Performance persistence of international mutual funds

This study applies the “winner–winner, winner–loser” methodology developed by Brown and Goetzmann, Goetzmann and Ibbotson, and Malkiel to test for short-term performance persistence in international equity mutual funds over the 20-year period from 1977 to 1996. Persistence tests are applied to a database consisting of all international equity funds in existence during this period, varying from a low of 11 (1977) to a high of 473 (1996) funds, reflecting the extremely rapid growth of this asset class over the last 20 years. The authors are not aware of any other persistence studies of international equity funds. The results show statistically significant performance persistence for 1-year holding periods, but no persistence for 2-, 3- or 4-year periods. For 1-year periods, overall, performance persistence is statistically significant at the .001 level. This leads to the conclusion that international equity mutual funds exhibit strong performance persistence for short-term (1-year holding periods), but persistence generally fades after the first year. These results are generally consistent with results found by other researchers using this methodology. Survivorship bias is a concern in virtually all time series studies of mutual fund returns. This bias is minimal in this study because each new fund is added to the database, merging funds continue to be included and adjustments are made for funds that cease operations. The only bias is that if any fund closed and did not merge with an existing fund, that fund would not have returns to be included for the future periods. Only 28 funds ceased operations over the 20-year period during which 490 new funds were introduced.     

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MUTUAL FUND EXPENSES

Mutual fund investors are subjected to many fees and expenses related to both the management of the fund assets and the sale and distribution of the fund's shares. In recent years these expenses have increased as a percentage of assets. The preoccupation of mutual fund investors with using performance evaluation as a selection criterion is misguided because of the volatility of investment returns. Whether the fund's performance is due to superior management or just good luck is difficult to determine. On the other hand, mutual fund expenses are stable. As such, the mutual fund investor should pursue a policy of choosing funds with low expenses. In this paper we conduct an empirical analysis of these expenses. The results of our analysis of equity funds suggest that expense-conscious investors should look at the fund size, age, turnover ratio, cash ratio, and existence of a 12b-1 fee as key determinants of expenses. Our analysis of bond funds suggests that the key factors are the fund's sales charge, weighted average maturity, size, and existence of a 12b-1 fee.     

Flow-Performance Relationship and Star Effect: New Evidence from Chinese Mutual Funds

In this paper, we reexamine the mutual fund flow-performance relationship and star effect using mutual funds in China that have unique features of high risk and low performance persistence. Confirming prior studies, we find that fund performance is positively related to flows in subsequent periods. However, our results show that funds that performed well in the past do not attract additional inflows after controlling for performance. In addition, a star fund, a fund with a five-star Morningstar rating, does not have any significant effect on the fund's flows. These results suggest that it is important to recognize the difference in investor groups and factors that affect performance persistence when analyzing the mutual fund flow-performance relationship.     

Security Concentration and Active Fund Management: Do Focused Funds Offer Superior Performance?

We examine gross fund returns based on the number of securities held and find no evidence that focused funds outperform diversified funds. After deducting expenses, focused funds significantly underperform. Controlling for various fund characteristics, fund performance is positively related to the fund's number of holdings both before and after expenses. We find evidence linking focused fund underperformance to agency and liquidity problems. Finally, the attrition rate of focused funds is higher than that of diversified funds. These results do not support the view that managers holding focused portfolios have superior stock‐picking skills or that focused funds provide value to investors.     

Who Charges More: Hedge Funds or Mutual Funds?*

Explicit mutual fund fees are typically less than 1% of the assets under management. By comparison, the typical hedge fund charges a base fee of 2% plus a performance fee equal to 20% of net profits. Thus, hedge funds appear to charge far more for even comparable performance—unless one takes account of the following:

• ? For most mutual funds, a very high percentage of performance is driven by its passive exposure to the market, even though the fee is applied to the total fund.
• ? Many hedge funds are designed to provide returns that are completely independent of market performance.

Using these two assumptions, the author provides a simple example that shows that a representative mutual fund's performance can be replicated by combining an index fund, which represents the mutual fund's passive component, with a hedge fund, representing the mutual fund's active component. When analyzed in this way, the fee of the combined fund turns out to be remarkably close to the actual fee of the mutual fund. This in turn suggests that the implicit fee for the mutual fund's small active component is comparable to the fees of the hedge fund.     

Active management, fund size, and bond mutual fund returns

Conventional wisdom holds that bonds are relatively homogenous investments compared to equities. Consequently, factors that explain variation in returns among bond mutual funds may differ in magnitude from those for equity mutual funds. In this study, a time-series cross-sectional analysis is employed to investigate the relationship between a bond fund's risk-adjusted return and specific fund attributes. Results indicate that a bond fund's past performance does not predict future performance and that bond fund managers are generally ineffective at increasing risk-adjusted returns. However, unlike equity mutual funds, bond mutual funds do appear to enjoy economies of scale.     

Meeting new peers: The effects of Morningstar category reassignment on fund flows and star ratings

We investigate how the reassignment of a fund's Morningstar category affects fund flow and Morningstar star rating. We find that funds assigned to a different category gain positive abnormal flows and this effect is significant mainly for high-rated funds. Category reassignment does not improve a fund's star rating on average, and flows are less responsive to a star-rating change if the rating change is likely to be driven by category reassignment. The positive abnormal flows captured by high-rated funds after category reassignment are consistent with a visibility story: some investors filter funds by Morningstar category and star rating, and category reassignment makes a fund more visible to a new group of investors if the fund is highly rated. In contrast, a low-rated fund is likely to be selected only by investors who do not refer to the fund's Morningstar information and, hence, gains little visibility from category reassignment. We also find evidence that more sophisticated investors are more likely to consider not only fund rating but also fund category when evaluating fund performance.     

Mutual fund corporate culture and performance

In this paper we test if a mutual fund's own corporate culture predicts fund performance. To do this we use Morningstar's corporate culture ratings for mutual funds and then examine the ability of these corporate culture ratings to predict risk-adjusted performance of domestic equity funds over the period 2005–2010. Using methods that are robust to survivorship bias, we find there is little significant evidence that corporate culture predicts better fund performance. Indeed, we find that no individual component of the Morningstar stewardship rating including board quality, fees, manager incentives and regulatory issues is able to consistently predict fund performance.     

Equity fund size and growth: Implications for performance and selection

Should individuals choose the largest or smallest equity funds for investment? This study explores the relationship of equity fund size to performance. Historical returns of large funds are found to be superior to their smaller peers. Yesterday's best performing fund's tend to become today's largest funds as individuals invest heavily in response to the communications about the fund's past success. But the findings suggest that, once large, equity funds do not outperform their peers. Especially for funds in aggressive growth objectives, the advantages of being small appear to outweigh the disadvantages. For individual investors wtih aggressive growth objectives, a strategy of investing in smaller funds may thus be wealth maximizing.     

Managerial characteristics and performance of eurozone mutual funds

We investigate the relation between observable managerial characteristics (i.e., gender, age, tenure, professional qualifications, and advanced education) and performance in diversified equity mutual funds domiciled in the eurozone. We find that differences in the fund alphas are statistically significant only in groups based on age, tenure, and professional qualifications (i.e., chartered financial analyst [CFA]). We also find a significant positive relation for age and CFA certification with a fund's risk-adjusted performance and a significant negative relation for tenure. However, we find no significant effect for gender and advanced education (i.e., master of business administration [MBA]). The differences in risk taking are significantly related only with age and tenure; the former has a negative and the latter a positive relation with risk taking.     

Portfolio concentration and fund manager performance

This research examines the relationships among portfolio concentration, fund manager skills, and fund performance in Taiwan's equity mutual fund industry, yielding several empirical findings as follows. First, after controlling for other factors, concentrated equity funds tend to have smaller net asset values, larger fund flows, higher turnover rates, and a younger age and prevail in smaller fund families. Second, concentrated fund managers buy and sell stocks more smartly based on economic trends or market factors than do diversified fund managers, i.e., they have better market‐timing abilities. Third, only partial evidence supports the premise that concentrated equity funds have better next‐quarter risk‐adjusted performances than do diversified ones, as these fund managers' skills positively correlate to risk‐adjusted fund performance. Fourth, fund managers who have better stock‐picking abilities and intensively invest in certain industries generally exhibit better Carhart's alpha in the next quarter than do other fund managers. Fifth, fund managers' stock‐picking abilities more closely relate to long‐term performance than do their market‐timing abilities. Lastly, positive performance persistence is much stronger than negative performance persistence, but concentrated funds do not have stronger performance persistence than do diversified funds.     

Performance evaluation and self-designated benchmark indexes in the mutual fund industry

Almost one-third of actively managed, diversified U.S. equity mutual funds specify a size and value/growth benchmark index in the fund prospectus that does not match the fund's actual style. Nevertheless, these “mismatched” benchmarks matter to fund investors. Performance relative to the specified benchmark is a significant determinant of a fund's subsequent cash inflows, even controlling for performance measures that better capture the fund's style. These incremental flows appear unlikely to be rational responses to abnormal returns. The evidence is consistent with the notion that mismatched self-designated benchmarks result from strategic fund behavior driven by the incentive to improve flows.     

Failure Risk and the Cross‐Section of Hedge Fund Returns

Modeling a hedge fund's probability of failure with a dynamic logit regression, I find that the probability of a fund's failure has a significantly negative effect on the fund's future returns. A quintile portfolio with the highest failure probability underperforms a quintile portfolio with the lowest failure probability by 5% to 6% per year from 1997 to 2012. The results are robust to the definition of hedge fund failure and controlling for a large set of risk factors and fund characteristics. Moreover, the negative effect of failure probability on future fund returns is stronger for funds with weak share restrictions.     

Time‐Varying Fund Manager Skill

We propose a new definition of skill as general cognitive ability to pick stocks or time the market. We find evidence for stock picking in booms and market timing in recessions. Moreover, the same fund managers that pick stocks well in expansions also time the market well in recessions. These fund managers significantly outperform other funds and passive benchmarks. Our results suggest a new measure of managerial ability that weighs a fund's market timing more in recessions and stock picking more in booms. The measure displays more persistence than either market timing or stock picking alone and predicts fund performance.     

Do Funds Make More When They Trade More?

We model fund turnover in the presence of time‐varying profit opportunities. Our model predicts a positive relation between an active fund's turnover and its subsequent benchmark‐adjusted return. We find such a relation for equity mutual funds. This time‐series relation between turnover and performance is stronger than the cross‐sectional relation, as the model predicts. Also as predicted, the turnover‐performance relation is stronger for funds trading less‐liquid stocks and funds likely to possess greater skill. Turnover is correlated across funds. The common component of turnover is positively correlated with proxies for stock mispricing. Turnover of similar funds helps predict a fund's performance.     

Mutual Fund Flows and Cross‐Fund Learning within Families

We develop a model of performance evaluation and fund flows for mutual funds in a family. Family performance has two effects on a member fund's estimated skill and inflows: a positive common‐skill effect, and a negative correlated‐noise effect. The overall spillover can be either positive or negative, depending on the weight of common skill and correlation of noise in returns. Its absolute value increases with family size, and declines over time. The sensitivity of flows to a fund's own performance is affected accordingly. Empirical estimates of fund flow sensitivities show patterns consistent with rational cross‐fund learning within families.     

Fund manager conviction and investment performance

This paper examines the role conviction plays in asset management and its relationship with investment returns. We measure the strength of fund manager conviction through a fund's Active Share, i.e., the extent to which an investment portfolio differs from its benchmark index. First, we show fund manager conviction increases following both superior and, surprisingly, inferior past performance, and more so among solo-managed than team-managed funds. Second, and more importantly, we find an inverse-U relationship between conviction and subsequent performance. High levels of conviction proxied by high Active Share are associated with lower future returns and greater fund risk. Our study also illustrates an asymmetric investor reaction to fund manager conviction in the form of higher (lower) fund inflows rewarding good performance by high (low) conviction managers, but no pronounced penalties for poor performance, ceteris paribus.     

THE EFFECTS OF MUTUAL FUNDS ON M&A COMPENSATION

Motivated by shareholders’ interest in combating executive wealth expropriation through the merger and acqusition (M&A) process, we study how mutual funds influence firm behavior around an acquisition through votes against management proposals. We find that mutual funds reduce the chief executive officer's ability to extract rents during the M&A process by voting against management‐sponsored compensation proposals after the acquisition, thus lowering both excess compensation and increasing pay‐for‐performance sensitivity. Furthermore, mutual fund voting magnifies the impact on negatively performing firms and firms with a larger amount of the mutual fund's holdings in the firm.     

Measuring fund style,performance and activity: a new style‐profiling approach

We construct new measures of fund style, performance and activity from linear combinations of off‐the‐shelf stock‐market indices. A fund's benchmark portfolio is a linear combination of two or more reference portfolios that in a least‐squares sense most closely approximates the fund's portfolio. The resulting linear combination scalar is itself a measure of fund style and the distance between a fund and its benchmark is a measure of fund activity. Our approach has a number of advantages over existing characteristic‐matching methods. We illustrate our approach using a data set of US institutional funds.     

Life-cycle funds: Much Ado about Nothing?

The core idea of life-cycle funds or target-date funds is to decrease the fund's equity exposure and conversely increase its bond exposure towards the fund's target date. Such funds have been gaining significant market share and were recently set as default choice of asset allocation in numerous defined contribution schemes or related old-age provision products in several countries. Hence, an assessment of life-cycle funds’ risk-return profiles – that is, the probability distribution of returns – is essential for sustainable financial planning of a large group of investors. This paper studies the risk-return profile of life-cycle funds in particular compared to simple balanced or lifestyle funds that apply a constant equity portion throughout the fund's term instead. In a Black–Scholes model, we derive balanced funds that reproduce the risk-return profile of an arbitrary life-cycle fund for single and regular contributions. We then analyze the accuracy of our results under more complex asset models with stochastic interest rates, stochastic equity volatility and jumps. We further show that frequently used ‘rule of thumb approximations’ that only take into account the life-cycle fund's average equity portion are not suitable to approximate a life-cycle fund's risk-return profile. Our results on the one hand facilitate sustainable financial planning and on the other hand challenge the very existence of life-cycle funds since appropriately calibrated balanced funds can offer a similar (often dominating) risk-return profile.