会计准则制定机构国际间比较启示

本文通过不同国家会计准则制定机构的历史变迁比较,分析了对会计准则制定机构会产生影响的因素,希望能对我国会计准则制定机构的今后发展有所启示。     

对欧盟部分国家组织机构代码管理的考察与分析

为了进一步落实国务院关于“加快推进统一的组织机构代码”的要求,更好地推动组织机构代码的有关立法和应用,促进组织机构代码工作的发展,由国家质量技术监督局、国务院法制办、人事部、公安部、劳动和社会保障部、国家工商局等单位 10人组成的考察团,于 2000年 9月 30日～ 10月 13日对欧盟、比利时和德国的组织机构管理制度进行了 考察。通过此次考察,进一步了解了这些国家和地区有关组织机构代码的立法和推广应用的现状和发展方向,并加强了与有关组织的业务交流与合作。1 关于组织机构代码的赋 码机构 目前欧盟各国均由统一的一个管…     

市县机构改革中审计机关机构设置的建议

今年下半年，全国市县级政府机构改革将进入实质性运作阶段。在市县级政府机构改革过程中，国家审计机关及其内部业务机构应该如何置，才能更好地适应当前行政体制改革和经济发展的要求，的确是一个迫切需要解决的问题。笔者认为，市县国家审计机关在机构改革过程中，在设置内部业务机构时，应该考虑从按行业分工并设置内部业务机构的模式迅速转到以专项审计为特征，按的具体内容分工并设置内部业务机构的模式上来，强化基本建设、经济责任、财政金融、外资引进、行政执法收费等项目的监督，并设置专门的复核机构，以加强对执法质量的监督和管理。具体理由有以下几点。     

意大利认证与认可活动综述

意大利的认证与认可体系大致由4类机构组成。第1类是标准化机构,即研究、制订并向社会提供认证和认可使用的各种标准的团体,其中最重要的是意大利标准化协会（UNI）和意大利电工委员会（CEI）;第2类是认可机构,主要有意大利认证机构国家认可体系（SINCERT）、意大利实验室国家认可体系（SINAL）和国家校准体系（SNT;第3类是承担具体认证、校准。检测业务的认证机构、监督检查机构、检测实验室、校准实验室,以及校准服务中心等;第4类是认证服务的最终用户,主要是指工业企业、服务公司及其从业人员。（图1）l标准化机构1．l…     

《彩票机构会计制度》点评

2003年底,财政部发布了《彩票机构会计制度》,本文分析了其进步性,也归纳了《彩票机构会计制度》与《彩票机构财务管理办法》存在的不协调之处,并就完善《彩票机构会计制度》提出了建议。     

高校财务与会计机构分设的实践性探讨

随着高校面临竞争日益激烈的市场经济环境,面临教育体制改革的深入与发展,高校财务的战略性地位越来越重要。如何凸显高校财务的战略性地位?首要的就是科学、合理、高效地重组高校财务的经济业务流程,改革目前高校"重会计核算轻财务管理"的现象。通过分析我国高校"一元制"财务组织机构设置的现状、产生的原因、存在的问题等,提出了相应的改革思路,具体探讨了怎样建立可供操作的"二元制"高校财务组织机构、相关科室的职责职能等,为推动我国高校财务、会计机构的分设起到了较好的参考与借鉴作用。     

合模机构及其发展

文章通过结合注塑机、吹塑机合模机构，介绍了合模机构的类别和典型的合模机构特征以及合模机构的历史现状及其发展趋势，分析和探究合模机构的相关内容。     

从香港特区政府机构设置浅谈我国政府机构改革

香港特区政府在香港回归后以其高效务实的行政能力带领香港度过了一个又一个的难关.我国政府机构改革历经多年,但是机构臃肿庞杂的问题总是得不到根本解决.本文通过分析特区政府机构设置的某些优点,以期对我国政府机构改革带来一些启示.     

应对当前法定计量机构面临的新形势

加入WTO给我国的经济和社会发展带来了重大影响。对国内法定计量机构来说,其冲击和挑战是不可避免的,惟有改革创新、增强实力、主动应对才是明智之举。 目前是法定计量机构加快建设和发展的黄金时期,各机构应抓住改革及国家保护、扶持这一宝贵时机,在服务理念、币场营销、运行     

促进政策性信用担保机构发展的财政政策研究——以北京市政策性信用担保机构为例

从1992年以来,我国初步形成了"一体、两翼、三层"的信用担保体系,但从实践来看,当前我国担保机构的发展远不能满足中小企业的融资需求,必须通过政策引导加快担保机构的发展.以北京市为例,本文根据政策性信用担保机构的发展实践以及政策性信用担保机构享受的财政扶持政策及效果,分析了现有政策的不足之处,提出了促进政策性信用担保机构发展的财政政策建议.     

资本结构与代理问题研究综述

依据股权结构集散程度,将代理问题分为经营者代理问题和控股股东代理问题。本文对国内外资本结构与经营者代理问题和资本结构与控股股东代理问题的研究进行了回顾,并对其未来的研究进行了展望。     

Towards a Social Theory of Agency

We challenge critics of agency theory who suggest that agency theory's value does not extend outside a narrow context dominated by egocentric agents seeking only to maximize wealth at the expense of the principal. Instead, we argue that agency theory's flexibility allows for its application to a variety of non‐traditional settings where the key elements of agency theory, such as self‐interest, information asymmetry, and the mechanisms used to control agency costs can vary beyond the narrow assumptions implied in traditional agency‐based research. We suggest that extending agency theory to diverse settings using a deductive approach can be accomplished by formally recognizing and incorporating the institutional context surrounding principal–agent (P–A) relations into agency‐based models. Thus, criticisms that agency theory fails to acknowledge the social context in which P–A relations occur provides not a barrier but an opportunity for extending our understanding of P–A relations to a variety of diverse contexts.     

Agency Problems in Diverse Contexts: A Global Perspective

abstract    Bruce, Buck and Main (2005 ) offer two criticisms of agency theory as a valid model of executive behaviour. First, they suggest that because researchers have failed to find a strong empirical link between executive pay and firm performance, and since this research generally rests on models derived from agency theory, then we must question the theory. Second, they suggest that agency theory is under-socialized and therefore lacks generalizability to settings where social solutions would seem to eliminate the agency problem. In our response we make three points. First, agency theory rests on an assumption of self-interest that does not necessarily reflect opportunism. Second, agency theory does not make any reference to pay-performance sensitivity, and the failure of this research can be attributable to a variety of problems with the research. Third, we agree that agency theory does not explicitly recognize contextual factors, but suggest that this abstraction from context, gives agency theory greater generalizability. Finally, we review the UK and German contexts discussed by Bruce, Buck and Main to show that socialized solutions do not prevent the occurrence of agency problems.     

Agency workers and organisation's commitment to its workers

This study explores the understanding that Dutch agency workers (i.e. workers affiliated with a temporary-help service firm) have of organisation's commitment to its workers (OCW). Semi-structured interviews with 33 Dutch agency workers aimed to answer two questions: (1) what do agency workers believe the agency and the client should offer if they are aiming for perceived OCW and (2) who are the potential messengers of agency and client OCW? If agencies and clients want to get rewarded by agency workers with perceived OCW, they have to carry a shared responsibility for many aspects of fair and favourable human resource management. However, agency workers link some aspects exclusively to one of the two organisational parties: agency workers seem to associate promotion with the client organisation, and certain aspects of job characteristics (e.g. autonomy and performance feedback) solely with the client OCW. Other elements related to job characteristics were only associated with agency OCW (current and future person–task fit, job-satisfaction concerns and job-related problems), as well as keeping in touch and problem solving (e.g. job dissatisfaction) solely with agency OCW. Moreover, agency workers personify all the mentioned responsibilities: organisational member's actions concerning these responsibilities represent OCW. Agency consultants seem to be the sole representatives of perceived agency OCW, whereas several agents (e.g. top managers, direct supervisors, co-workers, clients' ‘clients’) serve as potential representatives of client organisations' commitment.     

公司治理的若干维度及与代理冲突之间的关系

现代企业在降低交易成本的同时,也产生了代理成本。基于缓解代理成本目的而提出公司治理概念在实证层面具有多个度量维度,并非所有维度下的公司治理对于代理冲突都具有相同的效应。基于国内外文献,文章分析了基于表现形式、行为主体和与制度环境关系的公司治理度量与代理冲突之间的关系。清晰认识公司治理的度量维度及与代理冲突之间的关系,有助于完善公司治理相关研究的假设的提出、度量变量的选择和研究结果的解释。     

Should I stay or should I go? Agency nursing work in the UK

There are competing perspectives as to whether agency represents the desire to be a ‘free agent’ in terms of greater flexibility and control, or whether it represents a reluctant retreat from permanent employment. This paper explores the reasons why nurses in the UK work on an agency basis through surveys of two nursing agencies and asks: to what extent do supply-side preferences contribute to the decision for nurses to work on an agency basis? How does working on an agency basis affect the work-life balance and career aspirations of nurses? Two surveys were conducted; one with a ‘generalist’ nurse agency; and one with a ‘specialized’ agency, in order to examine the impact of rare/specialized skills on pecuniary motives. It is found that while nurses who also have a permanent job are more likely to report pecuniary factors as influencing the decision to work through agencies, nurses who solely work agency are more likely to emphasize work-life balance issues and escaping ‘office politics’ as key factors. Importantly, the findings point to the continued appeal of agency work as a means to exit the nursing workplace, suggesting that government reforms to increase the appeal of nursing as a profession have only partially addressed the concerns of nurses.     

基于市民参与的旅行社经济发展对策——以忻州市为例

旅行社经济发展的好坏对区域旅游经济的发展构成重要影响。旅行社是促使旅游者与旅游资源相关联的环节之一,也是促进区域旅游经济发展的重要经济实体。本文运用旅行社管理、旅游经济和区域开发等学科的相关理论,采用问卷调查、实地考察和社会访谈等方法,从本地客源市场特征角度分析了忻州市旅行社经济发展中存在的现实问题,探讨了忻州市发展旅行社经济过程中存在的现实问题,并就忻州市发展旅行社经济提出了开发本地客源市场、设计本地旅游产品和加强旅行社管理等具体对策。     

资本结构与代理成本关系研究评述

资本结构与代理成本之间的关系始终是研究者关注的焦点。本文认为,资本结构中权益资本和债务资本会引发不同的代理成本,其产生的根源在于管理者与股东以及债权人与权益投资者之间存在不同的利益格局。在第一类和第二类代理冲突中,债务均具有重要的地位,但债务在第二类代理冲突中的作用与第一类冲突中显著不同。当企业股权集中时,大股东掌握着企业的实际控制权,企业的主要代理问题成为控股大股东与中、小股东之间的代理问题,这会导致其资本结构的代理成本与第一类和第二类代理成本显著不同。     

Agency costs and the discount rate for public sector enterprises

In this paper, we examine the implications of agency costs on the discount rate for public sector enterprises (PSEs); we do this in the framework of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. With the addition of agency costs, the discount rate for Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) under uncertainty becomes the risk-adjusted discount rate plus a premium for agency costs; under certainty, the discount rate for PSEs is shown to be the risk-free rate plus a premium for agency costs. Use of a discount rate by PSEs without adjusting for agency costs both under certainty and uncertainty, will lead to sub-optimal capital investment decisions by PSEs.     

强制分红政策与公司代理成本:博弈模型与DID检验

不同于公司自觉的现金分红行为，强制分红政策在矫正公司分红行为的同时，会激起高管的消极抵制，所以它能否有效降低公司代理成本，尚难预料。为此，建立了一个混合策略完全信息静态博弈，说明了强制分红政策影响代理成本的作用机制，并将2011年出台的强制分红政策视为一个准自然实验，实证检验强制分红政策能否降低上市公司的代理成本。实证研究发现，强制分红政策能够显著抑制企业的代理成本。异质性检验结果表明，相对于中小板和微股利的上市公司而言，强制分红政策可以更加显著地降低那些主板上市公司和正常发放股利的公司的代理成本。研究结果不仅支持了股利代理成本理论，而且为进一步完善公司股利政策和保护中小股东权益提供了经验证据。