Banking with nominal deposits and inside money

Bank runs in the literature take the form of withdrawals of demand deposits payable in real goods, which deplete a fixed reserve of goods in the banking system. That framework describes traditional bank runs based on currency withdrawals as occurred historically in the US and more recently in developing countries. However, in a modern banking system, large withdrawals typically take the form of electronic payments of inside money, with no analog of a depletion of a scarce reserve from the banking system. In a new framework of nominal demand deposits repayable in inside money, pure liquidity-driven bank runs do not occur. If there were excessive early withdrawals, nominal deposits would hedge the bank and flexible monetary prices in the goods market would limit real consumption. The maturity mismatch of short term liabilities and long term assets is not sufficient for multiple equilibria bank runs without other frictions. A key role of the bank is to ensure optimal real liquidity, which allows markets to optimally distribute consumption goods through the price mechanism.     

Liquidity and transparency in bank risk management

Banks may be unable to refinance short-term liabilities in case of solvency concerns. To manage this risk, banks can accumulate a buffer of liquid assets, or strengthen transparency to communicate solvency. While a liquidity buffer provides complete insurance against small shocks, transparency covers also large shocks but imperfectly. Due to leverage, an unregulated bank may choose insufficient liquidity buffers and transparency. The regulatory response is constrained: while liquidity buffers can be imposed, transparency is not verifiable. Moreover, liquidity requirements can compromise banks’ transparency choices, and increase refinancing risk. To be effective, liquidity requirements should be complemented by measures that increase bank incentives to adopt transparency.     

流动性幻觉与高杠杆率之谜

本文研究信用货币体系下流动性不足导致的过度投资和高杠杆率问题。文章将货币引入到消费者与银行互动的三期经济框架中,构建信用货币体系下的偏好冲击与流动性冲击模型,阐明消费者的购买力、经济投资效率和杠杆率都在一定程度上取决于流动性背后的价值支撑,而非仅由流动性的名义数量决定。本文指出,流动性的价值支撑主要体现为央行储备资产和政府财政收入,其水平决定了经济体系内短期消费的支付能力,流动性的价值支撑不足会导致过度投资和高杠杆率。进一步基于中国数据的实证分析验证了理论模型的主要结论。本文研究结果提示,在经济双循环体系下,货币政策与财政政策的协调配合尤为重要,维持央行储备资产规模并保持合理税率水平可以缓解流动性的价值支撑不足和高杠杆率问题。     

结售汇如何影响银行风险承担水平?——基于银行资产负债表的视角

本文构建了一个基于银行资产负债表的理论模型,研究了结售汇对银行风险承担水平的影响机制,并采用结售汇报表数据进行实证检验。结果表明,为实现利润最大化,银行会将外汇流入创造的流动性用于投放较高风险的贷款,导致净结汇对银行风险承担水平有正向影响,异质性分析结果显示大型银行受影响程度高于中小银行。本文结论意味着,当考虑结售汇波动可能进一步加剧时,有必要出台更多结构性政策,补足外汇流入减少带来的货币缺口,优化存款市场结构,稳定金融机构流动性预期,以缓冲外需冲击可能带来的影响,并激励银行服务重心进一步下沉,为小微企业提供更多信贷支持,完成好金融服务实体经济的重要使命。     

Bank-to-bank lending channel and the transmission of bank liquidity shocks: Evidence from France

Good liquidity is essential for the banking system to function properly and supply credit to the real sector. However, several banks all over the world face large shocks to their liquidity supply due to numerous factors. This study contributes to the literature on the transmission of liquidity shocks by investigating the bank-to-bank lending behavior of French banks during the global financial crisis (2008 and 2009). In addition, we examine the factors strongly influencing the liquidity of the interbank deposits market. First, using a fixed-effects model on a sample of 85 French banks for the period from 2005 to 2010, we find that the deposits channel plays an important role in the transmission of liquidity shocks across the banking system. Second, we use difference-in-difference methodology to study the effects of liquidity shock on bank lending. Our results show that French banks reduced their bank-to-bank lending significantly during the financial crisis period. Moreover, our results suggest that the reduction could have been due to deposit activities.     

Does lending relationship help or alleviate the transmission of liquidity shocks? Evidence from a liquidity crunch in China

We examine China’s June 2013 liquidity crunch as a negative shock to banks and analyze the wealth effects on exchange-listed firms. Our findings suggest that liquidity shocks to financial institutions negatively impact borrower performance, particularly borrowers reporting outstanding loans at the end of 2012. Stock valuations of firms with long-term bank relationships, however, outperform the market and experience smaller subsequent declines in investment than peers lacking solid banking relationships. This effect is the strongest for firms that enjoy good relations with China’s large state-owned banks or foreign banks, and weakest for firms whose connections are solely with local banks. We document a positive correlation between the stock performances of firms and the stock performances of lender banks and the likelihood of lender banks operating as net lenders in the interbank market. These results suggest that banks transmit liquidity shocks to their borrowing firms and that a long-term bank-firm relationship may mitigate the negative effects of a liquidity shock.     

Interbank market liquidity and central bank intervention

We develop a simple model of the interbank market where banks trade a long term, safe asset. When there is a lack of opportunities for banks to hedge idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks, the interbank market is characterized by excessive price volatility. In such a situation, a central bank can implement the constrained efficient allocation by using open market operations to fix the short term interest rate. It can be constrained efficient for banks to hoard liquidity and stop trading with each other if there is sufficient uncertainty about aggregate liquidity demand compared to idiosyncratic liquidity demand.     

耐用品、投资专有冲击与货币政策福利

本文构建蕴含耐用品与非耐用品的两部门DSGE模型,研究投资专有冲击对货币政策及社会福利的影响。投资专有技术进步改进了投资转化为生产资本的效率,放大边际成本波动,增加了厂商调价动机和价格水平变动。即使耐用品价格完全灵活,最优货币政策也无法同时稳定价格和实际GDP。研究发现:(1)耐用品相对价格缺口波动率的上升虽然增加了实际GDP波动,但能够有效地降低投资专有技术对边际成本的冲击,减少价格变动的福利损失。所以两部门投资专有冲击时,央行倾向于稳定价格水平。与其相反,在单部门投资专有冲击和两部门生产技术冲击时,最优货币政策应降低耐用品相对价格缺口波动,稳定实际GDP。(2)对比三种泰勒规则:钉住非耐用品PPI、钉住加权平均PPI及钉住CPI,福利分析发现钉住非耐用品PPI最优,钉住CPI次之,钉住加权平均PPI的福利损失最大。就损失程度而言,投资专有冲击的福利损失是生产技术冲击的2倍,表明投资专有冲击加剧了最优货币政策在稳定价格与实际GDP间的权衡。     

Banks’ intraday liquidity management during operational outages: Theory and evidence from the UK payment system

We investigate how settlement banks in the United Kingdom’s large-value payment system deal with intraday liquidity and operational risk. In particular, we are interested in payments behaviour towards a bank that is, for operational reasons, unable to make but able to receive payments. If other banks did not sufficiently monitor their outgoing payments, these operational shocks could impact the entire payment system because the affected bank could absorb liquidity from the system. Our game-theoretic model predicts that only early in the day, when they are uncertain about the payment instructions they might have to execute, banks stop sending payments to a counterparty which is unable to make payments. Using a non-parametric method, we find that this prediction is supported by the data, implying that banks effectively contain the disruption caused by the operational outage: payment flows between healthy banks remain unaffected.     

Optimal liquidity management and bail-out policy in the banking industry

We characterize the profit-maximizing reserves of a commercial bank, and the generated probability of a liquidity crisis, as a function of the penalty imposed by the Central Bank, the probability of depositors' liquidity needs, and the return on outside investment opportunities. We demonstrate that banks do not fully internalize the social cost associated with the bail-out policy if the liquidity needs of individuals are correlated, and that competitive interbank markets will induce banks to raise their reserves under reasonable conditions. The marginal benefits from an interbank market decrease as the correlation between the liquidity shocks of banks increases.     

ESG投资能够促进银行创造流动性吗?——兼论经济政策不确定性的调节效应

当前在我国致力于实现“碳达峰、碳中和”目标的大背景下,银行能否通过ESG投资促进流动性创造,进而推动高质量发展具有重大战略意义。本文利用2009年第一季度至2020年第二季度中国36家上市银行的面板数据,实证分析ESG投资对银行流动性创造的影响,并将其置于经济政策不确定性条件下予以讨论。研究发现:第一,ESG投资整体上促进流动性创造,表现为对资产端和负债端流动性创造的促进作用,以及对表外流动性创造的抑制作用。从ESG投资结构看,环境保护投资和社会责任投资均抑制流动性创造,而公司治理投资则促进流动性创造。异质性分析表明,地方性银行和资本短缺银行的ESG投资对流动性创造具有更强的促进作用。第二,中介机制分析发现,ESG投资主要通过“盈利”和“风险”渠道促进流动性创造。第三,在经济政策不确定性上升时期,ESG投资对流动性创造的促进作用更加显著。从ESG投资分项看,经济政策不确定性会增强环境保护投资和社会责任投资对流动性创造的抑制作用,以及公司治理投资对流动性创造的促进作用。本文结论为充分发挥ESG投资作用并以此推动高质量发展提供了政策启示。     

English commercial bank liquidity, 1860-1913

This article presents new half-yearly time series for the asset ratios of commercial banks in England and Wales, 1860-1913. The series reveal new evidence on the nature of the banks' business and are, therefore, relevant to the debate on the role of banks in British economic development. The new estimates are used to examine trends and short-term changes in bank liquidity. Analysis is concerned with the changing stability of bank asset structure and with substitutability across different asset ratios. The main finding is of a sharp, long-term increase in liquidity and a concomitant decline in bank credit to the non-bank, private sector. The article also highlights the significance of short-term shocks to the trend increase in bank liquidity. The new findings are supportive of the argument that, over time, English banks became less involved with the non-bank private sector. In general, the results confirm that the English and Welsh bank asset structure became more liquid over time. However, no detailed breakdown of bank loans to the non-bank, private sector (for example, between business loans and personal loans), is available for this period. Moreover, the current study offers no evidence as to the trend in financial provision to the business sector from institutions other than the commercial banks. Nevertheless, the results are clear in showing a strong upward trend in commercial bank liquidity and a relative decline in private sector credit provision by the commercial banks.     

Systemic liquidity shortages and interbank network structures

This paper aims to shed light on the systemic nature of liquidity risk and to propose a method for calculating systemic liquidity shortages. Our method incorporates not only direct liquidity shortages but also indirect liquidity shortages due to the knock-on effects through interbank linkages. We perform a simulation with a simple banking system model and find that a deficit bank can mitigate a liquidity shortage by holding more claims on a surplus bank. Meanwhile, a greater imbalance in liquidity positions across banks tends to aggravate the liquidity shortage of a deficit bank. According to comparative analysis between different types of network structures, a core-periphery network with a deficit money center bank gives rise to the highest level of systemic liquidity shortage, and a banking system becomes more vulnerable to liquidity shocks as its interbank network becomes more ill-matched.     

Federal Home Loan Bank Advances and Commercial Bank Portfolio Composition

Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) advances are a source of government‐sponsored liquidity intended to encourage housing finance, although “community financial institutions” may use such funds more generally. Because money is fungible, it is an empirical question as to how advances are actually employed. Using panel‐vector autoregression techniques, we estimate dynamic responses of U.S. commercial bank portfolios to: FHLB advance shocks, bank lending shocks, and macroeconomic shocks. We find that FHLB advances: (i) are used as a general source of liquidity by U.S. commercial banks of all sizes and (ii) dampen the sensitivity of mortgage lending to macroeconomic shocks at small banks.     

Bank Mergers, Competition, and Liquidity

We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings, and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost efficiencies and more precise estimates of liquidity needs. The merged banks may increase their reserve holdings through an internalization effect or decrease them because of a diversification effect. The merger also affects loan market competition, which in turn modifies the distribution of bank sizes and aggregate liquidity needs. Mergers among large banks tend to increase aggregate liquidity needs and thus the public provision of liquidity through monetary operations of the central bank.     

流动性、银行间市场摩擦与借贷便利类货币政策工具

通过内生引入流动性短缺银行(拆入行)对流动性盈余银行(拆出行)的流动性需求机制,本文构建了一个包含银行间市场的DSGE模型,对借贷便利类货币政策工具的传导机制和传导效果进行了理论和实证研究。研究表明:(1)负向冲击会同时增加拆入行和拆出行对流动性的预防性需求,在经济形势不确定的情形下,拆出行不会很快恢复对拆入行的流动性供给,引起银行间市场流动性缺口放大和市场失灵。(2)由于仅依赖银行间市场自发回归稳态的过程太过缓慢,需要央行进行流动性干预。借贷便利类工具可以通过引导贷款市场定价和流动性效应这两个渠道来影响银行融资可得性,进而降低银行间市场流动性风险对宏观经济的负面影响。(3)借贷便利类货币政策工具的影响效果边际递减,央行可根据借贷便利操作的收益和成本,制定最佳的反应程度参数。     

The Regulation of Private Money*

Financial crises are bank runs. At root, the problem is short-term debt (private money), which while an essential feature of market economies, is inherently vulnerable to runs in all its forms (not just demand deposits). Bank regulation aims at preventing bank runs. History shows two approaches to bank regulation: the use of high-quality collateral to back banks’ short-term debt and government insurance for the short-term debt. Also, explicit or implicit limitations on entry into banking can create charter value (an intangible asset) that is lost if the bank fails. This can create an incentive for the bank to abide by the regulations and not take too much risk.     

Deposit insurance, bank regulation, and financial system risks

Empirical evidence is presented to show that in modern times banks can hedge liquidity shocks but could not do so prior to FDIC insurance. However, the government's limitations in properly pricing FDIC insurance are leading to many current examples of moral hazard. A model is presented to show that if insurance premiums are set to be “actuarially fair,” incentives for banks to take excessive systematic risks remain. Motivated by empirical evidence that money market mutual funds also can hedge liquidity shocks, I consider an alternative government insurance system that mitigates distortions to risk-taking yet preserves liquidity hedging and information synergies.     

市场模式、政府模式与城商行流动性风险化解—一个三期博弈的分析框架

分析城商行流动性风险化解中的政府手段和市场机制,对于下一步规范城商行营商环境、化解流动性风险具有参考意义。本文首先通过银行间的博弈模型,发现政府持股比例越高会增加城商行同业负债比例,进而提高流动性风险发生的可能性;当经济处于下行周期时,全社会资金需求不足,大型银行资金投放的机会成本降低,有利于城商行获得同业负债,但却进一步积累了流动性风险。其次,通过系统GMM对2011—2018年80家城商行的非平衡面板数据进行分析,实证结果验证了理论假说。最后,结合理论与实证分析,进一步提出政府行为边界,破除隐性担保,建立城商行资金内部定价机制以及完善城商行监管体系等方面的政策建议。     

流动性、银行间市场摩擦与借贷便利类货币政策工具

通过内生引入流动性短缺银行(拆入行)对流动性盈余银行(拆出行)的流动性需求机制,本文构建了一个包含银行间市场的DSGE模型,对借贷便利类货币政策工具的传导机制和传导效果进行了理论和实证研究。研究表明:(1)负向冲击会同时增加拆入行和拆出行对流动性的预防性需求,在经济形势不确定的情形下,拆出行不会很快恢复对拆入行的流动性供给,引起银行间市场流动性缺口放大和市场失灵。(2)由于仅依赖银行间市场自发回归稳态的过程太过缓慢,需要央行进行流动性干预。借贷便利类工具可以通过引导贷款市场定价和流动性效应这两个渠道来影响银行融资可得性,进而降低银行间市场流动性风险对宏观经济的负面影响。(3)借贷便利类货币政策工具的影响效果边际递减,央行可根据借贷便利操作的收益和成本,制定最佳的反应程度参数。