Does financial connectedness predict crises?

The global financial crisis has reignited interest in models of crisis prediction. It has also raised the question whether financial interconnectedness—a possible source of systemic risk—can serve as an early warning indicator of crises. In this paper, we examine the ability of connectedness in the global network of financial linkages to predict systemic banking crises during the 1978–2010 period. Our results indicate that increases in a country’s own connectedness and decreases in its neighbours’ connectedness are associated with a higher probability of banking crises after controlling for macroeconomic fundamentals. Our findings suggest that financial interconnectedness has early warning potential, especially for the 2007–2010 wave of systemic banking crises.     

What do financial intermediaries do?

This paper presents evidence that the traditional banking business of accepting deposits and making loans has declined significantly in the US in recent years. There has been a switch from directly held assets to pension funds and mutual funds. However, banks have maintained their position relative to GDP by innovating and switching from their traditional business to fee-producing activities. A comparison of investor portfolios across countries shows that households in the US and UK bear considerably more risk from their investments than counterparts in Japan, France and Germany. It is argued that in these latter countries intermediaries can manage risk by holding liquid reserves and intertemporally smoothing. However, in the US and UK competition from financial markets prevents this and risk management must be accomplished using derivatives and other similar techniques. The decline in the traditional banking business and the financial innovation undertaken by banks in the US is interpreted as a response to the competition from markets and the decline of intertemporal smoothing.     

Does inequality lead to a financial crisis?

The recent global crisis has sparked interest in the relationship between income inequality, credit booms, and financial crises. Rajan (2010) and Kumhof and Rancière (2011) propose that rising inequality led to a credit boom and eventually to a financial crisis in the US in the first decade of the 21st century as it did in the 1920s. Data from 14 advanced countries between 1920 and 2000 suggest these are not general relationships. Credit booms heighten the probability of a banking crisis, but we find no evidence that a rise in top income shares leads to credit booms. Instead, low interest rates and economic expansions are the only two robust determinants of credit booms in our data set. Anecdotal evidence from US experience in the 1920s and in the years up to 2007 and from other countries does not support the inequality, credit, crisis nexus. Rather, it points back to a familiar boom-bust pattern of declines in interest rates, strong growth, rising credit, asset price booms and crises.     

Do financial advisors exhibit myopic loss aversion?

Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been proposed as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle, and a number of experiments on students indicate that people do exhibit MLA. However, many people do not rely on their own judgment when making investment decisions, but obtain help from financial investment advisors on how to allocate their wealth. The preferences and choices of financial advisors are thus important for understanding investment behavior. In this paper we make use of 50 professional financial advisors to examine whether they exhibit behavior consistent with MLA. Indeed, we find that they behave consistently with MLA to a larger extent than students.     

Is there a relation between audit fee cuts during the global financial crisis and banks’ financial reporting quality?

As a result of the global financial crisis (GFC), several audit clients were able to negotiate lower audit fees for the years 2008 and 2009. However, the PCAOB has expressed concern that lower audit fees might lead to lower audit effort and lower audit quality and financial reporting quality. This study examines the relation between audit fee cuts and banks’ financial reporting quality. Specifically, we focus on earnings management via loan loss provisions (LLP), the relation between current period LLP and future loan charge-offs, i.e., LLP validity, and the timely recognition of loan losses. For banks audited by Big 4 auditors, we find that income-increasing abnormal LLP are decreasing in audit fee cuts and LLP validity is increasing in audit fee cuts. For banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors, LLP validity is higher for banks that received a fee cut of more than 25% relative to other banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors. We do not observe an association between timely loan loss recognition and cuts in audit fees except for banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors and exempt from internal control audits where a fee cut of more than 25% is associated with less timely loan loss recognition. Overall, the findings suggest that Big 4 auditors constrained earnings management via LLP in banks that received cuts in audit fees. Our findings have important implications for regulators, investors, and others.     

Do financial conglomerates create or destroy economic value?

This paper investigates whether functional diversification is value-enhancing or value-destroying in the financial services sector, broadly defined. Based on a U.S. dataset comprising approximately 4060 observations covering the period 1985–2004, we report a substantial and persistent conglomerate discount among financial intermediaries. Our results suggest that it is diversification that causes the discount, and not that troubled firms diversify into other more promising areas. In addition, the discount applies to all financial services activity-areas with the exception of investment banking and is stable over different combinations of financial activity-areas with the exception of commercial banking units combined with insurance companies and/or investment banking activities.     

How loss averse are investors in financial markets?

We investigate loss aversion in financial markets using a typical asset allocation problem. Our theoretical and empirical results show that investors in financial markets are more loss averse than assumed in the literature. Moreover, loss aversion changes depending on market conditions; investors become far more loss averse during bull markets than during bear markets, indicating their more profound disutility for losses when others enjoy gains. Contrary to most previous results, we find that investors are more sensitive to changes in losses than changes in gains.     

Are modern financial systems shaped by state antiquity?

We demonstrate that existing differences in financial development between countries can be explained by the cumulative variations in their levels of state experience since 1 AD. This dimension of early historical development has not been considered so far in studies that analyze the determinants of financial development. The estimation allows for all major theories established in the literature as possible explanations for the disparity of financial development across the globe. Significance of state antiquity is robust to the use of alternative indicators of financial development, the consideration of different lengths and periods of statehood, and controlling for a range of variables or country characteristics. Our results highlight the important role of statehood in propelling financial system development, and thus provide some support to the view that historically determined differences in the early-start developmental advantage provide the basis for explaining the fundamental sources of variations in financial development between countries today.     

Gender stereotyping in financial advisors’ assessment of customers

This article presents the results of a comparison of male and female advisors’ assessment of their customers. The findings from the empirical material, consisting of 361 advisors’ answers to a questionnaire, show significant evidence that advisors assess their customers differently depending not only on customer gender, but also according to their own gender. The investigated variables are the advisors’ assessment of consumers’ perception of their own risk tolerance, customer satisfaction with the advisor, customer trust in the advisor, customer likelihood to follow the advice given and advisors’ ratings of customer financial literacy. Male advisors rated consumers’ answers higher than did their female colleagues for all variables, with the exception of advisors’ ratings of consumer financial literacy. Advisors and their employers in the financial services industry, as well as policymakers, should be aware of the possible association between advisor gender and potential gender stereotyping of clients.     

Audit committees’ social capital and financial reporting quality

We draw on social capital theory to examine the relationship between audit committee (AC) members’ social capital and financial reporting quality. Using US data for the period 2001–2010, our results suggest that non-AC directors’ social capital does not appear to be relevant to financial reporting quality. As far as AC members are concerned, our findings show a negative relationship between their social capital and financial reporting quality, suggesting a ‘dark side’ to social capital. Specifically, we find that sitting in multiple ACs (centrality) has a negative impact on reporting quality only for those AC members designated as financial experts. When other proxies for social capital are considered (connectedness, brokerage position and strong ties), our results show that the quality of financial reporting significantly decreases with the social capital of non-financial experts sitting in the AC. We contribute to prior research by: (i) relying on social capital theory, which is widely neglected in accounting research, (ii) using multiple metrics to capture the complex dimensions of social capital, and (iii) discriminating between the effects of financial and non-financial experts’ social capital on reporting quality. Our results suggest policy-makers might wish to limit financial experts’ multiple directorships as well as assess the actual contribution of non-financial experts to AC effectiveness.     

Assessing financial market integration in Asia – Equity markets

Financial integration has strong implications for financial stability. On the one hand, financial integration among economies helps to improve their capacity to absorb shocks and foster development. On the other hand, intensified financial linkages in a world of increasing capital mobility may also harbour the risk of cross-border financial contagion. This paper provides a survey of high-frequency indicators to monitor the development of equity market integration in Asia. The results show that after slowing down between 2002 and 2006, the equity market integration process picked up again in 2007–08. Nevertheless, the process is not complete and the degrees of integration between mature and emerging equity markets are different. The divergence may be attributed to the difference in the political, economic and institutional aspects across jurisdictions in Asia.     

Can financial statement analysis beat consensus analysts’ recommendations?

We examine whether investors can exploit financial statement information to identify companies with a greater likelihood of future earnings increases and whether stocks of those companies generate 1-year abnormal returns that exceed the abnormal returns from following analysts’ consensus recommendations. Our approach summarizes financial statement information into a “predicted earnings increase score,” which captures the likelihood of 1-year-ahead earnings increases. We find that, within our sample of consensus recommendations, stocks with high scores are much more likely to experience future earnings increases than stocks with low scores. A hedge portfolio strategy that utilizes our approach within each consensus recommendation level generates average annual abnormal returns of 10.9 percent over our 12-year sample period, after controlling for previously identified risk factors. These abnormal returns exceed those available from following analysts’ consensus recommendations. Our results show that share prices and consensus recommendations fail to impound financial statement information that helps predict future earnings changes.     

Do corporate boards matter during the current financial crisis?

This study examines the impact of corporate boards on firm performance during the current financial crisis. Using buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the crisis to measure firm performance, we find that board independence, as traditionally defined, does not significantly affect firm performance. However, when we redefine independent directors as outside directors who are less connected with current CEOs, a measure we call strong independence, there is a positive and significant relationship between this measure and firm performance. Second, outside financial experts are important for firm performance. We find that the positive impact of outside financial experts on firm performance is more significant than that of strong independence. Overall, our results suggest that firm performance during a crisis is a function of firm-level differences in corporate boards.     

Systemic risk and financial consolidation: Are they related?

The creation of a number of very large and sometimes increasingly complex financial institutions, resulting in part from the on-going consolidation of the financial system, has raised concerns that the degree of systemic risk in the financial system may have increased. We argue that firm inter-dependencies, as measured by correlations of stock returns, provide an indicator of systemic risk potential. We analyze the dynamics of the stock return correlations of a sample of US large and complex banking organizations (LCBOs) over 1988–1999, and find a significant positive trend in stock return correlations. This finding is consistent with the view that the systemic risk potential in the financial sector appears to have increased over the last decade. In addition, we relate firms' return correlations to their consolidation activity by estimating measures of the consolidation elasticity of correlation. Consolidation at the sample LCBOs appears to have contributed to LCBOs inter-dependencies. However, consolidation elasticities of correlation exhibit substantial time variation, and likely declined in the latter part of the decade. Thus, factors other than consolidation have also been responsible for the upward trend in return correlations.     

Dodd–Frank and risk in the financial services industry

We present evidence that discretionary risk taking by financial institutions has declined following the passage of Dodd–Frank. The largest institutions experience the greatest reduction in risk consistent with the legislation’s objective of reducing systemic risk and an ultimate goal of ending the too-big-to-fail doctrine. Analysis of a sample of banks, the most highly regulated financial institutions, reveals that banks exhibiting characteristics consistent with riskier business strategies prior to Dodd–Frank experience the greatest risk reduction. Further, banks that alter their business practices by increasing their capital ratios and reducing their level of non-performing loans following the law’s passage are shown to experience the greatest reduction in risk. Our results point to the efficacy of Dodd–Frank in reducing risk in the financial system.     

Are financial constraints of corporate activist investors perceived negatively?

This paper shows that financial constraints of corporate activist investors are negatively perceived by the market. By conducting an event study on a sample of 561 Schedule 13(D) filings disclosed by US corporations in the years 1996–2016, abnormal share price reactions in the [?10, \(+\)3] event window are about 10.8% lower for targets of financially constrained corporate investors. The average abnormal return for all targets is equal to 13.4%. This positive market response suggests that activism results in actual value improvement for the target. Yet, our analyses show that value improvements crucially depend on the investor’s access to external financing.     

The financial crisis: What is there to learn?

Many are currently studying the origins of the financial crisis in an attempt to answer two seemingly simple questions: why did it happen, and can another crisis be prevented? Those two questions have proved incredibly divisive. The majority opinion of The United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was submitted with two dissenting positions. Furthermore, The 2010 Economic Report of the United States President does not perfectly align with any opinion presented in that report. Few studies, however, provide proper consideration to the evolution of macroeconomic thought and lengthening of the business cycle preceding the current crisis.     

Does internal control over financial reporting really alleviate agency conflicts?

This study investigates whether internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) alleviates the managerial expropriation of corporate resources. We do this by examining the potential effects of material weaknesses in internal control on the values of corporate cash holdings and capital expenditures. Our findings suggest that ICFR facilitates the scrutiny and discipline of capital markets and thus alleviates the agency problems. Our results support the premise that high financial reporting quality impairs managers’ abilities to use corporate resources in a self‐serving manner.     

Have IFRS made a difference to intra-country financial reporting diversity?

According to the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are intended to provide a common set of globally applicable accounting standards, having the ultimate aim of reducing international financial reporting diversity. Much previous research on standards harmonisation has been conducted on relatively small samples and in periods which pre-date the introduction of mandatory IFRS in the EU and Australia. Most of these studies have also relied on some form of indexing technique to measure harmonisation (such as the modified C-index) which have since been challenged in the literature. Based on a sample of 81,560 firm years, this study examines whether the mandatory IFRS regime has led to any significant reductions in overall financial reporting diversity by companies within the EU and Australia. Financial reporting diversity is proxied by the variability of several balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement ratios measured over the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS periods. Variability is measured by the coefficient of variation (CV), a scale neutral measure of dispersion of a probability distribution. This measure avoids many of the methodological problems associated with index techniques. Notwithstanding some mixed findings, the group mean comparisons and multiple regression results indicate some statistically significant reductions in the variability of ratio measures in the post-IFRS period, even after controlling for factors such as firm size, industry and adoption status (whether a country is an IFRS adopter or not). While the results should be viewed as preliminary, they provide some tentative support for IASB’s current policy direction towards global accounting standards convergence (for instance, the IASB-FASB convergence project). The results also have implications for other countries contemplating a shift to IFRS, such as the United States and several Asian nations, including Japan and India. A useful direction for future research is to determine whether the same results hold using a more extensive post-IFRS sample.     

Euro money market spreads during the 2007–? financial crisis

In the paper we investigate the empirical features of euro area money market turbulence during the recent financial crisis. By means of a novel Fractionally Integrated Heteroskedastic Factor Vector Autoregressive model, we find evidence of a deterministic level factor in the EURIBOR-OIS (OIS) spreads term structure, associated with the two waves of stress in the interbank market, following the BNP Paribas (9 August 2007) and Lehman Brothers (16 September 2008) “shocks”, and two additional factors, of the long memory type, bearing the interpretation of curvature and slope factors, respectively. The unfolding of the crisis yields a significant increase in their persistence and volatility. We also find evidence of a declining trend in the level and volatility of OIS spreads since December 2008, associated with ECB liquidity policies.