美联储与美国“新经济”

持续了近七年的美国经济扩张向世界宣告了"新经济"的出现，美国经济率先迈入了"世界经济的新时代"──信息时代。持续的经济增长、低失业率和低通胀率并存构成"新经济"的突出表征，美国经济之所以会出现这种繁荣局面是多种因素促成的结果，其中美国联邦储备体系（以下简称"美联储"）成功的货币政策是其中不可缺少的一环。本文试从制度和历史角度来分析美联储与美国新经济之间的关系和互动作用。在美国的经济体系中，美联储主司货币政策。由于美国的金融体系十分发达，完全靠市场运作，且法律赋予美联储极大的独立性和影响力。美联储的职能主…     

美联储与欧洲中央银行的独立性对比分析

美联储与欧洲中国银行作为美国和欧盟的“中央银行”，都具有较高的独立性，其在发行货币，制定货币政策以及保证币值稳定方面具有较高的权力，不受政府或各成员国的干扰，也不接受其监督。本文从几个角度分析其独立性的不同。     

对抗美联储

美联储正在就一项法律提案与国会议员进行交锋,该法案名为美国联邦储备委员会问责制和透明度法案,要求美联储使用正式的规则来指导货币政策。美联储担心法律会限制其独立性,而该法案的支持者认为,这将产生更多可预测的低通胀经济增长。谁才是正确的呢？     

史上最严重的金融危机

2008年9月15日，必定成为人类金融史上的一个重要里程碑。 拥有158年辉煌历史的美国第四大投行雷曼兄弟宣布破产。 拥有94年历史的美国第三大投行美林公司被美洲银行收购。 举世震惊，全球恐慌，从美联储到中国人民银行，世界主要中央银行立刻宣布各种救市措施。     

全球金融周期变化对新兴经济体货币政策独立性的影响研究

文章以全球20个新兴经济体2005~2015年年度数据为样本,运用动态面板数据模型GMM方法考察了全球金融周期对于货币政策独立性的影响。研究发现,在金融一体化大背景下,以VIX指数为代表的全球金融周期会显著地影响一国货币政策的独立性,即便采取更为灵活的汇率制度,新兴经济体也无法保证其货币政策的独立性。文章还进一步证实当VIX指数下降时,美联储货币政策对新兴经济体货币政策影响加大,该国中央银行的货币政策独立性将会遭到削弱;当VIX指数上升时,美联储的货币政策对新兴经济体货币政策影响减小,该国中央银行的货币政策独立性将会得到加强。     

《中国人民银行法》:通货稳定的保证

《中国人民银行法》已经由八届全国人大三次会议审议通过,这是建国以来我国金融领域的第一部大法。共分8章51条,分别对中国人民银行的性质地位、组织结构、人民币、业务、金融监督管理、财务会计、法律责任等作了规定。国家以法律形式明确中国人民银行的性质地位,即是保障中央银行制定和执行正确的货币政策,从而为通货稳定提供了保障条件。 首先,《中国人民银行法》赋予中央银行相应的独立性,这为中央银行独立地执行货币政策提供了法律保证。《银行法》第二条规定,中     

中日中央银行独立性比较

一国中央银行的独立性在现代经济发展中具有十分重要的意义，本文通过对中国人民银行和日本银行之间独立性的比较，提出了中国人民银行在今后进一步加强独立性的若干建议。     

论法与经济的关系

马克思主义法哲学研究的一个关键问题是法与经济基础之间的联系问题。关于法和经济的诸多关系,马克思进行了一系列的研究和分析,他通过自己的著作来深入阐述这两者的方方面面。大体包括两个方面,一是法的发展性和变革性,另一方面是对法的包含内容、框架以及它的价值,以经济基础的角度来进行评判。我国关于法学的研究以及法律框架的构造深受马克思这些经典著作的影响,它对我们国家的法律发展和法律改革有很重要的现实意义。在这篇文章中,想要得到法学中独立性的重大现实意义,需要的是从两者之间的联系入手,马克思主义经济基础是重要的关键点。     

对美联储独立性的评价

中央银行体制自产生以来 ,各国中央银行无不在强化中央银行的卓然地位 ,追求中央银行的独立性。美联储是公认的世界上独立性最强的中央银行之一 ,其成功的做法为各国所仿效。我国设立的九大区域行就是仿效美国的 12大联储分行的做法 ,对此本文将做一分析     

锚定“长期国债波动率”的货币发行新机制——试析美联储扭转操作的原理与影响

美联储使用创新的扭转操作来实现其量化宽松的货币政策,说明其可能正在尝试通过人为地改变美国国债的风险收益比来达到政策目的。本文引用金融学传统的交易策略分析法来分析美联储扭转操作,认为美联储人为压低了美国长期国债的波动率,使长期国债波动率成为市场新的锚。本文将该操作视为美联储建立一种新的货币发行体系的尝试,并预测未来美联储扭转操作和其他量化宽松货币政策时对世界经济的潜在影响。     

How were the Federal Reserve Bank locations selected?

The Reserve Board Organization Committee decision to locate 12 Federal Reserve Banks is reviewed. Probability choice models estimate a city’s selection probability for a Federal Reserve Bank location. Results of predicted selections show reserve cities were selected for their spatial economic characteristics, including information contained in bankers’ preferences, infrastructure development, population and recent National Banking System growth, rather than Democratic Party politics. The Reserve Board Organization Committee placed Federal Reserve Banks in preeminent financial and commercial centers, and relied upon bankers’ preferences for the remaining non-obvious selections. Given 12 cities were to be selected, the conclusion drawn is the decision was in the public interest.     

我国中央银行的独立性及其完善

中央银行作为一国货币政策的制定者和执行者,其政策关系到整个国民经济能否顺利运行,而其政策是否具有稳定性﹑一贯性,银行体制是否健全,对于市场投资者而言,具有重要的指标作用。中央银行的独立性问题一直是各国金融理论的热点之一。但是,我国中央银行的独立性在人事任命、政策决策、财务预算管理等方面受到很大的限制,只有在立法和实践中更好地加强中央银行独立性的地位,才能更好地发挥中央人民银行的职能。     

Reverse-lag reserve accounting,bank behavior,and monetary control: A formal analysis

Conclusion The fundamental conclusion of the analysis contained in this paper is that Laurent's claims concerning the potential monetary control enhancements of the adoption of a reverse-lag reserve accounting system are correct. This result conflicts with those reached by other studies of the monetary control properties of RLA, because the model of RLA used in this paper has been based on an analysis of the microeconomic behavior of banks. The conclusion that monetary control could be improved by adoption of RLA vindicates Laurent's [1984] argument that a “microbank analysis” is fundamental to understanding correctly the workings of an RLA system. An important qualification that prohibits a conclusion that RLA clearly is superior to lagged or contemporaneous accounting is that the monetary control enhancements resulting from adoption of RLA are mitigated to some extent by the existence of the Federal Reserve discount window. Indeed, the relative desirability of RLA as compared to alternative reserve accounting systems cannot be evaluateda priori in the presence of a discount window. Any serious consideration of RLA would need to be prefaced by a careful study of the relationship of the money stock to bank borrowing in an RLA setting. The final version of this paper was written while the author was a visiting economist at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. This paper has benefited considerably from comments and suggestions by Robert Laurent, Kenneth Kopecky, Daniel Friel, Chris Waller, Elmus Wicker, and participants in a seminar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and in the Indiana University Money and Banking Seminar. Initial work on this topic was supported by an Indiana University Summer Faculty Fellowship. Any errors are the author's responsibility, and any views expressed in the paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or its staff.     

Duopoly conjectures

This paper embodies the views of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or of the Federal Reserve System.     

Testing for shifts in variability

This paper embodies the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or of the Federal Reserve System.     

Annuities and inflation

This paper embodies the views of the author and does not represent the views or policy of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.     

Institutionalisation without internalisation. The cultural dimension of French-German conflicts on European Central Bank independence

When accepting the Maastricht treaty, the members of the Euro-zone agreed on the establishment of a very independent European Central Bank (ECB). Over the years, however, French political leaders systematically brought forward proposals undermining the ECB’s independence, much to the dismay of their German counterparts. This pattern of political disagreement on central bank independence has again surfaced during the current sovereign debt crisis, and has contributed to the discord amongst the Euro-zone members on the causes and proper solutions to the problems. This article conducts tests of various factors generally expected to influence the preference for central bank independence. It shows that economic explanations are unable to account for the persistent differences amongst European member-states on this issue. In contrast, national differences in political and economic culture and especially a nation’s score on the dimension Power Distance—its acceptance of centralisation of power in political leaders or institutions—does show a correlation with the different levels of internalisation of the norm of central bank independence. These findings show that institutionalisation of economic norms does not imply their internalisation by the political and the economic elite. In the broader context of current European politics, this may mean that even if European leaders will be able to come up with a common institutional answer to the current crisis, more profound convergence of their underlying economic and political cultures is needed for the successful and sustainable implementation of these solutions.     

Is the US quantitative easing more effective than China's? A second thought

We study the balance sheet of the People's Bank of China and the Federal Reserve Bank in a historical context and analyze whether the recent round of global expansionary monetary policy has been effective in achieving its desired economic effects. In particular, we focus on the roles played by excess reserves, monetary aggregates and financing to the real economy and highlight the tension between a liquid financial sector and an illiquid real sector. We show that, while both China and the US have followed reserve-driven growth strategies, the compositions and relative sizes of these quantities are quite different. In relative terms, excess reserves and lackluster corporate lending constitute a big problem for the US, whereas for China the pertinent question is how to further mobilize funds tied up in the real estate and stock market. We provide some thoughts on possible solutions to the current policy dilemma at the end.     

美联储货币互换工具的实践及对我国央行的启示

货币互换是指两国央行之间签订的为了解决流动性问题的一种金融管理工具。布雷顿森林体系成立以来,美联储基于不同目的多次与其它央行签订了货币互换协议。我国央行为便利双边贸易和投资于2001年开始使用货币互换工具。通过对比分析,我们认为美联储货币互换的实践对我国央行进一步实施、完善和拓展货币互换工具的使用有借鉴意义。     

Cross-sectional aggregation and demand system estimation

The views expressed herein are the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Loyola College of Maryland, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or their staffs.