Margining in derivatives markets and the stability of the banking sector

We investigate the effects of margining, a widely-used mechanism for attaching collateral to derivatives contracts, on derivatives trading volume, default risk, and on the welfare in the banking sector. First, we develop a stylized banking sector equilibrium model to develop some basic intuition of the effects of margining. We find that a margin requirement can be privately and socially sub-optimal. Subsequently, we extend this model into a dynamic simulation model that captures some of the essential characteristics of over-the-counter derivatives markets. Contrarily to the common belief that margining always reduces default risk, we find that there exist situations in which margining increases default risk, reduces aggregate derivatives’ trading volume, and has an ambiguous effect on welfare in the banking sector. The negative effects of margining are exacerbated during periods of market stress when margin rates are high and collateral is scarce. We also find that central counterparties only lift some of the inefficiencies caused by margining.     

Competition in markets with dominant firms: A note on the evidence from the Italian banking industry

In this paper we consider the Italian banking industry, where the eight largest firms operate at a national level, manage about a half of total loans, and have a notably larger dimension than the other competitors. We estimate a structural model containing a behavioural parameter, in order to assess the market conduct of the largest banks for the period 1988–2000. Our finding is that, in spite of their noteworthy size and significant market share, these banks have been characterised by a more competitive conduct than the Bertrand–Nash outcome: this is in line with the results of the latest literature of the field, for which in the banking industry there is often no conflict between competition and concentration.     

Competition in banking: A disequilibrium approach

The Rosse–Panzar revenue test for competitive conditions in banking is based on observation of the impact on bank revenue of variation in factor input prices. We identify the implications for the H-statistic of misspecification bias in the revenue equation, arising when adjustment towards market equilibrium is partial and not instantaneous. In simulations, fixed effects estimation produces a measured H-statistic that is severely biased towards zero. Empirical results for the banking sectors of the Group of Seven (G7) countries corroborate our principal finding, that a dynamic formulation of the revenue equation is required for accurate identification of the H-statistic.     

Systemic risk in an interconnected banking system with endogenous asset markets

We analyze the emergence of systemic risk in a network model of interconnected bank balance sheets. The model incorporates multiple sources of systemic risk, including size of financial institutions, direct exposure from interbank lendings, and asset fire sales. We suggest a new macroprudential risk management approach building on a system wide value at risk (SVaR). Under the SVaR metric, the contribution of individual banks to systemic risk is well defined and can be approximated by a Shapley value-type measure. We show that, in a SVaR regime, a fair systemic risk charge which is proportional to a bank's individual contribution to systemic risk diverges from the optimal macroprudential capitalization of the banks from a planner's perspective. The results have implications for the design of macroprudential capital surcharges.     

Competition in fragmented markets: New evidence from the German banking industry in the light of the subprime crisis

Of all of the EU member states, Germany has the largest banking market. However, not all German banking institutions necessarily face fierce competition. Because the industry is highly fragmented, strict separation of the three existing banking pillars may impede competition, with negative effects on financial stability. We assess the competitive stances of 1,888 universal banks from 2001 to 2009 by using the Panzar–Rosse revenue test. We find evidence that measuring competition at an average country level does not necessarily generate valid evaluations of fragmented markets. In addition, we find no clear indication that either the particular objectives of cooperative and savings banks or the legal protection of these institutions impedes competition or discriminates against private banks. Therefore, as long as the relationship between competition and financial stability is dubious, the overall effect and the social costs or benefits of political measures that influence the structure of the German banking market are at least questionable.     

Competition in British retail banking

This article employs British cross-section time-series data to examine the competitive behavior of retail banks in the period 1985–1989. Product offerings are found to consist of both survivor and dominated products over time. In addition, there is evidence of price discrimination being practiced by banks. Individual banks are found to be influential in the setting of interest rates for retail bank products, though there is wide variation across banks and products.     

Financial nexus: Efficiency and soundness in banking and capital markets

Based on a modified version of the model used in Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) and De Guevara et al. (2005), we argue that banks' soundness, the structural characteristics and efficiency of the banking sector along with the development of the capital markets constitute a financial nexus. For a data set of 63 developed and developing countries, we find evidences that efficiency significantly modulates the linkages between concentration and soundness. We also find that capital markets' development supports a stable evolution in banking sector. For the relationship between capital markets and soundness, our findings appear to be robust for various measures of the considered variables as well as for different estimation techniques. Regarding the impact of the concentration upon soundness, the results obtained display a certain sensitivity about the way concentration is measured.     

Monetary transmission during low interest rate environment in a dual banking system: evidence from Malaysia

This study aims to determine the role of bank loans in the transmission of monetary policy in an environment of low interest rate in the context of a dual banking system in Malaysia. By adopting a balanced panel data approach applied on data covering the period from 2000 to 2011, the study finds that changes in the monetary policy have no significant impact on the level of financing extended by the Islamic and conventional banks. However, bank-specific factors, namely size and liquidity play an important role in influencing the lending behaviour of both the Islamic and conventional banks, whereas capitalization is relevant only for the Islamic banks. Findings of the study provide important input for effective monetary policy implementation in countries with increasing presence of the Islamic banks.     

Competition in securities markets: the impact on liquidity

Competition for order flow is widely documented for U.S. markets, but is a relatively new phenomenon in European equities trading. Only with the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, which went into effect in November 2007, did new trading venues emerge in Europe that for the first time ever seriously threatened established exchanges. Chi-X, one of the new competitors, has gained a considerable market share, eroding the traditional exchanges’ share of equities trading volumes. As the proliferation of new trading venues in Europe increases the danger of market fragmentation, this paper analyzes the potentially positive liquidity implications of a new trading venue. To this end, we examine the impact of the Chi-X market entry in French blue-chip equities on the liquidity of their home market. Our findings suggest that in consequence of the new competitor’s market entry, liquidity in the most actively traded stocks was enhanced on the home market during the observation period. This improvement exceeds the general European liquidity trend measured by a matching firm approach, which implies that despite fragmentation of order flow, market quality may even be enhanced.     

Competition for small firm banking business: Bank actions versus market structure

This paper addresses two questions related to the ongoing consolidation of the US banking industry and its effect on small firm financing. First, are conventional measures of market structure (e.g. geographic market size and deposit concentration) related to bank competition for small firm financial business? Second, does an increase in bank competition produce an improvement in bank services irrespective of market structure? To answer these questions we use a survey of small firm owners that asks them to report on changes in bank competition for their business. Our findings show that reports of increased competition by small firm owners are negatively related to the level of and change in deposit concentration. In addition, we find a significant positive association between changes in bank competition reported by small firms and their reports of changes in banking outcomes (e.g. service quality) that is independent of deposit concentration, firm risk, and credit usage.     

Interstate banking in rural markets: The evidence from the corn belt

This report studies the causes and effects of interstate expansion into the rural banking markets of the Corn Belt. A logit analysis indicates the prior characteristics attracting out-of-state organizations to specific rural banks include lower loan-to-deposit ratio, greater market share of deposits, and less initial exposure to agricultural lending. Consistent with previous research on the more traditional forms of geographic market expansion, there is as yet no evidence the out-of-state organizations are abandoning local lending or competing unfairly. We do find significant increases in the loan-to-deposit ratios after purchase, due primarily to increases in the non-agricultural loan holdings on the portfolios. The results suggest the possibility the rural affiliates are serving as warehouses for loans originated elsewhere.     

Explaining banking stability in Sub-Saharan Africa

The study examined banking stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results reveal that banking spread (Net Interest Margin – NIM) is the main determinant of stability and the major means to achieve stability during crises periods. We however find the existence of a threshold effect in NIM.Crises in the banking sector consistently showed to reduce stability. While the results show that high percentage of foreign banks reduce stability, we find foreign banks help stabilize the banking sector in periods of crises. The results show that diversification could also have a positive impact on stability (Z-score) even though this relationship was not robust enough. The results also largely support the competition-fragility view. Particularly, we find that less competition during crises periods can help improve stability. Again, we find evidence for both concentration-stability and concentration-fragility hypotheses depending on the stability measure used. We however find that when large banks in concentrated markets are well regulated, stability could be improved. Weak regulatory environment reduces stability (Z-score) directly and matters during crises periods. Our results are robust to the use of different indicators of stability and estimation methods.     

Bank Mergers and Diversification: Implications for Competition Policy

This paper analyses competition and mergers among risk averse banks. We show that the correlation between the shocks to the demand for loans and the shocks to the supply of deposits induces a strategic interdependence between the two sides of the market. We characterise the role of diversification as a motive for bank mergers and analyse the consequences of mergers on loan and deposit rates. When the value of diversification is sufficiently strong, bank mergers generate an increase in the welfare of borrowers and depositors. If depositors have more correlated shocks than borrowers, bank mergers are relatively worse for depositors than for borrowers.     

Competition in two‐sided markets

Many markets involve two groups of agents who interact via “platforms,“ where one group's benefit from joining a platform depends on the size of the other group that joins the platform. I present three models of such markets: a monopoly platform; a model of competing platforms where agents join a single platform; and a model of “competitive bottlenecks” where one group joins all platforms. The determinants of equilibrium prices are (i) the magnitude of the cross‐group externalities, (ii) whether fees are levied on a lump‐sum or per‐transaction basis, and (iii) whether agents join one platform or several platforms.     

Restructuring,consolidation and competition in Latin American banking markets

This study examines the competitive conditions in the banking industries of eleven Latin American countries for the period 1993–2000. For these countries, the time interval under examination corresponds to an era characterized by substantial reforms to restructure their banking systems, increased consolidation and foreign bank penetration. The banks in our sample are found to be earning their revenues as if operating under monopolistic competition, as in many other developed and emerging financial systems. The results indicate that, overall, market concentration is not significantly related with competitive conduct. At the country level, however, we do observe a decline in competition for Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela in late 1990s which may be attributable to increased consolidation. Further, we observe that deregulation and opening up of the financial markets for foreign participation serves as an important catalyst to increase the competitiveness of banking markets. Higher degree of competition in the sector, in return, is associated with reduced bank margins and profitability but improved cost efficiency.     

Competition and voluntary disclosure: evidence from deregulation in the banking industry

We use the relaxation of interstate branching restrictions under the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) to examine how increases in competition affect incumbents’ voluntary disclosure choices. States implemented the IBBEA over several years and to varying degrees, allowing us to identify the effect of increased competition on the voluntary disclosure decisions of both public and private banks. We find that increases in competition are associated with an increase in press releases. Overall, press releases become more negative in tone as entry barriers decrease. However, disclosures by public banks and by banks issuing equity become incrementally positive in tone when entry barriers decrease. Thus, the increase in disclosure is consistent with a dominant incentive to deter entry via negative information, which is mitigated by an incentive to communicate positive information to investors.