intermediate variables. The results indicate that there is a strong negative relationship between the degree of financial leverage and the level of R&D expenditure that firms undertake. The negative relationship is robust to changes in model specifications and sample periods. More importantly, the results show that it is higher leverage that leads to lower R&D expense rather than R&D causing variations in future leverage. In addition, the results indicate that higher leverage adversely influences future investment in R&D which may in turn lead to negative impact on long term operating performance and future growth opportunities.     

CEO pay, firm size, and corporate performance: evidence from Canada

Executive compensation of 755 Canadian firms is examined over the period 1991–95, and evidence is obtained consistent with previous studies: CEO pay rises with firm size and compensation is tied to company performance. In addition, executives in utilities earn lower pay, and their compensation is less responsive to performance, than is true for their counterparts in other industries. Some novel findings are also documented. First, the sales elasticity of CEO compensation is greater in larger firms. Second, while CEO turnover probability is generally negatively related to the firm's stock performance, the threat of dismissal appear to be less pronounced in small firms. JEL Classification: G35, J33
Salaire des PDG, taille de l'entreprise et performance des sociétés: résultats pour le Canada. En étudiant le salaire des PDG de 755 entreprises canadiennes au cours de la période 1991–95, l'auteur confirme certains résultats d'études antérieures: le salaire du PDG croît avec la taille de l'entreprise, et il est liéà la performance de l'entreprise. Il appert aussi que les cadres dans les entreprises de service public gagnent moins relativement parlant, et que leur salaire est moins sensible aux écarts de performance que dans les autres secteurs. On met aussi à jour certains résultats inédits. D'abord, il semble que l'élasticité du salaire du PDG par rapport au niveau des ventes est plus forte dans les plus grandes entreprises. Ensuite, alors que la probabilité de roulement est en général co-reliée négativement à la performance des actions en bourse de l'entreprise, la menace de renvoi semble moins prononcée dans les petites entreprises.     

Privatizing public services and strategic behavior: The impact of incentives to reduce workers' compensation claim duration

During the 1990s, the state of Ohio contracted out Workers' Compensation (WC) case management, incorporating a large bonus payment intended to reward reduced claim duration. The bonus is essentially a decreasing function of average days away from work, excluding claims longer than 15 months. In response, duration is predicted to decrease for claims with moderate injuries and increase for some severe claims so that claimants will miss more than 15 months of work and be excluded from the calculation. I show that contractors increased duration for severe claims but find no evidence that contractors successfully reduced duration for moderate claims. However, contractors received large bonus payments. This is likely because the financial reward to merely excluding a small share of severe claims from the calculation of the bonus payment is large enough to enable TCMs to receive the full bonus. These contractor responses are inconsistent with state intentions, suggesting public entities should anticipate strategic behavior when crafting performance-based incentives.     

CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: Evidence from micro data

In this paper, we use unique data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002 to show that CEO turnover is significantly and inversely related to firm performance, although the magnitude of the relationship is modest. In addition, we find that this turnover-performance link is weaker for listed firms that are still controlled by the state and those that have a relatively weak non-state controlling shareholder. In contrast, the appointment of independent directors enhances the turnover-performance link. Moreover, the listing suspension mechanism, adopted by China's securities regulatory agency, appears to be effective in improving the turnover-performance tie. Finally, listed firms with CEOs holding additional positions among the controlling shareholders have a weaker turnover-performance link. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (4) (2006) 796–817.     

The impact of financial constraints on firm survival and growth

We propose a new approach for identifying and measuring the degree of financial constraint faced by firms and use it to investigate the effect of financial constraints on firm survival and development. Using panel data on French manufacturing firms over the 1996–2004 period, we find that (1) financial constraints significantly increase the probability of exiting the market, (2) access to external financial resources has a positive effect on the growth of firms in terms of sales, capital stock and employment, (3) financial constraints are positively related with productivity growth in the short-run. We interpret this last result as the sign that constrained firms need to cut costs in order to generate the resources they cannot raise on financial markets.     

Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps

Should a firm favor insiders (handicap outsiders) when selecting a CEO? One reason to do so is to take advantage of the contest to become CEO as a device for providing current incentives to employees. An important reason not to do so is that this can reduce the ability of future CEOs and, hence, future profits. The trade-off between providing current incentives and selecting the most able individual to become CEO is the focus of this paper. If insiders are good enough (better or nearly as good as outsiders), incentive provision to insiders typically dominates and it is optimal to handicap outsiders, sometimes so severely that they have no chance to win the contest. However, if outsiders are sufficiently better than insiders, selection dominates and it is the insiders who are severely handicapped. This finding is in sharp contrast to the existing literature which has so far ignored this trade-off. In all, our model provides useful insight into contests to become CEO and rationalizes empirical regularities in the source of CEOs chosen by firms. In particular, our analysis helps to explain the lower tendency of firms in more heterogeneous industries and firms with a product or line of business organizational structure to select an outsider as CEO.     

The impact of the financial crisis on new firm registration

Panel data for 93 countries shows that most countries experienced a sharp drop in new firm registration during the financial crisis. The decline was more pronounced in countries with higher levels of financial development that were more affected by the crisis.     

Managerial compensation and incentives in for-profit and nonprofit hospitals

Differential economic behavior of for-profit and nonprofit institutionscan be manifest in both output and input markets. When behaviorin output markets is difficult to observe, behavior in inputmarkets can be useful proxies. We examine monetary compensationand its composition between base salary and bonus, and the associatedincentive structures, in the U.S. hospital industry. Our datapermit controlling for interinstitutional differences in thescope and complexity of jobs having the same titles, as wellas differences in organization size and other variables. Wefind (1) total monetary compensation for the two top executivejobs is substantially higher in the for-profit sector; and (2)the composition of compensation as between base salary and bonusdiffers materially across forms of organization, bonuses beingabsolutely and relatively greater in the for-profit sector.Particularly noteworthy is the finding that for-profit hospitalsutilize compensation mechanisms that, by involving larger contingentcomponents, provide stronger incentives - greater rewards -as compared with nonprofit hospitals, for performance that ismore easily monitored. While our findings are consistent withmore than one model of comparative organizations differ in theirgoals and, hence, in the kinds of managers they demand and thereward structures they offer. Nonprofit organizations may pursueobjectives that reflect greater concern about collective goodsor other outputs that are more difficult to measure and reward.Alternatively, nonprofits, confronted by a nondistribution constrainton the payout of profit to managers, may lack incentives forefficiency, and so may pursue other goals such as a quiet life.Such differential objective functions, together with the differentialconstraints on the distribution of profit to managers, havetwo kinds of implications. (1) Nonprofit and for-profit organizationsmay attract different kinds of managers, especially at the toplevels, because nonprofits prefer working for a nonprofit organizationand, hence, may offer a lower supply price to them. (2) Thetwo types of organizations can be expected to offer differentialcomposition of compensation as between base salary and performance-basedbonus, providing different incentives for managers. Our analysisis positive in character, the goal being to identify systematicdifferences in organization behavior.     

Labor flexibility and firm performance

The aim of this paper is to add to the labor flexibility debate by exploring the relationship between different forms of flexible working practices and the performance of the firm. Although there is a strong argument that labor flexibility can lead to greater financial success through the reduction in labor costs and the ability to use labor resources more efficiently, little empirical evidence has been provided to demonstrate the existence of such a relationship. This paper reviews the existing literature, puts forward a number of research propositions, and tests them by using data drawn from the Cranet-E International Survey of Strategic Human Resource Management. Only one form of numerical flexibility is found to have a positive relationship with firm performance. Proposals for further research are suggested.     

The impact of IT investment on firm performance in China: An empirical investigation of the Chinese electronics industry

Over the past three decades, the impact of information technology (IT) investments on firm performance has been the subject of active research. Although many studies have shown positive and significant benefits derived from IT investment, the findings of almost all these studies are based on data collected in developed countries. Few studies have been conducted to validate these results and to determine whether or not they are still applicable in developing countries. This study tries to investigate the effects of IT investment on firm financial performance in the electronics industry of China, still classified as a developing country, and compare it with the United States. Findings show that IT investment has a positive impact on firm performance in China. Moreover, the impact in China is not different from what occurred in the United States in terms of direction and the size against the assertion of previous studies and expectations.     

Managerial incentives, CEO characteristics and corporate innovation in China’s private sector

We use a unique World Bank survey of 1088 private manufacturing firms from 18 Chinese cities over the period 2000-2002 to empirically examine the roles of managerial incentives and CEO characteristics in a firm’s innovation activities. We look at both innovation effort (R&D intensity) and innovation performance measures such as new product sales. We obtain the following main results: (1) the presence of CEO incentive schemes increases both corporate innovation effort and innovation performance; (2) sales-based performance measures in the incentive scheme, as compared with profit-based performance measure, are more conducive to firm innovation; and (3) CEO education level, professional background and political connection are positively associated with firm’s innovation efforts. The main results are robust to endogeneity tests with instrumental variables. We also discuss some important policy implications.     

The dynamic impact of intellectual capital on firm value: evidence from China

We examine the dynamic relationship between intellectual capital (measured by human capital and organizational capital) and firm value of Chinese listed firms. We do causality identification using system GMM and IV estimation, and find no significant relation between human capital and firm value, but organizational capital positively affects firm value with a lag. Our findings are robust to firms with different property rights, of different sizes, or in different industries, with the only exception of capital-intensive firms, in which human capital has a significant influence on firm value. The results imply that the improvement of organizational system plays a more important role in raising the value of a firm in a typical developing country, like China.     

Overseas business costs and firm export performance

Abstract.  The recent microeconomic literature on international trade has highlighted the importance of firm characteristics and trade costs for exports. This study provides evidence on one type of those costs, the costs of doing business overseas, from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Controlling for firm- and industry-level covariates, we find that improvements in the business environment of foreign countries lead to an increase in the export intensity of exporters in the UK manufacturing sector and additional export market entry. Further investigation suggests that important determinants of foreign business costs include factors relating to legal structure, property rights, and business regulation.     

Technological discontinuities, competition and firm performance

This article discuss in a tentative way what determines the effect of technological discontinuities on the competitive position. of companies within an industry. Three cases of technological change are anahzed: the change from manual to romputer numericalb controlled metal cutting machine tools, the change from stand-alone machine tools to flexible manufacturing systems; and the change from non-cellular to cellular mobile telephony It is argued that the character of technological discontinuity affects market shares, by altering the barriers to entry and mobility, and by being more or less in accordance with the different firms' vision about the future, implying variations in the time needed to detect and accept the new threat or opportunity. A technological discontinuity that includes a new threat or opportunig. A technological discontinuip that involues a new generic technology which substitutes for rather than adds to the previous technology base is seen as being most disruptive. The time actualb available for detecting the need to change and to act is limited by the market growth of the new product (the 'speed of diffusion between users). The faster the difficulties is, therefore diffusion is the greater are the possinbilities that early movers will fain intial advantages. Furthermore, the faster the diffusion is the greater are the possibilities that early movers will build sustanable, volume-related entry and mobility barries.     

The impact of mergers on acquiring firm shareholder wealth: The 1905–1930 experience

From the standpoint of investors successful acquisitions increase profitability and stock Contemporary studies find acquiring firm shareholders earning small gains before and large losses after consolidation. Using modern financial market procedures, we examine a portfolio of 191 acquiring firms from 1905 to 1930 to determine the impact on firm owners of early industrial acquisitions in the United States and the effect of institutional changes on takeover gains. Acquisitions from 1905 to 1930 raised shareholder wealth by more than 3 percent, an increase exceeding gains from more recent mergers. Stock price continued to rise after completion for acquisitions before World War I, but fell dramatically for acquisitions during the oligopoly merger wave of the late 1920s.We would like to thank Patrick Byrne and Tara Nussman for help in collecting the financial data, Ralph Nelson for permitting us to use his and Carl Eis's worksheets on merger activity from 1905 to 1930, and George Bittlingmayer, Malcolm Burns, David Gulley, Stephen Grubaugh, Lori Leeth, John Matsusaka, Dennis Mueller, Rexford Santerre, Scott Sumner, Tugrul Temel, and Nikhil Varaiya for their helpful comments.     

The welfare impact of a managerial oligopoly with an altruistic firm

I analyse the welfare impact of a mixed market with a private or public firm that is characterised by wider objectives or altruism, in the presence of an agency problem. Contrary to some earlier findings, the total surplus turns out to be increasing in the degree of altruism. This impact is stronger than without an agency problem, despite more stringent conditions for the market to remain mixed. The altruistic firm is more cost efficient, and viable if the market can remain mixed. A competition policy that encourages entry may increase welfare, but its scope is reduced by higher altruism.     

Managerial pay adjustments: Decomposition and impact on firm productive efficiency

This paper decomposes managerial pay adjustments and examines their impact on firm productivity based upon Taiwanese firm panel data. Pay adjustments are decomposed into components arising from three sources: a scheme based on the external labour market comparisons, a scheme derived from the changes in firm and manager characteristics, and transitory pay adjustments. The stochastic frontier model is used to test how these pay components affect firm productivity. Empirical results suggest that the pay adjustments based on the comparison between managers' actual pay and their market-clearing pay are positively related to the output and technical efficiency of the firms, whereas this productivity-boosting effect cannot be seen for other components. This paper shows the importance of the external labour market in connecting managerial pay to firm productivity, and provides a model for the research of managerial pay in an environment where the compensation structure does not have apparent stock incentives.     

The social dimension of firm performance: a data envelopment approach

A data envelopment model is proposed to quantify the social dimension of firm performance. Corporate social responsibility activities are treated as netputs to production. Production of good outputs and unintended by-products are combined in the overall measurement of firm performance. Our model is illustrated using a sample of global firms and suggests strikingly low social performance levels.     

The stained China miracle: Corruption,regulation, and firm performance

Regional corruptness in China has a positive effect on the profitability of private firms, but not that of state-owned firms. A natural experiment of exogenous trade policy change suggests that corruption may help private firms circumvent government regulation.