Quality disclosure in the presence of strategic consumers

Consider a market for short-life products, such as smartphones, where a firm and consumers have asymmetric quality information, the firm sells products in two periods, and consumers make purchase decisions strategically. We investigate when a firm should disclose quality and the interaction between consumers' strategic behavior and the firm's disclosure behavior. We obtain several findings. First, regardless of whether consumers have low or high patience, the firm should disclose quality information if product quality is high and conceal it if product quality is low. However, for products with moderate quality levels, the firm will disclose more quality information to consumers with relatively high or low patience levels than when consumer patience is moderate. Second, firms will disclose less information when consumers behave strategically than when they are myopic. Third, when concealing quality information is an equilibrium, product prices are affected only by disclosure costs and independent of true product quality. Finally, the firm can benefit from consumers' strategic behavior and a higher disclosure cost, but greater patience might be detrimental to consumer surplus and social welfare.     

Who should practice price discrimination using rebates in an asymmetric duopoly?

Price discrimination is generally thought to improve firm profits by allowing firms to extract more consumer surplus. In competition, however, price discrimination may also be costly to the firm because restrictive incentive compatibility conditions may allow the competing firm to gain market share at the discriminating firm’s expense. Therefore, with asymmetric competition, it may be the case that one firm would let the other firm assume the burden of price discrimination. We investigate optimal segmentation in a market with two asymmetric firms and two heterogeneous consumer segments that differ in the importance of price and product attributes. In particular, we investigate second-degree price discrimination under competition with explicit incentive compatibility constraints thus extending prior work in marketing and economics. Focusing on the managerial implications, we explore whether it would be profitable for either or both firms to pursue a segmentation strategy using rebates as a mechanism. We identify conditions under which one or both firms would want to pursue such segmentation. We find that segmentation lessens competition for the less price-sensitive consumer segment and that this results in higher profits to both firms. A key to understanding this result is that segmentation leads to consumer remixing. We establish the key result that if firms are asymmetric in their attractiveness to consumers, the disadvantaged firm in our model is more likely to pursue a segmentation strategy than its rival in equilibrium. We then ask whether this result prevails in practice. To this end, we explore competitive segmentation empirically and are able to verify that disadvantaged firms indeed pursue segmentation through rebates with greater likelihood.     

Culture, product type, and price influences on consumer purchase intention to buy personalized products online

With personalization, consumers can choose from various product attributes and a customized product is assembled based on their preferences. Marketers often offer personalization on websites. This paper investigates consumer purchase intentions toward personalized products in an online selling situation.The research builds and tests three hypotheses: (1) intention to purchase personalized products will be affected by individualism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and masculinity dimensions of a national culture; (2) consumers will be more likely to buy personalized search products than experience products; and (3) intention to buy a personalized product will not be influenced by price premiums up to some level. Results indicate that individualism is the only culture dimension to have a significant effect on purchase intention. Product type and individualism by price interaction also have a significant effect, whereas price does not. Major findings and implications are discussed.     

Effects of personalized e-mail messages on privacy risk: Moderating roles of control and intimacy

New communication platforms have enabled firms to collect personal data on their consumers and provide more personalized services. Personalized service facilitates interpersonal communication and interactions based on consumers’ personal and preference information, and therefore constitutes a way to improve firm–customer relationships. However, such personalized services may be vulnerable to privacy issues. This study investigates the effects of personalized e-mail messages (an archetypal example of personalized service) on consumers’ risk perceptions and two moderating variables: consumers’ control and message intimacy. In three experiments, we show that an increase in the level of personalization in e-mail messages increases consumers’ privacy risk perceptions. However, giving consumers more control over their personal information and adding intimate cues to e-mail messages moderate the negative effects of personalized e-mail messages on their privacy risk perceptions. The study provides important implications for both academics and managers in developing and employing personalized service in new media communication.     

Permission Marketing and Privacy Concerns — Why Do Customers (Not) Grant Permissions?

Little is known about the influence of motivators that drive consumers to grant permission to be contacted via personalized communication. In this study, a framework is developed to investigate the effect of select drivers of consumers granting permission to receive personalized messages. The authors distinguish between drivers related to benefit and cost to the consumers. They identify the influence of perceived personal relevance, entertainment, and consumer information control as well as monetary incentives and lottery participation as benefit-related factors. Cost-related factors entail the registration process, privacy concerns, and perceived intrusiveness. The authors find that, except for monetary incentives and lottery participation, the identified drivers significantly influence consumers' decision to grant permission. The strong negative influence of privacy concerns on the probability of granting permission can be lessened by two benefit-related factors, namely message content with entertainment value or personal relevance for the consumer. The study helps to improve firm measures aimed at getting more permissions — granted by customers for interactive campaigns.     

The effect of product touch information and sale proneness on consumers' responses to price discounts

Since price discounts are costly and can negatively affect consumers' perceptions of quality, it is crucial to identify the factors that make them effective in stimulating purchase behavior. Drawing on cue utilization theory, we examine price discount effectiveness in affecting consumers' reliance on the sale cue based on the provided product touch information as an intrinsic cue and individual consumer differences in sale proneness. Two experimental studies indicate that price discount information, product touch information, and sale proneness interact to determine consumers' responses. Perceived quality is the underlying mechanism behind the observed effects. For nonsale-prone consumers, product touch information favorably influences responses to large price discounts by addressing product quality concerns and enhancing purchase confidence, but has no effect for regularly priced or low discounted products. For sale-prone consumers, product touch information is not effective in increasing their responses regardless of the discount size. A qualitative study provides support for these results and highlights the role of perceived quality and purchase confidence. The research contributes to behavioral pricing, cue utilization theory, and sensory marketing and suggests that marketing managers should provide consumers with product touch information when implementing high discounts for products for which prepurchase touch is important.     

The market value for product attribute improvements under price personalization

Personalization of the marketing mix is a topic of much interest to marketing academics and practitioners. Using discrete choice demand theory, we investigate the aggregate market value for product attribute improvements when firms are engaged in personalized pricing. Our results provide a theoretically grounded rule for how to aggregate consumer valuations to assess the overall profitability of attribute improvements under price personalization. Under common pricing, each consumer contributes the same margin. Profitability of an attribute improvement is thus driven by inducing more consumers to buy. Consumers with high choice probabilities are given less weight in the market valuation under common pricing as they are less responsive to attribute improvements. Under personalized pricing, profitability of an attribute improvement is driven by extraction of consumer surplus from high valuation consumers. Consumers with higher valuations, and consequently higher choice probabilities, are given more weight in the market valuation under personalized pricing. Since individual consumers play a more central role in the market valuation under personalized pricing, estimation of consumer-level valuations is of increased importance. Under common pricing, the market valuation for an attribute improvement is robust to extreme estimates of the consumer-level valuations. Through our theoretical and empirical analyses, we demonstrate that this robustness does not hold under personalized pricing.     

Duopoly Pricing Under ‘Private Knowledge’ of Product Differentiation

This note studies price decisions in a duopoly industry where firms have private information over the degree of product differentiation (product-type). A Bayesian-Nash price solution is derived assuming firms maximize their ??certainty-equivalent?? profit levels. The comparative-statics indicate that increased risk aversion over the rival??s product triggers price competition. Consequently, the results of the study suggest revealing information is a higher reward strategy than concealing information in situations where rivals have asymmetric information over product type. These findings contribute to the industrial economic literature by generalizing the Bertrand equilibrium in an asymmetric information game model.     

Consumer deliberation and quality signaling

Consumers are often uncertain about their product valuation before purchase. They may bear the uncertainty and purchase the product without deliberation. Alternatively, consumers can incur a deliberation cost to find out their true valuation and then make their purchase decision. This paper proposes that consumer deliberation about product valuation can be an endogenous mechanism to enable credible quality signaling. We demonstrate this point in a simple setup in which product quality influences the probability that the product has high valuation. We show that with endogenous deliberation there may exist a unique separating equilibrium in which the high-quality firm induces consumer deliberation by setting a high price whereas the low-quality firm prevents deliberation by charging a low price. Compared to the case of complete information, the price of the high-quality firm can be distorted upward to facilitate consumer deliberation, or distorted downward to avoid the low-quality firm’s imitation. In an extension we show that dissipative advertising can facilitate quality signaling. The high-quality firm can utilize advertising spending to avert imitation from the low-quality firm without distorting price downward, earning a higher profit than that without advertising. However, advertising mitigates the distortion at the expense of consumer surplus and social welfare.     

How does ad relevance affect consumers' attitudes toward personalized advertisements and social media platforms? The role of information co-ownership,vulnerability, and privacy cynicism

Consumers' responses to the use of their personal data for personalized advertising by platform providers are paradoxical. Drawing from psychological ownership theory and the collective information boundary, this study examines how the social relevance and personal relevance of ads impact consumers' attitudes toward advertisements and social media platforms. Basing on 350 responses, we confirm that perceptions of information co-ownership and feelings of vulnerability play a serial mediating role in the positive relationship between ad relevance and consumer attitudes. Specifically, ad relevance increases consumers' perceptions of social media platforms as co-owners of their personal information, which in turn reduces feelings of vulnerability and improves their attitudes toward personalized advertisements and social media platforms. Privacy cynicism negatively moderates the indirect effects of information co-ownership perceptions on two attitude variables mediated through feelings of vulnerability. Our research findings provide a new perspective on the personalization–privacy paradox and offer platform providers new insights into improving their personalized advertising performance and user–platform relationships.     

Strategic Implications of Keeping Product Value Secret from Competitor’s Customers

Customers can sometimes learn unanticipated or hidden use value of a firm’s product whereas the non-customers remain uninformed about that extra value. A monopolist will increase its profit by informing the non-customers of its product’s hidden value. However, our analysis reveals that this may not be true when the firm faces competition in the market—the firm may actually make a higher profit if it keeps its hidden value secret from its competitor’s customers even if advertising to inform those customers is costless. This is because no advertising leads to information heterogeneity among consumers about the existence of the firm’s hidden value, which gives an incentive for both firms to continue targeting their own existing customers rather than poaching each other’s customers, alleviating price competition and increasing firms’ profits. This beneficial strategic effect of keeping some product value secret from the competitor’s customers can persist even when the firms anticipate the hidden value and compete more aggressively for customers in the early period. Our research suggests that firms can benefit from an “under-promise and over-deliver” strategy if they refrain from communicating their extra value to the competitor’s customers. Moreover, positive word of mouth about a firm’s product will not necessarily benefit the firm and can in fact make all firms worse off.     

人工智能时代个性化定价行为的反垄断规制--从大数据杀熟展开

人工智能时代,数据规模显著扩张,算法能力持续优化。科技实力雄厚、市场力量强大的经营者凭借大数据与算法工具的紧密结合,收集和分析能够反映消费者特征和行为的相关信息,以无限接近消费者购买能力和支付意愿上限的方式对消费者实施个性化定价。个性化定价行为涉及对条件相同的交易相对人在交易价格上实施差别化待遇,可能构成反垄断法所禁止的价格歧视行为。但与以往反垄断实施重点关注的排他性价格歧视不同,个性化定价突出表现为直接针对终端消费者实施的剥削性价格歧视,且在具体情形下呈现出不同的限制竞争效果,引发消费者选择能力与选择范围的双重限制。鉴于此,个性化定价行为的反垄断规制需要准确识别涉案行为,综合判断竞争效果,慎重选择福利标准。对于同时降低消费者剩余和社会总福利的个性化定价行为,可认定其具有限制竞争效果且不具备正当理由,从而构成违法价格歧视;对于降低消费者剩余却提高社会总福利的个性化定价行为,如果选择消费者福利标准则可认定其构成违法价格歧视,如果选择社会总福利标准则可认定其具备正当理由;对于同时提高消费者剩余与社会总福利的个性化定价行为,因涉及消费者之间的剩余转移,对其竞争效果的评价仍待反垄断实施予以明确。     

Consumer attitudes and loyalty towards private brands

Private or store brands improve the efficiency of consumer decision making by offering equivalent quality products at lower prices. The present study evaluated consumer attitudes towards private brands with the goal of understanding their appeal in order to enhance efforts to convince more consumers to buy them. We used three samples (ns = 279, 245 and 305) of US consumers to compare attitudes of buyers of private and national brands in three product categories: orange juice, cereal and bottled water. The results show that private label buyers (23% of orange juice, 6.5% of cereal and 14% of bottled water buyers) consider brands themselves to be less important and private brands to offer better performance than do national brand buyers. When asked about specific brands, national brand buyers tended to be price insensitive towards national brands, and private label buyers price insensitive towards store brands. In addition, the national brand buyers saw some of the national brands to be more relevant to their lifestyles and needs, but the private label buyers saw the private labels the same way. Being relevant to consumers' lives appears to influence brand selection. Besides touting lower prices, private brand promotions might stress the equivalent performance of private labels and create promotions showing how these brands can be relevant to consumers' lifestyles and needs.     

Attributional influences on consumers' desires to communicate about products

Three studies examined attributional antecedents of selected consumer communications about products. Study One used the critical incident technique to examine the types of attributions consumers make about product performance when they want to complain to or compliment a firm. Studies Two and Three systematically manipulated causal inferences to determine their effects on consumer desire to complain to a firm, compliment a firm, warn against, or recommend a product to other consumers. Results indicate that attributional locus (buyer-related versus seller-related), controllability (under volitional control versus uncontrolled), and stability (fluctuating versus stable) influence consumers' desires to communicate about products.     

Would You Like to be a Prosumer? Information Revelation,Personalization and Price Discrimination in Electronic Markets

Electronic commerce and flexible manufacturing allow personalization of initially standardized products at low cost. Will customers provide the information necessary for personalization? Assuming that a consumer can control the amount of information revealed, we analyze how her decision interacts with the pricing strategy of a monopolist who may abuse the information to obtain a larger share of total surplus. We consider two scenarios, one where consumers have different tastes but identical willingness to pay and another with high and low valuation customers. In both cases full revelation may only result if the monopolist can commit to a maximum price before consumers decide about disclosure.     

Illusion of safety: How consumers underestimate manipulation and deception in online (vs. offline) shopping contexts

Online commerce changes how consumers shop for products and services—while also giving firms more control over consumers' shopping experience, more access to their information, and leading more firms to use these platforms to their financial advantage. In this research, I examine consumer perceptions of firms when they shop for products and services online (vs. offline), to determine whether consumers feel firms might use certain kinds of manipulative and deceptive tactics against consumers. Results show consumers believe firms are less likely to use manipulative and deceptive practices to increase consumer spending, when they shop online (vs. offline) for products and services. These findings remain consistent despite key individual differences (in ethnicity, gender, age, and time spent online). This research also demonstrates how certain cues can make consumers more (vs. less) suspicious of firms when they shop online and discusses the implications these findings have for consumer financial welfare.     

The effect of exogenous product familiarity on endogenous consumer search

When a consumer is familiar with one product but not its competitor, she is faced with a decision: either buy what she knows, or engage in search to learn more. When search is costly, competing firms may attempt to encourage or discourage search by adjusting prices. In this paper we consider how competitive dynamics between two quality differentiated firms are affected if one product enjoys a familiarity advantage. Familiarity is defined as a consumer’s ex-ante knowledge of fit for a particular product. An increase in the level of familiarity for one product allows a firm to charge higher prices since there are more consumers with information on that product relative to the competition. We call this the direct effect of familiarity. However, an increase in familiarity also has an indirect effect, since it gives the rival firm a stronger incentive to decrease price in order to encourage searching, in turn increasing overall competition. The effect of familiarity on profits depends on the magnitudes of these effects, and it is moderated by the level of quality differentiation between products. For very high or very low levels of differentiation, the results are relatively straightforward. However, when the level of differentiation is moderate, the results are more nuanced, with the higher-quality firm realizing higher profits from more familiarity, even if it must lower prices due to the indirect effect. We also find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, overall competition may be higher when firms are more quality differentiated. This is driven by the fact that higher quality differences bolster the indirect effect, with a lower quality firm providing deeper price cuts to counter increased familiarity of a high quality rival. We conclude by examining how changes in the cost of searching impact equilibrium outcomes.

     

A study on promotion with strategic two-stage customized bundling

In order to enhance both purchase willingness and consumer satisfaction, firms may sell products in a customized bundling way, with which consumers are allowed to select their preferred products to form a bundle. However, such a way needs to be carried out with an efficient strategic tool. This study contributes to the literature by proposing a two-stage customized bundling strategy with the aims of maximizing the firm's profit and satisfying the consumers' demands. The proposed strategy may assist managers in enhancing consumer satisfaction and loyalty under consideration of consumer heterogeneity. Consumers can select one main product with the greatest utility from the main product category at the first stage, and then, at the second, consider the associations between the chosen main and possible add-on products in the add-on product category, and finally select an add-on product to form a customized bundle with the greatest overall utility. Pricing strategies are investigated and compared for the customized and other traditional bundling strategies. The results show that when consumers are highly sensitive in their preferences, the use of a customized bundling strategy would be more profitable. However, in an extreme case when the consumer's perceived value of the add-on product and product association are both high, the traditional individual sales strategy would earn more profits than the customized bundling strategy.     

Increasing Price Transparency: Implications of Consumer Price Posting for Consumers' Haggling Behavior and a Seller's Pricing Strategies

In an attempt to gain a better position in haggling, consumers often seek a seller's pricing information (e.g., whether the posted price is negotiable, the discount and transaction prices) before going to that seller. Although traditionally difficult to obtain, such information is becoming increasingly available due to consumer price posting (CPP), whereby consumers post and share their purchase price information on the Internet. In this analytical study, we consider a market in which a seller, who chooses between a fixed price policy and a haggling policy, serves two types of consumers who differ in their willingness to pay and haggling costs. We explore how CPP can affect consumers' behavior and the seller's pricing strategies (i.e., pricing policy and the associated prices). In the absence of CPP, our model features a two-sided uncertainty: the seller does not know individual consumer's type and thus may find it optimal to use a haggling policy to price discriminate consumers, whereas consumers do not readily observe the seller's cost type and pricing policy, and thus are uncertain whether their haggling will be fruitful. In the presence of CPP, consumers' uncertainty about the seller's pricing policy is resolved. Because CPP can improve price transparency, inhibit consumers' acceptance of a posted price and spur price haggling, it seems apparent that it should benefit consumers and hurt the seller. However, our analysis shows that CPP can lead to fewer purchases, higher prices and even a greater seller profit. It further shows that although CPP surely increases information accessibility, it can also reduce the amount of information available to consumers. These results are in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom in the literature.     

Whose Algorithm Says So: The Relationships Between Type of Firm,Perceptions of Trust and Expertise,and the Acceptance of Financial Robo-Advice

Financial advisors seek to accurately measure individuals' risk preferences and provide sound personalized investment advice. Both advice tasks are increasingly offered through automated online technologies. Little is known, however, about what drives individuals' acceptance of such automated financial advice and, from a consumer point of view, which firms may be best positioned to provide such advice.We generate novel insights on these questions by conducting a real-world empirical study using an interactive automated online tool that employs an innovative computer algorithm to build pension investment profiles, the “Pension Builder,” and a large, representative sample.We focus on the role that two key firm characteristics have on consumer acceptance of pension investment advice generated by computer algorithms running on automated interactive online tools: profit orientation and role in the sales channel.We find that consumers' perceptions of trust and expertise of the firm providing the automated advice are important drivers of advice acceptance (besides a strong impact of the satisfaction with the consumer–online tool interaction), and that these constructs themselves are clearly influenced by the for-profit vs. not-for-profit orientation and the product provider vs. advisor only role in the sales channel of the firm providing the advice.We discuss the implications of our findings for marketers and policy makers and provide suggestions for future research.