Limited attention and the role of the venture capitalist

This research analyzes the venture capitalist's incentives to maximize the profits of the entrepreneurs of ventures and the limited partners of a venture fund. Venture capital is a professionally managed pool of capital invested in equity-linked private ventures. Entrepreneurs turn to venture capitalists for financing because high-technology startup firms have low or negative cash flows, which prevent them from borrowing or issuing equity. In addition, venture capitalists are actively involved in management of the venture to assure its success. This solves the problem of startup firms that do not have the cash flows to hire management consultants.Venture capital contracts have three main characteristics: (1) staging the commitment of capital and preserving the option to abandon, (2) using compensation systems directly linked to value creation, and (3) preserving ways to force management to distribute investment proceeds. These characteristics address three fundamental problems: (1) sorting the venture capital among the entrepreneurial ventures, (2) providing incentives to motivate venture capitalists to maximize the value of the funded ventures, and (3) providing incentives to motivate entrepreneurs to maximize the value of the ventures. Venture capitalists fund only about a dozen projects a year out of a thousand evaluated. Each project may receive several rounds of financing. Payoffs to VCs can be very high or be a complete loss.The typical venture capital (VC) firm is organized as a limited partnership, with the venture capitalists serving as general partners and the investors as limited partners. General partner VCs act as agents for the limited partners in investing their funds. VCs invest their human capital by placing their reputation on the line. The goal is to begin to convert the investment into cash or marketable securities, which are distributed to the partners. VC management companies receive a management fee equal to a percentage (usually 2.5%) of the capital of each fund. They also receive a percentage (15–30%) of the profits of each fund, called carried interest. Periodic reports are made by the VC firm to the limited partners. Usually these are only costs of managing the fund, and so revenues are negative. Most contracts specify the percentage of time that the VC will devote to managing the fund.The analysis of this research deals with the incentives of the VC who has limited attention to be allocated between improving current ventures and evaluating new ventures for possible funding. The analysis shows that the VC, as agent for both the entrepreneur and the general partners, does not have the incentives required to maximize their profits. The VC allocates attention among ventures and venture funds less frequently than required to maximize the entrepreneurs' and limited partners' profits. However, the VC does maximize the total profits of all ventures. Because the VC considers the opportunity cost of attention, the VC's allocation of attention is efficient. The implication of this result is that, although the entrepreneurs and limited partners could be made better off with a different allocation of the VC's time, this would be an inefficient use of the VC's time.     

Risk management in Indian venture capital and private equity firms: A comparative study

Venture capitalists and private equity funds are often considered experts at investing in high‐risk projects and firms. To be successful investors, venture capitalists and private equity funds must therefore manage the many aspects of risk associated with investing in unlisted small and medium‐sized enterprises. This study examines how Indian venture capital and private equity firms manage several dimensions of risk. We analyze risk management preferences in Indian venture capital and private equity firms. A comparison between Indian and U.K. funds is presented. The results are discussed in detail. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

A theoretical analysis of optimal financing strategies for different types of capital-constrained entrepreneurs

In this paper, we compare two alternative financing strategies that capital-constrained entrepreneurs can adopt: they can either wait until they raised enough money to complete their project (the more conservative strategy) or use limited resources to achieve some intermediate milestone before contacting large outside investors such as venture capitalists (the more adventurous strategy). We examine how the choice of financing strategy is affected by entrepreneurial types (life-style, serial and pure profit-maximizing entrepreneur). We show that specific entrepreneurial characteristics may ultimately affect the shape of firms as they may pursue different strategies to achieve similar goals. The paper generates a number of empirical predictions on security design, the interplay between angel and venture capital finance, and the professionalization of the venture capital market.     

Government policy towards entrepreneurial finance: Innovation investment funds

This paper analyses 280 Australian venture capital and private equity funds and their investments in 845 entrepreneurial firms over the period 1982–2005. I focus the analysis on the Innovation Investment Fund (IIF) governmental program, first introduced in 1997. In order to highlight the unique aspects of the IIF, I compare the properties of the Australian IIF program with government venture capital programs in Canada, the UK and the US. The IIF program is unique with a focus on partnering between government–private sector partnerships, as described herein. I analyse the performance of the IIF funds along several dimensions: the propensity to take on risk by investing in early stage and high-tech investments; the propensity to monitor and add value to investees through staging, syndication, and portfolio size per fund manager; and the exit success. For each of these evaluation criteria, I assess the performance of the IIF funds relative to other types of private equity and venture capital funds in Australia. The data analysed show – in both a statistically and economically significant way – that the IIF program has facilitated investment in start-up, early stage and high tech firms as well as the provision of monitoring and value-added advice to investees. Overall, therefore, the data are strongly consistent with the view that the IIF program is fostering the development of the Australian venture capital industry. However, the vast majority of investments have not yet been exited, and the exit performance of IIFs to date has not been statistically different than that of other private funds. Further evaluation of IIF performance and outcomes is warranted when subsequent years of data become available.     

Should securities regulation promote equity crowdfunding?

In this paper, we show that too strong investor protection may harm small firms and entrepreneurial initiatives, which contrasts with the traditional “law and finance” view that stronger investor protection is better. This situation is particularly relevant in equity crowdfunding, which refers to a recent financial innovation originating on the Internet that targets small and innovative firms. In many jurisdictions, securities regulation offers exemptions to prospectus and registration requirements. We provide an into-depth discussion of recent regulatory reforms in different countries and discuss how they may impact equity crowdfunding. Building on a theoretical framework, we show that optimal regulation depends on the availability of an alternative early-stage financing such as venture capital and angel finance. Finally, we offer exploratory evidence from Germany on the impact of securities regulation on small business finance.     

Financing technology-based small firms in Europe: what do we know?

This paper reviews the evidence on financing technology-based small firms (TBSFs) in Europe. European TBSFs finance new investments by relying primarily on internal funds, due to capital market failures induced by asymmetric information. European venture capital has caught up with US venture capital, but this is mainly because of the growth in UK venture investments. It is unclear whether European venture capital has been able to certify the quality and enhance the growth of funded companies. Compared with the NASDAQ, there is little development of trading in high-tech stocks in Europe: the so-called New Markets established in the 1990s collapsed in the wake of the Internet bubble crash. Public venture capital and research and development (R&D) tax incentives seem to have positively affected high-tech firms.     

SMEs,foreign direct investment and financial constraints: The case of Belgium

This paper explores the problems experienced by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with international ambitions in gaining access to debt and equity finance for foreign direct investment (FDI) projects. We develop several arguments for why such small businesses are expected to face severe financing constraints for foreign investments and provide an explorative empirical study with both the demand and supply side of FDI finance. We have interviewed thirty-two Belgian SMEs that carry out FDI, five banks and five venture capitalists. Based on the SME discussions, we have composed a questionnaire that was sent to the interviewed SMEs. The information problems and lack of collateral that often characterize international investment, the home bias of financiers and the capital gearing method used by banks to evaluate small firms’ foreign projects give rise to financial constraints for SMEs’ FDI projects. The reported finance gap hinders small firms’ (international) development and leads to suboptimal home and FDI host country development.     

Venture capital in Western Europe

Western Europe is in the process of an entrepreneurial renaissance. An integral part of this renaissance is the emergence of a venture capital industry in Europe. Although the venture capital institution in Europe is very much modeled along the lines of its American counterpart, it is significantly smaller in size both in absolute terms as well as in relation to the size of the economy. Substantial differences in venture capital activity are also found to exist within Europe,it is most prevaient in the United Kingdom, France, and Netherlands. Surprisingly, it is less developed in West Germany, particularly given the size of this country's economy.Venture capital in Western Europe shares some characteristics with that in the United States. Its investment focus is in high technology, and syndication between funds is common. Unlike the United States, however, banks are a major source of venture capital funds. Surprisingly, in spite of the economic integration to which the European Community aspires, the mobility of venture capital across national boundaries is low.The authors try to explain differences in venture capital activity in several countries of the European Community by examining four aspects of each country's environment. In particular, the size of the technology sector, the cultural influence on entrepreneurial risk-taking, the government's policy to stimulate risk capital and entrepreneurship. and finally, the ability of venture-backed firms to turn to publicly traded markets as a source of future financing. One common factor shared by the three countries with the highest level of venture capital activity is the presence of a secondary stock market geared to the needs of a small, relatively new venture contemplating an initial public offering. The Unlisted Securities Market in the United Kingdom, the Seconde Marché in France, and the Parallel Market in the Netherlands serve these needs and provide the mechanism by which venture capitalists can liquidate their equity position after the venture is quoted on these financial markets. To the venture it provides access to public financing for funding continued growth.In the United Kingdom and Netherlands, the business enterprise has historically been regarded as a tradeable entity and hence the concept of ownership by passive investors is well accepted. In France, where this is a relatively recent phenomenon, the government has played a strong role in stimulating an interest in stock market investing in general. It has also created some extremely attractive fiscal incentives for investors in venture capital funds.     

Stock option taxation: a missing piece in European innovation policy?

Europe continues to lag behind the USA in venture capital (VC) activity and in the creation of successful startups, and has recently been surpassed by China. This is despite the fact that many European countries have deep financial markets, strong legal institutions, and high R&D spending. We point to the tax treatment of employee stock options as an explanation for the stronger growth of the US VC sector. As a response to high uncertainty and transaction costs, VC financiers have developed a model in which founders and key recruitments are compensated with stock options under complex contracts. Low tax rates on employee stock options further raise the relative returns of working and investing in innovative entrepreneurial firms, and shift financial capital and talent to that sector. We measure the effective tax on stock options in VC-backed entrepreneurial firms in a number of developed economies. Countries with lower stock option taxation have higher VC activity and more high-growth expectation entrepreneurial activity. Based on these associations and the theoretical and empirical literature, we argue that more lenient taxation of gains on employee stock options can be a strategy for European countries to catch up in entrepreneurial finance. This tax policy would narrowly target entrepreneurial startups without requiring broad tax cuts. The favorable tax treatment of stock options allows the state to promote firms that rely on entrepreneurial finance and make use of these types of contracts without lowering taxes for other sectors of the economy.     

Deal Structuring in Philanthropic Venture Capital Investments: Financing Instrument,Valuation and Covenants

Philanthropic venture capital (PhVC) is a financing option available for social enterprises that, like traditional venture capital, provides capital and value-added services to portfolio organizations. Differently from venture capital, PhVC has an ethical dimension as it aims at maximizing the social return on the investment. This article examines the deal structuring phase of PhVC investments in terms of instrument used (from equity to grant), valuation, and covenants included in the contractual agreement. By content analyzing a set of semi-structured interviews and thereafter surveying the entire population of PhVC funds that are active in Europe and in the United States, findings indicate that the non-distribution constraint holding for non-profit social enterprises is an effective tool to align the interests of both investor and investee. This makes the investor behaving as a steward rather than as a principal. Conversely, while backing non-profit social ventures, philanthropic venture capitalists structure their deal similarly as traditional venture capital, as the absence of the non-distribution constraint makes such investments subject to moral hazard risk both in terms of perks and stealing and social impact focus.     

The informal venture capital market: Aspects of scale and market efficiency

Risk capital is a resource essential to the formation and growth of entrepreneurial ventures. In a society that is increasingly dependent upon innovation and entrepreneurship for its economic vitality, the performance of the venture capital markets is a matter of fundamental concern to entrepreneurs, venture investors and to public officials. This article deals with the informal venture capital market, the market in which entrepreneurs raise equity-type financing from private investors, (business angels). The informal venture capital market is virtually invisible and often misunderstood. It is composed of a diverse and diffuse population of individuals of means; many of whom have created their own successful ventures. There are no directories of individual venture investors and no public records of their investment transactions. Consequently, the informal venture capital market poses many unanswered questions.The author discusses two aspects of the informal venture capital market: questions of scale and market efficiency. The discussion draws upon existing research to extract and synthesize data that provide a reasonable basis for inferences about scale and efficiency.Private venture investors tend to be self-made individuals with substantial business and financial experience and with a net worth of $1 million or more. The author estimates that the number of private venture investors in the United States is at least 250,000, of whom about 100,000 are active in any given year. By providing seed capital for ventures that subsequently raise funds from professional venture investors or in the public equity markets and equity financing for privately-held firms that are growing faster than internal cash flow can support, private investors fill gaps in the institutional equity markets.The author estimates that private investors manage a portfolio of venture investments aggregating in the neighborhood of $50 billion, about twice the capital managed by professional venture investors. By participating in smaller transactions, private investors finance over five times as many entrepreneurs as professional venture investors; 20,000 or more firms per year compared to two or three thousand. The typical angel-backed venture raises about $250,000 from three or more private investors.Despite the apparent scale of the informal venture capital market, the author cites evidence that the market is relatively inefficient. It is a market characterized by limited information about investors and investment opportunities. Furthermore, many entrepreneurs and private investors are unfamiliar with the techniques of successful venture financing. The author's scale and efficiency inferences, coupled with evidence documenting gaps between private and social returns from innovation, prompt questions about public as well as private initiatives to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market.The article concludes with a discussion of Venture Capital Network, Inc. (VCN), an experimental effort to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market. VCN's procedures and performance are described, followed by a discussion of the lessons learned during the first two years of the experiment.     

Why do contracts differ between venture capital types?

The main objective of the present paper is to investigate differences in the design of contracts between venture capitalists and their portfolio firms across venture capital (VC) types. By controlling for selection effects, we focus on contract design differences which reflect differences in corporate governance approaches across VC types. To address this issue, we use a unique, hand-collected German data set consisting of all contractual details of VC investments into 290 entrepreneurial firms in the period 1990–2004. By employing various matching procedures, we show that VC types differ in their corporate governance approach vis-à-vis their portfolio firms. It turns out that independent VCs, when compared to captive VCs, use significantly more contract mechanisms which induce active intervention.     

Financial intermediaries,ownership structure and the provision of venture capital to SMEs: evidence from Japan

This paper examines how the provision of venture capital to small- and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) is influenced by the ownership structure of the venture capital provider. We introduce a new and unique dataset from the Japanese venture capital market, comprising data on investment and venture capital activities of 127 Japanese venture capital funds. The data allow us to provide a direct comparison of the behaviour of individual owner-manager venture capitalists versus financial intermediation (e.g., bank’s venture capital divisions). The data indicate owner-manager venture capitalists (financial disintermediation) give rise to much smaller portfolios of SMEs and more advice to entrepreneurs. Across the scope of different financial intermediation structures, including banks, life insurance companies, securities firms, corporations and government bodies, there are further differences in the provision of governance and value-added advice provided to SMEs. Also, the data indicate US-affiliated funds in Japan are more likely to have smaller portfolios and tend to provide more advice to SMEs.

Venture Capital Investment Duration

This paper examines cross‐country evidence on the duration of venture capital (VC) investment. We formulate a theory of VC investment duration based on the idea that venture capitalists exit when the expected marginal cost of maintaining the investment is greater than the expected marginal benefit, and thereby relate VC investment duration to entrepreneurial firm characteristics, investor characteristics, deal characteristics, and institutional and market conditions. VC investment duration data in Canada and the United States lend strong support to the theoretical predictions developed herein.     

The advantage of experienced start-up founders in venture capital acquisition: evidence from serial entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs with prior firm-founding experience are expected to have more skills and social connections than novice entrepreneurs. Such skills and social connections could give experienced founders some advantage in the process of raising venture capital. This paper uses a large database of venture-backed companies and their founders to examine the advantage associated with prior founding experience. Compared with novice entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs with venture-backed founding experience tend to raise more venture capital at an early round of financing and tend to complete the early round much more quickly. In contrast, experienced founders whose earlier firms were not venture-backed do not show a similar advantage over novice entrepreneurs, suggesting the importance of connections with venture capitalists in the early stage of venture capital financing. However, when the analysis also takes into account later rounds of financing, all entrepreneurs with prior founding experience appear to raise more venture capital. This implies that skills acquired from any previous founding experience can make an entrepreneur perform better and in turn attract more venture capital.     

风险投资对创业企业作用的实证研究

文章从风险投资对创业企业作用的机理分析出发,实证研究风险投资对创业企业创生和企业成长的作用。对企业创生作用的研究表明风险投资活动的发展和增长有助于地区新企业的创生,一方面风险投资为那些无法从传统渠道融资的创业企业提供资金支持,另一方面也刺激地区创新,促使新经济部门、新技术、新产品的出现,为创业者创业活动提供更多机遇。有关风险投资对创业企业成长作用的研究采用倾向得分匹配法,该方法有效剔除了风险投资家“选择作用”对研究结果造成的偏差。研究结果表明风险投资不但有助于企业规模的不断扩大,同时也有助于企业研发创新等各项成长能力的提升,有效促进了企业竞争优势,帮助企业做大做强。     

How to Design Public Venture Capital Funds: Empirical Evidence from South Korea

This study examines the effects of several features of government‐managed, sponsored venture capital (VC), and private VC funds on overall VC investments in new technology‐based firms (NTBFs) during two developmental stages (i.e., growth and restructuring) in South Korean VC market and suggests hints for designing effective government VC programs. Our results from data on 463 funds in the period 1995–2005 indicate the factors bearing a positive effect on VC investments targeted to NTBFs. Such factors are the fund specialization focusing on certain industrial sectors, performance‐sensitive compensation for venture capitalists in private and government VC funds.     

The CEO,venture capitalists,and the board

An element in the never-ending debate about the process of funding highpotential businesses is the extent to which venture capitalists add value besides money to their portfolio companies. At one end of the spectrum, venture capitalists incubate start-ups and nurture hatchlings, while at the other extreme, so-called “vulture” capitalists feed on fledgling companies. A very important way in which venture capitalists add value other than money to their portfolio companies is by serving on boards of directors. Hence, by studying the role of outside directors, especially those representing venture capital firms, we were able to shed light on the issue of value-added.In the first phase of the research, we studied 162 venture-capital-backed high-tech firms located in California, Massachusetts, and Texas. In the second phase (with data from 98 of the 162 firms), the lead venture capitalists on the boards were classified according to whether or not they were a “top-20” firm.Board Size The average board size was 5.6 members, which was somewhat less than half the size of the board of a typical large company. Board size increased from 3 to 4.8 members with the first investment of venture capital.Board Composition and Control The typical board comprised 1.7 inside members, 2.3 venture capital principals, .3 venture capital staff, and 1.3 other outsiders. Insiders constituted 40% or less of the members of 82% of the boards, while venture capitalists made up over 40% of members of 55% of the boards. When a top-20 venture capital firm was the lead investor, then 55% of the board members were venture capitalists; in contrast, when the lead was not a top-20 firm, only 23% of board were venture capitalists.Value-Added Overall, our sample of CEOs did not rate the value of the advice of venture capitalists any higher than that of other board members. However, those CEOs with a top20 venture capital firm as the lead investor, on average, did rate the value of the advice from their venture capital board members significantly higher—but not outstandingly higher—than the advice from other outside board members. On the other hand, CEOs with no top-20 as the lead investor found no significant difference between the value of the advice from venture capitalists and other outside board members. Hence, in our sample, we could not say that there was a noticeable difference in the value of valueadded by top-20 boards and non-top-20 boards.The areas where CEOs rated outside board members (both venture capitalists and others) most helpful were as a sounding board, interfacing with the investor group, monitoring operating performance, monitoring financial performance, recruiting/replacing the CEO, and assistance with short term crisis. That help was rated higher for early-stage than later-stage companies.Our findings have the following implications for venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and researchers.Venture Capitalist The main product of a venture capital firm is money, which is a commodity. It's impossible to differentiate a commodity in a martetplace where the customers have perfect information. As venture capitalists learned since the mid-1980s, their customers (entrepreneurs) now have an abundance of information that, while it may not be perfect, is certainly good enough to make a well-informed decision when selecting a venture capital firm. Hence, value-added may be the most important distinctive competence with which a venture capital firm—especially one specializing in early-stage investments—can differentiate itself from its competitors. If that is the case, then venture capital firms need to pay more attention to their value-added, because CEOs, overall, do not perceive that it has a great deal of value to their companies. The top-20 appear to be doing a somewhat better job in that area than other venture capital firms.Entrepreneurs If an entrepreneur wants outside board members who bring valueadded other than money, it appears that they can do as well with non-venture capitalists as with venture capitalists. The entrepreneurs we talked to in our survey gave the impression that board members with significant operating experience are more valued than “pure” financial types with no operating experience. If venture capital is an entrepreneur's only source offunding, then the entrepreneur should seek out firms that put venture capitalists with operating experience on boards. It also appears that an entrepreneur, will, on average, get more value-added when the lead investor is a top-20 firm, but there is a drawback: when a top-20 is the lead investor, it is more likely that venture capitalists will control the board. No entrepreneur should seek venture capital solely to get value-added from a venture capitalist on the board, because outside board members who are not venture capitalists give advice that is every bit as good as that given by venture capitalists.Researchers Value-added is a fruitful avenue of research. From a practical perspective, if valueadded exists it should be measurable. So far the jury has not decided that issue. Some finance studies of the performance of venture-capital-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) claim to have found valueadded, some claim to have found none, and at least one study claims to have found negative value- added. From a theoretical perspective, value-added is relevant to agency theory, transaction cost economics, and the capital asset pricing model. It also is relevant to strategic analysis from the viewpoint of distinctive competencies.     

The role of venture capital in financing small business

Venture capital is a primary and unique source of funding for small firms because these firms (with sales and/or assets under $5 million) have very limited access to traditional capital markets. Venture capital is a substitute, but not a perfect substitute, for trade credit, bank credit, and other forms of financing for small firms. Small businesses are not likely to be successful in attracting venture capital unless the firms have the potential to provide extraordinary returns to the venture capitalist.This study provides an analysis of a survey of venture capital firms that participate in small business financing. The survey participants are venture capital firms that were 1986 members of the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), the largest venture capital association in the United States.The average size of the venture capital firms responding to the survey is $92 million dollars in assets, with a range from $600 thousand to $500 million. Twenty-three percent of the respondents have total assets below $20 million, and 27% have assets above $100 million.The venture capitalists' investment (assets held) in small firms delineate the supply of venture capital to small firms. Sixty-three of the 92 venture capitalists' have more than 70% of their assets invested in small firms.The venture capitalists were asked how their investment plans might change with changes in the tax law that were projected in the spring of 1986. Fifty-four percent expected to increase their investments in small firms, and 38% did not expect to change these activities.Venture capitalists are very selective in allocating their resources. The average number of annual requests that a venture capitalist receives is 652, and the median number is 500: only 11.5 of the respondents receive more than 1,000 proposals per year.     

Structuring deals and governance after the IPO: Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in high tech start-ups

In an effort to better understand the effects of venture capital investment on selected firm governance and financing structures, we examined the post-IPO experiences of 190 biotechnology and healthcare firms (see appendix). Our study revealed that in virtually all cases, the involvement of venture capitalists reduced the role of the founder-entrepreneur in strategic decision making. This was illustrated by the larger proportion of outside directors when venture capitalists invested and the smaller proportion of entrepreneurs who remained officers or in board positions after the IPO. We also found that venture capitalists rarely invested alone, and preferred to structure deals in which venture capital partners share both risks and rewards.