Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle

This paper examines the proposition that fluctuations in discounts of closed-end funds are driven by changes in individual investor sentiment. The theory implies that discounts on various funds move together, that new funds get started when seasoned funds sell at a premium or a small discount, and that discounts are correlated with prices of other securities affected by the same investor sentiment. The evidence supports these predictions. In particular, we find that both closed-end funds and small stocks tend to be held by individual investors, and that the discounts on closed-end funds narrow when small stocks do well.     

EXPLAINING PREMIUMS AND DISCOUNTS ON CLOSED-END EQUALITY COUNTRY FUNDS

Over the past decade or so, the surge of interest among U.S. investors in international investing has led to the creation of numerous foreign equity country funds. Like U.S. closed-end mutual funds, the prices of such closed-end country funds fluctuate widely in relation to their underlying net asset values (NAVs).
In this paper, the authors summarize the major findings of their recent study of the performance of 28 country funds relative to their NAVs over the period 1978–1995. While 20 of the 28 funds traded at average discounts to their net asset values, the discounts for the country funds were smaller than those of the average U.S. fund, and over a quarter of the funds sold at premiums.
In an attempt to explain such premiums or discounts, the authors examined primarily three factors: (1) the sensitivity of country-fund returns (relative to that of local market indices) to U.S. returns; (2) the possible effects of local government investment restrictions; and (3) the impact of exchange rate changes. Although most of the eight funds that traded at average premiums represented countries with significant restrictions on capital flows and foreign ownership, there were also a number of funds with similar restrictions trading at significant discounts. In exploring the reasons for such discounts, the authors noted that the returns to the country funds were "surprisingly sensitive" to U.S. market conditions, thus reducing the extent of their diversification benefits for U.S. investors. The article also raises the possibility that if such country funds are not "priced at the margin" by globally diversified investors, U.S investors' "country-risk sentiments" could cause such funds to trade at discounts.     

Noise-trading, costly arbitrage, and asset prices: Evidence from US closed-end funds

The behavior of US closed-end funds is very different from that of UK funds. There is no evidence that the US funds' discounts are constrained by arbitrage barriers, no evidence that higher expenses increase discounts and no evidence that replication risk increases discounts but strong evidence that noise-trader risk is priced. The differences between US and UK funds may be due to the fact that small investors dominate US funds while institutional investors dominate UK funds, or because the sample selection method for the UK funds chooses only funds that are relatively easy to arbitrage.     

PRICE PRESSURE AND THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN CLOSED-END FUNDS

A trader-identified transactions database is employed to investigate: (1) the relation between order-flow imbalance and closed-end fund share prices and discounts; and (2) the role of institutional investors in closed-end funds. Empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that buyers (sellers) of closed-end funds face upward-downward-) sloping supply (demand) curves. The results also demonstrate that ownership statistics do not accurately reflect institutional investors' importance in the closed-end fund market. The results fail to provide evidence that institutional investors offset the positions of individual investors or that institutional investors face systematic “noise trader risk.”     

INVESTOR TAX-TRADING OPPORTUNITIES AND DISCOUNTS ON CLOSED-END MUTUAL FUNDS

Discounts on closed-end mutual funds are a puzzle to financial economists, because arbitrage activities should eliminate discounts in a perfect capital market. In this paper I develop a model that explains discounts, using Merton's option pricing theorem. By holding shares of a closed-end mutual fund, investors lose valuable tax-trading opportunities associated with the constituent securities of the closed-end mutual fund's portfolio. However, investors can take advantage of all tax-trading opportunities by directly holding the closed-end mutual fund's portfolio. I also show that both variances of individual securities and correlations among securities in the portfolio are important factors in determining the magnitude of discounts.     

Dividend policy,signaling, and discounts on closed-end funds

We test the predictions of dividend signaling models using closed-end equity funds that adopt explicit policies committing them to pay minimum dividend yields. These policies represent deliberate attempts to reduce share price undervaluation relative to NAV. Funds that adopt minimum dividend policies experience reductions in their share price discounts, trade at smaller discounts than other funds, earn greater excess returns following policy adoption, and their managers survive longer than other managers do. The results are broadly consistent with the predictions of dividend signaling models, and suggest that high quality closed-end funds can reduce undervaluation via dividend policy.     

CLO trading and collateral manager bank affiliation

This paper investigates whether the institutional affiliation of a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) manager influences the manager's access to information and risk appetite. We find that CLO managers affiliated with banks start to sell off their positions in loans arranged by their bank well before the onset of default. In contrast, CLO managers affiliated with nonbanks do not lower their exposures to distressed loans. These findings are consistent with bank-affiliated CLO managers being more risk averse, but they could also derive from them having access to valuable information. On close inspection, we find that although bank-affiliated CLO managers are averse to holding any distressed loans, they are also more aggressive at divesting distressed loans arranged by their parent bank, suggesting that they benefit from an information wedge. Besides helping us understand CLO managers’ trading activities, our findings highlight a potential limit to banks’ ability to originate loans and distribute them via their affiliated CLOs.     

Bank affiliation and mutual funds’ trading strategy distinctiveness

This study investigates the effect of commercial bank affiliation on mutual fund trading strategy distinctiveness. We find that bank affiliation has a significantly positive relationship with mutual funds’ unique investment strategies, and this phenomenon exhibits better performance, supporting the benefits of bank affiliation. This association is most pronounced around macroeconomic releases, during high economic policy uncertainty periods, and among funds located within a close distance from their parent bank headquarters. Further analysis indicates that the more talented affiliated fund managers tend to pursue the distinctive strategy. Therefore, our evidence reveals that the underlying mechanisms are that affiliated funds own information advantages or hire more skilled fund managers due to the unique position of commercial banks in the economy. Finally, our results suggest that affiliated funds with a higher Strategy Distinctiveness Index attract stronger net inflows and are less exposed to risks. Our findings remain unchanged after several robustness tests.     

Do investment banks listen to their own analysts?

To what extent conflicts of interest affect the investment value of sell-side analyst research is an ongoing debate. We approach this issue from a new direction by investigating how asset-management divisions of investment banks use stock recommendations issued by their own analysts. Based on holdings changes around initiations, upgrades, and downgrades from 1993 to 2003, we find that these bank-affiliated investors follow recommendations from sell-side analysts in general, increasing (decreasing) their relative holdings following positive (negative) recommendations. More importantly, these investors respond more strongly to recommendations issued by their own analysts than to those issued by analysts affiliated with other banks, especially for recommendations on small and low-analyst-coverage firms. Thus, we find that investment banks “eat their own cooking,” showing that these presumably sophisticated institutional investors view sell-side recommendations as having investment value, particularly when the recommendations come from their own analysts.     

Information,sophistication, and foreign versus domestic investors’ performance

Using an intraday transaction dataset with trader identity, we study foreign and domestic investors’ trading activities and investment performance ahead of open-ending events of Taiwanese closed-end funds. Simply buying the funds at a discount and holding until open-ending generates large abnormal returns. All information required to execute this strategy is made public, so the events set up natural experiments to examine how investors trade, holding constant access to information. Foreign investors are net buyers ahead of the open-endings, more than doubling their positions and earning large abnormal returns. Domestic investors are net sellers while the discounts are still large, and forego large abnormal returns. The results suggest that investor sophistication in interpreting the same information is potentially an important determinant of investment performance differences across foreign and domestic investors.     

Do the equity holding and soundness of bank underwriters affect issue costs of SEOs?

This paper examines the effects of characteristics of bank underwriters on issue costs in seasoned equity offerings in Japan following deregulation in 1999. I find that banks’ holding loans have a negative effect on price discounts and no effect on underwriting fees. However, banks’ equity holdings have no effect on discount rates and a positive effect on underwriting fees. Furthermore, issuers with unhealthy banks pay higher discount rates, are more likely to be weak in their ex-post operating performance, and are less willing to switch underwriters. I conclude that the characteristics of banks have different effects on issue costs.     

Large market shocks and abnormal closed-end-fund price behaviour

This paper investigates the short-term price behaviour of closed-end funds following eight large market-wide shocks. The findings, from a sample of 63 funds continuously traded on the London Stock Exchange, indicate that prices overreact relative to equilibrium given by net asset values. The speed of reversion in discounts following market-wide shocks is slower than that following fund-specific shocks of a similar magnitude. The post-shock persistence in discounts is related more to the ease of arbitrage rather than to liquidity, as proxied by fund size, or to the speed of recovery in the broader market. The discount decays more slowly for those funds that are difficult to arbitrage.     

THE PERFORMANCE OF BANK‐MANAGED MUTUAL FUNDS

The ability of banks to offer proprietary mutual funds has expanded over recent years, and the mutual fund industry has been a significant growth area for banks. I examine the growth and performance of bank proprietary bond mutual funds. The empirical results show no evidence that bank‐managed mutual funds underperform nonbank funds. I find some evidence that bank managers are more conservative than nonbank managers in terms of investment strategy and that banks appear more likely to target individual rather than institutional investors. Also, I find that abnormal fund performance does not appear to be a significant determinant of the net asset flows into and out of bank‐managed mutual funds. Rather, the results suggest bank investors rely mainly on past marketing information and the general reputation of the bank. JEL classification: G11, G21     

A model of a systemic bank run

This paper provides a model of the view that the 2008 financial crisis is reminiscent of a bank run, focussing on six stylized key features. In particular, core financial institutions have invested their funds in asset-backed securities rather than committed to long-term projects: in distress, these can potentially be sold to a large pool of outside investors at steep discounts. I consider two different motives for outside investors and their interaction with banks trading asset-backed securities: uncertainty aversion versus adverse selection. I shall argue that the version with uncertainty averse investors is more consistent with the stylized facts than the adverse selection perspective: in the former, the crisis deepens, the larger the market share of distressed core banks, while a run becomes less likely instead as a result in the adverse selection version. Therefore, the outright purchase of troubled assets by the government at prices above current market prices may both alleviate the financial crises as well as provide tax payers with returns above those for safe securities.     

The information content of closed-end country fund discounts

This paper examines whether premiums and discounts on closed-end country mutual funds (CECFs) contain useful information about future returns. We find that higher CECF premiums are associated both with higher future returns on the relevant foreign market index and with higher future NAV returns after controlling for the foreign market return. CECFs trading at large discounts are not necessarily bargains, because their future NAV performance can be expected to be relatively poor.     

Market Discipline of Banks: The Asset Test

As the banking business grows more complex, government supervisors of banks seem increasingly willing to share the role of policing bank risk with private investors, especially bondholders. Using spreads on nearly 500 bank bond issues between 1993 and 1998, this paper investigates the relationship between the spreads on those bonds and the full portfolio of assets held by the issuing bank. Our results show that bond spreads reflect the overall mix of banks' assets at the time of issuance, even after controlling for the standard measures of risk and performance used in earlier studies. Banks contemplating a shift into riskier activities like trading, for example, can expect to pay higher spreads as a result. Credit card and commercial and industrial lending also carry a penalty in terms of higher spreads. Overall, these results suggest that investors do price the ex ante credit and other risks implicit in banks' asset portfolios. Their vigilance should help to deter excessive or inefficient risk taking by banks.     

Commercial banks in investment banking conflict of interest or certification role?

When commercial banks make loans to firms and also underwrite securities, does this hamper or enhance their role as certifiers of firm value? This paper examines empirically the pricing of bank-underwritten securities as compared to investment-house-underwritten securities over a unique period in the U.S. (pre-Glass-Steagall) when both banks and investment houses were allowed to underwrite securities. The evidence shows that investors were willing to pay higher prices for securities underwritten by banks rather than investment houses. The results support a certification role for banks, which is more valuable for junior and information sensitive securities.     

Does Sentiment Explain Closed-end Fund Discounts? Evidence from Bond Funds

This paper documents that discounts and premia on closed-end bond funds exhibit the same sensitivity to broad market returns as stock fund discounts. Despite this, stock funds sell on average at discounts from net asset value while bond funds sell at small premia. This pattern calls into question the conclusion that the average level of the discount rate can be rationalized by appealing to the systematic nature of discount risk. These results indicate that appeals to investor sentiment, which have been hypothesized as a source of fund discounts, do not fully resolve the puzzle of closed-end fund discounts.     

Surety bonds and moral hazard in banking

We examine a policy in which owners of banks provide funds in the form of a surety bond in addition to equity capital. This policy would require banks to provide the regulator with funds that could be invested in marketable securities. Investors in the bank receive the income from the surety bond as long as the bank is in business. The capital value could be used by bank regulators to pay off the banks’ liabilities in case of bank failure. After paying depositors, investors would receive the remaining funds, if any. Analytically, this instrument is a way of creating charter value but, as opposed to Keeley (1990) and Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000), restrictions on competition are not necessary to generate positive rents. We demonstrate that capital requirements alone cannot prevent the moral hazard problem arising from deposit insurance.