推进机动车辆保险费率市场化改革势在必行

机动车辆保险费率市场化是近些年来保险市场上的一个热门话题,也是制约机动车辆保险市场发展的一个瓶颈和唯一的出路。回顾30多年来车险费率的变化、利弊以及市场化的前提条件等,对加快费率市场化有一个更为清晰的认识,既要充分认识车险费率市场化的重要性和必要性,摈弃那些保守怕乱的错误认识,从市场经济和市场化对接的高度理解车险改革特别是费率改革的迫切性,又要认真做好思想准备、技术准备、人员准备和流程准备工作,积极搭建适合费率市场化操作平台的步伐,坚定不移地走机动车辆保险费率市场化改革之路。     

A Note on Deductible Insurance and Production

This paper examines the optimal production decision of a firm facing revenue risk. We show that the purchase of actuarially fair deductible insurance unambiguously induces the firm to produce more if the firm is not only risk averse but also prudent. If the firm's perferences satisfy constant absolute risk aversion, buying actuarially unfair deductible insurance unambiguously enhances production should the positive loading factor be sufficiently small. When there are moral hazard problems in that the firm's output cannot be contracted upon, we show that the purchase of actuarially fair deductible insurance unambiguously induces the firm to produce more if the firm's utility function is quadratic.     

The Incentive Effects of Increasing Per-Claim Deductible Contracts in Automobile Insurance

A new rating system of automobile insurance for vehicle damage in Taiwan was launched in 1996, introducing a deductible that increases with the number of claims. In this article, we provide a theoretical rationale for the existence of an increasing per‐claim deductible system and show that the new system is most likely an optimal choice for those insured who tend to have lower claims probability when incentives are present. Using a unique dynamic data set, we are able to conduct a natural experiment to examine the incentive effects (both positive and negative) by looking at the change in claim tendency before and after switching between two deductible plans: an increasing per‐claim deductible and a zero deductible. Our results provide direct evidence of the effects of deductible structures on claim behavior.     

Strategic Price Discrimination in Compulsory Insurance Markets

This paper considers price discrimination when competing firms do not observe a customer’s type but only some other variable correlated to it. This is a typical situation in many insurance markets—such as motor insurance—where it is also often the case that insurance is compulsory. We characterise the equilibria and their welfare properties under various price regimes. We show that discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as gender is a dominant strategy, either when firms offer policies at a fixed price or when they charge according to some consumption variable that is correlated to costs. In the latter case, gender discrimination can be an outcome of strategic interaction alone in situations where it would not be adopted by a monopolist. Strategic price discrimination may also increase cross subsidies between types, contrary to expectations.JEL Classification No.: L13, G22     

强制责任保险与无过失保险可否兼容?——台湾的经验与大陆的教训

强制责任保险与无过失保险是机动车强制保险的两种模式,二者在保险原理、保障范围及运作机制等方面都有较大不同。与大多数强制责任保险立法不同,我国台湾地区《强制汽车责任保险法》在强制责任保险的框架内吸收了无过失保险的经验,规定了保险公司的无过失赔偿责任,并已被实践证明运行良好。然而,《道路交通安全法》第76条强制责任保险与无过失保险结合的规定却遭到了质疑。因此,有必要探讨强制责任保险与无过失保险的兼容性问题。     

Deregulation,Pricing Strategies,and Claim Behavior in the Taiwan Automobile Insurance Market

Stringent pricing regulations have long been in effect in the Taiwan automobile insurance market. In April 2009, a pricing deregulation was adopted, enabling insurers to establish their own auto insurance premium rates. This study examines the effects of deregulation in terms of three hypotheses that we propose pertaining to market shares, loading factors, and last policy month claims. The quantitative analysis results show that pricing deregulation prompts insurers to lower their rates. The effects of deregulation for insurers are determined by not only the decision to deduct premiums and the deduction percentages, but also by policy type.     

To Insure or Not to Insure?: An Insurance Puzzle

The selection of a deductible level in insurance is governed by the willingness to limit the risk borne by risk-averse agents at an acceptable cost, given the deadweight insurance loading. We examine the demand for insurance in a simple lifecycle model with a liquidity constraint and no serial correlation in the insurable risk. This allows for consumers to follow a time-diversification (self-insurance) strategy by accumulating buffer stock wealth. We conclude that insurance would only be demanded for catastrophic risks, or by people that are currently liquidity constrained. The added value of the insurance sector is thus surprisingly low in such an economy.     

Optimal Insurance Design Under a Value-at-Risk Framework

This study designs an optimal insurance policy form endogenously, assuming the objective of the insured is to maximize expected final wealth under the Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint. The optimal insurance policy can be replicated using three options, including a long call option with a small strike price, a short call option with a large strike price, and a short cash-or-nothing call option. Additionally, this study also calculates the optimal insurance levels for these models when we restrict the indemnity to be one of three common forms: a deductible policy, an upper-limit policy, or a policy with proportional coinsurance. JEL Classification No: G22     

Automobile Insurance Contracts and Risk of Accident: An Empirical Test Using French Individual Data

Insurance has for a long time been perceived as a way of transferring responsibility from insured agents to insurers and thus as potentially influencing insured agents' behavior. Two particular opportunistic behaviors have been analyzed. First, the theory of adverse selection predicts that high-risk agents are likely to demand more insurance than are low-risk agents. Second, the theory of moral hazard predicts that the wider the insurance coverage, the less agents will try to prevent accidents. Both theories thus conclude that agents who are totally insured should have a higher probability of accident than those with only partial insurance, ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, one of the aims of insurance rating systems is to control for these opportunistic behaviors. In this article, we use individual data to see if the French automobile insurance rating system has achieved this aim. We do this using a two-step maximum-likelihood method. First, we compute a probit model to estimate the probability of taking out comprehensive versus third-party insurance. We then calculate the generalized residual, which is included as an independent variable in a negative binomial model estimating the probability of having an accident. The coefficient of this variable is argued to represent adverse selection and ex-ante moral-hazard behavior.     

现阶段商业银行汽车贷款保证保险问题分析--兼评保监会《关于规范汽车消费贷款保证保险业务有关问题的通知》

保监会《关于规范汽车消费贷款保证保险业务有关问题的通知》在贷款流程、除外责任、索赔顺序、承保期限等方面对银行汽车贷款产生了较大的影响。该《通知》将被保险人(银行)的实质性审查义务作为保证保险合同生效的要件值得商榷,也没有合理、公平地划分保险公司和银行之间的风险。对此,作者认为,商业银行在汽车消费贷款中不能过分依赖保证保险,积极探索汽车贷款风险防范的其他途径,巧妙利用保险公司的先索抗辩权并不包括汽车的其他财产险、偷盗险等险种的有利条件,注意区分汽车贷款诈骗的情况,严防保险公司对诈骗做扩大解释,从而有效防范和化解汽车贷款义务中存在的风险。     

论不健全交强险关系之效力重构

在驾驶人使用机动车未得投保人允许或存在违法行为等不健全交强险关系中,被保险人将不享有保险金给付请求权,但现行法将保险人的责任限制在抢救费用的垫付上,有违保护受害人之立法目的。尽管实务部门以限缩解释“未得投保人允许”以及扩张违法驾车情形下保险人的责任等方式,在一定程度上强化了对受害人的保护,但仍存在一些保护漏洞。不健全交强险关系的效力应当限于使保险人取得对不正当被保险人的追偿权,而不应当对受害人的保险金请求权产生不利影响。现行法对保险人追偿权的规定采列举模式,无法涵盖所有情形。“未得投保人允许”除“被保险机动车被盗抢期间肇事”外,尚包括“擅自驾驶他人机动车”的情形。被保险人违法驾车除《交强险条例》第22条已经列举的情形外,还应包括其他不真正义务的违反。为兼顾被保险人的正当利益,保险人的追偿权应受到适当限制。除应具备因果关系要件外,对被保险人非因故意而违反不真正义务的情形应废弃全有全无原则,而改采比例原则。     

论保险代位求偿权行使的范围限制

保险代位求偿权当然有其行使范围.时至今日,理论界有很多学者认为:"代位求偿权只在财产保险中适人身保险中不存在代位求偿权."但依有些学者的态度,保险代位求偿权不只适用于财产保险.我国<保险法>的有关规定(第68条)虽有力地支持了否定说,但亦留下了一些缺憾.笔者建议将<保险法>第68条修改为:"人身保险的被保险人因第三者的行为发生保险事故的,保险人向被被保险人或者受益人给付保险金后,不得享有向第三者追偿的权利.但被保险人或者受益人仍有权向第三者请求赔偿."这样,肯定说就难有立锥之地了.     

汽车保险精算定价模型研究综述

汽车保险定价模型在非寿险精算领域内占有重要地位,本文对车险定价模型一百多年来的研究进展作了综述性的回顾。首先,本文介绍了车险定价模型的先验估费方法;其次着重介绍了时齐的后验估费方法,以及时变的先验后验相结合的精算模型;最后提出了车险定价模型的未来发展方向。     

Long-Term Care Insurance and Life Insurance Demand

This article investigates the interaction between life insurance and long-term care insurance markets on the demand side. In the model utility depends on both consumption and bequest, and utility from consumption is contingent on the state of health. While the demand for life insurance increases both with decreasing income and with a rising degree of altruism, the influences of these two parameters on the demand for long-term care insurance are ambiguous. If the utility shock arising from disability declines, both insurance demands will rise.     

论人寿保险公司的核心竞争力

我国寿险公司只有正确地处理客户、产品、销售和员工之间的关系,实现四者有机结合、相互协调、相互促进的契合关系,在价值观、企业文化、服务体系、人力资源、绩效管理以及知识共享等方面,比竞争对手更为领先、执行得更加有效,我国寿险公司才能在未来的激烈竞争中处于不败之地。     

最优免赔额定价分析

免赔额定价是保险市场较为关注的实践问题,通过科学地设定免赔限额,能够合理地在保险人和投保人之间分配风险,从而帮助保险人避免无效率的小额赔偿过多的状况,降低总体的理赔成本,在一定程度上改善社会总福利。本文从投保人效用最大化和保险公司利润最大化的角度讨论了最优免赔额的确定问题,并且根据模型推导出的解析方程,采用我国车险市场的实际数据,测算出我国车险市场的理论最优免赔额。     

汽车经销商授信风险的防范与控制

汽车经销商授信业务是目前商业银行利润新的增长点,具有良好的发展前景,但由于我国的汽车经销商授信业务还处于起步阶段,风险防范经验不足,如何防范、控制授信风险成为商业银行面临的重要课题.     

建立我国巨灾保险制度的思考

自然灾害的频繁发生所造成的损失逐年攀升.对于巨灾损失我国政府已习惯于采取财政的手段来应对一个个非预期的巨额窟窿,这在一定程度上影响了我国经济的健康可持续发展、社会稳定和国家安全.鉴于世界其他国家应对巨灾采取的再保险措施,我国政府可根据我国政治体制和法律完善程度来建立再保险市场,利用市场来分散巨灾风险,而非利用财政与自然...     

积极推进医疗保险体制改革

建国以后,中国机关事业单位实行公费医疗制度,企业实行劳保医疗制度.随着社会主义市场经济体制的确立和国有企业改革的不断深划,与之相配套的社会保障制度建设也在加速进行.作为社会保障制度的重要组成部分,医疗保障制度的弊端愈发明显.它的改革和建设,息息相关的影响和改变着中国人民的生活和权益;它的改革和完善,也将对当前和今后国民经济的发展起到有力的促进作用.本文在总结医疗保险制度的历史与现状的基础上,通过对新、旧医疗保险制度存在的弊端进行了分析,从而提出新时期推进医疗保险体制改革的对策.     

交强险立法与实践的两个法律问题辨析——以侵权责任法律关系为视角

交强险倍受争议的所谓“无责赔付”原则,其依据是《道路交通安全法》第76条。道交法第76条规定在强制保险限额内不问侵权责避免任归属而径由保险埋单,属逻辑颠倒,片面强调交强险的社会救济功能,摒弃责任保险的基本逻辑,实为交强险诸多问题的根源。《侵权责任法》对此未有实质改进,失去立法矫正机会。实践中无辜受害车辆反而多赔肇事车辆...