Does mandatory IFRS adoption improve information quality in low investor protection countries?

We examine the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the information quality of financial reporting in France, Germany and Sweden. These three Western European civil law countries are characterized as low investor protection by the World Economic Forum's 2012/2013 Global Competitiveness Report. Using data for 2003 and 2011, we find significant improvement in both forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion following mandatory IFRS adoption in all three countries. Furthermore, the effect on information quality is greater the lower the strength of investor protection. These results suggest that mandatory IFRS adoption in low investor protection countries leads to an improvement in information quality. A tentative implication of the results is that standard setters should not delay IFRS adoption pending regulators implementing a high investor protection.     

Analysts' Forecasts Following Forced CEO Changes

This paper examines analysts' earnings forecasts during the period of uncertainty following a change of chief executive officer (CEO). It distinguishes between forced and non‐forced CEO changes, and examines whether analysts utilize their information advantage to reduce the heightened uncertainty of a forced change of CEO. Examining a sample of Australian companies followed by analysts between 1999 and 2009, we find that forecasting accuracy is lower and earnings forecasts are more optimistic for firms experiencing forced CEO turnover compared to firms not undergoing such a change. However, dispersion is not statistically different. The results suggest that forced CEO turnover events provide a challenge to the forecasting environment for analysts. During CEO changes, investors should be aware that forecasts are less accurate and have an optimistic bias.     

信息不对称与金融市场脆弱性

在金融市场中,信息起着至关重要的作用.作为金融市场中普遍存在的现象,信息不对称是导致金融市场脆弱性的主要原因之一.本文对金融市场中的信息不对称现象进行了详细的分析,同时提出了相应的解决措施.     

Product market competition and analyst forecasting activity: International evidence

In this study, we investigate how product market competition affects the extent of analyst following and the properties of analyst forecasts. Using a broad sample of firms from 37 countries over the 1990–2008 period, we find that firms that operate in more concentrated industries and with stronger pricing power are associated with greater analyst following, higher forecast accuracy, and lower forecast dispersion. Moreover, the effect of product market power on analyst following and forecast properties is more pronounced in countries with less effective competition laws and higher entry costs. These findings suggest that high industry concentration and a dominant market position enhance the earnings predictability of firms and lower their information uncertainty, and that country-level institutions that promote competition effectively constrain the power in product markets.     

分工与证券市场信息披露

本首先从对信息披露制度的争论提出问题，然后以新兴古典经济学视角研究证券市场信息披露制度。股东与经理之间的分工导致信息不对称，为消除信息不对称、为减少股东与经理之间交易协调失灵的风险，需要证券市场信息披露制度。章最后从减少内生交易费用和限制外生交易费用的角度，指出我国信息披露制度应该完善的地方。     

Voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry in Denmark

This paper examines if the level of voluntary disclosure affects information asymmetry for industrial companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. Economic theory suggests that disclosing more information should lower the information asymmetry component of a firm's cost of capital [Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2000)]. The results indicate that voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with proxies for information asymmetry. The results are robust even after controlling for various firm characteristics introduced in related literature. Despite differences in institutional settings the findings in our paper are similar to the ones based on US data.     

Information asymmetry,mutual funds and earnings management: Evidence from China

This paper investigates how information asymmetry and mutual fund ownership affect listed companies’ earnings management. We show that (1) reducing information asymmetry improves firms’ earnings management behavior; (2) relative to short-term mutual funds, long-term mutual funds promote earnings quality by adopting a monitoring role; and (3) by dividing firms into high/low information asymmetry groups, we find that the information environment significantly increases the effect of long-term mutual funds on firms’ earnings management. In this paper, we provide new evidence for the role that institutional investors play in a typical emerging capital market. Our results have clear policy implications: to increase earnings quality, it is essential to improve information transparency and develop long-term institutional investors.     

Market behaviour around bankruptcy announcements: evidence from the Australian Stock Exchange

The corporate distress literature to date has largely focused on the predictive power of accounting variables ( Altman, 2001 ). Following previous literature, this study examines the relevance of abnormal stock returns in discriminating between failed and non‐failed firms (e.g. Clark and Weinstein, 1983; Shumway, 2001). Our results confirm the findings of previous literature that investors in failed firms typically incur substantial negative stock returns leading up to failure announcements. However, in contrast to prior research we do not find evidence of an announcement effect (i.e. negative stock returns on the event day itself or the day preceding). We also document evidence that the bid‐ask spreads of failed firms widen substantially up to 7 months prior to failure, indicating the likelihood of significant information asymmetries across investors in failed firms.     

Information asymmetry and accounting disclosures for joint ventures

In September 1999, the Financial Accounting Foundation issued a special report recommending the use of the equity method supplemented with appropriate disclosures for corporate joint ventures in the United States. This study, using data for corporate joint ventures in Singapore, provides some preliminary evidence regarding the effect of the supplementary information disclosure on information asymmetry among market participants as measured by bid-ask spreads. The results show that the disclosure of supplementary information of joint ventures is associated with a significant decline in bid-ask spreads. The results also indicate that the decline in information asymmetry is larger when the investment in joint ventures is significant and that larger investing firms tend to have a smaller decline in information asymmetry compared to smaller investing firms. The implications of this study, that the provision of supplementary information about joint ventures could reduce information asymmetry among participants in equity markets, thus leveling the playing field among traders, could have implications for policymakers.     

现代资本结构理论

自Modigliani和Miller提出MM理论以来,资本结构问题一直是理论界和实务界关注的焦点.本文从MM理论及其修正--基于税差的分析、基于权衡理论的资本结构理论、信息不对称条件下的资本结构理论、资本结构的实证研究四个方面阐述了自20世纪50年代以来资本结构理论的发展和研究成果,试图为我国学者开展资本结构研究提供借鉴.     

Do Publicly Signalled Earnings Management Incentives Affect Analyst Forecast Accuracy?

Using a panel of listed Australian firms for the years 1999–2007, this paper investigates whether analysts' forecast efficiency is improved by the occurrence of a publicly observable event, such as a CEO appointment, which signals a firm's earnings management incentives. Two supporting hypotheses are also tested: first, that CEO appointments are associated with income‐decreasing earnings management; and second, that analyst forecast errors increase with the level of earnings management present in current period financial statements. Consistent with prior literature, we find income‐decreasing earnings management in the year of CEO appointment. Earnings management, as a general phenomenon, is found to be significantly related to analyst forecast errors in the period in which the earnings management occurs. However, we present evidence that analyst forecasts for current year earnings are significantly more accurate with respect to earnings management in cases where a CEO is appointed during the current financial period.