Negative price spikes at power markets: the role of energy policy

In Germany, substantial drops in wholesale power prices have become a regular phenomenon. While such price drops have far-reaching implications for the functioning of the power market, their underlying determinants remain poorly understood. To fill this gap, we propose a Markov regime-switching model to investigate low-price events at the European Power Exchange. Our analysis focuses on the role of energy policies that promote renewable energies and have led to significant reductions of nuclear capacities after the Fukushima accident. We find that high electricity infeed from renewable sources increases negative price spike probabilities, while the decommissioning of nuclear plants under the Nuclear Moratorium had an opposing effect. Simulations of market outcomes under different energy policies indicate that reaching ambitious renewable energy targets increases the frequency of low-price events and compromises the financial viability of conventional generation units, while a nuclear phase-out or an increase in storage capacities mitigates these effects.     

Implications of CO<Subscript>2</Subscript> emissions trading for short-run electricity market outcomes in northwest Europe

We examine the short-run implications of CO₂ trading for power production, prices, emissions, and generator profits in northwest Europe in 2005. Simulation results from a transmission-constrained oligopoly model are compared with theoretical analyses to quantify price increases and windfall profits earned by generators. The analyses indicate that the rates at which CO₂ costs are passed through to wholesale prices are affected by market competitiveness, merit order changes, and elasticities of demand and supply. Emissions trading results in large windfall profits, much but not all of which is due to free allocation of allowances. Profits also increase for some generators because their generation mix has low emissions, and so they benefit from electricity price increases. Most emission reductions appear to be due to demand response not generation redispatch.      

Industrial cogeneration and regulatory policy

The 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) fostered decentralized generation of electricity, particularly in the form of cogeneration. A model of a firms' decision to cogenerate is developed that illustrates both the interface between the firm and an electric utility, and the firm's internal interface between its primary product and cogeneration technologies. The model is used to show that the firm may operate inefficiently in both the short run and long run owing to the fixed-proportions technology of cogeneration and PURPA mandated operating procedures, respectively. Cogenerating firms that dump heat into the atmosphere may signal inefficient behavior; therefore, monitoring heat dumping may be important in measuring the success of cogeneration.     

Transmission Constraints and Imperfect Markets for Power

This article argues that, while most of the economic gains from the restructuring of the power industry will be achieved in electricity generation, trading and retailing, the transmission grid holds the keys to an important share of the economic value created by the process. Using a simple three-node network, this article shows that an increase in transmission capacity has two effects: (1) cheaper power can be used, and (2) competition among generators is increased. This carries three policy implications: first, policy makers can and should use transmission expansion to increase competition in generation. Second, generators will not necessarily finance nor advocate optimal transmission expansion: they may prefer to keep the rents derived from local market power, rather than gain better access to markets, even if they receive transmission payments corresponding to their investment, as suggested in parts of the United States. Finally, this work provides support for the vertical separation between generation and transmission, beyond the traditional foreclosure argument.     

The Effects of Rivalry with Price Regulation of Electric Power Generation

This article examines how rivalry between an electric utility and nonutility generators (NUGs) affects electricity prices, market structure and welfare. If a utility cannot break even financially when outputs are priced at marginal cost, then the Ramsey optimal price paid by a utility purchasing electricity from a NUG should be below avoided cost, in contrast to the requirements of PURPA. The analysis also compares FDC, Residual and Ramsey prices for a utilitys electricity sales. It illustrates how FDC prices may force a utility to exit relatively competitive business markets, eliminating any benefits of economies of scope from serving both business and residential customers.     

The industrial life cycle of wind energy electrical power generation: ARI methodology modeling of life cycle dynamics

This innovation assessment addresses the factors that have influenced the exceptionally lengthy industrial technology life cycle of wind electrical power generation since its inception in the late 19th Century. It then applies the recently developed Accelerated Radical Innovation (ARI) Model to understand the dynamics of this innovation compared to those of other major 18th-20th Century innovations.Despite market pull in the late 19th Century to link small DC electrical generators with hundreds of thousands of existing wind mills used for mechanical water pumping, several factors prevented this from happening. These include the intermittent nature of wind electrical generation requiring low cost battery storage and DC-AC conversion, and the shift in the 1890s from DC to superior AC electrical generation making possible economies of scale for delivering AC electricity long distances over the grid from large hydroelectric and coal fired plants. As a consequence, wind generated electricity remained primarily a technological development until the first energy crisis in the 1970s.Development of an extensive science and technology base for wind turbine dynamics, and deployment since 2000 of commercial scale wind turbines (> 1MW) have elevated wind electrical power generation to commercial practicality, as described in two earlier papers by the authors applying technical cost modeling and experience curve projections of cost of energy (COE) to explore the economic viability of large scale wind electricity generation.. Strongly promoted by wind energy communities of practice in Europe, North America and Asia, normative COE projections suggest that by 2020 wind electrical power will be cost competitive, without tax incentives, with electricity from conventional fossil and nuclear fuel sources.Overcoming technological, business, market, societal, networking and political hurdles to date has required 120years of development to establish wind electricity generation as a breakthrough innovation with the capability to capture 20% of the world electricity market by the mid-to-late 21st Century. Further growth and maturation is expected to continue to 2100, corresponding to a projected ≅ 210year overall industry life cycle at market saturation. This finding has profound implications for innovation theory and practice, since the length of this life cycle exceeds by a factor of ≅ 4 the average life cycle diagnosed for five industrial revolutions and four key 20th Century innovations. The new ARI model provides a holistic approach to understanding the dynamics of the industrial technology life cycle for a wide variety of radical innovations as well as wind electrical power.     

The Market Response to Restructuring: A Behavioral Model

In this paper, I model the behavior of producers, consumers, and regulators in deciding to restructure the electricity sector and estimate their equilibrium response to the newly restructured market. The empirical model consists of simultaneous price and restructuring equations with endogenous switching and cross-equation correlation in the errors. This approach allow me to account for the influence of special interest groups and potential selection bias in which countries choose to restructure. I estimate distinct shifts from restructuring in both industrial and residential prices, and for English speaking, Scandinavian, and South American countries. I find that in all countries, it is industrial consumers that experience the price effects of restructuring, while residential consumers remain largely unaffected. In English speaking and Scandinavian countries, industrial prices decrease while in South American countries they increase. This is consistent with the political–economic environment in which these countries have considered restructuring.     

ELECTRIC POWER DEREGULATION: BACKGROUND AND PROSPECTS

The incentive failures of rate-of-return regulation are well known and thus raise the question of whether to deregulate electric power. The development of long-distance transmission and of alternative power sources in networks has spawned several institutions that would or could allow markets to substitute for such regulation. These include long-term contract sales, spot power exchange, contract power pooling, shared facility ownership, and economic dispatch. Because of the current surplus of power, the existence of such institutions has caused increasing competition in the electric power market and has catalyzed the movement to deregulate generators from state authority and to restructure utility assets. By encouraging this movement, regulators can further the discipline that markets already exert on prices and costs. By making counterproposals to the utilities, regulators can influence asset restructuring so that some of the capital gains inherent in such restructuring can be shared with consumers in the form of rate relief. Finally, for the future, the cotenancy agreement—which is antitrust supervised and competitively ruled—has promising possibilities for deregulating transmission and distribution.     

Cost savings and deregulation: an analysis of fuel cost savings in deregulated electricity markets

Unregulated utilities face competitive pressures that lead to cost-minimizing activities, but regulated monopolies in the US electricity generation sector face pressures only from regulators who must balance a desire for lower prices against the need for the utility to generate a sufficient return to encourage investment. This paper analyses the cost-minimizing behaviours of regulated utilities by comparing their average input coal costs with those of deregulated utilities purchasing coal from the same mine during the same month of the same year. Results indicate that coal-fired electric plants operating in deregulated electricity markets negotiate prices that are 6.1 ¢/MMBtu (3.5%) less than their regulated counterparts. In percentage terms, this is a fairly small discount for deregulated plants, but it happens to be on par with the restructuring gains that others have estimated for labour and nonfuel costs.     

Divestiture policy and operating efficiency in U.S. electric power distribution

Divestiture of generation assets by vertically integrated electric utilities has been a key element of restructuring in the U.S. The resulting generation sector has received much attention, but the standalone distribution sector that has been simultaneously created has received very little. This paper addresses the effects of divestiture policy on the operating efficiency of the resulting distribution utilities. Using data envelopment analysis to measure operating efficiency, we examine 73 utilities in the period 1994–2003 and find that the major divestitures that were required by state regulators had large adverse effects on efficiency, whereas utilities that divested at their own initiative had at worst neutral efficiency outcomes. These results raise serious questions about one of the centerpieces of electricity restructuring.     

Gas Utility Prices in a Restructured Industry

The natural gas industry has witnessed significant policy changes since 1978. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has undertaken a number of policy initiatives designed to promote competition in the natural gas industry. These initiatives have affected both natural gas pipeline and local gas distribution companies. This study provides an empirical examination of the impact of restructuring on local gas distribution utilities' residential, commercial, and industrial prices.     

Market power in the Spanish electricity auction

Hourly data from the Spanish day-ahead electricity auction is used to obtain a lower bound measure of generators’ market power. Our method is not based on cost estimates but rather on the behavioral differences between strategic generators and more competitive producers. The results indicate that, despite the price cap effect of regulation in this market, the larger operators in the day-ahead market are able to increase significantly prices above the competitive benchmark. We also show that the two large generators do not exploit the full potential of their market power.     

The effects of wind generation capacity on electricity prices and generation costs: a Monte Carlo analysis

We use Monte Carlo analysis to examine the potential of increased renewable generation to provide a hedge against variability in energy prices and costs. Fuel costs, electricity demand and wind generation are allowed to vary and a unit commitment and economic dispatch algorithm is employed to produce cost-minimizing generation schedules under different levels of installed wind capacity. Increased wind capacity reduces the mean and the variance of production costs but only the variance of electricity prices. Wind generators see their market revenues increase while consumer payments and fossil generator profits do not considerably vary as wind capacity increases. Risk aversion is captured by considering the conditional value-at-risk for both consumers and producers. The optimal level of wind generation increases as risk aversion increases due to the potential of wind to act as a hedge against very high electricity prices in high fuel price scenarios.     

Residential energy use and conservation: Economics and demographics

Energy consumption in the residential sector offers an important opportunity for conserving resources. However, much of the current debate regarding energy efficiency in the housing market focuses on the physical and technical determinants of energy consumption, neglecting the role of the economic behavior of resident households. In this paper, we analyze the extent to which the use of gas and electricity is determined by the technical specifications of the dwelling as compared to the demographic characteristics of the residents. Our analysis is based on a sample of more than 300,000 Dutch homes and their occupants. The results indicate that residential gas consumption is determined principally by structural dwelling characteristics, such as the vintage, building type, and characteristics of the dwelling, while electricity consumption varies more directly with household composition, in particular income and family composition. Combining these results with projections on future economic and demographic trends, we find that, even absent price increases for residential energy, the aging of the population and their increasing wealth will roughly offset improvements in the energy efficiency of the building stock resulting from policy interventions and natural revitalization.     

Price effects of independent transmission system operators in the United States electricity market

In 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) sought to “remove impediments to competition in the wholesale bulk power marketplace and to bring more efficient, lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity consumers” through a series of market rules. A product of these rules was the establishment of regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs) charged with facilitating equal access to the transmission grid for electricity suppliers. Whether these changes in market structure have succeeded in achieving FERC’s goal to provide “lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity consumers” remains an open question. This paper utilizes a panel data set of the 48 contiguous United States and a treatment effects model in first differences to determine whether there have been changes in delivered electric prices as a result of the establishment of ISOs and RTOs. To avoid the confounding effects of electric restructuring, the model is estimated with the full panel data set, and then again without the states that have restructured their electric markets. This estimation shows that electricity prices fall approximately 4.8 % in the first 2 years of an ISO’s operation and that this result is statistically significant. However, this result is dependent on the presence of states that restructured their electricity markets. When these restructured states are removed from the data set the price effects of RTOs become indistinguishable from zero. The paper concludes that rate agreements are the principal source of the observed decrease in prices and that RTOs have not had the desired effect on electricity prices.     

Rural electrification and groundwater pumps in India: Evidence from the 1982–1999 period

India's groundwater extraction is heavily dependent on diesel pumps, and one reason is the lack of reliable power supply. The widespread use of diesel pumps is an economic problem due to the inefficiency and high cost of said pumps. Could rural electrification improve the situation? We estimate the relationship between village electrification and the counts of electric and diesel pumps in India, 1982–1999. We find that, in addition to increasing the number of electric pumps, rural electrification also greatly increases the number of diesel pumps. While initially surprising, these results make sense in an environment characterized by frequent power outages and constant quality problems. If rural electrification increases the number of electric pumps and promotes irrigated agriculture, the demand for diesel pumps also grows because many farmers need a reliable pump that does not depend on electricity. Without improvements in the supply of electricity through rational power sector reforms, India cannot stop the spread of diesel pumps through rural electrification. For energy and development economists, the results are novel because previous econometric work has largely focused on industrial uses of power.     

Do production subsidies have a wage incidence in wind power?

Employment in electricity generation from renewable resources has expanded rapidly in the US and in Texas during the last decade. Availability of the Production Tax Credit (PTC) has been an important driver of this growth. Using establishment-level employment and payroll data for Texas at the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS)-6 level, we analyse the differences in average wages between firms generating electricity from fossil fuels and those generating electricity from wind power. We compare relative average wages before and after the rapid expansion of wind power development that followed the ex ante renewal of the PTC in 2006. Our main finding using both the parametric and nonparametric estimation techniques proposed by Racine and Li (2004), is that average payrolls for wind power generators increased relative to fossil fuel-based electricity generators after 2006.     

VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL ECONOMIES IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

ABSTRACT ** :  The empirical literature on the cost structure of the electric utility industry traditionally focused on the measurement of specific technological properties: 1) scale economies in generation or distribution; 2) multi-product (or horizontal) scope economies at one particular stage; 3) multi-stage (or vertical) scope economies. By adopting an integrated approach, which simultaneously considers both horizontal and vertical aspects of the technology, we find the presence, on a sample of Italian electric utilities, of both vertical integration gains and horizontal scope economies at the downstream stage. In the light of recent regulatory reforms aiming at restructuring European electricity markets, our findings have important policy implications as for the proper configuration of the industry. Moreover, this methodology can be usefully applied to the study of the production structure of other public network utilities involved in similar vertical and horizontal reorganization processes.     

电力与经济增长关系计量分析——以新疆为例

运用Granger因果关系和误差修正模型,分析新疆电力与GDP以及三次产业之间的长期均衡关系.结果表明,新疆电力与经济的Granger因果关系是从GDP到装机容量和用电量的单向因果关系.从长期均衡看,GDP每增加1％,用电量增长1.1136％,装机容量增长0.9525％,经济增长对电力有效利用的促进作用显著.第一、二、三产业都是从产业增加值到用电量的单向因果关系.从长期均衡来看,第一、二、三次产业增加值每增加1％,用电量分别增长1.4215％、1.0887％和0.9533％.基于电力与经济的关系,新疆应做好电力规划,避免电力工业的产能过剩,优化产业结构,降低能耗,促进经济可持续发展.     

How may a carbon tax transform Australian electricity industry? A CGE analysis

The carbon tax policy proposed by Australian government has triggered deep concerns about the high electricity prices facing households and the sustainability of electricity industry. By employing a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and an environmentally extended Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), this article simulates the effect of Australian carbon tax on the electricity industry. The modelling results show that the wholesale electricity prices indeed increase by about 90%, but the retailer prices only increase by 25%. The coal-fired electricity generators will reduce their output by 8% (for black-coal) to 18% (for brown-coal), but the profitability of the industry will drop dramatically. On the other hand, generators using oil, gas or renewable resources, will increase their output significantly and enjoy a handsome profit. Through the price, cost and profitability mechanisms, the carbon tax will transfer the Australian electricity generation to a low emission industry in the long term.