The incentives of grey directors: Evidence from unexpected executive and board chair turnover

We study the stock market's reaction to the unexpected death of a top executive or board chair for insight into grey director incentives. Whereas there is little debate as to the motives of inside and strict outside directors, the allegiance of grey directors is less certain. We find that grey directors' dominant incentive depends on whether the firm has a succession plan or not. In firms with a succession plan, grey directors' primary motive is to maintain their business ties to the firm. Absent a succession plan, the stock market expects grey directors to use their influence to hire a higher quality replacement, particularly when these directors hold a large equity stake. Our findings suggest that grey directors place their interests as shareholders first when a replacement decision is likely to weaken their business ties with the firm. Grey directors appear to influence the choice of a higher quality replacement whether that person is an insider or outsider.     

Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship Market

Agency theory and optimal contracting theory posit opposing roles and shareholder wealth effects for corporate inside directors. We evaluate these theories using the market for outside directorships to differentiate among inside directors. Firms with inside directors holding outside directorships have better operating performance and market‐to‐book ratios, especially when monitoring is more difficult. These firms make better acquisition decisions, have greater cash holdings, and overstate earnings less often. Announcements of outside board appointments improve shareholder wealth, while departure announcements reduce it, consistent with these inside directors improving board performance and outside directorships being an important source of inside director incentives.     

Large Shareholders and Independent Director Equity Compensation

This paper investigates the use of equity compensation for independent directors, with a focus on the impact of large shareholders on a company's tendency to use equity compensation to align independent directors’ interests with those of shareholders. Based on data from 215 large Australian listed companies from 2005–2009, our analyses show that the use of equity incentive pay for independent directors is more likely when the aggregate ownership percentage of large shareholders is moderate, when there are multiple large shareholders and when the ownership stakes of large shareholders are more comparable. This paper contributes to the literature by providing new evidence of how various aspects of ownership dispersion affect compensation design for independent directors.     

Bank Risk Taking at the Onset of the Current Banking Crisis

We analyze bank governance, share ownership, CEO compensation, and bank risk taking in the period leading to the current banking crisis. Using a sample of large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), we find that BHCs with greater managerial control, achieved through various corporate governance mechanisms, take less risk. BHCs that pay CEOs high base salaries also take less risk, while BHCs that grant CEOs more in stock options or that pay CEOs higher bonuses take more risk. The evidence is generally consistent with BHC managers exhibiting greater risk aversion than outside shareholders, but with several factors affecting managers’ risk‐taking incentives.     

Top Management Compensation and the Structure of the Board of Directors in Commercial Banks

We examine the relationship between top management compensation and thestructure of the board of directors for a sample of commercial banks. Wefind that boards with more reputable outside directors compensate managersmore heavily with long-term incentives (stock and stock options) than withcash (salary and bonus). We also find a significant positive correlationbetween the future performance of our sample banks and the proportion oftheir managers' compensation in the form of long-term incentives. Taken together, these results suggest that boards with highly reputed outsidedirectors are more effective in providing managers with the appropriateincentives and thus ensuring better future firm performance. Anotherindication of the effectiveness of these boards is our finding that theycompensate managers more heavily with long-term incentives (instead ofcash) when these managers are more entrenched. We also find very little evidence of mutually beneficial back-scratching or collusion betweenoutside directors and senior managers when setting management compensation.But boards with long-serving outside directors are less effective increating appropriate management incentives.     

Top Management Compensation and the Structure of the Board of Directors in Commercial Banks

We examine the relationship between top management compensationand the structure of the board of directors for a sample ofcommercial banks. We find that boards with more reputable outsidedirectors compensate managers more heavily with long-term incentives(stock and stock options) than with cash (salary and bonus).We also find a significant positive correlation between thefuture performance of our sample banks and the proportion oftheir managers’ compensation in the form of long-termincentives. Taken together, these results suggest that boardswith highly reputed outside directors are more effective inproviding managers with the appropriate incentives and thusensuring better future firm performance. Another indicationof the effectiveness of these boards is our finding that theycompensate managers more heavily with long-term incentives (insteadof cash) when these managers are more entrenched. We also findvery little evidence of mutually beneficial back-scratchingor collusion between outside directors and senior managers whensetting management compensation. But boards with long-servingoutside directors are less effective in creating appropriatemanagement incentives.     

Determinants of Intercorporate Shareholdings

This paper examines why firms choose to spend resources on acquiring ownership rights in other firms. Based on a unique data base of every individual intercorporate shareholding on the Oslo Stock Exchange during the period 1980–1994, we find that such investments serve at least three functions. First, they play a role incorporate governance, as managers in firms withlow insider holdings, diffuse ownership structure and high free cash flow tend to mutually acquire equity stakes in each other, possibly in a collective attempt to protect their human capital in the market for corporate control. Second, interfirm equity holdings serve as financial slack for growing firms, reducing potential adverse selection costs by providing an internal funding source for new investments in long-term assets. Finally, our findings also suggest that intercorporate shareholdings are an integrated part of the investor's cash flow management system by being a liquidity buffer when cash inflows andcash outflows are non-synchronous.     

Audit committee equity holdings,the risk of reporting problems,and the achievement of earnings thresholds

There is conflicting evidence on whether audit committee equity holdings enhance or undermine committee effectiveness. Some researchers contend that equity holdings motivate audit committees to minimize the risk of reporting problems, while others believe equity holdings align the committees’ incentives with management. To reconcile these seemingly contradictory positions, I hypothesize that the influence of audit committee equity holdings depends upon the risk of reporting problems. I contend that when the risk of reporting problems is low (high) equity holdings motivate audit committees to give managers greater (less) discretion over reporting policies because the expected benefits from giving the discretion is greater (less) than the expected cost of the reporting problems that might occur from giving the discretion. I test whether the influence of audit committee equity holdings varies with the risk of reporting problems using a sample of 1370 firm-observations with earnings near the prior year’s earning level and a sample of 2389 firm-observations near analyst forecasts. I find the influence of audit committee equity holdings on the likelihood that a firm meets the prior year’s earnings level varies with the CEO’s equity incentives and the level of high-risk assets. I also find the influence of audit committee equity holdings on the likelihood that a firm meets analysts’ forecast varies with the CEO’s equity incentives and the effectiveness of internal controls. Collectively, my results suggest equity holdings enhance audit committee effectiveness by increasing a committee’s responsiveness to risk factors.     

Share‐pledging and the cost of debt

We examine how corporate insiders pledging their equity stakes to collateralise personal loans influences firm cost of debt. Pledging enables managers to diversify personal holdings, potentially increasing risk‐taking incentives. However, exposure to contingent risks creates potentially stronger risk‐reducing incentives. Using hand‐collected data with OLS, difference‐in‐differences, and instrumental variables models, we find significant decreases in yield spreads associated with executive share‐pledging. Reductions in spreads surrounding share‐pledge disclosures suggest investors update their risk assessment to reflect pledging managers’ risk‐taking incentives. Consistent with risk‐reducing incentives, firms with share‐pledging executives subsequently reduce leverage.     

Outside directors' equity incentives and strategic alliance decisions

This study examines whether the proportion of equity-based compensation in outside director compensation is associated with corporate strategic alliances. We hypothesize that equity incentives provided to outside directors mitigate potential agency conflicts between outside directors and shareholders that arise from the strategic alliance decision-making process, thus resulting in more alliance activities. Our empirical evidence indicates that the percentage of equity in outside director compensation is positively associated with the incidence and the number of strategic alliance activities. Additionally, when the proportion of outside directors' equity in total compensation is higher, firms with strategic alliances generate better future stock returns. Overall, our findings suggest that providing equity incentives in outside director compensation mitigates the agency problems inherent in corporate strategic alliance decisions and enhances the quality of alliance activities.     

The initial private placement of equity and changes in operating performance in Taiwan

We propose the corporate governance hypothesis which suggests that the outside blockholders arising from the private placement of equity are more likely to have a significantly positive effect on firms with poor corporate governance. Using a sample of Taiwan‐listed firms with initial private placements of equity, our study’s results indicate that an improvement in operating performance is more likely to be seen after a private placement for those firms that are without independent directors, are controlled by a family, have lower insider shareholdings or are characterized by a pyramidal ownership structure. These findings are consistent with our hypothesis.     

Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies

Using a sample of U.S. dual-class companies, we examine how divergence between insider voting and cash flow rights affects managerial extraction of private benefits of control. We find that as this divergence widens, corporate cash holdings are worth less to outside shareholders, CEOs receive higher compensation, managers make shareholder value-destroying acquisitions more often, and capital expenditures contribute less to shareholder value. These findings support the agency hypothesis that managers with greater excess control rights over cash flow rights are more prone to pursue private benefits at shareholders' expense, and help explain why firm value is decreasing in insider excess control rights.     

Managerial shareholding policies and retention of vested equity incentives

Previous literature documents that executives tend to cash out equity incentives when equity-linked compensation vests. Such a behavior destroys long-term incentives and hence is costly to outside shareholders. It is recommended that the unloading of incentives can be limited when the firm adopts a minimum executive shareholding policy. We provide the first evidence of the effectiveness of such policies in that respect. Using data for UK FTSE 350 companies we show that executives whose ownership is below the minimum set by the policy retain more newly vesting equity and the incentives to retain shares weaken when the holdings are above the minimum. We also document economic implications of compliance with the policy and we find higher firm valuations when actual ownership increases relative to the minimum holdings required. Our results have implications for the debate on executive remuneration regulations and practices.     

Aligning debt and equity claimant interests: Evidence from dual claim investors

This study investigates how investors that own both equity and debt in the same firm affect other shareholders in the firm. It documents that dual claim investors are quite prevalent among the industrial firms listed in the Russell 3000, with over 20% of them having a bank holding company that owns both debt and equity in the firm. The results imply that shareholders are substantially impacted by the presence of dual claim investors in firms, suggesting that relatively small ownership stakes by dual claim banks are associated with greater conflicts of interest among shareholders and debt holders; while relatively large bank equity stakes may benefit outside shareholders when aligned with loan by dual claim banks because they improve bank monitoring incentives and reduce the agency cost of debt.     

Insider Ownership,Subsidiary Cash Holdings,and Economic Consequences: Evidence from Listed Chinese Companies

ABSTRACT

Using a large sample of listed Chinese companies, we investigate how the equity ownership of business group insiders affects subsidiary cash holdings. We find that ownership by the largest shareholders and senior managers in the listed parent firm is negatively related to its subsidiaries’ cash holdings, whereas there is a positive relationship with minority equity in subsidiaries. We also find that the market places a more significant value discount on listed firms whose cash holdings are more located in the affiliated subsidiaries. Our evidence demonstrates how cash policy inside business groups is influenced by insider ownership, and it reveals to what extent cash allocated in subsidiaries may suffer from losses in efficiency.     

Determinants of Intercorporate Shareholdings

This paper examines why firms choose to spend resources on acquiringownership rights in other firms. Based on a unique data baseof every individual intercorporate shareholding on the OsloStock Exchange during the period 1980–1994, we find thatsuch investments serve at least three functions. First, theyplay a role incorporate governance, as managers in firms withlow insider holdings, diffuse ownership structure and high freecash flow tend to mutually acquire equity stakes in each other,possibly in a collective attempt to protect their human capitalin the market for corporate control. Second, interfirm equityholdings serve as financial slack for growing firms, reducingpotential adverse selection costs by providing an internal fundingsource for new investments in long-term assets. Finally, ourfindings also suggest that intercorporate shareholdings arean integrated part of the investor’s cash flow managementsystem by being a liquidity buffer when cash inflows and cashoutflows are non-synchronous.     

Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors

We investigate the incentives that led to the rash of restated financial statements at the end of the 1990s market bubble. We find that the likelihood of a misstated financial statement increases greatly when the CEO has very sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options. Misstatements are also more likely for firms that are constrained by an interest-coverage debt covenant, that raise new debt or equity capital, or that have a CEO who serves as board chair. Our results indicate that agency costs increased [Jensen, M.C., 2005a, Agency costs of overvalued equity. Financial Management 34, 5–19] as substantially overvalued equity caused managers to take actions to support the stock price.     

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES

Because the break-up of conglomerates typically produces substantial increases in shareholder wealth, many commentators have argued that the conglomerate form of organization is inefficient. This article reports the findings of a number of recent academic studies, including the authors' own, that examine the causes and consequences of corporate diversification. Although theoretical arguments suggest that corporate diversification can have benefits as well as costs, several studies have documented that diversified firms trade at a significant discount from their single-segment peers. Estimates of this discount range from 10–15% of firm value, and are larger for “unrelated” diversification than for “related” diversification. If corporate diversification has generally been a value-reducing managerial strategy, why do firms remain diversified? One possibility, which the authors label the “agency cost” hypothesis, is that top executives without substantial equity stakes may have incentives to maintain a diversification strategy even if doing so reduces shareholder wealth. But, as top managers' ownership stakes increase, they bear a greater fraction of the costs associated with value-reducing policies and are therefore less likely to take actions that reduce shareholder wealth. Also, to the extent that outside blockholders monitor managerial behavior, the agency cost hypothesis predicts that diversification will be less prevalent in firms with large outside blockholders. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that companies in which managers own a significant fraction of the firm's shares, and in which blockholders own a large fraction of shares, are significantly less likely to be diversified. If agency problems lead managers to maintain value-reducing diversification strategies, what is it that leads some of these same firms to refocus? The agency cost hypothesis predicts that managers will reduce diversification only if pressured to do so by internal or external mechanisms that reduce agency problems. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that decreases in diversification appear to be precipitated by market disciplinary forces such as block purchases, acquisition attempts, and management turnover.     

Tone emphasis and insider trading

In this study, we examine whether emphasized tone in earnings releases systematically predict managers' insider trading activities in the post earnings releases periods and whether managers' choices of tone placement in earnings releases are motivated by opportunistic incentives. We find that, holding constant the net tone of the overall document, managers make more insider sales (purchases) immediately after earnings releases when positive (negative) tone is presented more prominently in the document. In addition, we document that the relation between tone emphasis and the observed insider trading activities is more (less) pronounced when insiders have greater information advantage or when a firm's overall information environment is more opaque (when a firm has better corporate governance). Overall, our findings suggest that managers use narrative characteristics strategically to facilitate their insider trading and achieve personal gains.     

CEO internal experience and voluntary disclosure quality: Evidence from management forecasts

Internally‐promoted CEOs should have a deep understanding of their firm's products, supply chain, operations, business climate, corporate culture, and how to navigate among employees to get the information they need. Thus, we argue that internally‐promoted CEOs are likely to produce higher quality disclosure than outsider CEOs. Using a sample of US firms from the S&P1500 index from 2001 to 2011, we hand‐collect whether a CEO is hired from inside the firm and, if so, the number of years they worked at the firm before becoming CEO. We then examine whether managers with more internal experience issue higher quality disclosures and offer three main findings. First, CEOs with more internal experience are more likely to issue voluntary earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Second, CEOs with more internal experience issue more accurate earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Finally, investors react more strongly to forecasts issued by insider CEOs than to those issued by outsider CEOs. In additional analysis, we find no evidence that these results extend to mandatory reporting quality (i.e., accruals quality, restatements, or internal control weaknesses), perhaps because mandatory disclosure is subjected to heavy oversight by the board of directors, auditors, and regulators. Overall, our findings suggest that when managers have work experience with the firm prior to becoming the CEO, the firm's voluntary disclosure is of higher quality.