Transitions From School to Work and the Early Labour Market Experience

We consider transitions from school to work and the early market experience. The duration of post-school unemployment, wages, and job duration are estimated simultaneously. We find that individuals with higher levels ofschooling get jobs more quickly and have longer employment durations. Apprentices have shorter unemployment periods and stay longer in their jobs than others at the same educational level. Females have shorter unemployment periods and lower wages, and also stay in the first job longer. The unemployment duration and the accepted wage affect job duration positively, but the estimated covariance terms suggest unobserved factors working in the opposite direction.     

Monopsonistic competition for the “best” workers

In this paper we analyse an economy where firms use labour as the only production factor, with constant return to scale. We suppose that jobs differ in their non-wage characteristics so each firm has monopsonistic power. In particular, we suppose that workers are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity. Then, each firm has incentives to offer higher wages in order to recruit the most productive workers. Competition among firms leads to a symmetric equilibrium wage, which is higher than the reservation wage, and to involuntary unemployment for the less productive workers, who are willing to work at the current wage but are not hired because their productivity is lower than the wage level. If firms have no institutional constraint on paying lower wages for the same job, an endogenous labour market segmentation emerges.     

The effect of job flexibility on female labor market outcomes: Estimates from a search and bargaining model

In this article, we develop a search model of the labor market in which jobs are characterized by work hours’ flexibility. Workers value flexibility, which is costly for employers to provide. We estimate the model on a sample of women extracted from the CPS. The model parameters are empirically identified because the accepted wage distributions of flexible and non-flexible jobs are directly related to the preference for flexibility parameters. Results show that more than one-third of women place a small, positive value on flexibility. Women with a college degree value flexibility more than women with only a high school degree. Counterfactual experiments show that flexibility has a substantial impact on the wage distribution but a negligible impact on the unemployment rate. These results suggest that wage and schooling differences between males and females may be importantly related to flexibility.     

Designing employment subsidies

The paper examines the relative effectiveness of two policy proposals in reducing unemployment and working poverty: hiring subsidies and wage subsidies. The hiring subsidies are targeted exclusively at the unemployed and are provided only for a limited period of time. The wage subsidies, on the other hand, are granted to all low-wage earners regardless of their employment history and are of limitless duration. Our analysis indicates that the relative effectiveness of the two policies depends on workers' prospective wage growth. The more upwardly mobile workers are (i.e. the more their wages rise with employment duration), the more effective will unemployment vouchers be relative to low-wage subsidies. Conversely, the greater the danger that workers come to be trapped in dead-end jobs with flat wage profiles, the more effective will low-wage subsidies be relative to unemployment vouchers.     

Optimal tax progressivity in imperfect labour markets

All modern labour market theories capable of explaining involuntary unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon imply that increased income tax progressivity reduces unemployment, but they also imply that higher progressivity tends to reduce work effort and labour productivity. This suggests that there may be an optimal degree of tax progressivity where the marginal welfare gain from reduced involuntary unemployment is just offset by the marginal welfare loss from lower productivity. This paper sets up four different models of an imperfect labour market in order to identify the degree of tax progressivity which would maximise the welfare of the representative wage earner. Simulations with these models suggest that the optimal degree of tax progressivity could be quite large, although the results are sensitive to the generosity of unemployment benefits and to the after-tax wage elasticity of work effort.     

How low can U go?

• ? Although there is growing evidence that wage growth is building in response to low and falling unemployment in the advanced economies, there is scope for unemployment rates to fall further without triggering a pay surge.
• ? For a start, current unemployment rates in comparison to past cyclical troughs overstate the tightness of labour markets. Demographic trends associated with the ageing ‘baby boomer’ bulge have pushed down the headline unemployment rate – unemployment rates among older workers are lower than those of younger cohorts. And in a historical context, Europe still has a large pool of involuntary part‐timers.
• ? In addition, rising participation rates mean that demographics are less of a constraint on employment growth than widely assumed. In both 2017 and 2018, had it not been for increased activity rates (mainly for older cohorts), unemployment would have had to fall more sharply to accommodate the same employment increase. We expect rising participation rates to continue to act as a pressure valve for the labour market.
• ? Finally, unemployment rates were generally far lower during the 1950s and 1960s than now. If wages stay low relative to productivity, as was the case during that prior era, employment growth may remain strong, with unemployment falling further. In the post‐war era, low wages were partly a function of a grand bargain in which policy‐makers provided full employment in return for low wage growth.
• ? There is evidence to suggest that many post‐crisis workers have opted for the security of their existing full‐time job and its associated benefits despite lower wage growth, rather than change job and potentially earn more; the rise of the ‘gig economy’ has led some workers to value what they already have more. Put another way, the non‐accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) has fallen. So, the role of labour market tightness in pushing wage growth higher may continue to surprise to the downside.

     

A model of labour supply with job offer restrictions

We specify a model of labour supply with job offer restrictions. A job offer is defined by a wage rate and working hours. The number of job offers is restricted, and follows a Poisson distribution. Individuals choose the alternative with the highest utility level. Three specifications are estimated: a basic specification, a specification in which the number of job offers depends on characteristics, and a specification in which the wage rate depends on working hours. Although the properties of the sample distribution of hours observed are replicated well for all of the specifications, the implications for the underlying behaviour are different.     

The interrelated dynamics of unemployment and low‐wage employment

This paper examines the extent of state dependence in unemployment and the role played in this by intervening low‐wage employment. A range of dynamic random and fixed‐effects estimators are compared. Low‐wage employment is found to have almost as large an adverse effect as unemployment on future prospects and the difference in their effects is found to be insignificant. Evidence is presented that low‐wage jobs act as the main conduit for repeat unemployment and considerably increases its probability. Obtaining a higher‐wage job reduces the increased risk of repeat unemployment to insignificance. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The cyclicality of effective wages within employer-employee matches in a rigid labor market

This study analyzes real wage cyclicality for male full-time workers within employer-employee matches in Germany over the period 1984-2004. Five different wage measures are compared: the standard hourly wage rate; hourly wage earnings including overtime and bonus pay; the effective wage, which takes into account unpaid overtime; and monthly earnings, with and without additional pay. None of the hourly wage measures exhibits cyclicality except for the group of salaried workers with unpaid overtime. Their effective wages show a strongly procyclical reaction to changes in unemployment. Despite acyclical wage rates, salaried workers without unpaid overtime experienced procyclical earnings movements if they had income from extra pay. Monthly earnings were also procyclical for hourly paid workers with overtime pay. These findings suggest that cyclical earnings movements are generated by variable pay components, such as bonuses and overtime pay, and by flexible working hours. The degree of earnings procyclicality revealed for the German labor market is comparable to the United States.     

The Effects of UI Benefits on Unemployment and Subsequent Outcomes: Evidence from a Kinked Benefit Rule

This paper analyses the effects of unemployment insurance benefits on unemployment exits and subsequent labour market outcomes. We exploit a piecewise linear relationship between the previous wage and benefits in Finland to identify the causal effects of the benefit level by using a regression kink design. Although we only find weak evidence of an effect on the time to the next job, higher benefits decrease the time spent in part-time unemployment and thus result in more full-time unemployment. The re-employment probability and post-unemployment wage are also negatively affected. The results for the duration of the first post-unemployment job are not conclusive, but in total both employment and earnings in the two years following the beginning of the unemployment spell decrease with higher benefits.     

Wage curve, unemployment duration and compensating differentials

In this study unemployment effects on individual pay are investigated following the study on ‘wage curves’ by Blanchflower and Oswald (1990). In bargaining models, higher unemployment should lower wage pressure; due to compensating wage differential arguments, on the other hand, workers who take jobs with higher layoff risks should be rewarded. In a cross-sectional study on Austrian data, a negative wage curve is confirmed. Contrary to the results by Blanchflower and Oswald no U-shape is found, also long-term unemployment seems to be important. No conclusive evidence of compensating differentials has been determined.     

Subsidizing low-skilled jobs in a dual labor market

We introduce a matching model that allows for classical and frictional unemployment. The labor market is dual featuring low-skilled and high-skilled workers and simple and complex jobs. Simple jobs pay a minimum wage, while wages in the complex jobs are determined by Nash bargaining. Opportunities for low-skilled workers are limited to simple jobs; while high-skilled unemployed can apply for both types of jobs, and thereby can accept to be downgraded. We analyze the outcomes of simple job subsidy policies assuming that government budget is balanced through taxes on occupied workers. We first give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state equilibrium and we then analyze the effects of different fiscal instruments. We show that in this set-up, increasing simple job subsidies does not necessarily reduce low-skilled unemployment or unemployment spells. By introducing heterogeneous skills and possible downgrading of the high-skilled workers, we show that the effectiveness of such policies in reducing the classical unemployment is decreasing. In fact, any additional classical unemployed re-entering the job market is accompanied by an increasing number of high-skilled workers downgrading to low-skilled jobs. We calibrate the model on French labor market data. It is found that for five low-skilled workers leaving classical unemployment, two high-skilled workers are downgraded.     

The motherhood wage gap: What about job amenities?

Women with children tend to earn lower hourly wages than women without children — a shortfall known as the ‘motherhood wage gap’. While many studies provide evidence for this empirical fact and explore several hypotheses about its causes, the impact of motherhood on job dimensions other than wages has scarcely been investigated. In order to assess changes in women's jobs around motherhood, I use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and employ a first difference analysis. The results reveal that women when having children accommodate at their original employer primarily through adjustments in working hours. Yet, when changing the employer women adjust their jobs in several dimensions, such as different aspects of the work schedule (working hours, work at night or according to a flexible schedule) as well as the level of stress. Further analysis provides some limited support for the motherhood wage gap being explained by adjustments in the work conditions.     

Unemployment and compensating wages: an analysis of shift work

Compensating wages have been documented for a number of job attributes including working non-standard hours. Using data that aggregates across occupations, our analysis confirms a wage premium for working night shifts. However, the compensating wage is greater in areas where unemployment is low, suggesting that employers are less pressured to compensate for night shifts when employment opportunities are relatively scarce. If this result holds for other undesirable work characteristics, such as risk of death on the job, then weak labor markets will have lower compensating wages in general.     

MULTI‐CRITERIA OPTIMIZATION OF REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT POLICY: A SIMULATION ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY

The distribution of European and national aid among 271 German labor market regions is considered as an optimization problem with three targets: (i) interregional equalization of unemployment rates; (ii) minimization of total (national) unemployment; and (iii) maximization of GDP, subject to budget constraints and some administrative restrictions. The analysis of the German program in 2000–2002 shows that the results actually obtained for 6 billion euro required only 241 million euro under optimal planning (4% of the actual budget). Such an inappropriate implementation of active labor market policies can be the cause of low efficiency, often misinterpreted as uselessness. This paper suggests a decision aid for optimal planning and shows that tax returns from the additional GDP due to jobs subsidized can transform regional policy into a winning governmental strategy.     

Wages,non-wage characteristics,and predominantly male jobs

This paper estimates the wage premium associated with working in predominantly male jobs. It also examines whether this wage premium is greater than the compensation workers demand for the less desirable non-wage characteristics of such jobs. The coefficients of the change in the proportion of men in an occupation on the change in wages for quits and layoffs provide opposing biased estimates of the wage premium; because workers who voluntarily quit move to better matches, but those that are laid off accept jobs from the representative distribution of job offers. Specifically, when the premium paid over- (under-)compensates for undesirable work characteristics, the quit estimate is a downward (upward) biased estimate of the wage premium, while the layoff estimate is biased upward (downward). Results from the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) indicate that: (1) the estimated bounds of the wage premium are large; and (2) the wage premium overcompensates for the non-wage characteristics of male jobs.     

School Kids and Oil Rigs: Two More Pieces of the Post‐Katrina Puzzle in New Orleans

Shortly after Hurricane Katrina's landfall in August 2005 and the reports of rampant looting of businesses in the city, we became curious about the extent of Katrina looting as compared to that after other major storms that hit New Orleans in 1947 and in 1965. Using burglary as a proxy variable for looting, we discovered that the burglary rates in the month before and the month after Katrina were significantly higher than those before and after the other two hurricanes. We then investigated the socioeconomic conditions in the city in an effort to explain these numbers. Population loss and high unemployment rates, coupled with a decline in high‐paying manufacturing jobs and an increase in low‐wage food and hotel service jobs generated severe economic inequality in the city that exacerbated the situation created by Katrina. Our current analysis of the impact of public school desegregation and the oil bust suggests that both events contributed to population loss and the increase in low‐wage jobs prior to the storm. We believe that this type of research can assist in the recovery of New Orleans by providing an understanding of the city's pre‐Katrina social and economic conditions and make clearer which post‐Katrina changes are desirable.     

Informality in developing economies: Regulation and fiscal policies

This paper proposes a unified theoretical framework where formal and informal firms coexist and face the same type of product and labor market imperfections: they have monopoly power in the goods market, they are subject to matching frictions in the labor market, and wages are determined by bargaining between large firms and their workers, through either individual or collective bargaining. Our model matches the main stylized facts on informality for developing countries and appears to be a good candidate for policy analysis. In this framework, we study the impact on informality, wages and unemployment of policies that may be used to reduce informality. We consider changes in product market regulation (PMR) and in two types of fiscal policies, labor taxes and formality enforcement. We find that lessening PMR decreases informality and unemployment simultaneously, indicating that there is not necessarily a tradeoff between informality and unemployment. The tradeoff appears when fiscal policies are used, though. Moreover, the impacts of PMR on unemployment and on wages are larger under collective than individual bargaining. With respect to wage inequality, lessening PMR reduces it, while lower taxes tend to increase the formal sector wage premium.     

Analyzing female labor supply — Evidence from a Dutch tax reform

Among OECD countries, the Netherlands has an average female labor force participation, but by far the highest rate of part-time work. This paper investigates the extent to which married women respond to financial incentives. We exploit exogenous variation caused by a substantial Dutch tax reform in 2001. Our main conclusion is that the positive significant effect of the tax reform on labor force participation dominates the negative insignificant effect on working hours. The latter contradicts the common empirical finding of positive wage elasticities. Our preferred explanation is that women respond more to changes in tax allowances than to changes in marginal tax rates.     

The labour market consequences of self-employment spells: European evidence

We examine how those re-entering paid-employment after a brief self-employment spell fare upon return using data from the European Community Household Panel. Unconditionally, those re-entering paid-employment appear to have considerably lower wages than those staying in the wage sector. This difference appears to be larger in Europe than in the US. Conditional analysis suggests, however, that the difference is more apparent than real: It seems that Europeans select negatively into (and possibly out-of) self-employment, i.e., the likelihood of entering (and exiting) entrepreneurship correlates negatively with unobserved ability and/or in-paid-employment productivity. Our analysis of non-wage outcomes indicates that the selection is mostly involuntary, and that for highly educated men, the brief self-employment spells are unemployment in disguise.